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Abstract 
LEADERS, IDEAS, NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND ECONOMIC STRATEGIES: 
EXPLAINING THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION DECISIONS OF MEXICO AND 
BRAZIL 
 
by 
 
ROBERTO GENOVES 
 
 
Adviser: Professor Kenneth P. Erickson 
Regional integration agreements (RIAs) facilitate economic integration by allowing 
member countries access to each other’s markets and by removing or reducing trade and 
investment barriers. Their increasing influence on international patterns of trade and 
investment flows has stimulated substantial academic work. Yet, scholars note that we lack 
an adequate comprehension of the factors that cause governments to seek RIAs, and why they 
prefer a particular type of integration arrangement. These are important questions because 
they speak to the forces that shape cooperation among states, a vital issue in international 
relations with implications for global governance.   
Using an eclectic analytical approach, this investigation tackles those questions by 
focusing on the relative role of governmental leaders, ideas, national interests, and economic 
development strategies. It does so via a comparative study of the foreign policy processes and 
decisions that led Mexico and Brazil to seek economic integration with neighbors within their 
respective North and South American regions, which resulted in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the United States and Canada, and the 
Common Market of the South (Mercosur) between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
In-depth case studies of Mexico and Brazil are followed by a comparative analysis of 
similarities and differences in their respective processes and decisions.   
The main conclusion confirms the importance of powerful decisionmakers within the  
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executive as pivotal political actors whose preferences are critical in determining regional 
integration outcomes. Leaders choose the economic development strategy that establishes 
how they want to configure the country’s relations with the world economy, which is a major 
factor influencing regional integration decisions. In turn, the interpretation of core national 
interests by top decisionmakers is an important variable shaping the choice of development 
strategy. Finally, leading policymakers’ political and economic ideas represent a crucial 
intervening factor because they provide the lens through which national interests are 
interpreted, economic strategies are chosen, and specific integration policies are decided 
upon.   
The study was conceived as an empirical political investigation. It relies on data 
collected in Mexico and Brazil via interviews with local analysts and observers and relevant 
political and economic actors, and through archival research.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s there has been a continued proliferation of regional economic 
integration schemes across the world. Also known as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), or regional integration agreements (RIAs), these 
reciprocal arrangements between two or more countries facilitate economic integration by 
allowing access to each other’s markets and by removing or reducing trade and investment 
barriers. These integration agreements have become a major defining feature of the world 
economy. 
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as of January 10, 2013 there 
were 354 RTAs in force and the number is expected to continue growing steadily (WTO 
2013). The chart below shows the evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the world, 
1948-2012 based on RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO, including inactive RTAs, by year of 
entry into force (Source: WTO 2013):  
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There are four main types of regional economic agreements. Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) abolish or reduce tariffs and other non-tariff restrictions between members, but each 
country retains its own tariffs against third parties. Customs Unions (CUs) remove barriers to 
trade among members but erect a common external tariff (CET) vis-à-vis third parties.  
Common Markets (CMs) not only eliminate trade restrictions but also allow the free flow of 
factors of production among members. In Economic Unions (EU) members participate in a 
common market and coordinate national fiscal and monetary policies in order to remove 
discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies (Balassa 1961). 
FTAs account for the vast majority of existing integration agreements, while Customs 
Unions represent only 10% of the total. Some best known examples of RTAs are: the 
European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),  the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),  the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), and  the 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).    
The increasing influence of RIAs on international patterns of trade and investment 
flows economic relations has stimulated substantial academic work on the subject. Yet, 
integration scholars note that we still lack an adequate comprehension of what causes 
governments to seek RIAs (Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner 2012), and what leads 
them to prefer a particular type of integration arrangement (Mansfield, Milner, and Jon C. 
Pevehouse 2008). These are important questions because they speak to the forces that shape 
cooperation among states, a vital issue in international relations with implications for global 
governance.  
I address those questions by focusing on the relative influence of governmental 
leaders, ideas, national interests, and economic development strategies in deciding regional 
integration outcomes. My investigation confirms the critical role of individual top 
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policymakers as pivotal political actors with the power to determine the course of action at 
critical points of the decision-making process. Leaders choose the economic development 
strategy, which establishes how they want to configure the country’s relations with the world 
economy, a major factor shaping regional integration preferences. In turn, powerful 
individual decisionmakers define the country’s core national interests, which is an important 
variable affecting the choice of development strategy. In this process, political and economic 
ideas represent a crucial intervening factor because they provide the lens through which 
leaders interpret national interests, select economic strategies, and decide on specific 
integration policies.   
Using an eclectic analytical approach, I develop a comparative study of the foreign 
policymaking processes and decisions that led Mexico and Brazil to seek economic 
integration with neighbors within their respective North and South American regions in the 
early 1990s, which eventually resulted in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). NAFTA is a RIA between 
Mexico, the United States and Canada to implement a free trade area.  It was signed in 1992 
and came into force in January 1994. Mercosur is a quadripartite arrangement between 
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay that was created by the signing of the Treaty of 
Asunción in March 1991. In December 1994, the four countries signed an additional protocol 
that established the institutional structure of Mercosur, its legal international personality, and 
further defined it as a customs union.
1
  
A particular puzzle contributes to make the comparison between Mexico and Brazil 
compelling as a means to achieve the purpose of my study. Why did Mexico and Brazil opt 
for different integration schemes in the early 1990s (i.e., a North-South FTA in the case of 
                                                             
1
 Currently, Mercosur includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, as full members.   
Bolivia requested its entry as a full member, and since December 2012 is in the process of joining as 
such. Other countries (i.e., Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) are recognized as “Estados 
Asociados” (Associated States) (Mercosur 2013).  
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Mexico and a South-South customs union in the case of Brazil)? Why did they not continue 
following a similar path as they did in 1960 when they both joined the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) and again in 1980 when both became members of the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), the arrangement that replaced LAFTA? Simple 
functionalist logic would lead one to expect little variation in national preferences for 
integration arrangements from comparable developing countries that face similar types of 
cooperation problems (Acharya and Johnston 2007).   
An incentive for my research is that the explanatory power of the theories that 
dominate the study of regional integration (i.e., neofunctionalism, realism/neorealism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, neoliberal institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and 
constructivism) is limited by a substantial dependence on the European case (Choi and 
Caporaso 2005). Thus, by studying integration experiences that occurred in the Americas, I 
contribute to diversify the literature and enrich the understanding of the sources of 
regionalism.   
In addition, this study allows me to examine a connection often overlooked by the 
relevant literature between regional integration, a topic associated with international political 
economy (IPE), and foreign policy (Milner and Tingley 2011). It aso contributes to the field 
of comparative foreign policy as it probes for similarities and differences in the relative 
influence exerted by a set of factors that shaped the respective foreign policymaking 
processes of Mexico and Brazil that decided their participation in NAFTA and Mercosur. 
Finally, my research adds to the broader field of international cooperation.  
Theoretical Context 
The subject of the dissertation bears on two main interrelated literatures. One is 
dedicated to the study of regional integration. It aims to explain why and how countries agree 
to cooperate in the creation of regional institutions that facilitate the integration of their 
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economies. The other concerns itself with the analysis of foreign policymaking. Its main 
purpose is to explain the processes and decisions through which each country defines its 
external behavior and determines its international relations. 
My review of these two literatures addresses the two central questions that motivate 
my study. Why do governments seek regional integration agreements? Why do governments 
choose different types of integration schemes? The purpose is to establish a frame of 
reference for my research and to identify valuable contributions to draw from in the analytical 
framework used to conduct the study.  
1. Various Explanations of Regional Integration  
1.1 Functionalism 
The functionalist approach emerged originally in the early 1940s as a proposal to 
achieve a lasting world peace. Its proponent, David Mitrany, argued that “the evil of conflict 
and war springs from the division of the world into detached and competing political units 
[i.e., nation-states]” (Mitrany 2003, 101). He envisioned two possible ways to overcome such 
war-prone international structure:   
One would be through a world state which would wipe out political divisions 
forcibly; the other is the way discussed in these pages, which would rather overlay 
political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in 
which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually 
integrated (2003,101). 
 
For Mitrany, the need to solve common practical (i.e., administrative and technical) problems 
made countries interdependent thus generating a demand for international institutions that 
functionally serve that purpose. He rejected any regional solution because it would lead to an 
enlarged version of the conflictive sovereign state instead of superseding it (Mitrany 1965).   
Mityrany’s functionalism was based on a rational-technocratic approach that 
mistakenly derided the role of politics in international integration, and was also marked by a 
normative bias (Rosamond 2000). However, his claim that international institutions’ raison 
d’être derives from their functional capacity to solve interstate cooperation problems 
 6 
 
remained an enduring legacy for the subsequent development of regional integration theory. 
In particular, Mitrany’s insight that countries learn to integrate with others through practical 
cooperation within institutional settings (see Haas 1964, 13) is a relevant contribution to a 
theory on the formation of states’ preferences regarding integration,  
1.2 Classical Realism 
Best represented by Hans Morgenthau, the classical realist approach argues that 
states’ actions  are determined by “statesmen [who] think and act in terms of interest defined 
as power” (Morgenthau 2006, 5) as dictated by patterns of behavior rooted in an unchanging 
human nature. Therefore, the possibility of achieving lasting peace through international 
institutions under such conditions is at best uncertain. While sympathetic to Mitrany’s 
functionalism, Morgenthau argued that international institutions could only play a role 
subordinated to that of nation-states because “[m]ore important than anything else is the 
ability of the national government to defend its territory and citizens against foreign 
aggression” (2006, 528-29).   
Morgenthau could explain the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s, 
which was based on cooperation in the coal and steel sectors, only as “a revolutionary 
departure from the traditional methods [i.e., balance of power] by which inferior powers [i.e., 
France] have tried to counter a superior one [i.e., Germany]” (Morgenthau 2006, 533). In 
other words, the European regional project was a new form of inter-power relations 
conceived by governments that were however ultimately driven by a traditional defense of 
national interests. This viewpoint underlies the arguments advanced by intergovernmentalist 
perspectives (see below, Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1993), which explain regional integration 
as the result of interstate bargaining.   
Classical realism is not well-suited to explain international cooperation. Yet, 
Morgenthau’s contention that a concern for the defense of national interests is a necessary 
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part of the strategic calculations that governments make when deciding to join regional 
integration schemes is a valid one. It is thus a relevant insight when studying the factors that 
influence governments to join integration agreements.   
1.3 Transactionalism 
Karl W Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice E. Lee, Jr., Martin 
Lichterman, Raymonde E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen 
(1957) proposed another approach to integration known as transactionalism, which emerged 
from studying the “possible ways in which men someday might abolish war” (1957, 3). The 
research focused on historical experiences of successful integration where political 
communities had become “security-communities,” defined as groups of people that 
eliminated the use of violence in their interactions, and developed stable expectations of 
peaceful means to achieve changes or solve conflicts. In this sense, Deutsch et al. define 
integration as a condition to be attained. At the same time, the “sense of community” 
necessary for integration is defined as a “perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, 
communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making 
(1957, 36; emphasis added), which is also characterized as “a process of social learning” 
(1957, 129).   
The transactionalist approach equates integration to a multidimensional process of 
communication where the degree of match between the level of economic, political, social, 
and cultural transactions connecting the units involved and their respective capabilities to 
support that volume determines its success or failure. The units’ capabilities are two-
dimensional: 1) capacity to act measured as “size, power, economic strength, administrative 
efficiency”, and 2) subjective ability of the units to be “responsive” or “to control [their] own 
behavior and to redirect [their] own attention” to the needs of integration (1957, 40).    
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Therefore, according to Deutsch et al.’s model, actors’ preference formation for integration is 
an attribute endogenous to the process and not externally given or assumed.    
Transactionalism’s neglect of politics (see Haas’s criticism below) is an important 
drawback. However, its dynamic conception of integration where interaction and learning 
play an important role in molding actors’ preferences in favor of integration is a pertinent 
insight to be incorporated into the analytical arsenal used to study the sources of regional 
integration arrangements. The perspective developed by Deutsch and his associates 
contributed to the constructivist concept of security communities later developed by Adler 
and Barnett (1998) (see below).   
1.4 Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism 
Two perspectives dominated the scholarly debate on regional integration in the 1950s 
and 1960s influenced by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1952, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) in 1957. Neo-functionalism, pioneered by Ernst B. Haas (1958) was 
inspired by Mitrany’s approach, and based on an in-depth study of the ECSC. It explains 
regional integration as a self-sustaining process of institution-building starting with economic 
integration by sector which “spills over” into other areas through the convergence of elites’ 
demands and expectations, which in turn leads to successively higher levels of political 
cooperation and integration, culminating in the formation of a regional political community 
and identity.  
For Haas, regional political integration is “the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national state” (1958, 16). Therefore, actors’ preferences are developed 
during the integration process. They behave according to their perceived interests and 
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configured values. Yet, values change and interests are redefined during the process, so that 
“separate national group values will gradually be superseded by a new and geographically 
larger set of beliefs” (1958, 14).    
Also, Haas’s notion of political community implies the development of a  
“supranational” institutional structure, akin to a central government, that is capable of 
modifying expectations through adequate policies because economic integration by itself 
“does not necessarily lead to political community” (1958, 12; emphasis in the original). Thus, 
Haas criticizes Deutsch for ignoring that “[i]ntegration is the result of specific decisions made 
by governments acting in conjunction with politically relevant, organized groups” (Haas 
1958, 285). Whether integration is making progress or not depends on the actual interaction 
of “national ideologies on the one hand and the beliefs of the office-holders in the central 
institutions on the other” (1958, 19), that is, whether it produces positive changes at the 
national level in terms of ideologies, expectations and behavior patterns.   
While Haas was initially skeptical that the European experience could be successfully 
applied to other regions of the world, he eventually examined this possibility (Haas 1961; 
1967). He argues that whether the European experience can be replicated in Latin America, 
raises “one the most puzzling of questions: can only industrialized nations integrate or can the 
very fact of underdevelopment be a spur to regional unity?” (1961, 382). He recognizes that 
the motivation for regional integration in Latin America was different from Europe’s, noting 
that the idea originated in the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. It was driven 
by the urge to develop and to enlarge markets to stimulate industrialization, and it reflected 
the unifying ideological influences derived from a similar situation of backwardness. It also 
represented a defensive reaction to the perceived economic threat posed by a united Europe.   
Haas (1967) revised his neofunctionalist approach in view of the unanticipated 
stalling of the European integration process in the mid-1960s caused by the stern opposition 
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of French President Charles de Gaulle to any supranational authority. The author 
acknowledged that his gradual theory of integration where “pragmatic interest politics” 
prevailed over “high politics,” was grounded on a teleological assumption of automatic 
integration, and thus it was unable to account for the recent setback. It thus acknowledged 
that “[i]ntegrative decisions based on high politics and basic commitment are undoubtedly 
more durable than decisions based on converging pragmatic expectations” (1967, 328). 
Haas’s emphasis on learning, changing expectations and beliefs, and redefinition of interests 
is pertinent to an analysis of the processes underlying regional integration. 
Stanley Hoffman (1965; 1966) developed the intergovernmentalist perspective at the 
time that President de Gaulle’s nationalist posture forced the freezing of the European 
integration process. He argued that de Gaulle’s opposition to supranationality revealed that, 
while national governments were amenable to delegating authority with respect to matters of 
economic cooperation, they remained reluctant to relinquish power over the “high politics” of 
national sovereignty and foreign policy. For Hoffman, this event contradicted the tenets of 
neofunctionalism, which according to him were based on two flawed assumptions: “first, the 
obsolescence of the nation-state […] if not for all nations at least for those of Western 
Europe; secondly, the belief in the capacity of the supranational procedure to solve problems 
on which governments cannot agree if they are left to themselves” (1965, 94).   
Haas and Hoffman also differ on the relationship between economics and politics.  
For the pioneer of neofunctionalism, economics aided by a supranational bureaucracy can 
“spill over” into politics via the shift in expectations. For Hoffman, economics and politics 
pertain to parallel domains and develop according to different logics which rarely converge. 
Thus, economic cooperation cannot by itself evolve into political integration. 
Hoffman (1966) claims that world politics tends to pull state actors apart: “[e]very 
international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic 
 11 
 
determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units; any international 
system based on fragmentation tends, through the dynamics of unevenness […] to reproduce 
diversity” (1966, 864; emphasis in the original). The author does not reject the possibility of 
integration, but “the chance depends on the timely convergence of too many variables to be 
counted on” (1966, 903).    
Hoffman concedes to neofunctionalists that integration requires similar domestic 
structures, but “what matters is not that the units be in ‘objectively’ similar situations at the 
time when integration begins and while it proceeds. What matters is ‘subjective’ similarity -a 
similarity that is not the scholar's assertion, but the policy-maker's conviction” (1966, 905). It 
is “high politics” that guides states to integration, not “spill-over” effects or supranational 
institutions. In this sense, Hoffman’s intergovernmentalism resonates with Morgenthau’s 
realism.    
1.5 Realism and Neorealism  
Robert Gilpin’s (2001) realist approach is state-centered. It emphasizes “the 
importance of power, national political interests, and interstate rivalries” in processes of 
regional integration (2001, 356). It argues that the success of regional integration requires the 
leadership of one or more powerful, hegemonic actors (Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976).  
Gilpin asserts the traditional realist’s view that politics prevails over economics in explaining 
outcomes, that is, economic union follows, rather than precedes, political union. According to 
him, the neofunctionalist dynamics may work only after a political choice has been made in 
favor of the union. Regionalism “has been a response by nation-states to shared political and 
economic problems […] in order to strengthen their autonomy, increase their bargaining 
position in disputes about distributive issues, and promote other political or economic 
objectives” (2001, 357).     
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He considers the spread of regionalism as a result of the efforts by states to benefit 
from a global economy, while at the same time they strive to secure a larger share of relative 
gains and guard themselves against external risks. The competitive threat of globalization has 
impelled nation-states to form defensive regional alliances or arrangements led by one or 
more major economic powers (Gilpin 2001). Gilpin’s approach offers plausible insights on 
the forces that may have compelled Mexico and Brazil to join integration agreements. 
Whereas state-centered  realism focuses on the pursuit of power and the defense of 
national interests to explain state behavior, neorealism emphasizes the role of the anarchical 
(i.e., lacking a central authority) structure of the international system of states and the 
distribution of power capabilities within it (Schweller and Priess 1997). According to its 
founder, Kenneth Waltz (1979), such a structure encourages states to behave in a self-
regarding manner, seeking their own survival. On the other hand, differing economic 
capabilities propel states to cooperation and interdependence via the international division of 
labor.  Waltz predicts that ultimately international cooperation will be thwarted by states’ fear 
of an adverse distribution of mutual gains and their worry that cooperation will make them 
dependent on others.    
Based on the basic assumptions of its structural approach, neorealism can only 
conceive the possibility of international cooperation as the result of a change in the 
distribution of material capabilities among states. Thus, for Waltz, the shift from a multipolar 
to a bipolar world after WWII, which was a change in the distribution of power, facilitated 
the European integration process, because “for the first time in modern history, the 
determinants of war and peace lay outside the arena of European states” (1979, 70), that is, it 
mitigated their mutual fear that any unequal distribution of gains could result in military 
advantage for others.   
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The broad strokes afforded by the neorealist approach cannot account for a 
phenomenon as complex as regional integration in a satisfactory manner. It does provide a 
first cut into potential triggers of governments’ decisions to join regional integration schemes 
by focusing on the impact of changes in the structure of the international political economy.   
Joseph M. Grieco (1999) modifies the basic neorealist argument to explain why 
Germany remained committed to the European Union while Japan was reluctant to promote 
any East Asian integration scheme after the end of bipolarity (i.e., Cold War), thus 
contradicting expectations of similar attitudes toward regional integration based on realist 
theory about the role hegemonic leadership in international regimes. In his view, the answer 
to this puzzle requires one to take into account the influence that U.S. power and strategy 
during and after the Cold War had over the respective national preferences of Germany and 
Japan. That influence was exerted through the impact of “asymmetries of interdependence”, 
that is, via the relative vulnerability of a country to external pressures due to unequal 
dependence on certain markets (i.e., Japan was more vulnerable than Germany due to higher 
dependency on U.S. markets).    
Grieco provides a valuable perspective to assess external causes of variation in 
regional integration. It can thus help to account for the influence that U.S trade policies may 
have had on the different paths to regional integration that Mexico and Brazil followed in the 
early 1990s.     
1.6 Neoliberal Institutionalism (NI) 
Robert O. Keohane is the main architect of NI, which he developed as an alternative 
to, and in debate with, neorealism to explain world politics (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 
1989; Keohane 1993). Like neorealism, NI has a systemic, “top-down” view of state behavior 
and assumes that states are unitary rational actors motivated by self-interest. Contrary to 
neorealism however, NI contends that international cooperation is possible when states’ 
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interests coincide. International institutions play a crucial role in this regard because they  
prevent cheating or defection, which are major obstacles to cooperation, by supplying 
information, transparency and monitoring, low transaction costs, and convergence of 
expectations.       
One can also discern the influence of functionalism on the NI conception of 
international institutions as instruments to overcome inter-state problems derived from 
interdependence: “[f]acing dilemmas of coordination and collaboration under conditions of 
interdependence, governments demand international institutions to enable them to achieve 
their interests through limited collective action” (1993, 274). In their analysis of the European 
integration process, neoliberal institutionalists tend to focus on the intergovernmental 
bargains that underlie the building of the complex European institutional arrangements 
(Hurrell 1995).   
More generally, NI would explain regionalism as a response to the demand for inter-
state cooperative institutions derived from processes of regionalization where states in a 
certain geographical area become more interdependent and integrated among themselves than 
with other parts of the world mainly driven by markets, trade, investment flows, and 
corporate decision-making (Hurrell 1995). This view on the sources of regional integration is 
important for the analysis on the causal factors that led Mexico and Brazil to join integration 
agreements in the early 1990s.  
1.7 Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
RCI is an analytical approach to political science characterized by four major 
assumptions (Peter A Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor 1996): 1) pertinent actors have a static 
set of policy outcome preferences and behave in a purposive and strategic manner, that is, 
taking into account the potential behavior of others, to maximize the satisfaction of their 
preferred outcomes; 2) politics is conceived as a series of collective action problems 
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requiring the existence of institutions to solve them; 3) institutions configure the strategic 
interaction of actors by supplying information and enforcement mechanisms that mitigate the 
lack of certainty concerning the behavior of others, thus shaping individual conduct in a 
manner that is congruent with desired social outcomes; and 4) institutions emerge because of 
their value to actors in performing desired functions, that is, in ensuring the achievement of 
gains from cooperation.   
Geoffrey Garrett (1992) uses RCI to explain puzzles posed by the institutional 
structure of the EU’s internal market, that is, why its sovereign members accepted an 
arrangement that constrains their autonomy, and why a certain institutional arrangement was 
chosen over others. In doing so, Garrett probes for the forces that drive countries to join 
regional arrangements. He contends that the main external factors that triggered the renewal 
of European economic integration in the 1980s were declining economic performance vis-à-
vis Japan and the United States and growing economic interdependence among European 
countries.    
Once European states accepted the need of international cooperation to surmount 
economic decline and respond to interdependence, they had to face the dilemma of 
institutional design. In this regard, Garrett claims that the issue was decided through a process 
of strategic bargaining among rational actors (i.e., states) unequally endowed with power 
resources and guided by different agendas based on their governments’ outcome preferences. 
The author finds that while the EC constrained member states’ autonomy, the most powerful 
members’ preferences (i.e., of Germany) prevailed. 
Contrary to other RCI explanations, Garrett notes that regional institutional 
arrangements among sovereign states do not necessarily result in rational-optimal solutions to 
collective action problems. He illuminates the power dimension in inter-state bargaining 
processes that shape regional institutional outcomes, emphasizing the dynamic interaction of 
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elites’ preferences and the distribution of power resources. This is a valuable analytical 
contribution for my study.    
1.8 Constructivism 
According to Young Jong Choi and James. A. Caporaso (2005), constructivism asserts  
that norms, ideas and identities rather than material forces shape regionalism, not just by 
constraining agents’ preferences and behavior but more importantly by “constructing” or 
forming them via processes of interaction and socialization. Constructivism disputes 
rationalist approaches (i.e., neorealism, realism, neoliberal institutionalism, rational-choice 
institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism) that conceive actors’ interests and identities as 
fixed qualities that are attributed by the analyst prior to actual investigation. It claims instead 
that those attributes emerge and are shaped in the process of integration, and are therefore 
subject to continuous change. This approach appears relevant to analyze how Mexico and 
Brazil decided their different regional integration policies because it can help to illuminate 
how political and business elites in each of the two countries developed their particular 
interests and preferences in this regard through interaction and international socialization.   
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) illustrate the use of constructivism to build 
on the concept of “security communities” first advanced by Deutsch et al. (1957) and develop 
a framework to study these entities. They define a pluralistic security community as “a 
transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable 
expectations of peaceful change” (1998, 30), and apply it to different regions where such 
communities are deemed to exist. Their work is relevant to this study inasmuch as it attempts 
to unravel conditions which facilitate the formation of regional communities, or why and how 
states engage in regional integration, via “[t]ransactions and interactions [that] generate 
reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests, and even collective identities” 
(1998, 14).   
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Adler and Barnett’s framework offers a three-tiered process of security community 
building. The first tier identifies initial conditions where states “begin to orient themselves in 
each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations” (1998, 37-38) such as changes 
in technology, demographic conditions, economic patterns, novel understandings of social 
reality, and the emergence of external threats. The second tier examines the interaction of 
“factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity” (1998, 38), that 
is, the dynamics between the regional structure of power and knowledge, and social processes 
determined by organizations, transactions, and social learning. Finally, the third tier identifies 
the “necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change” (1998, 38) created 
on the basis of the previous tiers: mutual trust and collective identity. 
1.9 Other Approaches Emphasizing the Role of Ideas 
The three different perspectives examined below have valuable contributions for my 
study. They highlight different situations in which ideas can become important factors 
influencing regional integration outcomes. Craig Parsons (2002) accounts for the conditions 
under which leaders can assert their autonomy and thus impose a policy agenda based on the 
ideas that shape their thinking. Kathleen R. McNamara (1998) reveals how policymakers 
adopt new policy paradigms under the influence of external structural changes. Geoffrey 
Garrett and Barry R. Weingast (1993) shows the way in which ideas can serve as focal points 
that help actors with differing interests and unequal power capabilities to agree on a certain 
institutional arrangement.   
Focusing on France’s policymaking process in his study of European integration, 
Parsons (2002) contends that “[w]ithin vague structural and institutional pressures, only  
certain ideas led Europeans to the EEC [European Economic Community] rather than to less 
extensive cooperation in much weaker international institutions (or without formal 
institutions at all)” (2002, 47-48; emphasis in the original). The author singles out leaders’ 
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ideas as the main causal variable. According to Parsons, a key intervening factor that 
facilitates this possibility is the leader’s political capacity to set the agenda, which includes 
the use of political power to pressure or induce a certain policy outcome. A necessary 
condition is the existence of ideas that cross-cut “lines of shared material interests” 
fragmenting coalitions and parties thus creating enough political space for leaders to obtain 
the autonomy “to set the policy agenda around their own personal ideas” (2002, 48).   
In her study of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), McNamara 
(1998) explains why European states agreed to a monetary integration scheme. She argues 
that “[t]he key to solving the puzzle of European monetary cooperation lies in the historic 
economic policy convergence that occurred across the majority of the European 
governments” (1998, 3). In her view, both structural changes affecting the international 
economy and the ideas that influenced decision-makers’ reaction to those changes were 
critical to the emergence of the EMU.    
On one hand, increasing levels of capital mobility created the necessary structural 
condition for an international monetary agreement. On the other hand, also necessary was a 
convergence of ideas, defined by McNamara as “shared causal beliefs” regarding 
macroeconomic policy, particularly in evaluating the costs and benefits of monetary 
cooperation. Thus, “[a] process of policy failure, policy paradigm innovation, and policy 
emulation unfolded among the states of the European Union, producing a new, neoliberal 
view of monetary policy” (1998, 5). An additional factor was the success of the German 
experience with a monetarist policy, which thus served as an example. The author 
emphasizes that the neoliberal consensus did not directly emanate from the increased 
international capital mobility but from policymakers’ interpretation of their past experience, 
the influence of neoliberal monetary ideas, and the example of Germany’s success. 
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Garrett and Weingast (1993) offer an explanation for the choice of institutional design 
made by European Community (EC) members to complete the integration of their internal 
markets into a single European one. Like Garrett (1992), they base their argument on rational 
choice institutionalism but introduce the notion of ideas as a crucial causal factor that served 
to coordinate expectations and behavior. The authors criticize prevailing functionalist views 
of international cooperation for assuming that institutional designs chosen for cooperative 
arrangements constitute uniquely efficient solutions to collective action problems. They argue 
that for every cooperation problem there are several potential solutions and yet, existing 
studies do not explain why a particular set of institutional arrangements was chosen over 
others.  
Garrett and Weingast’s (1993) explanation incorporates the role of ideas in 
combination with interests and institutions. Ideas can act as focal points when they facilitate 
an agreement between parties with different preferences and power capabilities in strategic 
situations where there is no unique equilibrium:  
Only certain ideas have properties that may lead to their selection by political actors 
and to their institutionalization and perpetuation. It is not something intrinsic to ideas 
that gives them their power, but their utility in helping actors to achieve their desired 
ends under prevailing constraints. Given the complexity and uncertainty of most 
political economic interactions, appropriate ideas may serve as pivotal mechanisms 
for coordinating expectations and behavior  (1993, 178).   
 
In this explanation, institutions serve as a mechanism that helps to transform the idea of 
cooperation into a shared belief system in a manner that shapes behavior and expectations 
accordingly.   
1.10 The New Regionalism Approach (NRA) 
The NRA takes its name from the notion advanced by Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai 
and Osvaldo Sunkel (1999/2000) that the global wave of regional integration initiated in the 
late 1980s is different from the one developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and it thus demands a 
new type of analysis that transcends traditional theories of regional integration. They contend 
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that the old regionalism, which appeared during the Cold War era, was mainly state-driven; it 
was protectionist and inward-oriented; it had specific objectives (i.e., security or economic); 
and it was circumscribed to interstate cooperation within a geographical region.   
Instead, the new regionalism appeared in a world subject to globalization and in 
transition toward a multipolar order; it emerged not only driven by the state but also by non-
state actors who felt the urgent need to cooperate; it was “open”, that is, oriented towards 
integration with the world economy; it had a more multidimensional character involving 
economic, security, environmental, cultural, and other issues; and it included not only states 
but also an array of non-state actors. The interaction between globalization and 
regionalization under varied conditions in different parts of the world has induced diverse 
paths to regionalization” (Hettne 2003). This is a relevant assessment that concerns processes 
of integration like NAFTA and Mercosur, which were devised as open models of regional 
integration (Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal 2001). 
The NRA is a very broad perspective that prefers not to prescribe in advance a 
definite causal theory and set of variables because these, according to its proponents, are 
“unlikely to capture the complex heterogeneity and multidimensional dynamics of 
regionalization” (Miclael Schulz, Fredric Soderbaum and  Joakim Ojendal 2001, 16). Instead, 
in attempting to understand each region’s integration process, the approach is rather “open-
ended” and interdisciplinary, emphasizing the need for historical analysis, and the importance 
of adopting a global perspective.   
The NRA approach also adopts a social constructivist view of regionalization in the 
sense that it is conceived as socially constructed and based on collective intersubjective 
understandings. This notion underlies the possibility that actors’ interests and identities can 
change during the process of interaction thus allowing for new forms of regional cooperation 
and identity. At the same time, the NRA emphasizes a focus on the role of agency, actors, 
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and strategies in shaping regional structures as “agency, and particularly the role of often 
previously excluded transnational actors, is an under-researched field in the study of 
regionalism and regionalization” (Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, 15). These are 
relevant forces to be examined in my study. Thus, for example, I probe for the role of 
transnational corporations in the decision-making processes of Mexico and Brazil, and 
examine the influence of development strategies in the articulation of regional integration 
policies. 
The NRA views regional integration as a possible response to the forces of 
globalization, that is, as an attempt at defending society by establishing political control over 
markets, in line with Karl Polanyi’s (1957) conception of the “double movement.” In this 
connection, the approach also sees a connection between power and regionalization: 
“[r]egionalism today is emerging as a potent force in the global restructuring of power and 
production” (Mittelman 1999, 25, cited in Schulz, Soderbaum & Ojendal 2001, 257). Thus, 
the pattern of distribution of power in a region is highly relevant to the conditions underlying 
regional integration, subject to the level of conflict among actors, that is, “where conflict 
resolution has taken place and/or where power is distributed fairly equally, regionalization 
has advanced the most” (2001, 259).   
1.11 Approaches Stressing the Role of Domestic Factors 
Simon Bulmer (1983) examines the European Community’s (EC) process of 
integration focusing on the linkage between domestic politics and EC outcomes, particularly 
on the domestic structures of policy-making and the attitudes of domestic actors. His 
approach emerges in a debate against intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the role of 
governments and thus overlooks the more complex domestic sources of national policies for 
integration. For the author, the unit of analysis should be the broader “national polity”  
because it is there that “governments, interest groups, parliamentary bodies and political 
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parties” bargain and make decisions that shape “national interests and policy content” (1983, 
354). Only an analysis of respective national conditions can determine if governments are 
actually as powerful as intergovernmentalism proposes or, on the contrary, if they are highly 
constrained and influenced by domestic interests and international forces (Bulmer 1983).    
Helen V. Milner (1997) offers a theory of domestic influences on international 
politics. Her central argument is that international cooperation is largely affected “by the 
domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors” (1997, 9; emphasis in the 
original). It is the domestic contest between supporters (winners) and opponents (losers) that 
determines the creation and makeup of international cooperative agreements. Debating with 
Realism, Milner argues against the notion of the state as a unitary actor noting instead that it 
is “composed of actors [i.e., mainly the presidency, the legislature and political parties, and 
socio-economic interest groups] with varying preferences who share power over decision-
making” (1997, 11).    
In her view, three key variables determine the extent to which a state is hierarchical 
(i.e., unitary) or polyarchic: the policy preferences of domestic actors, the institutional 
structure of power sharing among them, and the distribution of information among them.   
The interaction of these factors defines the policy-making dynamics of a particular state and 
thus the possibility of international cooperation among states. Milner finds that domestic 
politics tends to make international cooperation among states more difficult, mainly because 
of the likely presence of internal divisions regarding policy preferences derived from 
concerns about the domestic distributional consequences of international cooperation.    
Andrew Moravcsik (1998) develops a Liberal Intergovernmentalist (LI) approach to 
explain the European integration process by means of a detailed comparative analysis of 
German, French, and British national preferences formation. His account is an essentially 
domestic-societal explanation of integration:  “economic interest groups and economic 
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officials, along with ruling parties and chief executives, will take the lead in formulating 
policy” (1998, 50). Its basic argument claims that regionalism arises from a three-stage 
process.   
In the first phase, increasing economic interdependence affects the commercial  
interests of rational domestic actors who are thus motivated to re-formulate their states’  
preferences in favor of integration through a selection process involving domestic bargaining 
and aggregation via national institutions. In the second stage, states, acting as unitary rational 
actors and guided by their preferences, engage in intergovernmental negotiations, which are 
conducive to bargains determined by relative power measured in terms of asymmetrical 
interdependence. Finally, international institutions lock-in commitments and ensure 
enforcement following the rationalist logic advanced by neoliberal institutionalism.   
LI contends that the main source of European integration was “the great post-Second 
World War shift from north–south inter-industry trade and investment (i.e., exchanges of 
manufactures for primary goods) to north–north intra-industry trade and investment (i.e. 
exchanges of similar manufactures or commodities)” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
70). Thus, changes in the world economy, that is, the expansion of productive forces and the 
consequent transformation of the international division of labor, shaped states’ domestic 
interests in favor of European integration. Moravcsik does not deny that geopolitical factors 
played a role, but it was overall secondary.   
Moravcsik views the process of national preference formation as “a series of  
rational adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming from the 
evolution of an interdependent world economy” (1998, 472). The influence of structural 
factors (i.e., the underlying evolution of the international economy) facilitates the progress 
toward regional integration. Policies are “rational adaptations” to structural “constraints and 
opportunities.” Therefore, in the main, there are no “unintended consequences,” policy 
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mistakes, or erroneous strategies. Rational actors, according to Moravcsik (1998), know what 
they are doing: “The historical record reveals that the consequences of major decisions were 
in fact foreseen and desired by national governments to a much greater extent than most 
analysts have been aware” (1998, 491).   
This view of the conditions surrounding state policy decision-making process is 
problematic. Contrary to the rationalist assumption of perfect information, in practice 
policymakers operate under conditions of “bounded rationality” (Herbert A. Simon 1955), 
that is, they are limited by the amount of available information and the level of knowledge or 
expertise at their disposal (Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas 1992).   
Moravcsik’s view of national preferences formation misses the potential effect of 
ideational factors which may intervene in the ultimate definition of policies. In other words, 
interests are first interpreted by decision-makers through the lens of prevalent political and 
economic ideas, and then translated into actual foreign economic policies toward trade and 
integration (Kathryn A. Sikkink 1991). On the other hand, Moravcsik’s explanation of 
integration as the result of a structural process of increased trade and investment flows 
between countries of a region underestimates the importance of geopolitical (i.e., security) 
factors which under certain conditions may lead the way to economic cooperation.   
Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (2012) focus on the role of domestic 
politics to explain why and when governments choose to enter regional integration 
agreements. In addition, the authors consider an issue that Mansfield et al. (2008) studied 
earlier from a similar perspective, that is, what determines the type of integration 
arrangement that a government chooses defined in terms of the depth of integration that it 
seeks to achieve. They mainly contend that the type of political regime and the constraints 
faced by the chief executive in the form of veto players are key factors influencing the 
demand for and the design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Their argument portrays 
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chief executives as rational actors who seek to remain in office: “[l]eaders enter PTAs to 
reassure their publics about their policies in the hope that this will increase their longevity in 
power” (2012, under “Conclusions,” in Chapter 6).   
The executive’s proclivity to enter PTAs would be greater in democratic regimes 
because in such settings they face a higher risk of being thrown out of office by disenchanted 
voters if they appear not to be competent. Thus, for the president or prime minister, joining a 
PTA can serve the purpose of assuring voters “that they are not rent-seekers or captured by 
special interests” (2012, under “The Argument and Evidence in Brief” in Chapter 6), that is, 
it can further executives’ political interests. Likewise, the authors claim that the depth of 
integration preferred by leaders will depend on their domestic political situation. If they feel 
that their position is weak and need to offer greater reassurance to constituents then leaders 
will opt for deeper agreements. Thus, Mansfield and Milner expect that democracies will be 
more likely to pursue PTAs that lead to deeper integration. 
On the other hand, the presence of numerous veto players can create obstacles for the 
conclusion of PTAs. In this manner, there is a trade-off between the level of competitiveness 
in a democratic regime and the number of veto players when it comes to the decision of 
whether to join a PTA or not, where the benefits of a policy change (i.e., signing a PTA) is 
weighted  against the costs of veto players’ opposition to the PTA. In the case of non-
democratic regimes the political calculation is different because the authors assume that 
“[i]nterest groups’ pressures for protectionism in autocracies vest leaders […] with an 
incentive to resist entering PTAs that reduce the rents they can provide to supporters. 
Equally, leaders do not face as great a cost since electoral competition is less likely to 
determine their fate” (2012, under “The Effects of Domestic Politics on PTAs: The Argument 
in Brief,” in Chapter 1). 
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One can question the fundamental premise of the argument presented by Mansfield 
and Milner (2012), which assumes that leaders’ main rational political motivation is simply to 
stay in office.  Instead, it is also plausible to assume that leaders often want to pursue national 
goals for the benefit of their countries and not just for their own personal interest. Likewise, 
the assumption that autocratic leaders are more prone to be prisoners of protectionist interest 
groups than leaders in a democracy is problematic. An autocratic leader may be more 
insulated from the pressure of interest groups and thus have more autonomy to pursue a 
policy change, such as joining a PTA, than his/her counterpart in a democratic country.   
1.12 Other Perspectives 
Jacob Viner (1950) offers explanations of some historical experiences that resonate with 
realist arguments. He contends that powerful actors play an important role in integration. 
Thus, Prussia led the formation of the Zollverein, or customs union, in the nineteenth century 
“to gain hegemony” (1950, 98), and the United States helped to shape European integration 
by conditioning Marshall Plan aid in post-WWII Europe to the pursuit of economic and 
political cooperation and unification.   
Bela Balassa (1961) argues that developing countries seek integration to achieve 
economic development and greater bargaining power. They try to emulate Europe, while at 
the same time offsetting adverse competitive effects. Political and economic factors interact 
in alternative ways to motivate integration depending on circumstances. The author notes that 
“[p]olitical motives may prompt the first step in economic integration, but economic 
integration also reacts on the political sphere; similarly, if the initial motives are economic, 
the need for political unity can arise at a later stage” (1961, 7).   
Richard E. Baldwin (1997) explains the diffusion of regionalism as the result of “a 
domino effect.” When a regional arrangement arises, an outsider is negatively affected by 
being excluded. Affected domestic sectors pressure their government to seek incorporation 
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into the new regional scheme. If joining is not possible, the excluded country will seek to 
form a new entity or join a different one. Baldwin does not explain why the initiative 
triggering the domino effect arises in the first place, or why regional arrangements differ.   
John Whalley (1998) identifies some objectives pursued by countries that lead to 
various regional trade arrangements: trade gains, support of domestic reforms, strengthening 
of negotiation power, assurance of market access, and reinforcement of security agreements. 
His study correlates objectives and agreements, but fails to explain the causal mechanisms, 
and the source of states’ objectives. 
For Wilfred J. Ethier (1998), the demand for foreign direct investments makes 
developing countries more receptive to participate in free trade agreements with developed 
countries to gain comparative institutional advantage. Tim Buthe and Helen V. Milner (2008) 
argue that for multinational corporations contractual commitments through trade agreements 
lend credibility to developing states’ policy choices by making their non-compliance dearer. 
The emergence of “multilatinas,” or Latin American multinational corporations, with 
increasing regional and international interests motivates states of the region to revise their 
preferences in favor of regional integration (Benedicte Bull 2008).   
Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt (2003) causally link the rapid spread of 
preferential trade agreements to the influence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argue that these 
organizations encourage their members to seek regional integration as a means to attain 
bargaining leverage in multilateral trade negotiations.  The continuing increase in 
GATT/WTO membership size has helped to promote this trend because it reduces the 
capacity of individual states to influence outcomes and makes multilateral negotiations more 
difficult to settle. Thus, GATT/WTO members “may find it useful to enter smaller 
preferential groupings composed of states with common economic interests” (2003, 856).  
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Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman (1989) explain why the revival of the European 
integration process leading to a unified internal market by 1992 started in the 1980s. In their 
view, structural change in the form of a shift in the international distribution of economic 
power resources (i.e., relative economic decline of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and a 
newly surging Japan) forced European elites to reconsider their interests and position in the 
world. The process however required the agency role of the European Commission with the 
active support of business through the Roundtable of European Industrialists, which 
represented the largest and most influential European corporations. Their combined political 
entrepreneurship helped to marshal a pro-market integration coalition of governmental elites 
that carried the project through a process of bargains among the nations of the region. The 
authors plausibly contend that “structural situations create the context of choice and cast up 
problems to be solved, but they do not dictate the decisions and strategies […] The choices 
result from political processes and have political explanations” (1989, 127).   
    I assessed a diverse array of perspectives in connection with the study of the factors 
that cause countries to engage in regional economic integration and to choose different types 
of institutional arrangements. I limited the number of approaches examined to those I deemed 
most appropriate to provide a relevant context for my research. In the process, I highlighted 
appropriate contributions that inform my investigation. The exercise confirmed that regional 
integration is a phenomenon resulting from the complex interaction of material and ideational 
factors acting at the international and domestic levels.   
2. Approaches to Studying Foreign Policy 
The purpose of this section is to examine theoretical perspectives that explain foreign 
policymaking processes and decisions. I already reviewed some of them (i.e., Realism, 
Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Constructivism, and Liberalism) when discussing 
approaches to regional integration since they constitute broader theories of International 
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Relations (IR) applied to different substantive issues. Thus, here I focus on those approaches 
not already surveyed that emphasize foreign policy decision-making as opposed to foreign 
policy outcomes (Valerie Hudson 2007).    
2.1 The Individual Decisionmaker 
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. 
Chollett, and James M. Goldgeier (2002) points to the key role played by the human 
decision-maker to explain state behavior: “State action is the action taken by those acting in 
the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers” (2002, 59). According to the 
authors, the fundamental role of the decision maker resides in that he/she is the one who 
defines the situation according to his/her perceptions and acts accordingly producing 
outcomes, which ultimately appear as a result of state behavior. In performing his/her role, 
the decision-maker expresses in a concentrated fashion the dynamic relation between the 
individual and the structure (the unit and the whole), and also the point of articulation 
between the internal (domestic) and external (international) domains of action.  
Alexander L. George (1969) places a similar emphasis on the role of the individual 
decision-maker: “the way in which leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of 
world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in 
relations among states” (1969, 190). The author argues that decision-making is greatly 
affected by the individual leader’s set of beliefs, including the way in which he/she relates 
“means and ends” (“instrumental” beliefs), and his/her outlook on fundamental political 
issues (“philosophical” beliefs). The combination of the two determines what the author 
labels the “operational code” under which decision-makers determine courses of action.  For 
George, the “operational code” is just a framework, “a set of premises and beliefs” (1969, 
196) which provide general guidance rather than specific “rules and recipes to be applied 
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mechanically” (1969, 197), and should not be understood unilaterally as the only determinant 
of decision-making.   
Janis G. Stein (1994) inquires how learning by political leaders can impact foreign 
policy by studying the case of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Her general 
argument is that structural/systemic or domestic accounts of political change are 
“undetermined”, and that any causal explanation must also take into account the individual.  
Her interest is in studying the development of a leader’s cognitive constructs and its 
subsequent translation into foreign policy change. The author finds that Gorbachev “did not 
learn in an orderly linear fashion or through deductive reasoning” but rather by means of “a 
complex interactive relationship between political learning and action [...] through a process 
of trial and error” (1994, 178). As Stein (1994) reflects, “openness to new ideas and the 
capacity to create new representations of ill-defined problems are in part functions of 
personality” (1994, 182).  
Robert Jervis (1976) focuses on the role of decision-makers’ perceptions of the world 
and of other actors as an important factor affecting foreign policymaking decisions. 
According to the author, these perceptions often conflict with reality “in patterns that we can 
detect and for reasons that we can understand” (1976, 3). Thus, misperceptions can be 
explained and this understanding can help us to explain patterns of international interactions 
and to increase our knowledge of international relations. Jervis claims that “it is often 
impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ 
beliefs about the world and their images of others” (1976, 28). Thus, he proposes a two-step 
model to explain foreign policy decisions where the analyst first examines a leader’s 
perceptions “as one of the immediate causes of his behavior” (1976, 30), and then attempts to 
understand how the decision-maker’s images developed, that is, what were the causes for 
his/her perceptions. 
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Jack S. Levy (1994) explores the role of individual learning, particularly from 
experience, in foreign policy. He defines experiential learning “as a change in beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures 
as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (1994, 283). In Levy’s view, 
experiential learning can be a factor affecting a leader’s behavior and thus influence foreign 
policy decisions, but it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for policy change. In 
addition, it is difficult to establish “when learning occurs and whether it has a causal impact 
on policy” (1994, 307) because other variables, such as interests or preexisting belief 
systems, may also intervene to shape policy preferences thus making causal inferences about 
learning problematic. 
Margaret G. Herman et al. (2001) examine the role of single, powerful individuals  
in foreign policymaking. They focus “on the importance of leadership style in understanding 
what predominant leaders will do in formulating foreign policy” (2001, 84). The powerful 
leader becomes the decision unit because he/she has the authority to decide on behalf of the 
nation or is at the top of the hierarchal structure that decides foreign policy and is accountable 
for the decision taken. Leadership style is broadly defined by the authors as the “different 
ways of dealing with political constraints, processing information, and assuming authority” 
(2001, 84). Four main conditions facilitate the playing of a prominent role by powerful 
leaders in foreign policy decision-making: 1) they are actively involved and/or have an 
interest in foreign policy matters; 2) the critical nature of the foreign policy issue attracts or 
demands the attention of the government; 3) the international problem includes high level 
diplomacy; or 4) the leader has a special concern or interest in the foreign policy issue.   
Herman and her collaborators identify four major types of contrasting leadership 
styles: crusader vs. pragmatist, directive vs. consultative, task-oriented vs. relations-oriented, 
and transformational vs. transactional. In general, these types are based “on the assumption 
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that the leadership style of one type of leader [i.e., goal-driven] is guided by a set of ideas, a 
cause, a problem to be solved, or an ideology, while the leadership of the other type [i.e., 
situationally responsive] arises out of the nature of the leadership context or setting in which 
the leader finds him or herself” (2001, 86). Whether a leader is goal-oriented or contextually 
responsive determines his/her sensitivity to the constraints of the political situation, the flow 
of information, and the pressures from domestic or international sources when deciding 
foreign policy matters.   
2.2 Group Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Politics 
Graham Allison (1971) focuses on the role of bureaucracy in policymaking, noting 
that “the ‘maker of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker but is rather a 
conglomerate of large organizations and political actors” (1971, 3). His argument criticizes 
the Rational Actor model that was then prevalent in analyses of foreign policy for its limited 
“black box” approach that neglected the inherent complexity of governmental policymaking.   
The center of his critique is the model’s assumption that policy decisions were the product of 
a choice made by a unitary actor (the government) that behaves rationally in the pursuit of 
certain goals or strategic objectives. Allison proposes instead two alternative “conceptual 
models,” the Organizational Process Model and the Governmental (bureaucratic) Politics 
Model, to remedy the weaknesses of the first model by confronting “the intra-national 
mechanisms from which governmental actions emerge” (1971, 6).   
The first of the two models focuses on the processes and procedures of the 
organizational complex that comprises a government and attempts to explain decisions by 
identifying the governmental unit(s) from which the policy output emanated and uncovering 
the pattern of organizational behavior that shaped it. Allison’s second model centers on 
processes of political bargaining as the source of the foreign policy decisions, and determines 
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“the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of the players” (page 6) in 
order to understand patterns of interaction that shape policy.   
The Organizational Process Model exhibits a structural approach to policymaking 
based on the organizational makeup of government, whereas the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
evidences an agency approach focused on the political bargaining of actors (Carlsnaes 2002).  
Thus, Allison’s dual approach to foreign policymaking opens up the “black box” of decision-
making and exposes a new level of analysis to investigate the causal factors that shape 
foreign policy. 
Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp (2006) emphasize the role of political 
processes within the governmental bureaucracy to explain foreign policy decisions. Like 
Allison (1971), they contend that foreign policy decisions do not simply emerge from a top 
decision-maker influenced by a single set of national goals but from a complex process that 
involves many individuals working in various governmental organizations who are driven by 
diverse motives, interests, and sources of power. The authors do not deny that foreign policy 
decisions are shaped in a process where domestic politics and the international environment 
play a role, but their focus of analysis is on the portion of that decision-making process 
involving the president and the bureaucracy “where organizational or personal interests are 
brought to bear on the issue at hand” (2006, 4). Thus, their analytical approach starts by 
identifying who is involved, what interests motivate them, and how those interests shape their 
views on issues. It then examines how organizations and individuals fight and negotiate to 
produce a decision that satisfies them taking into consideration how the issues emerge and are 
shaped by the institutional setting, and probing for the sources of power in the bureaucracy.   
3. Analytical Framework 
Scholars recommend an eclectic framework to study a phenomenon as complex as 
regional integration (Gilpin 2001; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). In following this 
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advice, I incorporate contributions from various perspectives and approaches identified in the 
literature reviews with a view to develop a multifaceted analytical tool.   
International factors can help to explain why countries decide to pursue a regional  
integration scheme. The international political economy provides the external context within 
which countries determine their interests and roles, which are largely shaped by the 
international distribution of economic and political power. In this sense, changes in the 
structure of the international economy can act as triggers of new foreign policies in favor of 
regional integration (Viner 1951; Waltz 1979; Keohane and Nye 1989; Gilpin 2001; Grieco 
1997; Garrett 1992; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009). Yet, these external factors, while generally necessary, are rarely 
sufficient to explain governments’ decisions to join regional trade agreements.   
The impact of pressures and influences created by international or systemic  
variables is ultimately defined in the domestic arena through the dynamic interplay between 
political (i.e., executive, legislature, parties) and socio-economic actors, and the institutional 
structure of power sharing among them (Milner 1997; Mansfield and Milner 2012; Bulmer 
1983; Moravcsik 1998). Actors’ behavior is driven by the interaction of interests and ideas 
through which interests and events affecting them are interpreted (Sikkink 1991; Parsons 
2002; McNamara 1998). In this regard, the views on learning and beliefs exposed by Mitrany 
(1943), Deutsch et al. (1957), Haas (1958), as well as constructivists, are relevant. Actor’s 
identities, interests and preferences are initially shaped by the social milieu, but they are 
subject to further change as agents interact with each other and with structures.   
 The institutional structure of power sharing affects the policymaking process and its 
ultimate outcome by both determining the degree of autonomy from societal influences 
enjoyed by decision-makers and shaping the intra-governmental dynamics between the 
president, the cabinet, and governmental bureaucracies. In this connection, policy outcomes 
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largely depend on the type of issues under consideration, the President’s leadership style, the 
interests that motivate key decision-makers as interpreted through the ideas and approaches 
that are prevalent among them, and the actual distribution of political power among these 
actors (Snyder et al. 2002; Jervis 1979; George 1969; Stein 1994; Allison 1971; Halperin and 
Clapp 2006; Herman et al. 2001).   
Argument 
Governmental decisions to seek regional integration agreements and the preference 
for a particular type of integration scheme depend on the chosen strategy for economic 
development, inasmuch as the latter determines how leading policymakers want to configure 
a country’s relationship to the world economy (Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman 1990).   
Top decisionmakers choose a development strategy based on their assessment of national 
interests in light of internal and external conditions.  Dominant political-economic ideas 
constitute a crucial intervening variable that shapes decisionmakers’ perceptions, 
assessments, analyses and decisions concerning national interests and economic strategies.     
My argument focuses on the domestic decision-making processes that determine a 
country’s policies for regional integration, but it does not imply that international factors are 
irrelevant. The analytical framework that I adopted takes into account the constraints and 
opportunities derived from the structure of the international political economy, which can 
precipitate domestic decision-making processes leading to a policy in favor of regional 
integration.  
Applied to the cases of Mexico’s and Brazil’s decisions to join NAFTA and 
Mercosur, respectively, my argument contends the following. The international debt crisis of 
1982 was a severe blow for Mexico and Brazil. The interruption of international lending 
made their strategies of growth through indebtedness unviable and severely constrained their 
economic development. The impact of the crisis led policymakers in both countries to 
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reconsider their national interests and the position of their economies in the world economy. 
In Mexico, this process led to the replacement of the import-substitution model of 
industrialization (ISI) by another based on the opening up of the economy and market 
liberalization. In Brazil, policymakers did not immediately abandon the ISI strategy and 
opted for a project of bilateral integration with Argentina as a strategic response to the new 
adverse international environment. Eventually however the Brazilian government began a 
process of trade liberalization, but it came later than in Mexico and it was more gradual.  
Subsequent additional external pressures came from substantial changes in the  
structure of the international political economy in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.   
The emergence of competing regional economic blocs, the effects of international policy 
diffusion, and changes in the foreign economic policies of the United States were some of the 
most significant external factors that led Mexican and Brazilian policymakers to devise new 
ways to insert their countries in the world economy as a means to ensure continued economic 
growth. It was at this junction that Mexico and Brazil devised their different policies of 
regional integration.    
Their different integration paths emerged from the particular way in which their 
respective policymakers reinterpreted national interests in light of the changing external 
conditions and more directly in connection with the new development strategies conceived to 
satisfy the urgent need for economic development. The key intervening variable in this 
process was the different set of political-economic ideas that guided the respective behavior 
of Mexican and Brazilian decision-makers. 
In the case of Mexico, the prevalence of a coherent set of neoliberal ideas led the 
government to consider the possibility of a free-trade agreement with the United States in 
order to structure an open integration with the world economy. In Brazil, a more ambivalent 
ideational framework that mixed neoliberal ideas with traditional developmentalist views 
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guided the government’s decision to seek a customs union with neighbor developing 
countries as a means to a less open, more defensive type of integration with the international 
economy. 
The main argument leads to the following related hypotheses: 
i) The greater the institutional power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature and the 
greater the political autonomy of the Presidency from domestic societal influences, the 
greater will be the role of top decision-makers and their ideas in foreign economic 
policymaking, including regionalism. 
ii) The greater the spread of regionalism across the world the higher will be the pressure on 
developing countries to join regional economic integration schemes. 
iii) The greater the influence of neoliberal ideas on the ruling political elite of a developing 
country, the more open will be the model of economic development pursued, and the 
greater the possibility that it will seek North-South integration schemes, in addition to 
South-South ones. 
iv) The greater the influence of traditional developmentalist ideas on the political  
leadership of a developing country, the more defensive will be the strategy for economic 
development, and the greater the possibility that it will privilege South-South economic 
blocs over North-South ones.  
v) The greater the influence of traditional developmentalism, the more the management of 
the integration process will depend on intergovernmental bargaining and consensus in 
decision-making, and the less it will be ruled by a contractual agreement. 
vi) The greater the influence of neoliberal thinking, the more the running of the integration 
process will rely on a highly developed legal framework to manage the integration 
process, and the less it will allow for intergovernmental bargaining. 
  
 38 
 
Research Design 
I designed the research as a comparative case study of Mexico’s choice of NAFTA 
and Brazil’s choice of Mercosur. The case selection is based on the advantages it offers in 
terms of allowing in-depth study of issues affected by such complex causal variables as those 
involved in regional integration (George and Bennett 2004). It combines in-depth within-case 
study and cross-case comparison which “greatly reduces the risks of inferential errors that 
can arise from using either method alone” (2004, 234).   
I complement the comparative methodology with the method of “structured, focused 
comparison” and the method of “process-tracing,” as proposed by Alexander L. George and 
Andrew Bennett (2004). The first one uses standardized data collection to facilitate 
systematic comparison of cases, and “focuses” on selected historical events according to the 
research objective. This method allows the researcher “to study historical experience in ways 
that would yield useful generic knowledge” (2004, 66). The second method “attempts to 
identify the intervening causal process –the causal chain and causal mechanism- between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (2004, 206).  
Thus, it seems particularly appropriate for tracing the influence of ideas on policy decisions 
and for testing the causal chain put forward by my argument. 
The choice of Mexico and Brazil is mainly justified on the basis of the leading role 
that each of them played in the emergence of major regional integration initiatives (i.e., 
NAFTA and Mercosur), and the fact that they are key regional economic and geopolitical 
players in Western hemisphere affairs. The basic unit of analysis is the individual country in 
connection with specific foreign policymaking processes for regional integration, as the 
central goal of the research is to explain why governments choose to join regional integration 
agreements, and why they choose a particular type of agreement.   
The validity of the research is limited by the following. I only study two cases, which  
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I did not select using scientific sampling methods. The integration processes studied (i.e., 
NAFTA and Mercosur) occurred more or less simultaneously in the early 1990. Mexico and 
Brazil are large developing economies located in the same hemisphere. These qualities 
impose some arbitrary restrictions on the number and variety of possible causal factors and 
causal mechanisms affecting decisions for regional integration and choices of schemes. Still, 
I believe the results of my study contribute to fill noted lapses in the literature. 
Definition of Key Terms 
I distinguish between regionalization and regionalism. The first refers to the process 
by which states in a certain geographical area become more interdependent and integrated 
among themselves than with other parts of the world mainly driven by markets, trade, 
investment flows, and corporate decision-making (Hurrell 1995). The second alludes to state 
policies aimed at establishing different forms of institutionalized regional cooperation, 
ranging from free-trade agreements to multidimensional arrangements that include 
interrelated political, economic, security, cultural, and social aspects leading toward the 
strategic building of regional cohesion and identity (Farrell et al. 2005).    
Regional integration is at the same time the outcome derived from state-led 
regionalism and/or market-led regionalization, and is a process. Regional integration scheme 
(a.k.a. arrangement, project) is the actual institutionalization of regional cooperation or 
formal agreement between the member states of a region. Types of regional integration 
schemes are the different forms that these arrangements take (i.e., customs unions vs. free 
trade agreements).  
Interests, Preferences, Strategies and Policies 
In the International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis literatures one often finds 
that scholars use key terms such as interest, preference, policy, and strategy in different ways, 
attaching different meanings to the same concepts. This lack of uniformity or absence of 
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standard definitions affects the exchange of ideas or debates by obscuring the understanding 
of differences between contending arguments (Jeffry A. Frieden 1999). I examine here the 
ways in which various authors define these terms, and then specify how I use them in this 
study.   
Helen V. Milner (1997) differentiates between interests and preferences. For her, 
“actors’ interests represent their fundamental goals, which change little,” while “[p]references 
refer to the specific policy choices that actors believe will maximize either their income or 
chances of reelection on a particular issue” (1997, 15). Both Andrew Moravcsik (1997) and 
Frieden (1999) define preferences as an ordering or ranking of possible outcomes derived 
from interaction. Moravcsik emphasizes the distinction between preferences, “a set of 
fundamental interests [which] are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other 
actors and, therefore, prior to specific …political interactions,” and strategies or tactics, 
“policy options defined across intermediate political aims” (1997, 519). Frieden, on the other 
hand, identifies strategies as “tools the agent uses to get as close to its preferences as 
possible” (1999, 45). Thus, while Milner refers to preference as predilection for a policy, 
Moravcsik and Frieden allude to the same term as inclination for an outcome. Moreover, 
none of these writers makes a clear distinction between policy and strategy. 
Alexander Wendt (1999) contends that interests are “what actors want” (1999, 231), 
that is, they constitute actors’ needs. These needs can be either material or spiritual.  Human 
beings for example, require not only food and clothing (material needs), but also love and 
self-esteem (spiritual needs). Some human needs are more primordial than others. The need 
to survive is perhaps the most elementary, since it constitutes a pre-requirement for the 
existence of other needs. In this sense, it can be argued that some basic human material wants 
(food, health, shelter) antecede in importance other material or spiritual wants.   
In addition, Wendt suggests that interests can be also classified as either objective or  
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subjective. Objective interests refer to those needs that exist independently of the actor’s 
recognition of them. Subjective interests constitute “those beliefs that actors actually have 
about how to meet their […] needs, and it is these which are the proximate motivation for 
behavior” (1999, 232). Therefore, actors’ beliefs about their needs may or may not coincide 
with their objective interests. Wendt notes that subjective interests represent what rationalists 
(i.e., Milner, Moravcsik, and Frieden) refer to as preferences, while “subjective interests are 
‘preferences over outcomes,’ not ‘preferences over strategies’” (1999, 232).   
Peter A. Hall (2005) offers a similar description of preferences as “an actor’s 
perceptions of what is in his/her interest” (2005, 154n1). This author further distinguishes 
between fundamental and strategic preferences. The former are basic perceptions of interests 
formed prior to full interaction with other actors, whereas the latter emerge during the 
bargaining process with other actors. Thus, the choices that ultimately an actor makes may 
differ, sometimes significantly, from its fundamental preferences.  
My study mostly follows Wendt’s and Hall’s suggestions. It refers to objective 
interests as interests, and to subjective interests as preferences. Thus, preferences are what 
actors perceive or believe are their needs or wants. I also distinguish between fundamental 
and strategic preferences in the sense that Hall does. Moreover, when discussing the 
formation of Brazil’s and Mexico’s national preferences the study mainly alludes to 
fundamental preferences. In addition, I adopt the following definition of policy: an actor’s 
plan or course of action to guide his/her behavior with respect to a certain issue or set of 
issues with the purpose of obtaining a desired outcome as identified by the actor’s 
preferences.    
I identify strategies as a more or less coherent set or package of policies (Stephen 
Haggard 1990; Aggarwal et al. 2004) aimed at achieving an actor’s goals as determined by 
his/her preferences. I adopt the definition of development strategy provided by Gary Gereffi 
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and Donald L. Wyman (1990): “sets of government policies that shape a country’s 
relationship to the global economy and that affect the domestic allocation of resources among 
industries and major social groups” (1990, 23).    
National Interests 
National interests constitute an enduring and yet elusive concept in International Relations 
and Foreign Policy. In examining its history, Rosenau (1980) concludes that it has little value 
as an analytical instrument to understand foreign policy because of its ambiguity.   He 
distinguishes two main schools of thought. One composed by analysts, whom he brands 
“objectivists,” contends that national interests can be objectively determined, and thus they 
serve as yardsticks to appraise the adequacy of foreign policies pursued by governments. The 
other, integrated by analysts that he labels “subjectivists” argues that national interests cannot 
be determined unambiguously, and therefore the concept is used to explain foreign policy 
rather than evaluate it.  In other words, since national interests can only be defined 
subjectively and their definition varies according to the preferences of various societal 
groups, the analyst can only determine how a certain conception prevailed through domestic 
bargaining processes but cannot establish its adequacy with respect to an objective standard.   
For Rosenau, neither of these views concerning the national interest is satisfying. On 
the one hand, the objectivists cannot escape the fact that “[a] description of the national 
interest can never be more than a set of conclusions derived from the analytic and evaluative 
framework of the describer” (1980, 289). On the other, the subjectivists end up reducing “the 
substantive content of the national interests […to] whatever a society’s officials decide it to 
be, and the main determinant of content is the procedure by which such decisions are made” 
(1980, 291).  
Rosenau’s skepticism is understandable but not sufficiently justified. National   
interests represent the material and spiritual needs of a nation as a sovereign collective entity 
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within the international community of states. As such, they exist as an objective reality 
independent of the subjective interpretation of the politician or the political scientist. They are 
distinguishable from other kinds of objective interests such as those of individuals, domestic 
groups, social classes, or international/systemic interests. They may at times coincide or 
overlap with each other but they remain different.    
I follow Wendt’s proposition that “behavior is caused not only by what an actor wants 
[interests] but also by what he thinks it possible to attain [preferences]” (1999, 232). I 
contend that both what a nation needs (national interests) and what policymakers deem a 
nation can or should achieve (national preferences) constitute empirically identifiable 
motivations for action. Moreover, I also adopt Wendt’s claim that decisionmakers’ 
interpretation of national interests constitute the proximate motivation for action (Wendt 
1999).  
Collection of Data 
Data collection included both primary and secondary sources. I collected primary data 
in both Mexico and Brazil through personal interviews and archival research. I list all 
interviews at the end of the dissertation, starting on page 309. I interviewed academics and 
other local analysts and observers using a “data probe” (open-ended) interview format mainly 
to gain an initial orientation and understanding of the issues. In interviews with political and 
economic actors, I used a “strategic interview” (semi-structured) interview format, asking   
the same set questions to all respondents, and adding others according to the specific 
circumstances of the interview. This approach helped to recreate complex decision-making 
processes in which the interviewees may have participated (Gereffi 1995). 
I conducted archival research in the Foreign Ministries of each country. I collected 
secondary data through available or published quantitative and qualitative analyses performed 
by other scholars and analysts, either comparative or case-based. I tried to “triangulate” the 
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data collected whenever possible using existing written documents and/or cross-respondent 
analysis of interviews other respondents in order to mitigate bias.   
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the study of Mexico’s decision to pursue an FTA with the 
United States, which eventually led to NAFTA. Chapter 3 analyzes Brazil’s decision to seek 
bilateral economic integration with Argentina during the government of José Sarney (1985-
1990). Chapter 4 examines Brazil’s decision to join Mercosur during the government of 
Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992). Finally, Chapter 5 compares the findings of the 
previous three chapters and presents the conclusions  
of the study. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are structured according to the methodological approach of 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (Hudson 2007). They are divided into several sections each 
pertaining to a different level of analysis: the individual decision-maker, group decision-
making or bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and international system. A final section 
discusses the findings and articulates an explanatory synthesis.   
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Chapter 2 
Mexico Changes Course: Seeks an FTA with the U.S. and Joins NAFTA 
In March 1990, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) stunned his country 
and world opinion by publicly acknowledging that Mexico was seeking a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the United States, an initiative that eventually led to the signing of the 
tripartite NAFTA, including Canada, in December 1992. The decision represented a 
remarkable change of course for a country that since the end of 1950,
2
 under the influence of 
a long-standing nationalist political culture, had sternly refused to establish a bilateral trade 
agreement with the United States claiming that it would undermine its sovereignty. It also 
seemed a surprising policy turnabout for the government of a President that as late as October 
1989 was still dismissing the idea of a trade agreement with the United States arguing that the 
great asymmetry between the two economies rendered it impracticable.   
Why did the government of President Salinas undertake such a sharp departure from 
Mexico’s traditional foreign policy concerning regional economic integration? In this chapter 
I develop an answer to this question by examining the complex process through which a 
variety of factors interacted to produce that outcome. Key among them are the ideas that 
influenced the President and his small circle of foreign economic policymakers, their re-
interpretation of Mexico’s national interests amid profound changes in the international order 
driven by globalization and the formation of economic blocs, and the  lobbying efforts of a 
powerful Mexican-U.S. business coalition. 
I organize the chapter into  sections, each pertaining to a different level of analysis:  
the individual decision-maker, group decision-making or bureaucratic politics, domestic 
                                                             
2
 On December 31, 1950, the Reciprocal Trade Treaty (RTT) that Mexico and the United States had 
established in December 1942 expired leaving both countries without a formal treaty to regulate their 
trade relations.  The RTT “was a wartime agreement that lowered specific duties on a long list of 
manufactured items entering Mexico from the United States, and gave Mexican oil, metals, and other 
raw materials needed for the defense effort similar privileged treatment above the Border” (Howard 
Cline 1965, 389-90).   
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politics, and international system. I end the chapter with a final section that discusses the 
findings and articulates an explanatory synthesis.   
The Individual Decisionmaker 
In seeking to explain the decision to undertake an FTA with the United States it is 
important to focus on the role of the individual political leader in foreign economic 
policymaking because: 1) the presidency has been preeminent in the Mexican political system 
in the Mexican policymaking system; 2) Mexico was facing urgent simultaneous political and 
economic crises that demanded the president’s attention; and 3) President Salinas’ leadership 
style, tended to concentrate political decision-making in his own hands. 
The Role of the President in the Mexican Political System 
At the time Carlos Salinas de Gortari became Mexico’s president, the head of the 
executive branch of government enjoyed substantial political power, particularly with regards 
to foreign policy and trade policy (Miguel A. Centeno 1999; Blanca Heredia 1996). Mexican 
presidentialism
3
 emerged from the Revolution (1910-20), consolidated during the 
government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), and developed in the following decades into a 
centralized political decision making system (Hernández Chávez 1994).    
As noted by Kenneth P. Erickson and Kevin J. Middlebrook (1982), 
[t]he 1910-1917 revolution produced a new conception of the Mexican state: as a 
representative of all groups and classes, the modern state was given responsibility for 
the moderation and conciliation of conflicting interests (1982, 221).  
  
The Constitution of 1917 gave the Mexican state a prominent role in directing the economy 
and ample latitude in the determination of economic policy. It helped to institutionalize the 
expansion of centralized political power by granting dominant authority to the president, 
                                                             
3
 A presidential system includes the following key characteristics: 1) The head of state or president is 
elected by direct or direct-like popular election for a fixed period of time; 2) The president or the 
executive is neither appointed nor dismissible through parliamentary vote; and 3) the president is both 
the head of state and the head of government, that is the president directs the government that he or 
she appoints (Sartori 1997). 
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eliminating the vice-presidency, and reducing the powers of Congress and the judicial branch 
(Erickson and Middlebrook 1982; Heredia 1992).   
Yet, the Constitution also established the principle of “no reelection” for the president 
and all federal, state and municipal governments. Heredia (1992) notes the uniqueness of this 
feature in the presidential system of Mexico: 
[a]mong the various mechanisms that have granted the Mexican political system its 
remarkable resiliency, the prohibition against reelection is paramount. This 
prohibition constitutes one of the few, and clearly the most important, formal 
objective constraints on presidential power. Non-reelection has provided for 
significant political mobility and has allowed the system to periodically adjust to new 
configurations of power. Losers in any particular six-year term can reasonably 
assume that compensation will be forthcoming during the next presidential period. 
This reduces the incentives for defection while increasing those in favor of continued 
cooperation (1992, 8). 
 
The Mexican presidential system developed as a new political structure began to take shape 
after the Revolution. In 1929, President Plutarco Calles formed the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR) as the party of the State. It marked the end of caudillismo
4
 and the 
emergence of a new Mexican state (Pablo González Casanova 2006).   
Lázaro Cárdenas replaced the PNR with the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana 
(PRM) in 1938, and instituted a corporatist-like structure that integrated the representation of 
four social actors: workers, peasants, other popular sectors, and the army.
5
 In 1946, the PRM 
was transformed into the PRI, maintaining the sectorial representation, further centralizing 
the party’s leadership, and reducing the power of labor unions (Steven Levitsky 2003).    
The consolidation of the PRI as the paramount political party went hand in hand with 
                                                             
4
 This is defined as a regime without a strong central authority characterized by the authoritarian rule 
of local chieftains, or caudillos, which struggle and compete among themselves for political 
domination (William H. Beezley 1969; Hugh Hamill 1992). 
5
 The labor sector was represented by the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and other large 
national unions (oil, electricity, telephones, mining, etc.). The peasant sector was mainly composed by 
the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the League of Agrarian Communities. The popular 
sector was constituted by public workers, teachers, and other middle strata organized in National 
Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP). The army was subsequently eliminated from 
sectorial representation in the party. 
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the development of the Mexican corporatist state.
6
 For María Amparo Casar (1996),  
[t]he variable that explains [Mexican] presidentialism is the existence of a party and a 
system of party hegemony that have allowed the executive to penetrate the political 
institutions and define not only their composition but their behavior (1996, 61; 
translated from Spanish).  
  
The political power of the presidency was reinforced by the dominance that the sitting 
president had over the party’s National Executive Committee. As such, he enjoyed significant 
discretion in establishing the internal rules of the party, choosing party leaders, and hand-
picking presidential candidates (Levitsky 2003).    
The president’s power was particularly strengthened by the unified government 
through the PRI, the strong party discipline, and the president’s capability to determine the 
political agenda of the PRI and punish any disloyal conduct among the PRI’s representatives 
in Congress (Lehoucq et al. 2008). Thus, as noted by Heredia (1996),  
The extreme concentration of power in the Presidency finds its roots in two basic 
factors. Firstly, the large array of legal faculties and prerogatives bestowed upon 
Mexican Presidents by the 1917 Constitution. Secondly, the equally large set of 
informal faculties derived from their position as heads of the official party. Together, 
these two factors centralize virtually all governing functions in the President, thus 
effectively cancelling both the formal separation of powers and the federal structure 
contemplated in the constitutional framework (1996, 23-4). 
 
According to De la Madrid (2004), in the context of Mexican political culture, the president 
was expected to arbitrate conflicts between contending interest groups and lead them:  
The President cannot limit himself (herself) to the process of negotiating  between  
groups […] its function requires that it orients and leads them. That is why, in the 
context of our society,  presidentialism, as manifestation of state interventionism, 
results indispensable (2004, 124; translated from Spanish). 
 
Moreover, 
  
                                                             
6
 “Corporatist institutions developed during the 1920s and 30s in the course of a vast process of social 
and political reorganization. Through it all major societal groups came to be incorporated into the 
political system through a network of mostly compulsory, state-controlled organizations endowed 
with monopolistic representational rights. The arrangement was based on a series of bilateral pacts 
between social groups and the state and had an essentially dualistic structure: one for popular sectors 
and one for business. The operation of corporatist institutions has been decisively shaped, though, by 
the centrality of informal clientelistic networks in the actual process of intermediation. These 
networks have been anchored upon discretionary state power and have long acted as the true rails of 
government in Mexico” (Heredia 1996, 25-26).  
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The arbitration of the President of the Republic is respected by the leaders of the 
party because knowing their differences they wish to avoid the division of our polity.  
There is a very broad consensus in favor of the preservation of a strong system, 
because we are afraid of falling  into internal conflicts that, in addition, would make 
us very vulnerable to external pressures (2004, 756). 
 
Political and Economic Crises 
By the time Salinas assumed the Presidency of Mexico, the country was confronting  
serious political and economic challenges that threatened his strategic goal of continuing the 
structural reforms initiated by his predecessor. First, despite advances in economic 
stabilization and structural reforms attained by the administration of Miguel de la Madrid, 
economic growth was negligible and inflation remained a major issue. From 1982 to 1988 the 
Mexican GDP grew at an average of 0.2% in real terms; the average annual inflation rate was 
91.1%; real salaries suffered an accumulated erosion of more than 50%; the rates of 
unemployment and sub-employment experienced substantial increases. Additionally, the 
external debt problem remained largely unsolved. In December 1988, the total external debt 
reached more than 100 billion dollars (José A. Gurria 1998).   
Second, Salinas’ political authority as president was weakened from the start by 
questions of legitimacy that arose from the contested presidential elections that took place on 
July 6, 1988. Salinas had emerged victorious but his triumph was tarnished by serious 
allegations of fraud.  
Third, the reported electoral results had shaken the image of the PRI as the dominant 
political force in Mexican politics. It was the first time that a presidential candidate for the 
PRI had obtained less than 60% of the total votes (Aldo R. Flores-Quiroga 1998). The weak 
performance of the PRI reflected growing popular dissatisfaction with the government of 
Miguel de la Madrid, and the unexpected electoral appeal of the Frente Democrático 
Nacional (FDN) (National Democratic Front), a coalition of left-leaning political groups 
headed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, the son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas.  
Fourth, in 1987 the PRI had suffered an important breakup when De la Madrid had 
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the Corriente Democrática (CD) (Democratic Current) expelled from the party. Once the 
members of the CD were ousted, they propitiated the creation of the FDN to compete with 
the PRI in the presidential elections of 1988. 
The CD had been created as an internal faction of the PRI in 1986 by Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, a former president of the party, with the stated goal of 
achieving the democratization of the PRI’s selection process for presidential candidates. In 
reality, behind this apparent objective of the CD there was a political struggle for the 
direction of the PRI and for the strategic course of the country, which had started since 
Miguel de la Madrid was selected as presidential candidate of the PRI for the elections of 
1982, in the wake of the worst crisis since the Great Depression.   
The selection of De la Madrid was the beginning of a fundamental shift in the balance 
of power within the PRI. Traditional advocates of statist developmentalism
7
 were displaced 
from the political direction of the party by those who favored a new development strategy 
based on market liberalization, opening up of the economy, and the shrinking of the state role 
in the economy. De la Madrid confirmed this change when he expressly excluded from his 
government those who within the traditional political bureaucracy of the party did not agree 
with his program of reforms (De la Madrid 2004). Thus, the emergence of the CD within the 
PRI represented the resistance of those displaced from the power structure of the party. 
The split of the group headed by Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo marked the beginning of 
the end of the PRI as an all-encompassing organization capable of accommodating a wide 
variety of political views and interests (Centeno 1999). The CD gained popularity during 
1987 as the economic situation deteriorated, inflation reached record levels of more than 
150%, and the government appeared unable to control the situation.  The internal tension 
                                                             
7 A long-standing approach to Mexican economic development based on the nationalization of key 
economic sectors, active State participation in the economy, and industrialization through highly 
protectionist import-substitution policies. 
 51 
 
reached its climax when Cárdenas attempted to promote himself as a rival candidate to 
Salinas for the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) (Authentic Party of the 
Mexican Revolution) while still being a member of the PRI, thus provoking his expulsion and 
that of the other CD members from the party. 
Leadership Style  
Alba E. Gámez Vázquez (2006) notes that although the centralization of decision-
making is a characteristic of the elaboration of foreign policy in Mexico, the personality of 
the sitting president seems to be a determinant variable in how relevant that feature is. Thus, 
De la Madrid’s relatively weak presidency was largely due to his personality, which drove 
him to delegate and keep a low profile in political decision-making rather than to exert active 
control over it (Centeno 1999). Carlos Salinas de Gortari represented just the opposite case.   
The prominent institutional position of the presidency and the severe political and 
economic situation that he faced as president-elect were conditions that demanded a major 
role for him as an individual decision-maker, but the determinant factor was his leadership 
style. Salinas was a strong president who was keen in asserting his political authority over the 
policy decision-making process and was very much in control of his government and the PRI 
(Gámez Vázquez 2006; Centeno 1999). 
Salinas was also acutely aware of the need to forge alliances in order to sustain 
economic reform: “when you want introduce an economic reform that is so strong, you must 
be sure of building a political consensus around you” (cited in Gámez Vázquez 2006, 194).  
Thus, he placed high value on building political bridges even with adversaries, and in doing 
so, he also demonstrated to be a pragmatic politician rather than a rigid ideologue.   
He personally cultivated close political relationships with political, labor, peasant and 
business leaders, which served to advance his agenda by forming a pro-NAFTA coalition. He 
engaged in a political dialogue with those key political figures who initially questioned and 
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opposed his integration project, such as the paramount leader of the Confederation of 
Mexican Workers, Fidel Velázquez, and the leader of the Senate, Emilio M.  González, in 
order to change their minds or at least to neutralize their opposition.  
Intellectual Formation   
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (2002) offers an account of the evolution of his political and 
economic thinking which helps to understand why and how he continued and deepened the 
reforms initiated by De la Madrid, and eventually decided to seek a trade agreement with the 
United States. Thus, he describes the process through which he arrived at his doctrine of 
Social Liberalism as  
…the result of a long and intense personal journey. It meant revising my beliefs and 
also my actions. My family and educational background was very influential. 
School in Mexico, UNAM, Harvard, debates, conversations with colleagues, 
[including long conversations with John Womack Jr., an expert on the Mexican 
Revolution] and experiences with popular groups were all decisive (2002, 305-06; 
emphasis added).   
 
Fundamentally, this process of critical reassessment shaped his views on the Mexican 
Revolution in a way that predisposed him to be open to new ideas and ways to interpret 
Mexican national interests according to how he perceived the changing conditions of his 
presidency. Thus, Salinas concluded that  
…no common revolutionary ideology existed, nor was there a lasting revolutionary 
party […]. I understood, I repeat, that the Revolution was not monolithic: many 
revolutions occurred in different states of the country with different and sometimes 
opposing claims […] The 1910 Revolution was above all a political movement with 
many contradictory aspects: it was conservative and anti-popular at some stages, 
populist and for a populist front in others […] nationalism was understood in different 
ways by the different factions that were fighting for power […] The Mexican 
Revolution, in the end reformist, modulated the market, without abolishing it […] 
Owing to the multiple misconceptions about what the Mexican revolution was and 
meant, the commitment to sovereignty was defined very differently throughout the 
twentieth century. For me, understanding these truths required real awareness.  It 
meant questioning everything I had learned at home and in my early years at school 
(2002, 309-10; emphasis added). 
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Early Collaborator of Miguel de la Madrid 
Salinas was a member of De la Madrid’s camarilla8 since the late 1970s, and became 
his economic advisor as director general of Economic and Social Policy  (1979-1981). In 
addition, Salinas headed the PRI’s Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Económicos y Sociales 
(IEPES) (Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies)  during De la Madrid’s political 
campaign.   
In December 1982, he participated in a meeting that De la Madrid had with his close 
collaborators where they began to sketch the theses that would frame the ideological platform 
of his campaign. They analyzed  
the different categories of  reality, questioning ourselves the actual meaning of the 
postulates that form the ideology of the Mexican revolution. In that process, they 
compared the ideological contents of our historical evolution with the real demands 
of our society  at  the present moment […] emerging from there the theses that were 
developed and exposed in the speeches that I subsequently delivered (De la Madrid 
2004, 26-7). 
    
According to Centeno (1999),  
Salinas had not only been a loyal assistant but had played critical role in De la 
Madrid’s success prior to the latter’s designation as the candidate in 1981. Many 
believed that he was the real author of the Global Development Plan produced by the 
SPB [Secretariat of Planning and Budget] in 1980, which had first brought de la 
Madrid recognition as a potential presidential material. During the election of 1982 
Salinas had served as the ‘point man’ for the candidate, defending the latter’s 
economic policies in a variety of forums (1999, 165). 
 
 Secretary of Planning and Budget in De la Madrid’s Administration 
For Salinas, being responsible for the Secretariat of Planning and Budget (SPB) 
required continual political work on his part, particularly in negotiations regarding the 
allocation of budgets, and dealing with different social sectors in order to attain an accord 
with De la Madrid’s adjustment policies (Salinas 2002). This experience was invaluable for 
him as a potential presidential candidate because it helped to acquire extensive knowledge of 
                                                             
8
 “It can be accurately characterized as the cement of the Mexican political system. It provides a 
human link which joins disparate groups together in a fluid, dynamic pool of political leadership. This 
pool of political leadership since the Revolution has until recently been commonly referred to as the 
"Revolutionary Family." The word family in that descriptive terminology is symbolic of the 
importance of personal political ties” (Roderic A. Camp 1990, 85). 
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national politics by means of actual political engagement with diverse political, economic and 
social actors. 
Moreover, in that important position, Salinas was able to exert influence on 
policymaking in accordance with his evolving liberal thinking. Thus, the Global 
Development Plan presented by De la Madrid and elaborated by the SPB tended to stress the 
need for increased integration of Mexico into the international economy following the 
successful example of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) (Centeno 
1999).   
Perception of the International Political Economy 
Salinas’ sexenio (1988-1994) took place at a time of drastic transformations at the 
international level that profoundly affected Mexico’s position in the world and demanded 
responses from the government. He reflected about those changes as they began to unfold in 
his first report to Congress, six months into his presidency:  
In the recent years, a great world transformation has been happening. The political, 
military and economic post-war configuration has been displaced at an extraordinary 
speed by a less predictable scenario, multipolar, highly competitive, technologically 
revolutionary and with a great capacity to affect the life of all countries. This change 
does not know of frontiers, does not respect ideologies, nor considers levels of 
development (Salinas 1989).  
  
According to Salinas’ own account, his interpretation of the international events taking place 
at that time greatly impacted and ultimately shaped his decision to enter into negotiations for 
a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada:   
…huge changes occurred: economic globalization; the disappearance of the ‘Second 
World’ with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the socialist camp; and the 
consolidation of the United States as the world’s undisputed economic and military 
leader […] The globalization of markets became an inevitable phenomenon of 
capitalist development […] The negotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement was Mexico’s answer to globalization. It was a way to respond to that 
inevitable process (Salinas 2002, 225). 
 
A major consideration in Salinas’ thinking was his perception that the formation of economic 
blocs tended to accompany the spread of globalization, and that Mexico’s future depended on 
how it adapted to that new reality which posed the need to belong to a trade region: 
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…economic globalization was a reality. Proof was the huge trade bloc formed by the 
newly ratified U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The European Community, for its 
part, was preparing to unify both monetarily and economically. Signing of the 
Maastricht treaty would formalize the existence of what would be the largest trading 
bloc. In Southeast Asia, the world’s most dynamic economic zone was taking shape.  
In this way, and with great rapidity, trade blocs unparalleled in history were forming 
worldwide […] While for some, regions were opening up, for Mexico, they 
threatened to close (Salinas 2002, 39). 
 
Interpretation of Core National Interests 
In March 1988, during a speech as a presidential candidate for the PRI, Salinas 
conveyed his belief that a reinterpretation of Mexican national interests was necessary.  He 
noted that in order to uphold their sovereignty and independence “national states are 
obligated to revise structures, redefine modalities of economic behavior and to establish with 
clarity the orientation that they will follow” (Javier Garciadiego 1994, 11).    
Several months later, during his acceptance speech in December 1988 the president 
advanced the view that modernization was the necessary condition to defend the country’s 
sovereignty in a world in transformation towards increasing interdependence: “…to 
modernize the country in that sense means opening ourselves up to the contemporary world 
reaffirming our identity” (Garciadiego 1994, 12). In his first presidential report to the nation 
in 1989, Salinas qualified his vision of modernization as “nationalist and popular,” linking it 
with the very character of the Mexican Revolution, and thus seeking to legitimize it within 
the national political culture (Salinas 1989).     
The analyst can discern in Salinas’ discourse a preoccupation with presenting the need 
for change as an adaptation of traditional Mexican values to new conditions: “There is no 
change that lasts without the present memory of the essential of yesterday and of always. But 
there is no change either in the mere contemplative evocation of the past” (Salinas 1989). He 
interprets change as part and parcel of the cherished ideals of the Mexican Revolution: “…we 
change because we want to make reality the Revolution (Salinas 1989).  
Salinas further advances in his redefinition of the national interests during his second  
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presidential report to the nation. He stresses the need to integrate Mexico into a world in 
rapid change in order not to remain marginalized.   
The nations that do not know how to creatively adapt will not be able to preserve 
their integrity. Those who do not do it on time will allow the possibilities that the new 
situation offers to pass by, but will be forced to pay, one by one, all the 
disadvantages… at the end, national weakness, that is to say, effective loss of 
sovereignty... (Salinas 1990).   
  
He warns against narrow conceptions of the national interest: “Mexico’s strength and 
sovereignty do not exhaust themselves today in its frontiers. They must also prevail outside 
our territory, on the chessboard of interdependence and globalization” (Salinas 1990). In a 
reference to the need for Mexico and the United States to overcome their conflicted 
relationship, he notes,  
Nobody can escape from these decisive impacts [i.e., the rapid international changes].  
The task of changing reaches everybody, not only the developing countries. Today, 
we see old enemies [i.e., European nations], heirs to a history of confrontations, 
proposing common goals, articulating their economies, responding to the free 
encounter of their cultures (Salinas 1990).   
 
In reinterpreting Mexico’s national interests, Salinas offers a new idea of sovereignty to 
confront an increasingly interconnected international system: 
Sovereignty never meant self-sufficiency or autarky, lack of influences or of 
relationships. Interdependence is not necessarily opposed to sovereignty; it supposes 
it when it is based on the control of the direction of the internal change, since 
interdependence can only exist among sovereign States. Otherwise it would be 
subordination, which for us is unacceptable […] We want Mexico to be part of the 
First World, and not of the Third one (Salinas 1990).   
    
He frames his new vision as a reinterpretation of Mexican nationalism rather than as a rupture 
with it. Thus, the defense of core national interests paradoxically demanded greater economic 
integration with the United States:  
Mexican nationalism has today new ways. Sovereignty already is not something rigid 
[…] given the increasing globalization of the world trade relations, it is indispensable 
a connection to the great economic centers. Without the interrelation the risk is 
greater: disintegration” (Salinas 1990).   
 
Salinas’ definition of the national interest reflects his critical reassessment of the legacy of 
the Mexican Revolution and highlights his pragmatic approach to politics:  
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Each moment of our history needed from Mexicans a response that privileged the 
national interests of the country that we have been and within the world in which we 
have lived. Because of that, our nationalism has itself been expressed in diverse 
manners along the history and it does not exhaust itself in any of them. These 
expressions have never been permanent or immutable: they have always responded to 
its circumstances (Salinas 1991). 
 
Eventually, the logic of his thinking in the face of the circumstances that surrounded his 
presidency led him to believe that for Mexico,  
[i]n the international arena at the end of the twentieth century, the defense of 
sovereignty implied greater economic integration with the United States. That was, 
and still is, my conviction (Salinas 2002, 281). 
 
Trade Agreement with the United States 
It is not easy to establish with absolute certainty when and how President Salinas began to 
conceive the idea of concluding a trade agreement with the United States. For example, in 
recalling an electoral speech during his  campaign for the presidency in May 1988, Salinas 
appears to have simply avoided the issue rather than to reject it:  
… I also mentioned advances Mexico had achieved through a policy of import-
substitution industrialization. Nevertheless, I gave a clear warning regarding the 
exhaustion of that strategy, which my predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid, had already 
recognized with Mexico’s decision to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) […] I underlined the need for renewed growth. Two priorities were on 
the agenda: reducing Mexico’s high level of debt and stopping inflation […] I pointed 
out that non-petroleum exports would be ‘a permanent prime factor in the growth of 
our production’, and I stated, ‘The opening of the economy to outside competition is 
an irreversible fact.’ However, I made no mention of free trade or agreement of any 
sort… (Salinas 2002, 9; emphasis added).  
 
On the other hand,  his account of the meeting with the United States president-elect George 
Bush in November 1988 seems to indicate that at that time he did not reject the initiative of a 
Mexico-U.S. trade agreement as a matter of policy but as a matter of timing: 
… I began the conversation with the topic I considered to be of central concern: the 
excessive foreign debt […] postponement of payments was insufficient. The debt had 
to be reduced […] President Bush intervened and replied positively to my 
explanation; he said that in January, as soon as he entered office and his new 
Treasury Secretary appointment was ratified by Congress, action would be taken […] 
We moved on to the subject of trade. Right from the start, President Bush proposed 
the establishment of a free trade zone between Mexico and the United States. The free 
exchange zone between the United States and Canada had just been created.  Bush’s 
proposal, however, came unexpectedly. I preferred that two subjects as broad and 
complex as free trade and the reduction of the debt should not be mixed in a single 
negotiation. I was concerned that the Americans would attempt to gain trade 
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concessions in exchange for the negotiation of the debt […] And so I answered that 
that while we were agreeing on the reduction of the debt, it would not be the time to 
begin negotiating a free trade agreement. I stated that in the area of trade our interest 
was in negotiations area by area […] He did not insist on free trade, but he had 
brought up the topic, and I would remind him of that in due time (Salinas 2002, 11-
12; emphasis added). 
 
Yet on February 7, 1989, in response to a statement from the head of Mexican Business 
Council for International Affairs (CEMAI), Enrique Madero Bracho, that eventually Mexico 
should integrate itself to the North American common market, the president declared that  
bilaterally, and in relation to zones, I reiterate that Mexico will not associate itself 
with any bloc. On the contrary, we will widen our scope of action according to the 
perspectives that the different integrating experiences are showing us (Garciadiego 
1994, 16).  
 
It is important to recall here that at the time Salinas became president, bilateral trade relations 
with the United States had already been improving steadily in terms of negotiations and 
agreements implemented during the administration of president De la Madrid. Besides 
entering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986, a step that, among other 
things, signaled the United States that Mexico was serious about liberalizing and opening up 
its economy, the two countries had been working diplomatically to allay obstacles to a freer 
flow of trade and investments between them.   
In 1985, they signed the Bilateral Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties, which required the U.S. government to demonstrate unfair advantage before applying 
compensatory duties against any Mexican export. In 1987, Mexico and the U.S. signed the 
Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment 
Relations, which established formal mechanisms of bilateral consultation in order to 
anticipate and avoid commercial sanctions affecting exports, and offered a forum for the 
discussion of issues related to the liberalization of trade and investments (Flores-Quiroga 
1998).   
As head of the Planning and Budget Secretariat during the government of President 
De la Madrid, Salinas was no stranger to those agreements. On the contrary, it is safe to 
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assume that he actively participated in the decision process that led to their conclusion.  
Salinas had become a key decision-maker within the De la Madrid’s government to the point 
that many observers considered “that Salinas was the effective president after 1986” (Centeno 
1999, 95).    
Therefore it was natural for Salinas, once he became the new president, to adopt as 
one of his goals the continuing transformation of the bilateral relations with the United States 
in order to achieve a beneficial regulation of the close economic relationship:  
Our new strategy had to establish clear rules for economic relations. It was necessary 
to establish trade rules that would be based on norms and verifiable by independent 
bodies. We had to ensure that certain issues fundamental for Mexico’s growth should 
not depend on the power games of the United State (Salinas 2002, 41).   
 
This acquired particular relevance for Salinas since at the time he initiated his presidency 
many issues in the Mexico-United States trade agenda remained unsolved. Additionally, the 
new Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1988, which 
aimed at “unjustifiable and unreasonable” foreign trade practices that threatened US exports 
was the source of new U.S. trade sanctions to Mexican exports (Flores-Quiroga 1998; I. M.  
Destler 2005). Thus, in October 1989 he signed the Understanding Regarding Trade and 
Investment Facilitation Talks with the United States that expanded the 1987 Framework 
Agreement and established a joint committee to identify areas where trade and investment 
between the two countries could be expanded (Flores-Quiroga 1998).   
These bilateral agreements and the established mechanism for negotiation and 
consultation between Mexico and the United States cleared the way for the eventual decision 
to start negotiations for a comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement in early 1990. It 
would seem that from the point of view of Salinas as the individual decision-maker it was a 
question of when and how, not why:  
At the beginning of the 1990s, with globalization a reality, Mexico could aspire to a 
sustained rate of growth only if participated in the international flows of free trade. 
There was no possibility of faster domestic growth unless we joined the great world 
movement toward free trade (Salinas 2002, 41).  
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Salinas’ thinking on regional integration with the United States appears to have been further 
influenced by his contacts with other world leaders that took place during his trip to Europe 
in early 1990 on his way to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In 
Portugal, he met with President Mario Soares in a private lunch:  
Soares was also a firm promoter of Portugal’s participation in the European Union. 
His comments encouraged me to find a way to participate in regional economic 
integration. The conclusion was obvious: the most important socialist leaders were 
moving toward the political center and were open to participating in economic 
globalization (Salinas 2002, 44; emphasis added).   
 
Days later Salinas met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. According to his own 
account of the conversation:   
Her comments confirmed my alarm and the insistence of Mario Soares on 
confronting globalization from an economically integrated region. They also 
corroborated the fact that if we acted in time, we could join in economic regions, and 
so compete for economic resources with a certain advantage (2002, 44). 
   
Salinas also met Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Germany, who stressed to him that in a world 
divided into three great zones Mexico needed to be part of the North American zone in order 
to avoid be left behind and marginalized from any bloc. Further meetings in Germany with 
Willy Brandt, leader of the International Socialist Movement, and in Brussels with Jacques 
Delors, president of the Commission of the European Community, to whom he suggested a 
free trade agreement between his country and the EU, only resulted in a similar response: 
integrate a regional market with the United States first and European investment flows will 
follow. In Salinas’ view, the conclusion was paradoxical: “in order to diversify our trade 
relations with parts of the world other than just the United States, we first had to concentrate 
on joining the enormous and powerful market of our neighbor to the north” (Salinas 2002, 
46). 
According to Salinas (2002), the trip to Europe in January 1990 was instrumental in 
triggering his decision to move ahead with the negotiation of a trade agreement with the 
United States in the face of European reluctance to his requests for deeper economic 
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 cooperation:
9
 
10
 
It was clear to me that globalization’s inevitability made it urgent to negotiate a free 
trade agreement […] Once we decided to negotiate a free trade agreement, it was 
essential to sound out the interests of the United States in light of my refusal to 
discuss it in November 1988. There, in Davos, the occasion arose […] I asked [Jaime] 
Serra to begin making contacts to start the negotiation of a free trade agreement with 
the United States. The following morning, Serra went to find Carla Hills, the person 
responsible for trade negotiations for the U.S. government, who was also in Davos.  
He let her know that my government was interested in initiating negotiations with the 
United States to set up a free trade zone between our nations (2002, 47-48). 
 
Even though in retrospect it would seem that NAFTA was a historically inevitable event, in 
reality it was not a forgone conclusion. It still required the additional political step taken by 
President Salinas in making the decision to reach out to the United States requesting a free 
trade agreement. And the decision, independently of its actual correctness, defined the 
political style of a pragmatic,
11
self-assured president.
12
 
13
    
It was a ground-breaking initiative at that time that required considerable political 
courage because of its controversial nature.
14
 It was politically unpopular in Mexico, a 
                                                             
9
 “… it is a turning point with respect to everything that he [Salinas] spoke during the first year of 
government. It was a paradigmatic change in Salinas’ vision” (Personal interview by author with 
Jaime Zabludovsky, former SECOFI’s Deputy Chief Negotiator for NAFTA (1990-1993), in Mexico 
City on November 9, 2010.   
10
 “I had interviewed him [Salinas], and what he said was that those two trips to Asia and Europe were 
determinant to understand that the train was passing by and that if he did not get on Mexico was to 
remain again thrown toward Latin America that was not of its political interest” (Personal Interview 
with Rossana Fuentes Berain, financial-economic journalist, in Mexico city on November 09, 2010).   
11
 René Renee Villarreal, economist; Luis Rubio, President of the Center for Research and 
Development (CIDAC); Rolando Cordera Campos, economist; Luis de la Calle, former SECOFI’s 
Undersecretary of International Trade Negotiations. Personal interviews by author in Mexico city in 
October/November 2010.   
12
 “It is true that NAFTA was a decision of Salinas, and I believe that was a very clear vision of where 
he wanted to lead the country.  Moreover, he was seeing the reality, how the regionalisms were 
emerging at the international level” (Luz Maria de la Mora, former member of the Mexican 
negotiation team for NAFTA in the automobile sector, personal interview by author in Mexico City 
on October 25, 2010). 
13
 “It was his decision, even though in the environment already floated the idea that we had to think in 
new terms of the relationship with the United States (Rolando Cordera Campos, economist, personal 
interview by author in Mexico City on November 23, 2011). 
14
 [Salinas] had a much  broader vision than the previous presidents in terms of trade policy […] That 
is to say, to take the risk and knock on the door of the United States, the opposite way of what was 
being done […] That is where it marks that great difference with the strategy that Mexico had had 
with this new initiative of the Salinas government […] Salinas’ government showed how practical he 
was because he not only negotiated NAFTA but also Mexico’s entry to the CAF (Corporación Andina 
de Fomento) as first extra-regional partner. This is important because the CAF has more 
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country with a long-standing nationalist political culture, where many viewed an economic 
pact with the United States as a threat to the nation’s sovereignty and autonomy.15 
Type of Integration Agreement 
Ever since former U.S. president Ronald Reagan publicly called for the formation of a 
North American accord during his political campaign for the U.S. presidency in November 
1979, the specter of a possible North American common market emerged periodically as a 
sensitive subject in the international politics of the North American region.  Before that 
initiative, the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 had already established in its Section 1104 
that:  
The President shall study the desirability of entering trade agreements with countries 
in the northern portion of the western hemisphere to promote the economic growth of 
the United States and such countries and the mutual expansion of market 
opportunities and report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate this findings and 
conclusions within 2 years (by July 1981) after the date of enactment of this Act.  
 
Additionally, during a visit of President Carter to Mexico in February 1979, his Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, had suggested the creation of a common market between Mexico, 
Canada and United States (Urencio 1981).   
Reagan’s idea was never developed into a full and detailed proposal for regional 
integration that indicated the type of agreement sought. However, in the media and the 
political discourse of that time it was loosely interpreted to be a proposal for the creation of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
disbursements than the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) in the region. At the same time, 
Mexico also entered the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the only Latin 
American country that did.  It also entered the OECD. These are concrete proofs that he was not only 
directed to consolidate the relationship with the Americans” (Salvador Arriola, former Mexican 
Consul in São Paulo, Brazil. Telephone interview by author from New York on December 28, 2010).  
Note: CAF is a development bank originally created in 1970 to promote the economic  integration of 
the Andean region. Initially launched by Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru, it includes 
today 18 countries of Latin America  the Caribbean and Europe as well as 14 private Banks of the 
Andean region. The IDB was created in 1959 to financially support economic development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
15
 “What is his ideology? I don’t know. He’s a politician that adapts to anything.  Salinas proved also 
to be an extraordinary leader. In that sense, he fulfilled a function very similar to that of Cardoso or 
Lula, in the sense that he established a direction. Not everybody liked what Salinas proposed but there 
was no doubt where he was going […] The risk that Salinas took was enormous” (Luis Rubio 
(CIDAC), personal interview by author, in Mexico on October 22, 2010). 
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common market between the three North American countries. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
type of agreement, the governments of both Canada and Mexico in the early 1980s rejected 
the idea of a trilateral economic pact with the United States. 
On September 29, 1989, Salinas declared to the Boston Globe that Mexico was 
seeking a broad trade accord with the United States to invigorate the bilateral relations in that 
area. Such agreement, according to the Mexican president, could have the following 
consequences: access of free scale of textiles, steel, automobiles, and other vehicles made in 
Mexico to the U.S. market. He also declared that a greater access of Mexican products to the 
U.S. market was essential part of the economic opening policy (Garciadiego 1994).   
Shortly thereafter, during the work tour through the United States in October 1989 
that included a meeting with President Bush and the signature of the Understanding 
Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks (URTIFT), Salinas declared that at the 
moment there were no conditions to establish a North American common market between 
Mexico, United States and Canada, due to the significant differences of their economies. That 
same day, during an interview by the TV network Univision, in response to questions about 
the recent signature of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), the 
Mexican president declared that  
…the U.S. and the Canadian economies are relatively similar. Instead, between the 
Mexican and the U.S. economies there are very big imbalances […] a free trade 
agreement, at this time, would not correspond to the conditions of our two countries 
(cited in Garciadiego 1994, 29; translated from Spanish). 
 
A day later, in his speech before the Joint session of the U.S. Congress, Salinas demanded 
reciprocity and access of Mexican goods to the U.S. market through sectorial accords: “We 
wish a bilateral agreement that, sector by sector, would bring down the barriers to trade” 
(Garciadiego 1994, 34; translated from Spanish).   
Therefore, at that time, the Mexican president seemed to be still thinking only of  
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sectorial agreements and not of comprehensive trade accords, and therefore the issue of a 
common market versus a free trade agreement did not appear yet relevant. Thus, in an 
interview with Newsweek on October 8, 1989, he manifested his preference for bilateral 
accords that could give Mexico access to the U.S. market, but rejected again the idea that his 
country  would form a common market with United States and Canada.   
It would seem that ultimately, the example of the CUSFTA helped both the United 
States and Mexico to agree on a free trade agreement as the most functional scheme. For 
Salinas, a free trade agreement granted Mexico an acceptable level of autonomy that 
mitigated the risks of integrating the developing economy of his country to a much more 
developed and more powerful neighbor such as the United States. He explained his rationale 
during his second government report on November 1, 1990:  
The negotiation of an agreement like the one that we intend to reach with the United 
States will not include any subject outside strictly commercial confines. This is the 
difference between a free-trade agreement and a common market treaty. We keep our 
autonomy in front of third countries (Salinas 1990). 
   
He referred again to the type of agreement chosen by Mexico during his third government 
report one year later:  
In the European continent it has been decided to create not only a free trade zone but 
a common region, without frontiers or passports, with common currencies, banking, 
parliament and army. Differently from the European project, in Mexico, for historic 
reason and by political conviction, we only promote greater economic interrelation 
and freer exchange with all nations, always maintaining our character of sovereign 
country (Salinas 1991). 
 
In summary, President Salinas’s pivotal role regarding NAFTA was not just based on 
his position as President, that granted him enormous political power, or on his leadership 
style, which ensured that he was in firm control of the government. It was, more decisively, 
based on the strategic political guidance that he provided. Grounded in new liberal ideas 
about the legacy of the Mexican Revolution, the notion of sovereignty and the conception of 
Mexico’s national interests, and oriented by a pragmatic approach to politics, President 
Salinas came to the realization that Mexico needed to do something else besides market 
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liberalization and the opening up of its economy. It had to look anew at its main economic 
partner and close neighbor to the north, the United States, and forge a new path to economic 
integration through a comprehensive trade agreement.  
Group Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Politics 
Heredia (1996) provides an important reason for studying the role of the 
governmental bureaucracy in Mexico:  
[e]xecutive dominance over the legislative placed Mexico’s economic bureaucracy at 
the center of economic policymaking. Economic ministers as all members of the 
cabinet are answerable only to the head of the Executive. Though subordinated to the 
President, economic ministers faculties for granting favors, their control over 
information and their key role in defining policy options have provided them with 
significant sources of independent power (1996, 56). 
 
This section examines the variables acting at the level of the relatively small group of 
government officials that together with the president had control of the political decision-
making process dedicated to foreign economic policy.   
The Mexican president has enormous political power within the state apparatus.  He 
or she enjoys ample discretion over three key governmental areas: 1) the selection of cabinet 
members, 2) foreign policy, and 3) economic policies (Jorge Carpizo 2002). The combination 
of these three attributes has helped to shape the pivotal importance and the makeup of the 
decision-making group that defines foreign economic policy.
16
   
The relative participation of various ministries in the group that dominates Mexican 
foreign economic policymaking depends on the issues at hand, the president’s leadership 
style, the policy-making institutional makeup, and the actual distribution of power among the 
cabinet members (Gámez Vázquez 2006). Traditionally, within the Mexican executive branch 
of government three main secretaries had shared and competed for influence over the 
elaboration and execution of trade policy and conclusion of trade agreements. They are: the 
                                                             
16
 Heredia (1996) notes that “[t]he absence of electoral competition and the declining importance of 
the PRI as a ladder into the upper echelons of the state apparatus increased the political significance of 
the economic bureaucracy, turning it –especially from the 1970s onward- into the pivotal locus of the 
struggle for state power’ (1996, 28-29). 
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Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Secretaría de 
Comercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) (Ministry of Commerce and Industrial 
Development), and the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP) (Ministry of 
Finance).  
In the beginning of post-revolutionary Mexico, the SRE had control over all aspects 
of foreign relations, including the promotion of trade and the negotiation of international 
agreements (Jorge A. Schiavon and Antonio Ortiz Mena L. N. 2001). The Finance Ministry 
occupied a dominant position in the Mexican economic bureaucracy, and had significant 
influence on  economic policies, including international trade. In the late 1940s, the SECOFI  
began to acquire increasing relevance in the shaping of trade policy (Heredia 1996).   
The creation of the Secretaría de Planeamiento y Presupuesto or SPP (Planning and 
Budget Ministry) in 1976 altered the balance of power among these ministries because the 
new office was charged with  
planning the future of the country, assigning the distribution of funds necessary to 
achieve that future, designing the procedures by which the administration would 
achieve these goals, and measuring the relative success of these policies (Centeno 
1999, 89).   
 
The SPP was able to accumulate enough resources to control policymaking within the 
governmental bureaucracy, thus becoming  a powerful political arbiter capable of influencing 
the path of economic development.  
In terms of the influence of economic ideas, those Mexican public officials who 
favored or were inspired by monetarist views tended to converge in public financial 
institutions such as the Banco de México, the Ministry of Finance, and the financial entity 
Nacional Financiera.
17
 Those who were influenced by structuralism found themselves 
working for Commerce and Industrial Development, decentralized state organizations and 
                                                             
17 Also known as Nafinsa, it was created by the government in 1934 to promote the stock market and 
channel financial resources to productive activities providing liquidity to the national financial system 
(Nafinsa 2012).  
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enterprises with state participation, and for a short while, the Planning and Budget Ministry 
(Elsa M. Gracida 2007). Yet, the arrival of De la Madrid as head of Planning and Budget in 
the Lopez Portillo administration changed the  ideological orientation of this institution by 
staffing it with professionals with whom he had worked before and that shared a similar 
liberal view of Mexico’s economic future, thus aligning it with the dominant ideas prevailing 
in the Finance Ministry (Centeno 1999; Gracida 2007).   
 As Salinas assumed the presidency, trade policy became a crucial centerpiece of the 
government economic strategy and thus, its formulation and implementation acquired special 
political relevance. Within a basic institutional framework that granted the president’s 
preeminence in foreign economic policymaking, and consistent with his leadership style,
18
 
Salinas introduced changes in the organization and composition of the governmental 
bureaucracy to ensure that his policy preferences could not be challenged and that the 
Mexican government acted as a unified force (Centeno 1999, Ortiz Mena L. N. 2005). 
To that effect, he selected an ideologically cohesive team of experts that shared his 
vision for Mexico, and created the Oficina de Coordinación de la Presidencia (OCP) (Office 
of Presidential Coordination) to oversee five specialized committees within the presidential 
cabinet: economy, agriculture, social development, foreign policy and national security.  
Centeno (1999) notes that “Salinas was masterful in balancing institutional powers with 
personal influence in his distribution of the cabinet seats” (1999, 95). Thus, for example, he 
allocated responsibility for the formulation of economic policy among Commerce and 
Industrial Development  (Jaime Serra Puche), Finance (Pedro Aspe), Planning and Budget  
(Ernesto Zedillo), and OCP (José Córdoba), making sure that none of them could develop 
enough bureaucratic power to overshadow his authority similarly to what he had done when 
                                                             
18 According to Bernardo Sepúlveda, Secretary of Foreign Relations in De la Madrid’s administration,  
“[t]he delegation (distribution or concentration) of [Mexican] foreign policy tasks and who is involved 
in it depends on the governing style of the president” (cited in Gámez Vázquez 2006, 172). 
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he was the head of SPB during De la Madrid’s administration (Centeno 1999).  
According to Schiavon and Ortiz Mena L. N. (2001), when Salinas became president 
in December 1988  
…the federal government lacked an effective organ to coordinate foreign policy, 
particularly in the area of international trade. Even when the SRE had the legal 
faculties to be in charge of the coordination of the bureaucracy in this area, it was 
overwhelmed by the diversity of international affairs in which the country was 
involved (2001, 740).  
  
Moreover, in 1986 De la Madrid had eliminated the Subsecretaría de Asuntos Económicos 
(Office for Economic Affairs) from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, thus effectively 
limiting that ministry capacity to influence the design of foreign economic policy (Gámez 
Vázquez 2006). 
It is not clear if this was the main reason that Salinas did not rely primarily on the 
SRE  to carry out his trade policy.
19
 It would seem that the importance of the economic 
dimension in foreign policy during his term facilitated an increasing influence of the 
secretaries concerned with the economy vis-à-vis the one dedicated to foreign affairs  
(Heredia 1997; cited in Gámez Vázquez 2006). Thus, he appointed Córdoba, his close 
advisor and head of Presidential Coordination, and Serra, head of Commerce and Industrial 
Development, as his emissaries to initiate negotiations with the United States toward a free 
trade agreement. Moreover, Salinas chose SECOFI to lead the negotiation of NAFTA, giving 
it ample authority to do so, while Foreign Relations  played a secondary role (Gámez 
Vázquez 2006; Ortiz Mena L. N. 2005). 
One  reason behind Salinas’ choice of SECOFI, Jaime Serra’s ministry, to lead the 
negotiation of NAFTA may have been his perception of the lack of ideological-political 
affinity of the diplomatic bureaucracy with his strategic vision for Mexico. As the official 
                                                             
19
 According to Gámez Vázquez (2006), Salinas’ decision may have been also influenced by Foreign 
Relations’ lack of initiative in seeking a prominent role in foreign economic policy and the promotion 
of international trade. As a presidential candidate Salinas sought the opinion of Bernardo Sepúlveda , 
head of Foreign Relations in De la Madrid’s administration in this regard, but Sepúlveda did not seize 
the opportunity to advocate for a greater policymaking role for his ministry (2006, 189). 
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diplomatic voice of Mexico in international affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Relations had 
been historically associated with a strong nationalist outlook that tended to view the United 
States solely or mainly as a threat to the country’s sovereignty (Golob 1999; 2003).  
Moreover, there was a perception that the diplomatic bureaucracy displayed considerable 
political independence and capacity that contradicted Salinas’s demand for a tightly unified 
governmental bureaucracy
20
 (Gámez Vázquez 2006).  
Gámez Vázquez (2006) concludes that Foreign Relations did not play a prominent 
role in the decision to create NAFTA because it was deprived from being part of the 
economic cabinet from which this initiative emerged:  
…although the secretary of Commerce  participated in the committee of foreign 
policy, the head of Foreign Relations did not do it in the committee of economy. Due 
to this situation, the Mexican foreign service  practically did not intervene in the 
design of the economic policy or in its establishment, at least not in the initial 
meetings that were considered decisive for the strategy of the government (2006, 
184). 
 
Fernando Solana, head of the Foreign Relations Ministry  during the Salinas government, 
acknowledged this state of affairs:  
[t]he economic relationship […] continues being handled by the Secretary of Finance, 
the Secretary of Commerce. What the Cancillería conducted permanently were the 
lines of politics and the coordination of the international presence of Mexico (cited in 
Víctor Arriaga 1994, 575).  
 
What role did the members of the economic cabinet (i.e., Jaime Serra Puche, Pedro Aspe, 
Ernesto Zedillo, and José Córdoba) play in the decision to seek a FTA with the United 
States? There seems to be no definite documentary evidence available in this regard.
21
   
According to Serra,
22
the head of Commerce and Industrial Development at that time, he was 
                                                             
20
 Grayson (1998) observes that “[b]ecause SRE personnel march to their own ideologically charged 
institutional drumbeat, major tensions traditionally strain the relationship between the ministry and 
Mexico’s ambassador to Washington, a presidential designee often lacking career staff members’ 
enthusiasm for gringo baiting” (1998, 80). 
21
 Gámez Vázquez (2006) observes that it is difficult to offer a definite analysis of the decision 
process within the governmental bureaucracy “because there is no evidence at hand of debates or 
meetings that could illuminate” it (2006, 127). 
22
 Personal interview by author with Jaime Serra Puche, head of SECOFI in Salinas’ cabinet, on 
October 25, 2010 in Mexico City. 
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the governmental actor that most influenced the decision besides president Salinas. Yet, José 
Córdoba has been widely acknowledged by the Mexican media and political observers as a 
very close advisor to the president with significant influence over his political decisions.
23
   
For Arriaga (1994), José Córdoba  and Serra Puche were key members of the small 
group responsible for the promotion of the major changes shaping the neoliberal economic 
policy. Fernando Solana represented the nationalist tradition, while the Mexican ambassador 
to the United States, Gustavo Petriccioli, supported  Salinas’ integration initiative and was his 
most important spokesmen in U.S. business circles.  
Arriaga (1994) also notes that “[a]mong these bureaucratic actors there were 
numerous clashes but in the end the line of Serra and Córdoba prevailed” (1994, 577; 
translated from Spanish). Yet, for this author, the bureaucratic actor of greater weight in the 
decision process was the Office of Presidential Coordination, because it was the link between 
Salinas and the cabinet.  During the Salinas’ sexenio the Mexican approach to foreign policy 
decision-making characteristically kept the handling of international economic policy and 
foreign policy institutionally separated. In this manner, the separation of functions tended to 
encourage inter-bureaucratic rivalries and a lack of adequate coordination among the 
secretaries responsible for economic matters and Foreign Relations.   
Yet, since Salinas’ project of economic modernization was of paramount importance, 
in case of conflicts among institutions, foreign policy decisions were subordinated to the 
needs of the group more clearly aligned with that project. Thus, in practice, this arrangement 
relegated traditional diplomats to a secondary role in the management of Mexican 
international politics (Arriaga 1994). Solana confirms that  
                                                             
23
 A former member of the presidential staff noted that "[Córdoba’s] agenda is the president's. He is in 
contact with constituencies abroad and knows what they want from Mexico. Salinas relies on him to 
make a coherent, broad economic policy. Salinas is skillful at the tactical level, but Córdoba has the 
strategic, long-term view" (Los Angeles Times 1992). 
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the specific weight that the economic policy and the group that integrated the 
economic cabinet had is undeniable. There is no doubt that they made the 
international decisions that influenced what has happened in the country (cited in 
Arriaga 1994, 578; translated from Spanish).  
 
 Córdoba (1994) reveals the important role played by the economic cabinet of an 
administration that prioritized a unified government to carry out its economic strategy: 
It has been argued that homogeneity of views on the part of the economic cabinet is a 
key element for the successful management of reform. It is surely a very useful 
attribute, and possibly even a necessary one […] but it is undoubtedly not a sufficient 
condition for success. In order to proceed with reforms, a president and his economic 
team must have a shared vision of the future and a clear overall policy design.  
Otherwise, precious time will be wasted in internal discussions, and political 
problems can arise from the clash of mutually incompatible economic lines of action.  
Vision, drive, and commitment are necessary to introduce radical change. Thus, in the 
initial stages of a reform process, the risks derived from excessive coherence of the 
economic team in government…are less than the costs associated with a permanent 
divergence of views […] In such situation, unity is preferable to diversity within the 
government. In Mexico, the economic team of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
88) was less philosophically homogeneous than that put together by his successor 
President Salinas. As a consensus on economic strategy emerged within the 
government over the course of 1980s, especially regarding the role of the state in the 
economy and the scope of trade liberalization, both the homogeneity of the economic 
team and the effectiveness of its policies increased (1994, 282; emphasis added). 
 
In terms of the bureaucratic politics approach, which tends to view the foreign policy 
outcomes as the result of negotiation among different governmental agencies or ministries, 
Gámez Vázquez (2006) concludes that in Mexico there was more consensus than bargaining 
among members of Salinas’ cabinet. This would be consistent with Salinas’ leadership style 
which encouraged consensus rather than compromise among dissenting views.   
According to Salinas (2002),  a cabinet meeting held immediately after he returned 
from Europe in February 1990, determined the choice of agreement type by rejecting the idea 
of a Common Market similar to the European model, while “on the other hand, the idea of an 
agreement that could include Canada gained strength” (2002, 53).  
National Politics  
The previous two sections examined Mexican domestic influences on the foreign 
economic policy-making connected to the creation of NAFTA from the perspectives of the 
individual decision-maker and the small circle of bureaucratic actors close to the president.   
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This section also looks at domestic factors but from a broader national perspective that 
includes other political and economic actors outside the sphere of the president’s office and 
the related governmental bureaucracies, such as the business community, labor unions, 
organized peasantry, Congress, political parties, and epistemic communities.  
Among the domestic forces, a powerful section of the private-interest sector  had a 
significant political role lobbying in favor of a FTA with the United States, which started 
during the De la Madrid’s sexenio. The rest of Mexican society largely reacted to the 
government’s decision once it had been made after Salinas’ return from Davos.    
The Mexican president was well-aware that his decision and the support of a portion 
of the business sector, however powerful, were necessary but not sufficient to close the deal.  
He needed to build broad social and political consensus: 
We had to begin by convincing Mexicans that it was worthwhile changing the 
historical relationship we had had with the United States. This required an ample 
process of explanation, dialogue, and negotiation with different groups and 
specialized sectors […] We had to promote a change in attitude toward Mexico’s 
hegemonic neighbor to the north. It was a matter of creating a new political culture in 
Mexico-U.S. relations. In the specific field of trade negotiation, an enormous task 
was forging a domestic united front -including government, businessmen, unions and 
campesino and rural organizations- to present to U.S. negotiators. [Otherwise] we 
would come to the negotiating table in a weakened position (Salinas 2002, 50). 
   
Business Organizations  
In drawing lessons from the Mexican experience with economic liberalization, José 
Córdoba (1994) concludes that: 
Accelerated trade liberalization does tend to motivate businessmen to form coalitions 
against the government in a more radical fashion than under a gradual program.  
However, this pattern did not emerge in Mexico, because of the clear and firm stance 
of the government and because of the establishment of a pro-liberalization lobby, 
composed of exporters who needed unhampered access to imported inputs to raise 
their level of competitiveness (1994, 244; emphasis added).   
 
The “pro-liberalization lobby” he refers to was a trade-policy business coalition24mainly 
                                                             
24  Adapting a definition provided by Thacker (2000) regarding state-business coalitions, I define 
trade policy business coalitions as alliances of actors joined together by shared interests and ideas to 
support or oppose certain kinds of policies. 
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composed of Mexican affiliates of U.S. transnational corporations (USTNCs) and large 
Mexican enterprises with substantial interests linked to international trade, which had also 
begun to have direct investments outside Mexico.
25
The latter included Mexican 
conglomerates with interests in various economic activities and often associated with 
transnational firms to obtain technology that allowed them to compete internationally (Carlos 
Alba Vega 1993; Flores-Quiroga 1998). This was a new development, which reflected the 
fact that by the late 1980s, Mexico’s modern economy had outgrown the autarkic ISI model 
of industrialization.  
USTNCs were responsible for about 50% of all Mexican sales of manufactures abroad 
(Alba Vega 1993). The three large companies of the automobile industry exported 80% of the 
auto parts; IBM exported 70% of the machinery to process information; two TNCs were 
responsible for 97% of cinematographic material; Resistol and Celanese were the largest 
exporters of resins and plastics; Tubos de Acero was almost the exclusive exporter of 
seamless tubes; Hewlett Packard and IBM dominated the export of typewriter parts and data 
processing (Carlos A. Rozo Bernal 1998). USTNCs were “natural allies” of the Mexican 
government in negotiating NAFTA, and “in fact, participated in diverse manners in the 
lobbying in favor of free trade” (Alba Vega 1993, 228), because they increasingly tended to 
export to their mother country and viewed growing U.S. protectionism at that time as a threat 
to their interests.  
Rozo Bernal (1998) credits the new economic policy of the Mexican government with 
influencing the export orientation of the TNCs, given that until 1982, they were 
fundamentally focused on the domestic market. The automobile industry, dominated by 
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, was the most clear example, since “from being the main 
contributor to the trade deficit until 1982 now it has become one of the main contributors to 
                                                             
25
 In other words, their economic growth has led them to operate as veritable transnational enterprises, 
also known as “multilatinas” (Javier Santiso 2008). 
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the surplus by modifying its participation in total exports from 2.38% in 1981 to 17.23% in 
1988” (1998, 183). In this manner, transnational corporations became one of the main 
promoters of export-led growth. 
The American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico A.C. (AmCham/Mexico), created in 
1917, is the main organization representing the interests of USTNCs in Mexico. Its members 
account for the vast majority of U.S. private direct investment in Mexico.
26
 Together with 
other U.S. organizations like the Council of the Americas (COA) and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (USCC), the AmCham/Mexico has been actively involved in lobbying for a FTA 
with the United States through the activities of a bi-national private-interest group, the 
Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (MEXUS). This committee became the organizational 
center of the bi-national pro-NAFTA business lobby, as described below.   
The emergence of large Mexican corporations with substantial interests in 
international trade and investment accelerated in the 1980s, encouraged by the increasing 
liberalization of the economy and the strategic promotion of exports.
27
 According to 
Hernández Rodríguez (1991), between 1955 and 1980, two fundamental changes affected the 
structure of the Mexican business sector: 
The first refers to the diversification in the size of private establishments that 
translates in different economic capacity and in interests that are not always 
coincidental despite of belonging to the same productive branch. The small 
[enterprise] […] that little by little has ceded its space to the micro-enterprise, is the 
most numerous in any productive branch, but the medium-size firm  augments its 
influence by its increasing concentration of capital. The second change consists in the 
economic strengthening of a reduced number of large consortiums that had become 
leaders in each sector of activity due to their concentration of the larger part of capital 
and the larger volume and value of production. As it is to be expected, this group of 
enterprises is very far from the concerns and interests of the others (1991, 452; 
translated from Spanish). 
 
                                                             
26
 Today, AmCham/Mexico includes more than 1,500 companies that account for almost 70% of 
direct investment in Mexico from the United States (AmChamMex 2012). 
27
 Among the most prominent of these firms at that time were: Alfa (steel, petrochemicals, and foods), 
Visa (beer, foods), Cydsa (plastics, chemical products), Vitro (glass), Imsa (steel, machinery), Protexa 
(petrochemicals, construction), Cemex (cement), Desc (chemical products, machinery), Hermes 
(transports, auto parts, machinery), ICA (construction, steel), Condumex (electric machinery) (Flores-
Quiroga 1998). 
 75 
 
The economic consequences of the 1982 crisis and the governmental policy response tended 
to hasten the process of industrial concentration initiated early in the decade thus reinforcing 
a shift in the balance of economic power in favor of large enterprises (Thacker 2000).  
Gonzalo Castañeda (2010) also notes that  
In the context of discretionary institutions dominated by corporatist relations, the 
GEP [post-revolutionary economic groups] generated enterprises of high profitability 
but low productivity. Before the lack of export capacity, poor aggregate savings and 
low tributary capacity, the macroeconomic crises favored an institutional re-
accommodation of greater political and economic opening. In this new environment, 
the groups were forced to re-direct the expansion of their businesses to the 
international market (2010, 612). 
 
The importance of large Mexican firms’ interests in foreign trade is underscored by the fact 
that in 1980 this group originated 77% of total exports of food, drinks and tobacco, 98% of 
wooden products, 70% of chemical products, 73.7% of non-metallic minerals, 64% of paper 
and publishing products, and 53.6% of steel products (Flores-Quiroga 1998). In addition, the 
economic logic of export-led growth encouraged some of these enterprises to seek 
acquisitions and mergers with foreign corporations in order to be able to compete on a global 
scale
28
 (Alejandra Salas-Porras 1992). 
The organizational representation of business interests in Mexico has been historically 
shaped by early state intervention after the Revolution (1910-1917). In 1918, the government 
created the two largest representative institutions of that sector, the Confederación Nacional 
de Cámaras de la Industria (Concamin) (National Confederation of Industrial Chambers) and 
the Confederación Nacional de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio (Concanaco) (National 
Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce), which thus acquired semi-official status.    
When in 1938 Lázaro Cárdenas reorganized and renamed the official National  
Revolutionary party (PNR) created in 1929 by President Calles into the Party of the Mexican  
Revolution (PRM), the predecessor to the PRI, he formally incorporated within the party 
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 For example: in 1989, Vitro acquired U.S. companies Anchor Glass and Latchford; and Cemex 
purchased several cement companies in Texas and California (Salas-Porras 1992).    
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structure labor, farmers and other popular sectors, which were thus represented in a  
corporatist-like manner, but excluded the business sector
29
 from such participation. 
Yet, in 1936, President Cárdenas effectively corporatized the business sectors 
organized in Concamin and Concanato via the replacement of the old law of chambers 
originated before the revolution, in 1908, with a new Law of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, which according to Branderburg (1964) “set the stage for the modern evolution of 
both chambers” (1964, 88). In this manner, Cárdenas not only corporatized workers and 
peasants into the official party, the PRM, but also capitalist sectors through chambers subject 
to state control.   
Story (1982) plausibly argues that precisely because the business sector was not 
within the institutional dominion of the PRI it had the potential for exerting independent 
influence on governmental decisions, including those related to foreign economic policy.
30
 
Instead, the government channeled private-sector political participation through state-
sponsored confederations, which thus became the main institutional mechanisms of business-
state interaction. In this manner, the government also exerted control of capital (i.e., industrial 
and commercial enterprises) along with the proletariat (i.e., wage-earners and peasants) via 
the PRI.   
Another important factor that has shaped the pattern of business-state relationships in 
Mexico is the relatively weaker role that the legislative branch of government plays vis-à-vis 
the executive in the political system. This has encouraged representatives of the private-
sector interests to focus their lobbying efforts on the president and his/her cabinet rather than 
on members of Congress. 
By the time Salinas de Gortari became president of Mexico, several major national 
                                                             
29 Persons within the business community could however become party members as individuals. 
30
 Story also identifies the intellectual community as another sector capable of having independent 
influence because it is not part either of the corporatist structure of the official party. 
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business organizations claimed, at times overlapping with each other, to represent a diversity 
of private-sector interests. State-sponsored organizations such as the Concamin, the 
Concanaco, and the National Chamber of Transformation Industries (Canacintra), coexisted 
with other private-interest entities that had been initiated by entrepreneurs independently of 
the state, like the Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (Coparmex) (Mexican 
Employers Federation), the Asociación de Banqueros Mexicanos (ABM) (Mexican Bankers 
Association), the Asociación Mexicana de Instituciones de Seguros (AMIS) (Mexican 
Insurance Association), the Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios (CMHN) (Mexican 
Businessmen Council), and the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE) (Business 
Coordinating Council). 
The semiofficial Concamin and Concanaco are all-encompassing organizations 
representing the interests of all industrialists and all commerce and service entrepreneurs, 
respectively. All firms are required by law to be affiliated with a chamber, which in turn has 
to be a member of one of the two confederations. A representative of SECOFI might attend 
their executive meetings and participate with voice but no vote.  
Formally, Canacintra is part of Concamin, but it tends to function independently.  
Created in 1941, this organization represents the interests of medium and small-size 
industrialists, also known as the New Group, that emerged during the WWII. After the war, 
they demanded protective backing from the state in order to continue growing, and were 
outspoken supporters of import-substitution industrialization.   
Politically, Canacintra has been perhaps the clearest voice from the Mexican business 
sector that opposed an FTA with the United States. In a document titled “International 
negotiations,” published in June 1990, the business organization presents its position 
regarding the relations between the two countries: 
… it is by no means  convenient to precipitate the signing of a broader free trade 
agreement [with the U.S.] without before evaluating the effectiveness and advantages 
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of the sectorial accords for the national industry […] the current conditions are not  
adequate to advance toward the establishment of a free trade zone to the interior of 
both nations. 
 
The paper calls attention  to the existing  asymmetry that characterizes the bilateral  
economic relationship  that places Mexico in a situation of disproportionate economic 
dependence on the United States. In this regard, it notes that while Mexico receives 63 
percent of all foreign investment from the U.S. that amount represents only 2 percent of all 
the capital that the U.S. channels to different countries of the world. Instead, Canacintra 
proposed that Mexico diversify its trade partners and the origin of foreign investments it 
receives in such manner that the country  would not become part of an economic bloc but that 
it negotiate with many nations and economic zones in formation (Marquez 1990). 
The Mexican Employers Federation (Coparmex) is a voluntary organization that 
represents all employers regardless of activity or industry. It was created in 1929 in response 
to governmental policies inspired by the conservative Monterrey Group, and as such it tended 
to express more extreme political views and to adopt more aggressive postures against the 
government of the PRI.   
 The Mexican Businessmen Council (CMHN) was founded in 1962 by thirty of the 
most prominent businessmen in the country, who are considered to hold most of the 
entrepreneurial power in Mexico (Camp 1989). It is a very elitist and secretive organization 
dominated by entrepreneurs of the largest industrial groups. According to a source cited in 
Camp (1989), “[t]he council is not an ordinary business organization –it does not pronounce 
publicly on major issues; it does not even have an office- yet the consensus that emerges from 
its secret deliberations determines the private sector’s political role” (1989, 168). Moreover, 
the CMHN has privileged access to state power, particularly the president: “we have constant 
access to the president, and we probably have meetings and meals with the secretary of the 
budget and programming at least once a week” (cited in Camp 1989, 169). 
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The Business Coordinating Council (CCE) was created in 1975 by an agreement 
between Concanaco, Concamin, Coparmex, ABM, AMIS, the National Agricultural 
Producers Council (CNA), and the CMHN, all of which participated as members with full 
voting rights. The purpose of the CCE was to coordinate the activities of the various member 
organizations. It functions as the political arm of the private sector. It appears as a peak 
representative of all Mexican business interests, but in practice the CMHN exerts 
considerable control (Camp 1989).   
Canacintra is also affiliated with the CCE but it can only participate with voice, not 
with vote.  The percentage of votes among the various organizations affiliated with the CCE 
is equally distributed with 14.3% each regardless of the size of their respective membership.  
Thus, the CMHN, which only has 30 individual members, has the same number of votes than 
Concamin and Concanaco, each with 125,000 and 500,000 affiliates respectively (Thacker 
2000).   
There are several other business organizations that represent in particular the interests 
of those Mexican entrepreneurs with ties to international trade. They are the Consejo 
Empresarial Mexicano para Asuntos Internacionales or CEMAI (Mexican Business Council 
for International Affairs), the Asociación Nacional de Importadores y Exportadores de la 
República Mexicana or ANIERM (National Association of Importers and Exporters), and the 
Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior or Conacex (National Council of Foreign Trade).  
These organizations, like Canacintra, are affiliated with the CCE, but do not enjoy the right to 
vote.   
CEMAI was created in 1951, to lobby “before the Mexican and foreign governments 
on issues related to Mexico’s international trade policy” (cited in Thacker 2000, 145).  
Formally, it has a cross-organizational membership of about 200 persons derived from 
members of Concamin, Concanaco, Canacintra, Coparmex, AMB, AMIS, and ANIERM. In 
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practice, “CEMAI draws principally from the ranks of the largest and most internationally 
integrated firms in Mexico” (Thacker 2000, 146). CEMAI played an active role as promoter 
of free trade with the United States, the negotiation of the 1987 framework agreement, and 
the negotiation of a comprehensive trade and investment, which eventually became NAFTA, 
mainly through its participation in MEXUS as the Mexican counterpart of the U.S. Council 
(see below).   
Salinas tacitly recognized CEMAI’s important role in this regard by selecting the 
national meeting of this business organization, on March 28, 1990, to publicly announce that 
the Mexican government was determined to conclude a FTA with the United States. This 
occurred in the wake of leaks to the press first published by the Wall Street Journal on March 
27, 1990, that Mexico had begun negotiations for the NAFTA (Truell 1990).  
ANIERM was founded in 1944 and represents approximately 500 companies.  It has 
the objective of promoting the internationalization of Mexican enterprises, products and 
services. Besides its early lobbying efforts before the Mexican government in favor of joining 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from the mid-1970s, and finally in support of De 
la Madrid’s decision to join in 1985, “ANIERM’s leadership presented a document 
specifically proposing the negotiation of a bilateral free trade agreement with the United 
States to PRI candidate Salinas” (Thacker 2000, 159).   
The case of Claudio Xavier Gonzalez Laporte, Chairman of the Board of Kimberley 
Clark of Mexico and one of the most prominent businessmen in Mexico, offers an example of 
the membership interconnections found among the various business organizations. He has 
participated in many enterprises’ board of directors, both Mexican and transnational (i.e., 
Telmex, Televisa, Banamex, Planet Hollywood, J.P. Morgan and Grupo Mexico among 
others), and has been president of the CCE, the CMHN, the COPARMEX, and the CEMAI 
(La Jornada 2000). The Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (MEXUS) is a bi-national private 
 81 
 
enterprise organization founded in 1948 with the goal of forging bilateral consensus on 
economic policy issues of common concern. As mentioned previously, MEXUS has been an 
instrumental conduit for the lobbying efforts of the powerful pro-free trade coalition 
composed  by USTNCs and large Mexican conglomerates. For that reason, it deserves a more 
detailed scrutiny. 
Each side of the bilateral business committee was represented by a respective council.  
The U.S. Council
31
 was sponsored by the Council of the Americas,
32
 which provided a legal 
umbrella, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AmCham/Mexico. The CEMAI acted as 
its counterpart.  Formal positions and decisions of the organization were arrived at by 
negotiation between the U.S. Council and CEMAI. Each of these councils had a chairman 
elected by their respective members and the two  co-chaired and ran MEXUS (Grayson 
2007).   
  The role played by MEXUS with respect to Mexico-U.S. economic integration bears 
strong resemblance to the case of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) in the 
development of the European Union. The ERT was born in 1983 as the Round Table of 
European Industrialists at a meeting of 17 leaders of major European corporations. The 
objective of the new grouping was “to revitalize European Industry and make it competitive 
again, and to speed up the process of unification of the European market.”33 This 
transnational business coalition promoted ideas and concepts that have helped to shape the 
agenda and discourse of European policymaking and played a major role in reviving the 
                                                             
31
 The US Council is a standing committee of the Council of the Americas, and plays an active role in 
public policy discussions related to North American economic relations. Its declared mission is “to 
strengthen the North American Community by advancing economic integration and promoting 
democratic stability, transparency, the rule of law, and cooperation throughout North America” (COA 
2005). 
32 It was founded by David Rockefeller in 1965 to promote Latin America’s economic growth through 
free markets and private enterprise.   
33
 Words of co-founder Wisse Dekker cited in Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn (2000). 
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European process of integration in the 1980s which led to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 
and the creation of the European Union in 1993 (Van Apeldoorn 2000).   
The Council of the Americas claims that “MEXUS was critical in the 
conceptualization, promotion, passage, and implementation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement” (COA 2005). Jaime Serra Puche, Secretary of Commerce and Industrial 
Development in Salinas’ government, who also served as Undersecretary of Finance in De la 
Madrid’s administration from 1986 to 1988, confirms that the “quiet, not flashy” political 
work carried out by MEXUS had “made commercial integration ‘realistic’ and ‘set the 
groundwork to launch NAFTA’” (cited in Grayson 2007, 98).   
According to Ambassador James R. Jones
34
 (2007), “[n]ot only did MEXUS play a 
critical role in the conceptual work that led to NAFTA, its members also wore out significant 
shoe leather on Capitol Hill, ultimately leading to the successful passage of NAFTA” (2007, 
vii). In a similar vein, Jaime Zabludovsky
35
 (2007) notes that “[t]he history of how Mexico 
proposed NAFTA to the United States in January 1990 is now well known […] What was 
less known is the role that a small group of business leaders played since the early eighties to 
pave the way for NAFTA […] The Understanding on Bilateral Subsidies signed in 1985 and 
the Bilateral Framework Agreement of 1987 were the brainchildren of MEXUS” (2007, xi-
xii). 
More than three decades after its foundation, MEXUS was still a relatively 
undeveloped enterprise: 
 [u]ntil 1982, casualness, flexible agendas, modest attendance, and informal meetings 
characterized sessions of the Mexico-U.S. committee. Discussion revolved around 
current issues –whether excise taxes, guest workers, investment requirements, border 
concerns, energy questions, guerrilla uprisings in Central America, or interpretations 
of the extremely complicated Automobile Pact (Grayson 2007, 65). 
 
                                                             
34
 U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (1993-1997) and Chairman of the U.S. Council of MEXUS (1997-2008). 
35 Deputy Chief for the Negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1990-
1994) and Undersecretary of International Trade Negotiations (1994-1998), Mexico’s Ministry of 
Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI).   
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The event that appeared to have triggered the revival of the committee was the bank 
nationalization decreed by Mexican president Lopez Portillo in August 1982. It created a 
serious political schism between the business sector
36
 and the government: “[t]he 
nationalization decision is the single most important cause, structurally and psychologically, 
of the rupture of the relationship between the Mexican private sector and the state” (Camp 
1989, 132). President Portillo’s decision also caused alarm and concern among U.S. 
corporations with interests in Mexico and within the U.S. government (De la Madrid 2004). 
Yet, that event alone does not explain why MEXUS became an active agent of 
political change in the 1980s. To play that role it required two additional factors: a bilateral 
ideational consensus among Mexican and U.S. members and the political initiative of its 
leadership to seize the opportunity created by changing conditions. The necessary political 
agency came from the U.S. co-chairman of the committee at that time, Rodman C. 
Rockefeller,
37
combined with the professional talent of his two close advisors, Robert E. 
Herzstein,
38
 chairman of the U.S. Council’s Subcommittee on Trade, and Guy F. Erb,39 
executive director of the Council.   
Rodman Rockefeller became the new chairman of the U.S. Council, and thus co- 
                                                             
36
 In Mexico, the banks’ interests were closely interconnected with the country’s leading corporations, 
largely through ownership.  In addition, banks owned the most important insurance companies and 
brokerage houses. Thus, when the state took ownership of the banks, it was perceived as a direct 
threat to the whole capitalist scaffolding of the country (Grayson 2007).   
37
 Rodman Rockefeller worked for the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), a private 
corporation launched in 1946 by his father, Nelson A. Rockefeller, that focused on developing the 
"basic economies" of developing countries, particularly in Latin America. He became its president in 
1968 and chairman from 1972 to 1991. Rodman Rockefeller directed the U.S. Council and as such he 
also co-chaired MEXUS from 1980 to 1994. He was a nephew of David Rockefeller.     
38
 Herzstein was an international lawyer, former Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade 
under the Carter administration, and chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of MEXUS. In the 1970s, 
he successfully represented the interests of the Sinaloa tomato producers then led by Manuel 
Clouthier (see footnote 45), in the so-called “Tomato War” against Florida growers (Grayson 2007).   
39 Erb was a former staff member of the U.S. National Security Council and the Overseas 
Development Council, principal in Erb & Madian, Inc., and Executive Director of the U.S. Council 
from 1983 to 1989. 
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chairman of MEXUS in 1980. Interested in renewing and reinvigorating the organization he 
began looking for the appropriate occasion to jumpstart the bi-national enterprise
40
 (Kelleher 
2007). Thus, at a plenary session of MEXUS that took place in October 1982 in Ixtapa, 
Mexico and attracted a larger number of participants than usual,
41
 Rodman Rockefeller noted 
that the prevailing sentiment among Mexican businessmen offered an opportunity to forge 
consensus for joint action:   
The Mexican private sector, in an economic crisis, as well as in a political crisis, had 
been accustomed to believing that it could live profitably and well within the ruling 
political structure. Lopez Portillo’s actions have dramatically proved to them that this 
is not true. They feel set adrift, considerably buffeted and insecure, seriously 
questioning the present system and their place in it. Psychologically, during the 
meeting, these conditions led to a warm response on the part of the Mexicans, both to 
the idea of holding the meeting at that time and to manifest support of the U.S. 
delegation (cited in Grayson 2007, 66).  
  
Years later, Herzstein recalled that the 1982 meeting offered an opportunity for decisive 
action since there was “a hiatus between Mexican administrations […] and the designated 
officials for the next term are seeking business’s advice on economic policy much more than 
is the case once they and their policies are in place” (cited in Kelleher 2007, 21). Moreover,  
[b]y the 1980s, Mexico’s government and business were increasingly populated by 
energetic, very well-educated young leaders, many of whom had attended universities 
in the U.S. or Europe. They saw economic, political and social possibilities that had 
not been realized in Mexico. They were ready to change things and notions being 
advanced by MEXUS coincided with their own views and received their prompt 
support (cited in Kelleher 2007, 21).  
 
Already in the previous plenary session of MEXUS held in Washington, D.C. in December 
                                                             
40
 Interestingly, by the same time, his uncle David Rockefeller was also actively seeking ways to re-
activate the role of the organizations he led. He was chairman of both the Council of the Americas 
(COA) and its cultural aide, the Center for Inter-American Relations (CIAR), a position he had 
reassumed in 1981, immediately after retiring from his job as chairman and chief executive of the 
Chase Manhattan Bank. The COA was a sponsor of MEXUS.  In his Memoirs, David Rockefeller 
notes: “I discovered during three trips to South America in 1982 and 1983 that our organizations, 
which had been in existence for almost twenty years, were virtually unknown […] The Americas 
Society and the Council had little visibility and no constituency in Latin America. If it was to be 
effective, that had to change” (Rockefeller 2003, under “Rejuvenating the Initiative,” in Chapter 28).   
41
 The number of Mexican participants reached 52 against 55 on the U.S. side (Grayson 2007, 70).   
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1981, Rodman Rockefeller and his Mexican counterpart, Manuel J. Clouthier,
42
 had explored 
ways to reactivate the work of the bi-national committee. To that effect, Herztein and Erb 
prepared a paper on trade and investment policy to be presented at the next meeting in Ixtapa 
which developed the concept of a bilateral framework agreement into a proposal to be 
included in MEXUS’s agenda for action to promote the liberalization of bilateral trade policy.  
In their proposal, Erb and Herztein argued that  
[t]he changed U.S. attitudes toward Mexico […], Mexico’s greater weight in the 
world economy […] and the magnitude of U.S.-Mexican bilateral trade make it 
necessary for both nations to examine alternatives to their current lack of a 
commercial agreement. A stable and well-defined trade policy framework would 
enhance Mexico’s capacity to diversify its exports and contribute to U.S. expectations 
that Mexico would continue to be a significant partner for long-term trade and 
investment. Prospects for renewed growth in trade and investment between the two 
nations would be enhanced if the two governments made progress toward a mutually 
acceptable commercial agreement (cited in Kelleher 2007, 21-22). 
 
Yet, although conditions had changed favorably for MEXUS intervention, there was no clear 
consensus on the idea of joint action for a bilateral framework agreement, particularly among 
the Mexican participants in the Ixtapa meeting who expressed doubts about the practicality of 
the proposal prepared by Herztein and Erb. It was in 1984, at the 39
th
 plenary session of 
MEXUS that things began to change in the direction desired  by the U.S. Council leaders. At 
that time, Mexican Commerce Secretary Héctor Hernández Cervantes attended the meeting 
accompanied by his two principal undersecretaries and exchanged views with the participants 
(Grayson 2007).   
In addition, Salinas, who was then Secretary for Planning and Budget in De la 
Madrid’s cabinet and his Undersecretary of Planning, Pedro Aspe, had already met with 
members of the U.S. Council several times during trips to New York City. According to Erb, 
they came to New York City to work with MEXUS and “helped us jump start the work 
                                                             
42
 Clouthier was a tomato producer from Sinaloa, president of the Unión Nacional de Productores de 
Hortalizas from 1971 to 1973, president of  COPARMEX  from 1978 to 1980,  president of the 
Business Coordinating Council (CCE) from 1981 to 1983, and candidate of the National Action Party 
(PAN) for President in the 1988 elections. 
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before the 1985 meeting with President De la Madrid” (cited in Grayson 2007, 85). This led 
Rodman Rockefeller to express his satisfaction for the progress made: 
After two years of work I think it fair to say that the U.S. Council has achieved a 
breakthrough with the leadership of the Mexican business community and possibly 
with the Mexican government. There appears to be uniform respect for the 
correctness and integrity of our positions in regards to trade and investment. The 
Mexican business community understands as never before the degree to which we 
must not only adopt joint positions but actively support joint positions before our 
respective governments. The opportunity to build on this achievement is now open to 
us (cited in Grayson 2007, 85). 
 
The meeting of MEXUS members with President De la Madrid took place on February 11, 
1985 at the presidential residence. It signaled a turning point in the relation between the 
Mexican government and the powerful binational business coalition. The President’s message 
was very well received by the business leaders because it evidenced that the government was 
receptive to their concerns and recommendations.  He  said: 
I agree that Mexico must seek, together with its trading partners and especially with 
the United States of America, a frame of reference that will give us all greater 
assurances and thus make it possible to plan exporting  efforts that are so necessary 
for the country’s economic recovery […] I believe we should seek a firmer, broader 
and more  certain framework. The convenience of a bilateral treaty between the U.S. 
and Mexico to cover the basic aspects of our economic relations has been mentioned.  
The Mexican government is willing to consider an arrangement [of] this nature. It is a 
matter of verifying its contents, scope, and repercussions and whether it is really a 
dynamic and equitable framework for both countries (cited in Grayson 2007, 86). 
 
Subsequently to this event, Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in 1986.  On November 6, 1987, PR Newswire announced the signing of the 
framework agreement by Mexico’s Secretary of Commerce and Industrial 
Development, Héctor Hernández Cervantes, and U.S. Trade Representative, Clayton 
Yeutter, noting the instrumental role played by MEXUS at that time:  
The approval of this agreement caps a six-year process which began in 1981 with 
proposals by business leaders for a bilateral commercial accord. Meeting in New 
Orleans this week, the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (MEXUS), which originally 
sponsored the idea of a bilateral commercial agreement, expressed appreciation to 
Presidents de la Madrid and Reagan, who at their meeting of August 1986 instructed 
their negotiators to complete the bilateral accord in 1987. At the 42nd plenary 
meeting of MEXUS, Co-chairmen Juan Elek and Rodman C. Rockefeller heralded 
the accord as providing the basis for a more open trading and investment relationship 
between the two countries. Rockefeller said that the agreement had resulted from a 
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very constructive series of business-government consultations in both countries over 
the past six years (PRNewswire 1987; emphasis added).  
 
Immediately after this accomplishment, MEXUS began to pursue the conclusion of a more 
ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement between the two countries. On November 21, 
1988, more than a year before Salinas’ decision to seek a trade agreement with the United 
States, PR Newswire made public MEXUS’s support for a free trade agreement between the 
two countries:  
On the eve of the first meeting between Presidents-elect George Bush and Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, MEXUS announced its support for the negotiation of a 
comprehensive bilateral trade and investment accord […] At its 43rd plenary 
meeting, MEXUS highlighted mutually reinforcing actions by business and 
government that can create the economic conditions for increased growth and job 
creation in both countries: 1) Reduce the legal and regulatory obstacles to immediate 
increases in the flows of private direct investment and technology to Mexico; 2) 
Restore Mexico’s international creditworthiness to attract the debt and equity capital 
essential for renewed solutions to the debt problem and increased lending to Mexico 
by the multilateral development banks; and 3) Make steady progress toward a 
comprehensive agreement to liberalize, and eventually remove, obstacles to trade and 
investment between our two countries. The plenary communique also noted that the 
U.S. and Mexican economies are increasingly becoming mutually interdependent.  
Therefore, the committee’s private sector  leaders believe that there is a need for 
increasing bilateral cooperation as Mexico and the U.S. jointly gear up for global 
competition (PRNewswire 1988).  
 
Not surprisingly, in his Memoirs, David Rockefeller (2003) largely credited his nephew 
Rodman Rockefeller and the U.S. Council for the changes in Mexico’s trade policy at that 
time: 
 [they] convinced their Mexican business and banking counterparts to abandon their 
traditional support for high tariffs and other protectionist policies […] The Mexican 
members then informed President de la Madrid that a reversal of Mexico’s traditional 
protectionist policy would have their full support. With important elements of the 
business establishment behind him, de la Madrid, in 1986, took the initial steps. 
These included unilaterally reducing tariffs, selling-off some state-owned companies, 
and announcing that Mexico would join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
–steps that fundamentally altered Mexico’s relationship with rest of the world and set 
its course for the future (2003, 436). 
  
In retiring as chairman of the U.S. Council in 1994, Rodman Rockefeller credited MEXUS 
with paving the road to NAFTA:  
Business Committee has led the evolution of business thinking within the U.S. and 
Mexico toward the liberalization of trade and investment, culminating finally by 
participating in the passage of NAFTA […] Our members wrote the text which 
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became the basis for the Commercial Framework Agreements in 1987, which was the 
basis for the subsequent trade negotiations (cited in Grayson 2007, 115).  
 
In recalling those events, Guy Erb conveys a similar idea about the influential role of 
MEXUS: 
MEXUS developed a consensus among key Mexican business leaders in favor of a 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement (FTA). Thus, when President Salinas 
announced his support for an FTA he had a foundation of support that allowed him to 
confront the protectionism that had been common in the Mexican business 
community until then. In the U.S., as a result of the Business Committee’s work 
major corporations and business organizations lined up in support of the NAFTA 
soon after the Bush-Salinas agreement to open FTA negotiations (cited in Kelleher, 
2007, 22). 
 
It is important to note that MEXUS’s leaders, like the powerful members of CMHN, 
deliberately followed a low-key approach in lobbying for their proposals with U.S. and 
Mexican authorities. They typically avoided publicity for their recommendations, circulated 
their ideas through so-called “non-papers” or memoranda that lacked cover sheets or 
letterhead, and refrained from mentioning expressions like “North American Free Trade 
Agreement.” The idea was to prevent any damaging allegation that they were interfering with 
public policy decision-making that could jeopardize their efforts (Grayson 2007). There is no 
question that the discreet diplomacy utilized by MEXUS’s officials has helped to obscure the 
extent of this transnational business coalition’s influence on trade policymaking.  
The coalition of business corporations from Mexico and the United States organized 
in MEXUS did not just lobby governments by making use of their economic power and 
political clout. Like its European counterpart, the ERT, it also engaged in a battle of ideas and 
arguments to convince and create political consensus. They both framed their cases in favor 
of economic integration as necessary for the greater good of the nation and the region so as to 
meet the political concerns of governments. Thus, the ERT argued that their aim was “not for 
the interests of individual sectors, but for the competitiveness of Europe.”43 In a similar 
                                                             
43
 Statement of Helmut Maucher, former Chairman of the ERT in 1997, cited in Van Apeldoorn 
(2000, 160). 
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fashion, MEXUS contended that the goal was to ready the two mutually interdependent 
economies for international competition.   
Organized Labor 
The Mexican labor movement, chiefly represented by official organizations affiliated 
with the PRI, did not have any significant participation in the initial policymaking process 
leading to NAFTA, and did not actively engage in the public debate that followed the official 
announcement by the government.  It did offer however, important political support that the 
president needed to offset resistance from sectors actively opposed to it because of material 
and ideological reasons. Organized labor in Mexico was thus principally a passive ally that 
facilitated the government’s implementation of its economic integration policy. 
This assessment of the influence of organized labor on policymaking in connection 
with NAFTA appears consistent with historical patterns.  According to Camp (1989), “The 
scholarly view and the economic facts themselves suggest at best a minor role for unions” in 
policymaking. For example, in the noteworthy case of the profit-sharing plan in the 1960s, 
the pattern that emerges was: “First, the president provided the initiative for the reforms.  
Second, organized labor played a very passive role. Third, labor lacked unity. Fourth, labor’s 
role was reactive. Fifth, compared with the private sector’s, labor’s efforts to influence the 
outcome were unimpressive” (1989, 124).  
Mexican labor organizations in the 1980s included more than 11,000 unions with a 
total of about 4.0 million members,
44
 or only one-sixth of a labor force estimated at  almost 
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 Grayson (1989) offers a much higher total figure of union members: 9.5 million workers, based on 
information from the U.S. Department of Labor in 1987. Trejo Delarbre’s (1990) estimation is based 
on official Mexican data and information from the union organizations. “Researchers that in diverse 
institutions and with different approaches had asked themselves for the percentage of salaried workers 
that have labor unions arrive at different data, but in all cases there is coincidence that less than a 
quarter of Mexican workers have labor organizations. One of the best documented studies, directed by  
Cesar Zazueta in the Centro Nacional de Información y Estadísticas del Trabajo (National Center of 
Labor Information and Statistics), that belonged to the Secretaría del Trabajo (Labor Secretariat) […] 
considers that less than three of every ten Mexicans with occupation or with the possibility of having 
one, can really form labor unions ” (Trejo Delarbre 1985, 144; translated from Spanish).  
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24 million people
45
 (Trejo Delarbre 1990). These were concentrated in strategic areas of the 
economy historically controlled by the State or with significant state intervention (i.e., 
energy, railroads, mining and metallurgy, banking, etc.). Here, almost all workers were 
affiliated to unions by branch of activity.  In other important areas of the Mexican economy 
dominated by the private enterprise, a combination of modern, highly technical form of 
production and the historical legacy of union struggle had facilitated the establishment of 
strong unions with high rates of affiliation, such as in the case of the automobile industry 
(Trejo Delarbre 1985). 
Despite the presence of thousands of union organizations, in the 1980s the Mexican 
labor movement  was dominated by a few large central organizations and national 
confederations.
46
 Yet, it was not monolithic. Far from it, “the different historical and 
conjunctural motivations, as well as the frequent influence of cacicazgos
47
 and rivalries 
among leaders, had constituted a panorama that is distinguished by  disorder and  
heterogeneity” (Trejo Delarbre 1985, 146). In addition, a myriad of groups, large and small, 
weak and powerful, included in a variety of organizations at different levels (i.e., unions by 
enterprise, industry-wide unions, national and regional federations, and large confederations) 
was  a source of inequality and disunion that hindered  overall unity among the four million 
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 “In Mexico, in 1982, more than twenty million workers received compensation in a regular manner.  
A quarter of them worked in the agricultural and fishing sectors; close to 300 thousand in mining; 
almost 2.5 million in the manufacturing industries; 1.8 million in construction; close to 70 thousand in 
electricity;  more than 2.72 million in commerce, hotels and restaurants; close to one million in 
transportation, storage services and communications; almost 0.5 million in financial, insurance and 
real estate services, and more than 6 million in a very wide category denominated communal, social 
and personal services  […] but it is necessary to consider that every year there are 800 thousand 
Mexicans that demand new jobs ” (Trejo Delarbre 1985, 143-44).  
46
 “What are the figures for unionization in our country, per labor centrals and labor unions? This is, 
for those who study the labor movement, one of the most difficult questions to answer. As we 
indicated before, very disparate calculations and assertions are often made about such data, and here 
one of the most notable deficiencies in official statistics is found. Against this lack of information, 
only partial and necessarily insufficient re-counts remain. Any estimate about union affiliation has to 
be approximate” (Trejo Delarbre 1985, 146; translated from Spanish). 
47
 It refers to the powerful influence of caciques or chieftains who rule organizations in an 
authoritarian manner (Paul Friedrich 1965; Victoria Lerner 1980). 
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members (Trejo Delarbre 1985).   
Union leaders at the helm of those paramount labor organizations were able to project 
a wider and more unified representation than that warranted by its relatively small and 
divided membership. Under certain conditions they could exert “their political influence and 
the capacity of these organizations to represent the interests of several million more Mexicans 
that without being unionized have needs, problems and concerns similar to those who are 
organized” (Trejo Delarbre 1985, 145-46). 
The large central labor organizations and national confederations emerged and were 
shaped by the intervention of post-revolutionary governments in Mexico. As noted by 
Erickson and Middlebrook (1982): 
In any nation that develops modern industrial activities, the manner in which the 
emerging labor movement is incorporated into the national political system will 
have enduring consequences both for the structure of the system as a whole and for 
labor’s future economic and political participation within it (page 214).  
   
Cárdenas sought to transform and thus strengthen the PNR created by Calles so that it could 
serve as a pillar of the state and the chief executive. To that effect, he did two important 
things. First, he changed the party’s coalitional structure into a solid unified party 
organization by disbanding all organized internal factions. Second, he converted the party 
into a mass organization by promoting the organization of workers and peasants into single 
national confederations, and incorporating them formally into the new PRM, thus 
institutionalizing a political alliance with broad popular sectors (Collier and Collier 2002).   
In this manner, Cárdenas set the foundations for the PRM’s (eventually the PRI’s) 
paramount political role in a centralized Mexican state, and facilitated organized labor’s 
access to national political decision-making. Yet, the fact that its participation was 
instrumented from above rather than conquered from below indelibly shaped organized 
labor’s political subordination and lack of independence vis-à-vis the political elite 
dominating the party, which over the long-run has favored the interests of the private sector  
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(Camp 1989). 
An organizational point of confluence for the Mexican labor movement is the 
Congreso del Trabajo (CT) (Congress of Labor), an umbrella organization created in 1966 
under the encouragement of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz as a means to facilitate a better 
governmental control of the labor movement by bringing together all the large official labor 
organizations existing at that time: the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) 
(Confederation of Mexican Workers), the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y 
Campesinos (CROC) (Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants), the 
Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) (Regional Confederation of Mexican 
Labor), the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) (General Confederation of 
Workers), and the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicios del Estado (FSTSE) 
(Federation of Workers’ Unions at the Service of the State), as well as important unions such 
as those representing textile, airline, sugar cane, oil, railroad, mining-metallurgical, electrical, 
and telephone workers (Grayson 1989). 
The CT was created with the goal of unifying Mexican workers around uniform 
political positions.  Yet, inside it diverse and sometimes opposing political currents coexist.  
Thus, in practice, given the loose integration of its component organizations to it,
48
 the CT 
functions more as a coordinating organism of workers interests.
49
 In turn, this may serve the 
government in its attempts to control the labor movement through a peak organization 
(Grayson 1989; Trejo Delarbre 1985). 
The CTM was created in 1936 as a united confederation of labor unions at a labor 
congress sponsored by Lázaro Cárdenas 
 
(Collier and Collier 2002). It was formally 
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 “No member has to modify its structure or abandon its bureaucratic interests to enter” and “all 
policy decisions that commit its members to a specific course of action must be reached by a 
unanimous vote of its 33 affiliates” (Grayson 1989, 44).  
49
 Within the CT, the CTM has more than one million and an half members. The rest of the central 
organizations have between 800 and 900 thousand members; the  FSTSE one million; and the national 
unions and federations (excluding those already accounted for in central organizations) close to 400 
thousand (Trejo Derlarbre 1985).  
 93 
 
integrated into the official party as one of its principal sectors with the goal of serving as an 
ally in mobilizing popular support for the economic and social reforms propelled by the 
government.
50
   
The CTM is the most important labor organization within the CT and the Mexican 
labor movement at large in terms of numbers and influence. It is considered the largest entity 
by far in membership, despite the uncertainty of the estimates that vary between four million 
and only one and one half million  affiliated workers.
51
 It includes thirty two state 
federations, in turn divided into hundreds of local and regional federations, also incorporating 
about thirty national unions of industry, like the important Sindicato Único de Trabajadores 
Electricistas de la República Mexicana (SUTERM) (Union of Electrical Workers) and the 
Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Petroleros (Petroleum Workers Union), which participate 
with their own votes in the CT (Trejo Delarbre 1985). 
By the 1980s, the CTM had evolved into a bureaucratic organization largely 
subservient to the political needs of the PRI and subject to the authoritarian rule of a leader 
like Fidel Velázquez, who remained at the helm for an unparalleled period of more than five 
decades.  In this manner, within the corporatist framework the CTM could do what the 
President wanted without incurring significant opposition from union members.   
Yet, it is important to also note that  the CTM’s historical pattern of political behavior 
has not always been one of quiescent support of the government.
52
 As observed by Trejo 
Delarbre (1985), the CTM “is, today [mid-1980s] a source of consensus but also of protest  to 
                                                             
50
 “Cardenas’ post-revolutionary actions were influenced by the ‘popular front’ strategy of 
contemporary Europe, which advocated a multiclass alliance to promote progressive socioeconomic 
and political change” (Erickson and Middlebrook 1982, 215).  
51
 “We dare to say that, very likely, not even the CTM leaders know how many workers belong to 
their central […] Fidel Velázquez has affirmed that it represents more than four million and a half 
workers. Several investigators indicate figures that fluctuate between one and a half million and three 
million.  We […] think that the CTM has approximately one and a half million  union members” 
(Trejo Delarbre 1985, 147-48; translated from Spanish). 
52“The widely recognized stability of the Mexican system must be understood in terms of the constant 
renegotiation of the labor-state alliance” (Collier and Collier 2002, 597). 
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the official economic policy and to bulwarks of  the political system like the PRI” (1985, 147; 
translated from Spanish). Thus, for example, the CTM was active in proposing an alternative 
program of economic reforms that the CT approved in 1978, which included nationalizations, 
strengthening of the state sector of the economy, in order to develop the “social sector” (i.e., 
enterprises in charge of unions and similar institutions) (Trejo Delarbre, 1985) 
The oldest labor central organization in Mexico is the CROM, founded in 1918. It 
controls a membership of about 250,000 workers (estimates oscillate between 200,000 and 
300,000), particularly among small enterprises. A smaller organization, the Confederación 
Obrera Revolucionaria (COR) (Revolutionary Worker Confederation), includes more than 
100,000 workers, was formed in 1975, formed by union activists expelled from the CTM. 
The CGT, which emerged in the early 1920s with an initial anarcho-syndicalist orientation, 
and became affiliated with the official party in 1935, has a membership of about 50,000 
workers.  
The CROC is the second most important labor organization after the CTM, with a 
membership that oscillates between 400 and 500 thousand workers, mostly from restaurants, 
automobile industry, shoe industry, and refreshments (industria refresquera). The CROC 
emerged from the merger of several other organizations (CPN, COCM, CNT, and CUT) and 
is also affiliated with the PRI. It has been used by the Mexican government to counterbalance 
the power of the CTM.   
Another prominent labor organization in the CT is the FSTSE, the union of state 
employees and civil servants, which encompasses about one million workers. Yet, this 
organization also participates in the National Confederation of Popular Organizations 
(CNOP), constituting what Trejo Delarbre (1985) qualifies as “one of the diverse 
incongruences that are maintained within the structure of the official political party” (1985, 
149; translated from Spanish), since in this manner, it is simultaneously part of both the  
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party’s “labor sector” (CT) and the “popular sector” (CNOP). 
Besides the CT’s conglomerate of official organizations there exist several other 
smaller labor organizations that are considered independent of the corporatist system. These 
are: the Unidad Obrera Independiente (UOI) (Independent Labor Unity), the Federación 
Nacional de Sindicatos Independientes (FNSI) (National Federation of Independent Unions),   
the Sindicato Único Nacional de Trabajadores Universitarios (SUNTU) (United National 
Union of University Workers), and other small unions that do not belong to any organization 
affiliated to the CT that carry out intense ideological-political activity such as the Frente 
Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT) (Authentic Labor Front). 
The political support from official organized labor to NAFTA was not immediately 
forthcoming. There were some initial negative reactions from labor leaders when in March 
1990 it was leaked to the press that Mexico was seeking an FTA with the United States. This 
early opposition tended to reflect traditional political views and concerns within the PRI and 
the leadership of official labor organizations, and it was a warning to Salinas that labor’s 
immediate support could not be taken for granted.   
Thus, on April 9, 1990, the head of the CTM, Fidel Velázquez, declared that the  
creation of a common market between Mexico, United States and Canada would generate 
unemployment. He noted that the adhesion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
had not brought favorable results for Mexican labor due to the flood of foreign goods that had 
adversely affected the Mexican industry with unemployment. Velázquez further warned that 
the labor movement was opposed to the common market idea and would participate in the 
convocation to an ample debate that Salinas had proposed to the Mexican Senate a few days 
earlier, in order to expose its disadvantages (Garciadiego 1994). 
 Velázquez’s warning was immediately followed by adverse declarations from other 
labor organizations on April 11, 1990. One, for example, came from Ignacio Cuauhtémoc 
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Paleta, leader of the CROM, who on April 11, 1990 qualified Mexico’s entrance in a North 
American bloc as highly risky, and recommended to carefully analyze the pros and cons of 
that possibility. Another came from the CNT, which rejected the entrance to the North 
American bloc, recommending that Salinas first resolved the national panorama and only 
later tried to conquer international markets (Garciadiego 1994). 
Later in April 1990, during the session of the National Consultative Forum on 
Mexico’s Trade Relations with the World (Spanish: Foro Nacional de Consulta sobre las 
Relaciones Comerciales de México con el Mundo),organized by the Mexican Senate, Jorge 
Leipen Garay, CTM’s director of Industries, conveyed a less contentious view than that of the 
Velázquez’s. He requested that trade relations follow the guidance of the Constitution, that 
the strategies devised serve the development of the country, and that there be a recognition of 
workers’ rights.  
During the course of the national forum, there were other declarations from CTM 
representatives that constituted expressions of concern with the potential consequences for 
Mexican workers rather than a firm opposition to it. Thus, for example, the deputy Ricardo 
Pacheco Dominguez, representative of the CTM Durango, noted that  
…the search for international agreements that  attempt to situate Mexico  at the  
forefront had been and will be supported by the cetemists […] but opening trade 
agreements, more so when are contracted with more developed countries than ours, 
could  have  unintended  consequences for the Mexican working class […] if our 
trade relations with Canada and the United States represent high percentages of our 
total trade we must find with them agreements capable of allowing Mexico and its 
workers better standards of living… (Garciadiego 1994, 92; translated from Spanish). 
   
The position of official organized labor however, began to fall into place immediately after 
the Mexican Senate formally closed the national debate on May 21, 1990 and officially 
declared  that the majority of presenters were in agreement that it was necessary to intensify 
and improve the ties with the United States through the negotiation of a bilateral free-trade  
agreement.   
On June 12, 1990, Porfirio Camarena Castro, economic advisor of the CTM, declared 
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that the importance of this agreement once it was signed, resided in that it would  increase the 
levels of exports and revenues, and it would improve the technological process, so that the 
accord would be  attractive and beneficial for the country, not only in the commercial terrain 
but also in the improvement of the balance of payments (Garciadiego 1994, 115).  
That same day, several labor leaders manifested their careful support. Roberto 
Castellanos Tovar, leader of the CROC, declared that the agreements that president Salinas 
had concluded were positive, and that  satisfactory results could be foreseen for the economy 
of the country. In a more cautionary tone, Mario Suarez, secretary of the CRT, noted that the 
principle of sovereignty should be respected, recommending that the CT should analyze the 
pros and cons of the trade agreement. Jorge Sanchez Garcia, leader of the Sindicato 
Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) (Electricians Mexican Union), declared that “what interests 
us as workers is that [the FTA with the U.S.] does not signify setbacks but, on the contrary, 
salary and social justice vindications” (Garciadiego 1994, 115). 
By mid-June 1990, Fidel Velázquez had already begun to turn away from his initial 
opposition to NAFTA, declaring that the FTA between Mexico and the United States would 
be more beneficial than  the entry to the GATT. He clarified that this agreement by no means 
signified a competition with the economies of Canada or United States, but an effort to gain 
access to foreign markets for our products and give them a better opportunity for expansion 
(Garciadiego 1994, 120).  
It is important to note that at the time that Salinas launched his integration initiative, 
Mexico’s organized labor confronted a situation of crisis and political paralysis in the midst 
of profound changes in the country’s political economy as a result of the government’s 
program of liberal reforms. This helps to explain labor’s relative lack of initiative and passive 
reaction to NAFTA, as described by Monaco and Trejo Delarbre (1993): 
The great majority of  labor leaders had let pass the extraordinary opportunity that the 
debate formal and informal, about the FTA meant. They had confined themselves to 
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old reiterations that account more for their own insecurity than for their interest to 
influence (or to try to influence) one of the most important national debates of  recent 
times. The great majority of union leaders had conformed themselves  to  demanding 
that nothing changes in the labor laws  or in the content of the collective contracts, or 
in their relation to the State when […] the country is changing irremediably […] and 
when besides   the many transformations of these times it continues being evident the 
paralysis of the so-called labor movement (Monaco and Trejo Delarbre 1993, 12; 
translated from Spanish). 
 
By February 1991, Fidel Velázquez declared CTM’s unconditional support “because the 
federal government will respect the rights of the workers” (cited in Moncayo and Trejo 
Delarbre 1993, 20; translated from Spanish). Three months later, Nezahualcoyotl de la Vega, 
senator and secretary of Economic Affairs of the CTM, offered a more nuanced support that 
explained the potential benefits for Mexican labor: 
it is hoped […] that [with the FTA] there will be a captive market of 360 million 
inhabitants, that there will not exist unfair competition […] This will bring as a result 
greater investments, fresh capital to Mexico and, what is fundamental, the creation of 
greater possibilities of employment (cited in Moncayo and Trejo Delarbre 1993, 19; 
translated from Spanish). 
 
Finally, the National Committee of the CTM issued its formal position in August 
1991, “The CTM before the Free Trade Agreement,” where it manifested its support for the 
economic policies of the government, including the opening up of the economy. It argued that 
the FTA would have as central objective to facilitate greater economic development for 
Mexico, with increased production and greater material wellbeing for the Mexican people.  
But it also warned about possible adverse effects on union rights, employment and workers’ 
living standards. However, it did not show an active interest in participating in the 
discussions at the negotiating table (Moncayo and Trejo Delarbre 1993). The CT announced 
its support for the FTA in July 1991, noting that the country will  come to it with very low 
wage levels, more than eight million  unemployed workers and with  situations of injustice 
that could be diminished with the trade opening (Moncayo and Trejo Delarbre 1993).   
The negligible role that organized labor played in the initial policymaking process of 
NAFTA was followed by its modest participation in the actual negotiation of the agreement.  
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Francisco Hernández Juárez, general secretary of the Sindicato de Telefonistas de la 
República Mexicana (STRM) (Telephone Workers’ Union of the Mexican Republic), a leader 
who promoted a more independent participation of labor within the CT and who sat at the 
NAFTA’s negotiating table,53 offered a stark assessment of organized labor’s participation:   
The signature of the Treaty has costs. To reverse them is part of the role that unions  
play in this process. The present scheme makes us think that the influence of the labor 
movement will be small. The situation is difficult for the unions. To be more precise, 
for the leaders. We, leaders, are in a transition phase. There are those like us who 
believe in the changing world conditions and thus in the necessity of changing in 
order not to remain bogged down. Others think that there is no need for changes in 
order to maintain privileges, and plan on staying put where they are. Thus, the role of 
unionism in the coming  years will depend in large measure on the role that  leaders 
play. For example, in the negotiation of the FTA. There, the fundamental scheme has 
been, in the case of Mexico, the participation of at least five hundred businessmen  as 
advisors of the government, in 171 industrial branches and 16 commissions. In the 
case of the labor sector, there are only six representatives, which are only recipients 
of information. We don’t have any prepared study regarding the consequences that 
the Treaty may have. We are subject to what in good faith the government and 
entrepreneurs pact to not jeopardize our interests (cited in Moncayo and Trejo 
Delarbre 1993, 25; translated from Spanish). 
 
Labor organizations like the STRM, the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) 
(Mexican Electricians’ Union), and the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación 
(SNTE) (National Education Workers’ Union) formed a group representing a modernizing, 
independent current within the Mexican labor movement, which supported the FTA with the 
U.S. and Canada but also sought a more active participation in the outcome. They expressed a 
concern for understanding potential consequences, and expressed a willingness to engage in 
the political debate and actual negotiations in order to ensure that the interests of Mexican 
labor were taken into account (Moncayo and Trejo Delarbre 1993). 
A minority within Mexican organized labor unsuccessfully resisted the conclusion of 
NAFTA.  It was composed of a heterogeneous coalition of small unions and NGOs, the Red 
Mexicana de Acción Ante el Libre Comercio (RMALC) (Mexican Action Network Against 
                                                             
53
 In the Consejo Asesor del TLC (Advising Council of the FTA) that the Mexican government 
created, the Mexican labor sector participated through representatives from the CTM, the CT, and the 
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de la  Radiodifusión, Televisión, Similares y Conexos de la 
República  Mexicana (STIRTC) (Castro Martinez 1991).      
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Free Trade), which was created in April 1991. The FAT was the most active member and 
promoter of this alliance. This group joined forces with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 
and the U.S. AFL-CIO, which adopted an active adversarial position against NAFTA, to form 
a transnational lobbying force.    
The support by Mexican official labor organizations contrasted sharply with the 
posture adopted by its U.S. and Canadian counterparts. The factors that explain this 
divergence  are also relevant to understand why official unions supported Salinas on NAFTA. 
In May 1991, Arturo Romo Gutierrez, CTM’s Secretary of Education, offered an explanation 
of why the position of official Mexican labor organizations diverged from that of the main 
U.S. labor organizations:  
The Mexican labor legislation is renowned as one of the most advanced and better 
structured in the western  world […] it is determined by the General Constitution of 
the Republic and by the Federal law […] [it is reflected] in institutions with deep 
roots that thus form a formidable system of social protection […] For this reason and 
because we are people with history, tradition and identity, we support the purpose of 
creating an area of free trade of North America, on the basis of  independence, not of  
subordination. The economic integration of the nations of this continent constitutes an 
inevitable process, with or without free trade agreement. It is better to steer this 
integration, than to become one of its victims (cited in Moncayo and Trejo Delarbre 
1993, 18; translated from Spanish). 
 
Torres (2010) plausibly contends that the explanation for Mexican official union leaders’ 
refusal to join forces with their U.S. and Canadian counterparts resides both in the corporatist 
structure of relations between unions and the state and  
the perception of the Mexican confederations’ leaders of a zero-sum game, at least in 
the short-term, a vision strengthened by the type of campaign made by the U.S. 
unions which underlined the potential loss of jobs in favor of the neighbor to the 
south (2010, 345n11). 
 
The Mexican official labor organizations’ backing of the government policy toward 
NAFTA has responded to a complex influence of variables. One of these factors is 
represented by the corporatist ties of organized labor to the PRI, which ensured its political 
loyalty to the authority of the chief executive. This structure of relations between the PRI and 
the unions in Mexico was based on an exchange of economic and political rewards for 
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political support. Even though the economic crisis of 1982 and the liberal reforms instituted 
by De la Madrid had begun to undermine the economic basis of this long-standing 
arrangement, at the time of Salinas government it remained largely in place.
54
 
Perhaps the most important factor in the preservation of that arrangement was the 
resilient ability of traditional leaders to remain at the helm of their official organizations 
despite the emergence of periodic union insurgencies that challenged them. These leaders 
were deeply embedded in the political culture of Mexican corporatism. Their personal 
progress as leaders was closely tied to the maintenance of that system of labor-state relations, 
and they had no interest in pursuing a politically independent course of action that could be a 
threat to their privileged positions.    
Another variable is the realignment of forces inside the PRI that began in 1982, which  
official union leaders did not welcome. They, according to De la Madrid (2004), resisted 
modernizing their ideas and organizations. The program of liberal reforms started in the 
aftermath of the 1982 financial crisis and continued by Salinas had put these traditional labor 
leaders on the defensive
55
 thus encouraging them to focus their concerns on domestic 
governmental policies affecting their constituencies (i.e., an adverse reform of labor laws) 
rather than on foreign economic policy issues such as trade agreements (Gámez Vázquez 
2006). 
The leadership style of the president was another important factor.  Salinas was 
determined to impose his project of reforms and opening up of the economy. Once he decided 
to move ahead with the North American integration project, he actively engaged his 
government in an all-out political effort to gain allies and supporters. Thus, the political 
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 This situation did not preclude that “between June and July of 1983 organized labor – the national 
leaders of which had not seen with pleasure the designation of Miguel de la Madrid- questioned the 
new government, hardly seven or eight months after it had begun, with the most important wave of 
simultaneous strikes that had taken place in Mexico” (Trejo Delarbre 1990, 27). 
55 “Having understood  organized labor as  a ‘necessary evil,’ the Mexican government –above all 
between 1982 and 1988-  tried to divide it, weaken it, discourage it and, when all that was not 
possible, marginalize it from the political and economic decisions” (Trejo Delarbre 1990, 26).  
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influence that the president himself was able to exert on official union leaders became a 
salient variable. 
Salinas (2002), for example, claims that in 1990 “finally managed to convince the 
leader of the CTM, Fidel Velázquez, that the Agreement was relevant for job creation and 
sustained wage increases” (2002, 64). Before becoming president, Salinas had already began 
to cultivate his relationship with Velázquez despite the latter’s misgivings toward him (De la 
Madrid 2004). After all, the Pacto para la Estabilidad y el Crecimiento Económico (PECE) 
(Pact for Stability and Economic Growth) established by Salinas, which was a continuation of 
the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (PSE) (Economic Solidarity Pact) established by De la 
Madrid in 1987, required the crucial cooperation of organized labor.    
Organized Peasantry 
Peasants’ organizations largely played a quiet supporting role in the process leading to 
the launching of Salinas’ integration project. The relative lack of active opposition on the part 
of the peasant sector represents something of a puzzle, given that the relative low 
productivity of the Mexican agriculture made it particularly vulnerable to the competition that 
they were likely to confront with NAFTA (Gámez Vázquez 2006).    
Yet, the potential damaging effect of NAFTA on the rural sector of the Mexican 
economy was only part of a larger transformative event represented by the process of 
agricultural liberalization that the Salinas administration began to consider in late 1989 
56
 
(Grindle 1995). Thus, according to Yúnez Naude (2010),  
The process of commercial liberalization of the agricultural sector began between 
1990 and 1991, when the permits to import agricultural products were eliminated and 
tariffs were reduced (between 1991 and 1994 the tariffs affecting most of the 
imported agricultural products were already very low, fluctuating between 0% and 
20%). With NAFTA, the process of agricultural liberalization with Canada and the 
United States that concluded in 2008 was deepened (starting that year and in 
                                                             
56 “Discussions about the need for change had begun quietly in late 1989 in the small and newly 
created Office of Deregulation in the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development 
(SECOFI)” (Grindle 1995, 47). 
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principle, there is free agricultural trade between the three countries)” (2010, 743; 
emphasis added; translated from Spanish). 
 
The market-oriented reforms launched by the Salinas administration included the ejidal 
57
 
reform, the elimination of import permits for food products, the dismantling of 
CONASUPO
58
 together with its enterprises and storage infrastructure, the reduction of agro 
subsidies, and the abolition of programs of agricultural extension  (Yúnez Naude 2010). The 
new policy, which was part of a broader strategy to liberalize the Mexican economy, 
transformed economic relationships in the agrarian sector and critically undercut long-
standing political relationship between peasants and the state (Grindle 1995).  
It is important to note that the liberalization of the international trade of Mexican 
products occurred in the context of new long-term trends affecting the structure of production 
of the Mexican agricultural sector.  Since the 1960s, after a long period of agricultural growth 
started in the 1940s, the rate of growth in agriculture begun to slow down mainly because of a 
decline in the production of corn, and to a lesser degree, in the production of beans and 
cotton.  In addition, there was an economic reorientation toward cattle raising activities and 
greater production of foodstuff for animal consumption. Finally, there was also an increase in 
the production of cartamo, soybeans and sorghum for the national market, and of vegetables 
and fruits for the U.S. market to satisfy an increasing demand (Yúnez Naude 2010).   
These changes interacted with the evolution of the commercialization of Mexican 
agricultural products. Starting in the 1970s, the country started to become a net importer of 
food (grains, meats and milk) and exporter of fruits and vegetables (including coffee, which 
since the last third of the nineteenth century has been an important export good). In the 
                                                             
57
 The term ejidal refers to the public rural property in pueblos and municipalities. The Constitution of 
1917 sanctioned the ejido as an accepted form of property besides the private property, both 
transmitted from the Nation as the original proprietor of lands and waters. The reform of the article 27 
of the Mexican Constitution in 1992 ended the distribution of land and defined the individual rights of 
ejidatarios who were thus allowed to buy, sell, rent or use as collateral the land that before could only 
use, with the previous authorization of the ejidal assembly (Yúnez Naude 2010).  
58
Acronym for Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (National Company of Popular 
Subsistence), a government purchasing agency that supported certain rural crops through pricing.  
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1970s, the Mexican agriculture started to lose its preeminent role as provider of foreign 
currency to the national economy. Finally, in the 1980s, the agricultural surplus disappeared 
and a process of recurrent and growing deficits started in the trade balance of the sector 
(Yúnez Naude 2010).  
Thus, given the uncertainty and instability that this combination of structural and 
policy changes were bringing to the Mexican peasantry, one would have not only expected 
from their organizations more clear evidence of either opposition or efforts to influence 
NAFTA through active participation in the negotiations leading to it so as to ensure it would 
be fair to peasants’ interests, but also of resistance to the process of rural liberalization that 
threatened cherished institutions  bequeathed by the Mexican Revolution. Yet, as Grindle 
(1995) notes:  
There was strong rural resistance to the new, market-oriented legal and regulatory 
structures –and to the incorporation of Mexico’s rural areas into the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)- but it came two years after59 the legal basis for 
economic liberalization in the countryside had been introduced (1995, 39; emphasis 
in the original). 
 
The author offers two main plausible reasons for what she considers as peasants’ delayed 
reaction against the policy of rural liberalization and NAFTA. One is “the highly centralized 
and presidentialist system of decision-making that virtually excluded the participation of the 
affected rural population.” The other is “the clear failure of the original agrarian reform of 
1917, as pursued after 1940, to provide for the economic and political well-being of Mexico’s 
rural poor” (1995, 39-40), which caused a loss of support for the ejido system. Below, I 
advance some additional conclusions to these but more specifically related to the creation of 
NAFTA.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, Salinas’ (2002) view of the process of peasants’  
                                                             
59
Reference to the Chiapas-based Zapatista rural rebellion that occurred in early 1994 which 
evidenced peasant opposition to the neoliberal policies of the Mexican government (Grindle 1995). 
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participation is quite different. According to him, there was consultation with peasant 
organizations in an effort to build consensus favorable to the idea of NAFTA: 
The topic of agriculture also raised strong controversy, but of another tenor. From 
1989, we took the initiative to establish a dialogue and umbrella forum, the 
Permanent Agrarian Congress (CAP), for all the rural organizations […] Throughout 
the negotiation, CAP participated in in-depth discussions, without coming to a 
unanimous position on the inclusion of agricultural products in NAFTA. For that 
reason, the PRI’s main campesino organization, the CNC [Confederación Nacional 
Campesina], built up reasoned support to construct a consensus […] we were able to 
identify the rural sector’s most controversial issues in regard to NAFTA, and we 
found common ground to bring positions closer together. Hugo Andres Araujo, from 
the CNC, was the most important advocate for establishing a clear-cut schedule for 
phasing out of import barriers […] As a precondition to include agricultural products 
in NAFTA, Araujo demanded that the Mexican government should implement a 
policy in favor of the countryside. He was right […] We responded to this demand 
with policies for a deep reform program. For its part, the organization of private rural 
producers, the CNPP [Confederación Nacional de la Pequeña Propiedad], defended 
the interests of the small landowners (2002, 120). 
 
Grammont and Mackinlay (2006) confirm that the CAP was an initiative of President Salinas 
motivated by his search of a base of support for the reforms he was seeking to implement. 
The novelty of the CAP consisted in that 
for the first time a government of the PRI incorporated non-PRI organizations among 
its formal interlocutors, such as the autonomous organizations and some of the 
independent current, several of them even associated  with opposition parties (2006,  
703-04).  
 
The CAP offered Salinas an opportunity to gauge the spectrum of views from various peasant 
organizations besides the expected backing from the official CNC. In reviewing this 
experience years later, he acknowledges the different positions expressed by the participants 
at that time. 
Thus, the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) (Independent Peasant Central) and 
the Confederación Agrarista Mexicana (CAM) (Mexican Agrarian Confederation) supported 
NAFTA, while the Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas (UNORCA) 
(National Union of Regional Peasant Organizations) appeared divided and offered 
conditional support. On the other hand, the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y 
Campesinos (CIOAC) (Independent Central of Rural Workers and Peasants) and the Unión 
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Nacional de Trabajadores Agrícolas (UNTA) (National Rural Workers’ Union) were 
decidedly opposed to it. Finally, the Unión General de Organizaciones Campesinas y 
Populares (UGOCP) (General Union of Peasant and Popular Organizations) offered cautious 
support (Salinas 2002). 
The CNC was the most important organization of the Mexican peasantry at that time.  
It was created in 1938 under the sponsorship of Lázaro Cárdenas, and became part of the 
official party’s structure. Integrated by campesinos ejidatarios,60 the CNC counted as its 
adherents the totality of peasants that benefited from the agrarian reform. Affiliation to its 
ranks was compulsory, and thus all its members were affiliated with the PRI (Grammont and 
Mackinlay 2006).   
Other campesino organizations began to appear in the 1940s and disputed the CNC’s 
hegemony over the peasant movement. They were: the Unión General de Obreros y 
Campesinos de Mexico (UGOCM) (General Workers’ and Peasants’ Union of Mexico),  
launched in 1949, the CCI, which was created in 1963, and the CAM, established in 1970.  
Despite their aspirations of independence from the corporatist system, they were eventually 
coopted by the government and also became  affiliates of the PRI. Together with the CNC, 
these organizations constituted the core base of support for the government within the 
organized peasantry (Grammont and Mackinlay 2006).    
In 1985, a group of regional organizations sought to establish a representation of 
peasant interests that was “autonomous” from the official party and the state, and formed 
UNORCA.  Its members did not refuse to work with the government and the PRI, and thus 
did not attempt to become fully “independent.” The CIOAC emerged in 1975 as a split  from 
the CCI, defining itself as an independent organization. Eventually however, the CIOAC 
opted for a course of action that was closer to the autonomous approach of UNORCA.  
                                                             
60
 The term ejidatarios refers to the peasants that were users of ejidos.  
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Another important independent organization, the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario (CAN) 
(National  Agricultural Council), created in 1984, became the representative organ of more 
economically powerful agro-industrial associations. 
Overall, there is a relatively high degree of organizational dispersion and atomization 
among the organized peasantry. According to Rojas and Moyano Estrada (1997), the bloc of 
official peasant organizations represented approximately 1.5 million members, and the group 
of independent entities less than one million adherents. Thus, the two main groupings of 
organized peasants only represented about 10% of the total rural population, which amounted 
to more than 20 million residents. 
The combined action of three main  factors helps to explain the lack of effective 
organized resistance to NAFTA among the Mexican peasantry. The first two are structural 
factors that explain peasant support for the PRI, which facilitated Salinas’s political drive for 
the FTA. The third is the agency factor of Salinas' skill in building political alliances, in this 
case in the peasant sector.   
One of the structural variables is the legacy of the agrarian reform started in 1915-17  
by post-revolutionary governments, which was reformulated in 1934 by Lázaro Cárdenas.
61
 
He went deeper and further in the restructuring of the agrarian productive system than the 
previous governments.
62
 This agrarian reform is justly considered  one of the earliest and 
most important in the world, and had a long-lasting influence on traditional peasant support 
for the official party.     
A major cause of the Mexican Revolution was the wave of massive expropriations of 
                                                             
61
 This massive redistribution of land –a total of 11,580,800 hectares between 1916-1934- at the 
expense of large holdings for the benefit of dispossessed peasants distinguishes the agrarian history of 
Mexico of that period from those of other Latin American economies (Marino and Zuleta 2010). 
62
 Close to 7 million hectares of land had been distributed to approximately 778,000 peasants, but the 
latifundia structure had largely remained in place (Hamilton 1975). 
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land suffered by the peasantry
63
 during the Porfiriato.
64
 According to Katz (2010), 
The prosperity of the Mexican economy [during the Porfiriato] produced the greatest 
historical catastrophe for the Mexican peasantry since the massive mortality of the 
Indians in the sixteenth  and seventeenth  centuries. The majority of the pueblos65 that 
had been able to maintain their land throughout the colonial period lost it toward the 
end of the nineteenth  century and beginnings of the twentieth  in the presence of the 
advance of the hacendados,66 speculators or rich members of their communities 
(2010, 470; translated from Spanish). 
 
As a result of this process of land dispossession, the great majority of free peasants almost 
disappeared as an economic group (Katz, 2010). Concentration in land ownership reached 
extreme levels. By 1890, fewer than 50 individuals or companies owned 20 percent of all 
Mexican land, and by the early 1900s, 835 families dominated 95 per cent of all arable land 
(Haber 1989). Under these conditions, the need  for land became a rallying cry that led 
Mexico’s peasant majority to play a fundamental role in the Revolution.67 It marked the 
beginning of their participation in national political life as a distinct socioeconomic actor. 
The second structural factor  was the way in which the peasant movement was 
coopted by the official party into a supporting ally by shaping from above the organization of 
the peasantry into the overarching CNC, and incorporating it within the structure of the party.   
The CNC managed to retain its majoritarian influence and political control over the peasantry 
and rural population in general despite the competition from newer peasant organizations that 
disputed its preeminence in the 1980s.   
The CNC enjoyed a resilient advantage in two key areas. One was its close political 
relationship with the PRI which allowed it to have privileged access to governmental 
                                                             
63
 The term peasantry refers to small owners, land occupants, members of communal indian pueblos, 
tenants that pay with their labor of cash, sharecroppers, and others (Coatsworth 2010). 
64
 Dictatorial regime of Porfirio Diaz, who ruled Mexico directly during 1876-80 and 1884-1910, and 
indirectly during 1880-84 through one of his close associates, Manuel Gonzalez (Hansen 1988).   
65
 Indian villages based on communal land. 
66
 Large landowners who controlled either traditional productive units that maintained peonage 
systems and retention of workers by debts, or modern-type haciendas that functioned with permanent 
or temporary salaried work (Marino and Zuleta 2010). 
67 In 1910, people residing in rural areas represented 71.3% of the total Mexican population (Gonzalez 
Casanova 2009). Some have estimated that the demand for structural agrarian reform involved 75 to 
80 percent of the active population of the country (Hamilton 1975).    
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programs and funds.
68
 The other was its long-lasting prestige among many peasant groups 
due to the fact that it had been the conduct through which they had obtained their land and 
other social benefits (Grammont and Mackinlay 2006). 
Finally, there is the agency factor represented by President Salinas’ own ability to 
build alliances and support for his program of reforms. He promoted the launching of the 
Permanent Agrarian Congress in 1989. The experience of this congress evidenced Salinas’ 
awareness of the need to forge a supporting coalition of peasant organizations in favor of 
NAFTA, and his political ability to pursue it.   
At the time of convening the CAP, he had already developed close relationships with 
campesino organizations before he became President, particularly with leaders of the 
autonomous UNORCA who worked in his presidential campaign and later became leaders of 
CNC in an attempt to reshape it after a similar autonomous model. Salinas’ ability to 
establish a rapport with non-official organizations around his project facilitated the success of 
the CAP in gathering most of the national peasant organizations (Grammont and Mackinlay 
2006).   
Salinas obtained broad backing from organized peasantry in exchange for granting 
them priority in the privatization of para-state enterprises on condition that they were 
managed in an efficient manner. Yet, while he relied on UNORCA’s leaders to configure this 
coalition, he did not neglect the importance of keeping the CNC’s loyalty by granting it most 
of the governmental support (Grammont and Mackinlay 2006). 
                                                             
68
 One of the most important examples in this regard is the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
(Pronasol) (National Solidarity Program), created by Salinas in 1989. Pronasol “aimed at developing 
health, education, nutrition, housing, employment infrastructure, and other productive projects to 
benefit 17 million Mexicans living in extreme poverty” (Dresser 1991, 1).  It became an instrument to 
coopt opposition and discontent through patronage (Centeno 1999). According to Grammont (1995), 
the CNC’s “strength does not reside in representing the interests of a broad middle and rich peasants’ 
sector but in controlling the poor peasantry and rural dwellers through the selective and patrimonialist 
implementation of Pronasol and Procampo (1995, 159; translated from Spanish). Procampo, the 
Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (Farmers Direct Support Program), was s initiated in October 
1993 to compensate staple producers who were expected to face declining prices after the initiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (IDB 2012).  
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Eventually however, the support gathered through CAP was not reflected on the role 
that its participants played during the negotiations of the NAFTA’s agricultural chapter in 
early 1994. Their influence, as well as that of small and medium rural entrepreneurs, such as 
the Confederación Nacional de la Pequeña Propiedad (CNPP) (National Confederation of the 
Small Property) and the Confederación de Productores de Hortalizas (CNPH) (Confederation 
of Vegetables Producers), was minor.  Instead, the CNA, the organization of the 
agroindustries, dominated the representation of the Mexican rural sector (Grammont and 
Mackinlay 2006).  
Congress 
In February 1990, one of the first things that Salinas did once he and the members of 
his cabinet were unified on the idea of an FTA with the United States was to meet with the 
leader of the Mexican Senate, Emilio M. González. There were two important reasons for 
Salinas to do that. One was that “[i]n Mexico, as in Canada, the Head of State could promote 
trade negotiations without needing the permission of the Congress. But in Mexico, according 
to the Constitution, the Senate had to ratify international treaties. I needed Senator 
González’s  support, as leader of the Senate.” The other was that besides being the leader of 
the Senate, González  was also an important political figure who commanded considerable 
respect and influence in the PRI and held traditional views that were opposed to those of the 
President (Salinas 2002, 53).  
The event underscores  one of the salient characteristics of the Mexican political 
system at that time, which shaped the role that Congress played in the creation of NAFTA, 
that is, the combination of presidentialism with the corporatist dominance of an official party, 
the PRI (Gámez Vázquez 2006). This unique combination of features, allowed Salinas to win 
the political support of a PRI-dominated Congress, particularly its Senate chamber, by 
successfully courting the favor of the Senate leader, in order to successfully conclude his 
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integration project.   
The presidentialist feature determined the concentration of enormous political power 
in the office of the chief executive vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial branches of 
government. The presence of an “official” party that dominates Congress and whose 
members are embedded in a long-standing political culture of unity and discipline, prevents 
the occurrence of political stalemate in the national policymaking process, and normally 
ensures an expedited approval of all executive initiatives. The corporatist political structure 
prevailing at that time complemented these characteristics of the Mexican political system.  
Workers, peasants and other popular sectors are linked to the state through their mass 
organizations that are affiliated with the party, which in turn is the electoral machine that 
dominates access to state power. 
In practice, however, Salinas’s situation was complicated by the fact that he started 
his administration from the weakest political position of any other previous Mexican 
president.  He had been elected by the smallest margin in the history of the PRI, and his 
election was plagued by serious questions of electoral fraud.  In addition, he confronted a 
changed Congress, where opposition parties like the PAN and the PRD had made significant 
inroads in the chamber of Deputies, and where the PRD had taken four of the sixty seats in 
the Senate.  Moreover, as Salinas was intent on continuing and deepening the liberal reforms 
started by De la Madrid, his program of structural economic transformation was likely to 
encounter political opposition from those still influenced by traditional developmentalist 
political culture within the PRI and from the newly formed PRD.    
These conditions forced Salinas, once he had made the decision to seek an FTA with 
the United States, to embark on an active political campaign to gain the support he needed in 
the Senate, which was the institutional key for the approval of NAFTA. This explains his 
keen interest in engaging the leader of the Senate in early February 1990, because “[h]is 
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position on the issue [economic liberalization, NAFTA] would be crucial during the long 
negotiation and, especially, for passing the agreement in the Upper House” (Salinas 2002, 
53). 
Salinas’ political efforts at convincing González eventually paid off. On April 5,   
1990, at a meeting with Senate representatives, the leader of the Senate told Salinas:  
There are constitutional points of contact  between the affairs of the Senate and those 
of the Executive. Of course, the Executive participates in the formulation process of   
laws, but the area of international affairs is of specific competence of the Senate. We 
feel opportune to express to you the solidarity with the international policy that the 
Executive at your charge has  followed (Garciadiego 1994, 65; translated from 
Spanish). 
 
As Salinas realized that he had Gonzalez’s support and the likely goodwill of most other 
Senate members, he followed Gonzalez’s advice,69 and formally invited the Senate to assume 
the role of political broker in opening the road to the negotiation of NAFTA:  
it is convenient […] and within the framework of the faculties that the Constitution 
grants it, that the Senate of the Republic –this is a respectful suggestion- convokes an 
ample debate over the new commercial relations in the world, their  impact on 
Mexico and the effective manner, with which we could confront these realities and 
make use of them in our favor while strengthening our sovereignty (Garciadiego 
1994, 66; translated from Spanish). 
  
In response, on April 16, the Mexican Senate publicly called on citizens, political parties, 
representatives of socio-economic sectors, public intellectuals, academic institutions, and 
others to participate in the Foro Nacional de Consulta sobre las Relaciones Comerciales de 
Mexico con el Mundo through sessions that took place in the city of Mexico and other cities.  
The debate sessions formally concluded on May 21, 1990. In a document, the Senate 
conveyed the political endorsement that Salinas expected:  
The Senate of the Republic, in view of the geographical location of Mexico, the 
history of its trade relations, and the complementarity and potential of its economy in 
respect to that of the United States of America, recommends negotiating a free trade 
agreement with that country. The agreement, unlike a common market, would 
preserve the political and economic sovereignty of the country (Salinas 2002, 63). 
                                                             
69
 The leader of the Senate “insisted principally on the need to offer informational hearings and 
debates in the Senate, so that the political parties and members of the general public could express 
their ideas and be kept informed.  In a discreet manner, he began the preparations to organize those 
sessions” (Salinas 2002, 53-54). 
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It was a political triumph for Salinas, who could now pursue his project as if it were at the 
request of the Senate. A structural factor, the institutional makeup of Mexican political 
decision-making, and an agency variable, the political ability of Salinas, had thus helped to 
establish the crucial Senate support behind NAFTA, only four months after the president 
decided to embark the country in such project.   
Political Parties 
In early 1990, three major party organizations competed in Mexico’s national political 
scene: the Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI) (Institutional Revolutionary Party), 
the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) (National Action Party), and the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD) (Party of the Democratic Revolution). The role that each of 
these three parties played  in the creation of NAFTA was very different.  Despite the electoral 
setback of 1988, during the Salinas sexenio the PRI was still the dominant national party in 
control of the government and Congress. As such, it provided Salinas the disciplined support 
he needed to carry out his integration project. It was thus a crucial facilitating variable in the 
political process that led to NAFTA. 
Since its creation in 1939, the PAN had been the principal political opposition force to 
the PRI until the sudden competing rise of the PRD in 1988. The National Action Party 
emerged at a time of high polarization in the Mexican political landscape when Lázaro 
Cárdenas’ radical-populist government (1934-1940)70 confronted strong opposition from a 
broad spectrum of hostile political forces: 
                                                             
70
 “Though a reformer dedicated to working within the capitalist system […] Cárdenas believed that 
the state should intervene to equalize the relative weight of labor and capital […] he strengthened 
organizations which were to defend their [urban and rural workers] interests, he encouraged strikes 
and committed the state to intervene on behalf of workers in industrial disputes , he greatly increased 
the distribution of land to campesinos, he favored collective ownership in the countryside and the 
‘socialization’ of the means of production in industry, he changed the curriculum of schools to include 
socialist education, and he employed the rhetoric of class struggle and Marxism” (Collier 1982, 68-
69).  
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The opposition had many expressions. These included capital flight abroad, attempts 
by the Church to mobilize opposition to government programs and to undermine 
peasant, labor, and student unions […]; an economic and diplomatic offensive by 
foreign capital that included an international boycott of the nationalized petroleum 
industry; the emergence of a rival mass movement, the sinarquistas, promoting 
conservative, religious values and opposing agrarian reform; the appearance of fascist 
movements with connections to Nazi agents and members of the Spanish Falange 
[…]; the Cedillo military rebellion of 1938; and the formation of a plethora of right-
wing opposition parties, many of which ultimately coalesced around the newly 
formed PAN and the promotion of the opposition presidential candidacy in 1940 of 
Juan Andreau Almazán (Collier and Collier 2002, 247).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Except for its opposition to Cárdenas’ policies and to the corporatist rule of the PNR (the 
Party of the Mexican Revolution), the forerunner of the PRI, the PAN lacked a clearly 
defined political identity. It initially attracted a variety of political and socio-economic 
adherents such as “professionals, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and ardent Catholics who 
reacted to growing anticlericism” (Shirk 2005, 50). According to Loaeza (1999): 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the PAN was not born as the lay appendage (brazo 
laico) of Church political action. The original project, marked by the anticardenista 
reaction, conceived of the party more as a pressure group that would unify and 
channel the political demands of private enterprise: businessmen of any level, liberal 
professionals, small property-owners, and in the end all those whose income did not 
depend on the State (cited in Shirk 2005, 56).   
 
Two main political-ideological tendencies coexisted within the party and competed 
for predominance. One, inspired by liberal principles advocated by Francisco I. Madero, the 
first President of the Mexican Revolution, demanded a representative democracy, criticized 
the authoritarianism of the post-revolutionary elite that ruled Mexico, opposed state 
intervention in the economy and defended private initiative as the basic driver of economic 
development (Shirk 2005; Hernández Vicencio 2010). The other, was strongly influenced by 
traditionally conservative political ideas of the Catholic Church: 
a second line of PAN doctrine, separate from the liberal democratic ideologies linked 
to Gomez Morin, speaks to a set of normative, spiritual, and social welfare concerns 
derived from Catholic thought. This line of thought, political humanism […], became 
known as the mystique of the PAN (Shirk 2005, 59).  
 
Yet, Loaeza (2003) points out that despite this influence from the social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church, the PAN “maintained an ambiguous relationship to the religious doctrinal 
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component” (2003, 196) as party leaders avoided open acknowledgement of any ties with 
Catholic doctrine and organizations but depended on both to survive. Eventually, this 
ambivalence ended in 1998 when the PAN became part of the international organization of 
Christian democratic parties.  
In the decades that followed its creation, the PAN experimented significant transitions  
as an opposition party. During the 1960s and early 1970s the doctrinal Catholic wing became 
relatively more powerful within the party emphasizing the role of the PAN as “loyal 
opposition,” and privileging doctrinarian identity over active political participation to dispute 
power with the PRI (Loaeza 2003).    
By the early 1980s an influx of business managers, owners of small and medium 
enterprises and large entrepreneurs from the agro-export sector, commerce and services 
changed the internal balance of power in favor of a new faction, known as neopanismo, 
imbued with a more secular and pragmatic vision (Shirk 2005). Neopanistas pursued a more 
active political participation of the PAN as a party of protest against the PRI, particularly in 
the aftermath of the bank nationalization by President Lopez Portillo in 1982 (Loaeza 2003).   
The emergence of this pragmatic current in the PAN, the development of a 
programmatic coincidence between its economic proposals and those of Salinas’ government, 
the president’s own political overtures toward it as he tried to gain political allies and 
neutralize the influence of the PRD,
71
 are important factors that help to explain why the PAN 
became an ally of Salinas. Yet, its leadership was divided in its attitude toward NAFTA.  
Some leaders supported the initiative from the beginning, but others firmly opposed it 
(Salinas 2002). 
The PRD had emerged as a popular left-leaning coalition of forces that seriously 
                                                             
71
 According to Centeno (1997), Salinas did not oppose the rise of the PAN to regional influence but 
decided instead to forge an alliance with it. The PAN consented to Salinas’ overture in exchange for 
the promise that it would be allowed to continue growing as a national force, and often refused to 
condemn frauds committed against the PRD. 
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challenged the PRI’s dominance in the 1988 elections.72 It displayed intense political activity 
against Salinas’ liberalization program, and became the main political force against  
NAFTA.
73
 However, it was not able to affect the outcome in any meaningful way. The PRD’s 
failure to gather enough political momentum to derail Salinas’ integration project seemed to 
reflect “the ideological exhaustion of the left in all Latin America. Almost 80% of the 
population […] voted for parties that advocated open markets and the sanctity of the private 
property” (Centeno 1997, 8). In addition, it appeared to show that the electoral support that  
Cardenas received in 1988 did not necessarily imply a lasting endorsement of his policies, but 
rather a circumstantial vote against the PRI (Centeno 1999).  
The fact that Salinas was able to summon the disciplined support of his party with 
relative ease despite the fact that an FTA with the United States represented a radical 
departure from the nationalist political culture of the PRI merits explanation. One important 
factor in this regard is that since De la Madrid became the PRI’s presidential candidate for the 
1982 elections, there had been a power shift that had displaced the developmentalists from 
the direction of the party, thus weakening their political capacity to oppose Salinas. Another 
factor is that the most ardent opponents to Salinas’ liberalization program had already left the 
PRI when the so-called Democratic Current was expelled by De la Madrid in 1987.  Thus, the 
opposition that remained in the PRI was relatively moderate (Gámez Vázquez 2006).   
In addition, according to Gámez Vázquez (2006), “[o]ther investigations indicate that 
the power struggle within the party did not question the implementation of Salinas’ economic 
model but the distribution of its benefits” (2006, 224). Moreover, Salinas launched a 
reorganization of the party that resulted in the removal of influential labor leaders, like La 
                                                             
72
 “the most pressing problem originated from the left. After the elections of 1988, responding to the 
cardenista opposition became the most important political problem for the regime” (Centeno 1997; 
page 6).    
73
 Speaking in California in April 1990, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas declared himself against the economic 
integration of Mexico and the United States. He declared that “the best manner of resolving our 
problems, in the short and long-run is the political and economic integration with Latin America” 
(Molina 1990). 
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Quina
74
 and Carlos Jongitud Barrios,
75
 who were opposed to his policies, thus signaling  “an 
open assault on the traditional politico structure” (Centeno 1999, 64). He also terminated 
twelve governors during his sexenio, and placed supporters in several state capitals (Centeno 
1999; Gámez Vázquez 2006).   
Coalitions and Epistemic Communities   
Arguably, the role played by MEXUS in forging a political consensus around the idea 
of a comprehensive bilateral trade and investment agreement between Mexico and the United 
States based on free trade principles could also be viewed as that of a transnational epistemic 
community. That is to say, beyond the basic coalition of material interests behind MEXUS, 
one can discern a “coalition of knowledge” that shaped the interpretation of those interests 
and provided a winning argument to gain the acquiescence of policymakers. This view is 
congruent with Sebenius’ (1992) argument about epistemic communities: 
An epistemic community, viewed through a negotiation-analytic lens, can be 
interpreted  as a distinctive  de facto natural coalition of ‘believers’ whose main 
interest lies not in the material sphere but, rather, in fostering  the adoption of its 
policy project. Initially, an epistemic community faces the problem of how to expand 
from a typically small and de facto natural coalition into a meaningful winning 
coalition. Its actions can often be understood as changing the perceived zone  of 
possible agreement in well-understood ways that are favorable to its objectives. The 
major contributions of the epistemic community concept would seem to be that it 
directs attention toward the conditions under which this distinctive kind of coalition is 
likely to form and expand, insists on the importance of perceptions and learning in 
negotiation, and deepens our knowledge of how various actors come to define their 
interests” (1992, 364-65; emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, the definition of “coalition” that I have adopted for this study, that is, an 
alliance of actors joined together by shared interests and ideas to support or oppose 
certain kinds of policies, has two interconnected dimensions. One is the coincidence 
of material interests, and the other is the concurrence of ideas. The coalition’s shared 
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 Nickname for Joaquín Hernández Galicia, powerful leader of the oil union (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana, STPRM) of the state-owned oil enterprise 
Petróleos de Mexico (PEMEX) (De la Madrid 2002). 
75
 Union leader of the national teachers' union (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 
SNTE) and governor of San Luis Potosí (De la Madrid 2002).  
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ideas provide a common interpretation of the material interests, and thus help to 
cement the unity among coalition members. From this point of view, coalitions  
involve both interest and epistemic communities. 
The International System 
The relevance of the international level of analysis becomes apparent if one considers 
that Salinas’ sexenio occurred in the midst of profound changes in the international political 
economy. These external changes imposed constraints and opened up opportunities for 
Mexico’s economic development and shaped its international behavior. Certain attributes of 
Mexico as a country like geographical location, relative size, level of economic 
development,
76
 and type of political system, acquired relevance and mediated the effect of 
these changes, but the decisive factor that shaped their impact was how those at the 
“commanding heights” of the state, Salinas and his cabinet members, interpreted them and 
responded accordingly through policies.   
Certain important international developments at that time inspired economic 
liberalization in general and thus created a more propitious environment that encouraged 
Mexico to seek the FTA with the United States. Since the focus of my analysis in this section 
are those international variables that had a more direct influence on Mexico’s attitude toward 
NAFTA, I only enumerate them here because they have been extensively analyzed elsewhere,  
The debt crisis of 1982 signaled the exhaustion of the “growth through indebtedness” 
strategy based on state-led import-substitution industrialization (Castello Branco 1993). It 
also pressured debtor countries to undertake programs of economic adjustment and opened 
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 A significant aspect of this attribute is the conversion of Mexico toward a model of export-led 
development where manufactures occupy a central role. According to Rozo Bernal (1998), there was 
a change in the relative composition of exports between 1982 and 1988, where oil exports decreased 
from 77% to 32%, and non-oil exports increased from 23% to 68% of the total. The author notes that 
this recomposition resulted from a better performance of the non-oil export sector rather than from a 
relative deterioration of oil prices. Thus, total non-oil exports increased from 4.7 billion dollars in 
1982 to 14.6 billion in 1988. Moreover, the relative importance of manufactures within  non-oil 
exports increased from 60% of the total in 1981 to 83% in 1988. At the same time, the private sector 
assumed greater responsibility for the non-oil exports from 76% in 1981 to 90% in 1988. 
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the door for the influence of IMF’s stabilization programs that pressed for economic 
liberalization (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Teichman 2001). Latin American policymakers 
and economists had begun to build a new intellectual consensus around the example of 
Chile’s radical economic liberalization under Pinochet (Edwards 1995). In 1986, the Council 
of the Americas, the Fundação Getúlio Vargas and El Colegio de Mexico had jointly 
sponsored the publication of Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America, a work 
that became the intellectual antecedent of the so-called Washington Consensus, which 
exerted considerable influence on Latin American policymakers (J. Williamson 2004; 
Rockefeller 2003).  In addition, China’s economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s 
(Tisdell 2009) and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 contributed to discredit centrally 
planned, state-led models of economic development.   
Globalization and Transnational Corporations 
Transnational enterprises
78
 (TNEs) have spearheaded the expansion of globalization 
by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI), transnational production processes and 
international trade.
79
 Many have a global reach, but their most important operations are 
concentrated in regional markets. These TNEs are a source of demand for regional integration 
agreements that institutionalize, and thus make credible, commitments made by host 
governments to carry out liberal economic reforms and ensure a safe environment for their 
FDIs. As Chase (2005) notes, “[i]n North America, multinationals sought free trade between 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico to liberalize FDI,
80
 strengthen intellectual  
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 “A transnational enterprise is defined as a firm that organizes production in more than one country.  
These outputs may represent different stages of production […] or they may be varieties of the same 
product.  Common to all TNEs is the existence of a central decision making unit (HQ) that 
coordinates production, prices, and investment strategy in the countries in question” (Robson and 
Wooton 1993, 72). 
79
 The world’s 500 largest companies are responsible for 70 percent of all trade. About one third of 
world trade is intra-firm; multinationals trading with unaffiliated firms account for another third 
(Chase 2004). 
80
 According to Chase (2004), the reason why TNEs have been strong advocates for regional 
agreements is to manage liberalization and deregulation in FDI. “The political economy problem that 
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property rights, and introduce dispute settlement procedures” (2005, 50).  
Moreover, the need for FDI provided by TNEs makes developing countries more 
receptive to regional trade agreements in order to compete with other countries for FDI. This 
encourages developing countries to participate in free trade agreements with developed 
countries, as a way of gaining comparative institutional advantage. In this manner, TNEs are 
an expression of the international influence that globalization exerts on the development of 
FTAs (Ethier 1998; Bull 2008; Robson and Wootan 1993; Chase 2005; Buthe and Milner 
2008). The transnational pro-NAFTA lobby organized by MEXUS in Mexico and the U.S. is 
a relevant example of TNE’s influence in foreign economic policymaking related to trade 
agreements.   
International Policy Diffusion: the Spread of Regionalism 
According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006), “International policy diffusion 
occurs when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned 
by prior policy choices made in other countries (sometimes mediated by the behavior of 
international organizations or even private actors or organizations)” (2006, 787). In this 
regard, the revival of European integration in the 1980s,
81
 particularly the entry of Spain and 
Portugal to the European Community in 1986, and the agreement to launch the Canada-
                                                                                                                                                                                             
TRIMs [investment contracts between a foreign-owned firm and its host government] present is that 
foreign investors locked into a particular trade and regulatory regime exhibit a status quo bias because 
they are vulnerable to being held up. As a result, multinational companies are inclined to demand 
safeguards before they will consent to having TRIMs relaxed or phased out. First, they want host 
governments to make ironclad commitments to liberalize trade and investment, lest old policy 
measures be restored later. Second, they need protection against new entrants while they adjust to a 
new policy climate. This requires formal treaties to enumerate explicit obligations, establish rules that 
discriminate between incumbents and new entrants, and provide transitional protection” (2004, 30). 
81
 The revival was spurred by the launching of the internal market in the 1980s. Support by the 
member states was affirmed in 1982, and subsequently confirmed. In March 1985, the European 
Council in Brussels set the end of 1992 as the completion date. A White Paper elaborated by the 
Commission that detailed the steps to take was approved in June 1985 by the European Council in 
Milan. The Single European Act (which was signed in February 1986 and came into force on 1 July 
1987) was a revision of the Treaty of Rome of 1958 (European Parliament 2012). 
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United States Free Trade Agreement in 1987,
82
 were important examples of international 
policy diffusion that impacted Mexico’s decision to seek an FTA with the United States. 
The main mechanisms through which these examples were diffused to Mexico appear 
to have been both competition and learning in one case (CUSFTA) and learning in the other 
(Spain and Portugal).  In the case of CUSFTA,
83
 there was an element of competition 
involved because it threatened to divert trade in sectors of interest to Mexico, like 
automobiles and petrochemicals. There was also an important learning aspect. Salinas’  
response to a question made by an NBC reporter during an interview in Washington in June 
1990 regarding the reasons that made him change his mind on the issue of integration with 
the United States,  said:  
I would say that two factors: the first one, the drastic changes in Europe that signaled 
me that one has to continue changing at an accelerated pace, and second, after a 
careful analysis of the benefits that other countries had obtained from similar trade 
agreements. 
 
And to an immediate follow up question if that was the case of Canada, he replied:  
Certainly, I find that the countries with less-developed economies  could gain more 
benefits than those that have more development (Garciadiego 1994, 114; translated 
from Spanish). 
 
Implicit in that response was the fact that his government had been studying the lessons 
stemming both from the CUSFTA and from the experiences of Portugal and Spain in joining 
the European Community, and that Mexico had learned from the conclusions obtained by 
those studies. My interviews with Pedro Aspe,
84
 Salinas’ Finance Minister, and Humberto 
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 In September 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney proposed formally an FTA with the United States.  
President Reagan accepted in December 1985.  CUSFTA entered into force in January 1989 (Baldwin 
1997). 
83
 “In 1987, when United States and Canada sign their FTA, the internationalized Mexican business 
elite is the one who expresses its preoccupation” (Aldo Flores-Quiroga, Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs at the Ministry of Energy, personal interview by author in Mexico City on 
November 1, 2010; translated from Spanish).  “The United States had already created an FTA with 
Canada.  That was the precedent” (Pedro Aspe, Minister of Finance (1988 – 1994) in the cabinet of 
President Salinas, personal interview by author in Mexico City on October 27, 2010; translated from 
Spanish).   
84
 “There are two references. The first is Germany [the fall of the Berlin Wall] and the second without 
a doubt is Felipe Gonzalez in Spain. It is an enormous reference […] Felipe saying: ‘Spain is part of 
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Jasso Torres,
85
 Director of International Negotiations at the Ministry of Economy, offer 
evidence of this process.   
End of the Cold War and Consolidation of Economic Blocs 
Mansfield and Milner (2012) observe that  
[t]he fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 precipitated the CMEA’s [the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance established by the Soviet Union and its allies in 1949] demise 
and prompted a rush by member-states to form arrangements with other countries, 
especially those in Western Europe. The trend was accelerated in 1991, when the 
Soviet Union’s collapse created a sizable number of new countries seeking to 
conclude PTAs with each other and with European countries (2012, under “The 
Balance of Power and the End of the Cold War,” in Chapter 3). 
   
This event had an important influence on the European Community’s negative attitude 
toward Mexico’s interest in forging an agreement with it in early 1990, because for the 
Western European political leaders the economic integration with their Eastern neighbors had 
become a pressing priority. Thus, one of the immediate effects of the end of the Cold War 
was to constrain the range of partner choices for Mexico to establish free trade agreements 
with, which in turn shaped its decision to invite the United States to conclude one   In fact, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Europe. She does not end in the Pyrenees, and I am going to do everything possible to enter.’And he 
did enter.  That was for us a reference because the difference between Spain and Germany was the 
same as that between Mexico and United States, in relative size” (Pedro Aspe, personal interview by 
author in Mexico City on October 27, 2010; translated from Spanish).   
85
 “The European example did not come from the East but from Spain.  When we started to document 
how the developing countries of Europe benefitted from integration there were the examples of 
Greece and Portugal, but the clearest example was Spain. That example was cited very often […] with 
empirical evidence because there was almost a decade of statistics of how the standard of living had 
improved. At the moment of showing examples of who had integrated, East Europe was not an 
example. It wanted to integrate but there were no examples. Spain was the example cited more often.  
We cited Canada, but it was more developed […] There was the need to diversify. I remember that 
several comparative studies had been made of what Taiwan and Korea had done […] and the study 
concluded that what they had done was no longer permissible after Mexico entered the GATT in 86 
[…] neither there was a political will from the United States to help like they had done it in Korea 
after the war. Thus, it  was neither viable under GATT nor was the United States going to help […] 
We were then instructed to quietly investigate what for was that the United States negotiated with 
Canada […] That was my first job […] If this is happening in Europe, what is the United States 
doing? It was a matter of reading the agreement with Canada.  It was a reference of what Mexico 
would do. But there was not even remotely the thought of a NAFTA. It was that Mexico copied, that 
is, it  proposed that the United States do what it did with Canada. In the end it  was something much 
more ambitious […] Canada took the opportunity to enrich the treaty very much. When Canada joined 
it took advantage of its  two years of experience with its treaty. This was very valuable for Mexico. 
Disciplines that in the Canada-U.S. treaty had only three paragraphs, in the new treaty had three 
pages, because Canada wanted to write very carefully all that was a commitment” (Humberto Jasso 
Torres, personal interview by author in Mexico City on October 27, 2010; translated from Spanish).   
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stated earlier, Salinas’ had received very direct suggestions from European leaders in the 
sense that Mexico needed to consider associating itself with the United States (Salinas, 2002). 
Aspe describes the importance that the fall of the Berlin Wall had in the strategic 
calculations of the Mexican government regarding an FTA with the United States: 
An event that accelerated everything was the fall of the Berlin wall. The year 1989 
was drastic, when we said Europe. The next years Germany will be going toward East 
Europe. Asia is very far. Japan is not interested. We said, how are we going to attract 
international trade and investments? It has to be done with the United States. I was 
very clear with the President. I told him: Mr. President, we need to do it now and we 
need to do it with rules […] If you ask me what were the antecedents? The fall of the 
Berlin wall and all East Europe, and the corresponding paradigm that disappeared.  
And we were very lonely, and saying well, we have to negotiate. Our neighbors are to 
the North and to the South. Then the question is: do we do something first with 
Central America or with United States? We said: we have to do it with the United 
States (Pedro Aspe, personal interview by author in Mexico City on October 27, 
2010; translated from Spanish). 
 
The end of the Cold War had another important consequence with repercussions for Mexico’s 
regional policies: “it reinforced the long-standing trend toward tripolarity in the global 
economy. The United States had to share power with the European Union and Japan. And all 
three needed to cooperate without the glue that Cold War security alliances had theretofore 
provided” (Destler 2005, 39). In other words, the end of the Cold War accelerated the 
formation of three powerful economic blocs that had been emerging in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the competition among  them.  
The revival of the European process of integration in the 1980s had largely responded 
to the need to revitalize economic growth and confront the economic competition from the 
United States and Japan (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). The creation of an FTA between 
Canada and the United States in 1988 had been to a large extent a competing reaction by the 
U.S. to the economic threat from a stronger united Europe and a fast growing Japan. How 
Mexico confronted this situation depended on its political leadership’s interpretation of it 
based on the intellectual framework dominating its thinking, as explained by Salinas (2002): 
At the end of that day’s session in Davos […] I went out for a walk with members of 
the cabinet who were accompanying me. I explained my views on the situation to 
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them. In a world undergoing change, the formation of economic blocs could lead to a 
new era of protectionism or trade wars between the different regions. It was in our 
interest to enter into arrangements that would allow us to diversify our exports. This 
would allow us to obtain more investments and consequently, to create more jobs at 
home. To do this unilaterally was becoming difficult: it was necessary to take the 
initiative to join one of these blocs. Geography gave us the chance to participate in 
regional integration with the greatest power in the world. In spite of historical 
objections, it was necessary to do it. This was the right moment (2002, 48-49). 
 
Trade Policy of the United States 
The United States has traditionally been the single most important economic partner 
of Mexico.
87
 As such, its trade policies have an enormous influence on the bilateral economic 
relations between the two countries. The U.S. trade policy during the 70s and 80s acquired a 
strong protectionist-defensive bent that is best explained by the relative decline of U.S. 
competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe, Japan and the emergence of Asia’s newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). 
The trade dilemma of the U.S. was well described by the Bilateral Commission on the 
Future of United States-Mexico Relations: “Rapid increases in import penetration, 
unsustainable high levels of imports, and adjustment problems in key sectors (like 
automobiles and agriculture) have made many U.S. politicians, government bureaucrats, and 
businessmen more receptive to managed trade. This has raised questions about the depth of 
the U.S. commitment to open markets that sustained the postwar trading system” (cited in 
Hart 1990, 49).    
This new defensive orientation of the U.S. trade policy started with the 1974 Trade 
Act, which granted the president extensive power to retaliate against perceived violations of 
what the U.S. unilaterally declared to be unfair trading practices by foreign countries. The 
1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act renewed and strengthened provisions already existing 
under the previous Act. This trade-remedy legislation focused on various issues such as 
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 As of 1990, Mexico was the fourth largest trading partner of the U.S., after Canada, Japan and the 
European Community, accounting for about 6-7% of U.S. exports and imports. On the other hand, the 
U.S. was the dominant trade partner, accounting for two-thirds of exports and imports, far outpacing 
Mexico’s trade with Europe, Japan and Latin America (Hart 1990).  
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injurious and subsidized imports, dumping, violations of trade agreements and commitments, 
unfair trading practices, foreign country discrimination, agricultural imports below U.S. 
prices, and others of similar nature (Hart 1990).   
The impact of these U.S. trade- remedy laws on countries like Canada and Mexico, 
for example, was significant because behind them was the structural power of the U.S. 
represented by the control of an enormous domestic market (Sinclair 1994). In this sense, the 
trade policy of the U.S. helped to shape Mexico’s policy of gradual rapprochement with its 
neighbor to the north that facilitated the eventual agreement to launch NAFTA.   
To understand how this was possible, one needs to consider that three main different 
strands were competing for the orientation of U.S. trade policy: “One represents the 
traditional multilateral orthodoxy […] The second is a resurgence of unilateralism and 
protectionism […] disdainful and distrustful of the multilateral trading system. The third 
favours the negotiation of regional or bilateral agreements
88
 with selected countries notably 
Canada, Mexico and those of the Pacific Rim…” (Hart1990, 54).   
Mexico made use of this third alternative as a way to eliminate the uncertainty and 
arbitrariness derived from unilateral trade criteria by the U.S. through bilateral agreements 
that established mutually agreed-upon rules of the game. Thus, Mexican leaders successively 
signed with the United States the Bilateral Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties in 1985, the Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding 
Trade and Investment Relations in 1987, and the Understanding Regarding Trade and 
Investment Facilitation Talks in 1989 (see pages 58-59 for a description of these 
arrangements).   
These agreements helped to institutionalize bilateral understandings on trade and 
                                                             
88 The 1979 Trade Act called for a study of trade agreements with countries of the northern portion of 
the western hemisphere, and the 1984 Trade and Tariffs Act provided for the negotiation of bilateral 
agreements (Hart 1990). 
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investments between the two countries that cleared the way for the comprehensive treaty that 
was NAFTA. Thus, a 1990 report issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC)
89
 noted that “… some long-standing bilateral trade frictions have been reduced or 
eliminated. As U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills recently remarked before the House 
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, ‘At no time in recent memory have our trade 
relations been as harmonious as they are today’” (USITC 1990, ix).   
Behind the willingness of the U.S. to set in motion the bilateral negotiations, there 
was also a  strategic political interest, which overruled concerns of multilateralists and 
protectionists in the U.S. government. According to USITC (1990),  
…economic incentives are but one part of the reason that the U.S. government should 
pursue an FTA with Mexico […] geopolitical considerations also make a United 
States-Mexican FTA an attractive prospect […] the development of a prosperous and 
politically stable Mexico, aided by an FTA, is in the ‘enlightened self-interest’ of the 
United States (1990, 1-1). 
 
Failure of the Latin American Integration Project 
Another important international factor that influenced Mexico’s decision to seek an 
FTA with the U.S. was the failure of the Latin American integration project that began with 
the Latin American Free Trade Association
90
 (LAFTA). It was established by the Treaty of 
Montevideo in February 1960 and signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay, and subsequently also by Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia.  
LAFTA was launched as a “free trade zone” where the member countries would 
progressively eliminate tariffs and restrictions in a period of twelve years (TM60 1991). 
A key provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment (Article 1), which requires that if a country grants any 
special preference to one of its trading partners, it must extend the same preference to all the 
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 On October 18, 1989, the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 
requested the USITC to conduct a two-part study to provide 1) a comprehensive review of Mexico’s 
recent trade and investment reforms, and 2) a summary of experts’ views on prospects for future 
United States-Mexican trade relations (USITC 1990). 
90
 In Spanish, Asociación Latinomericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC).  
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other members of the Agreement. However, Article XXIV of the GATT makes an exception.  
It allows customs unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs) to discriminate against non-
member countries as long as the tariffs, duties, or restrictions imposed to those countries are 
not higher or more restrictive than those existing prior to the creation of a CU or an FTA 
(WTO 2013).   
LAFTA this exemption to the MFN principle of the GATT. However, its foundational 
document required members to observe the MFN principle at the regional level.
91
 This 
requirement was an important factor in the Association’s ultimate demise, because member-
countries were reluctant to automatically grant product preferences to others that might 
already have a comparative advantage in that product, and that therefore did not need a 
preferential treatment. The fact that most member-countries had adopted protectionist import-
substitution strategies also contributed to LAFTA’s failure.  
LAFTA was eventually replaced by the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA) in 1980. This new organization was integrated by the same countries that were part of 
LAFTA.  Its ultimate goal was the establishment of a Latin American common market. Its 
foundational document was another Treaty of Montevideo (TM80, 1991). LAIA was a more 
flexible instrument for trade liberalization and economic integration that allowed the 
possibility of establishing economic preference areas through partial scope agreements 
(PSAs) between two or more countries in addition to those of regional scope that involved all 
members. The rights and obligations of this type of agreement were valid only for those 
members which subscribed to it. PSAs could be commercial, of economic complementation 
(ACEs), agricultural, for the promotion of trade or other modalities that did not violate the 
treaty’s guidelines Asunción Treaty (TM80 1991).   
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 Article 18: Any advantage, favor, franchise, immunity or privilege practiced by one Contracting 
Party with regard to a product originating from or destined to any other country, shall immediate and 
unconditionally be extended to the similar product originating from or destined to the territory of the 
remaining Contracting Parties (TM60 1991; translated from Portuguese). 
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The legal base of LAIA was not Article 24 of the GATT, but a special Clause of 
Habilitation, which had been negotiated during the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (1973-1979). This clause allowed latitude to LAIA’s members to choose 
what other members to offer preferential treatment to without having to extend the same 
treatment to all members.   
Thus, the Latin American Integration Association brought a new dynamics to the 
program of Latin American integration. It facilitated the spread of preferential trade 
agreements between two or more countries, which in the Southern Cone facilitated the 
bilateral economic integration project between Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s that 
eventually became Mercosur. Yet, LAIA remained a very lax and ultimately ineffective 
vehicle for achieving its long-term objective of “gradual and progressive establishment of a 
Latin American common market” (TM80 1991).   
In the case of Mexico, neither LAFTA nor LAIA offered a viable and effective path to 
economic integration capable of competing with the possibilities of an FTA with the United 
States. Mexico’s trade with other Latin American nations had not reached a level comparable 
to those achieved with United States and Europe. By 1987, Mexico’s imports and exports 
with the rest of Latin America represented only 2.9% and 7.5% of the total, respectively, 
compared with 64.6% and 64.7% in the case of United States, and 16.2% and 14.6% in the 
case of Europe. Thus, a much greater demand for economic integration was likely to come 
from these developed markets than from Latin America.   
Schmitter and Haas (1964) offer a somewhat dated  but relevant assessment of 
Mexico’s dilemma that helps to understand why President Salinas decided that was time to 
join the U.S. in an integration project instead of continuing to privilege integration with the 
rest of Latin America:   
Despite its positive answer to the challenge of economic regionalism, Mexico has 
been and continues being the most isolated member of LAFTA. In terms of the 
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existing network of social communications, the long-term integrating interests of 
Mexico would seem to be more toward the north than toward the south. Separated 
from the main population centers of South America by poor land communications, 
prolonged maritime trajectories and a maritime service of low frequency, the volume 
of the Mexican transactions with the rest of Latin America has been low and highly 
unstable (1964, 115-116).   
    
Discussion and Synthesis 
Up to this point, it would seem apparent that Mexico’s decision to seek an FTA with 
United States was a complex process influenced by a variety of factors acting at different 
levels of the country’s political economy. In this section, I discuss the results of the analyses 
included in previous sections and develop a synthesis to explain Mexico’s NAFTA decision. 
The early 1990 decision to join the United States in a trade agreement marked a sharp  
turn in Mexico’s policies for regional integration. Until then, its efforts had been directed 
toward economic integration with Latin America, which for the most part had been proved an 
elusive goal. This change in orientation occurred at a time when Mexico was undergoing a 
profound transformation from a protectionist, state-led import-substitution model of 
industrialization toward an open, export led type of economy under the guidance of a new 
intellectual consensus based on market liberalization and reduced state participation in the 
economy.   
Yet, an integration agreement with the United States was not a forgone conclusion at 
that time.  Argentina, for example, had also embraced so-called neoliberal reforms in but did 
not immediately or primarily seek economic integration with the United States. Instead, it 
joined Brazil in a customs union. Thus, while recognizing that a neoliberal economic model 
was a necessary condition for the NAFTA initiative, it was not a sufficient requirement.   
The geographical closeness of the huge U.S. market and the mounting economic 
interdependence between the United States and Mexico were structural attributes that 
acquired special relevance once the Mexican government turned toward export led-growth to 
revitalize economic growth. But, again, these structural factors per se did not dictate a new 
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regional policy. For decades, Mexico had maintained close economic relations with the 
United States, and had the same two-thousand-mile common border, but it had refused to 
consider the possibility of a bilateral accord to institutionalize that economic relationship.    
The new export-led strategy encouraged the outward economic growth of large 
domestic conglomerates and the strategic re-accommodation of TNEs in Mexico. This 
development shaped their material interest in a bilateral rapprochement with the United States 
that could support the continued expansion of their businesses. Thus, they joined forces in a 
bi-national coalition that demanded the establishment of an institutional framework that could 
bring order and predictability in trade and investment flows and minimize economic frictions 
between the two countries through bilateral consultation mechanisms. In this sense, there was 
an important agency role played by the leaders of MEXUS, particularly on the U.S. side, who 
skillfully lobbied the Mexican (and the U.S.) government by means of both their economic 
and political clout and the intellectual force of their arguments.   
Yet, their lobbying was successful in Mexico because there was a convergence of 
interests and ideas between the government and the bi-national business coalition. Given the 
paramount importance of the U.S. market for Mexico, particularly at a time when the Mexico 
needed trade expansion, the defensive U.S. trade policy had forced the De la Madrid 
government to focus on solving growing trade frictions between the two countries through 
negotiations.   
This was a new point of political confluence between the government and the bi-
national pro-export business coalition represented by MEXUS. It reinforced a more general 
agreement already under way based on market liberalization policies which favored a greater 
role for business vis-à-vis the state in the economy. Thus, the economic reforms adopted by 
the Mexican government facilitated the coalescence of a new business –state coalition after 
the political breakup caused by the bank nationalization that was essential for the success of  
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the deeper reforms carried by Salinas. 
In addition, the diffusion effect derived from the integration experiences of Spain 
joining the European Community in 1986 and the agreement to form an FTA between 
Canada and the United States in 1987 had an important learning effect on the Salinas 
government. Spain represented a relatively underdeveloped economy vis-à-vis the more 
advanced one of Germany, and it was led by a moderate Socialist government with which the 
Salinas administration had significant political affinities. Moreover, the evidence 
accumulated from the Spanish experience indicated that joining an integration scheme with 
more developed countries had been very positive for economic growth.   
The Mexican government viewed the Canadian economy as comparatively more 
developed than the Spanish one and thus it was not considered a fair case for comparison 
with Mexico. Still, it was an example from which Mexico could learn. Canada had in the past 
argued like Mexico against an integration accord with the U.S., and now, under a politically 
different administration, had found reasons to embrace such an agreement. In addition, the 
CUSFTA (and previously the one between Israel and United States) represented a form of 
“shallow” integration that appeared more attuned with Mexico’s sovereignty sensibilities than 
the “deep” European integration (Baldwin 1998).  
In this manner, one can discern an accumulation of favorable conditions for the 
establishment of an FTA with the United States. Yet, NAFTA was not structurally 
predetermined by factors like geography or economic interdependence, although these factors 
did exert an important influence. Nor was it determined by the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
international influence of globalization and the formation of economic blocs, though these 
variables shaped the choices that Mexico faced. The lobbying effort by the transnational 
business coalition represented by MEXUS also exerted an important influence and provided 
crucial support, but it did not determine the political outcome either. 
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The decisive factor in taking the step forward to integrate was the political decision of 
the Salinas government, particularly the president. The policy response in this regard was a 
direct product of how the government viewed and interpreted the core national interests of 
Mexico in light of the new international conditions shaped by globalization and the 
regionalization of international economic power.   
Its vision was influenced by the new liberal consensus that prevailed among the 
political elite that became dominant in the PRI in the aftermath of the 1982 crisis. Their 
project was to achieve  rapid and sustained economic growth through the opening up of the 
economy and market-based reforms destined to modernize Mexico’s industry to make it more 
competitive. The Mexican government’s thinking about regionalism was also molded by 
political learning from strategic interaction with other countries, their governments and 
political leaders.   
The vision of the Salinas administration about how to change Mexico, its reading of 
the new international political economy, and what it learned from the experience of other 
countries led its government to the conclusion that a North-South economic integration was 
necessary to achieve their goals. Confronted with European indifference, Japan’s aloofness, 
and a history of Latin American disappointments, a free-trade agreement with the United 
States appeared as a fitting and readily available choice.   
The U.S. was already the main recipient of Mexican exports as well as the main 
source of Mexican imports. A comprehensive bilateral agreement would allow Mexico to 
benefit from much needed preferential access to the markets and investment flows of the 
United States under clear rules of the game. An FTA, as opposed to a customs union or a 
common market, would allow Mexico a greater degree of political sovereignty and 
international autonomy.  
The characteristic feature of Mexico’s political system, presidentialism and 
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corporatism, greatly facilitated the  implementation of Salinas’s decision to integrate with the 
United States, a decision that shook a Mexican public opinion still embedded in traditional 
nationalist political culture. These institutional attributes allowed Salinas to carry the project 
to its successful completion with relative ease, because they shaped the disciplined support 
from its political party, the decisive political approval from a Senate dominated by the PRI, 
and the majoritarian political backing from both organized labor and organized peasantry. 
Yet, it is important to also note the active role played by Salinas himself, as a skillful  
and capable political actor. Mexican political institutions helped by offering a friendly 
framework to structuring political support for NAFTA, but they could not in and of 
themselves produce the desired political outcome. Salinas’ participation as political leader 
was fundamental. His style and political vision, influenced by liberal ideas but also imbued 
by intelligent pragmatism were key factors in explaining how NAFTA came into being. 
Therefore, NAFTA was not inevitable. It resulted from the activity  of political actors 
motivated by certain material interests and guided by definite ideas that produced the 
trilateral integration agreement. One only needs to imagine the counterfactual possibility of a 
government led by the PRD of Cuauhtémoc Cardenas in 1988 to realize that the outcome 
could have been quite different than NAFTA. 
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Chapter 3 
Brazil Embraces Integration with Argentina: Prelude to Mercosur 
One can distinguish two separate stages in the process that led the creation of 
Mercosur. The first one starts in the mid-1980’s as new civilian governments in Brazil and 
Argentina inaugurate their respective transitions from military rule to democratic regimes. In 
their attempt to reignite economic growth amid severe economic constraints imposed by the 
1982 financial crisis, the leaders of both countries embrace the idea of bilateral economic 
integration. 
They initially conceive their project in 1986 as a gradual, flexible, balanced and 
symmetrical integration process that proceeding by sectors would establish a free-trade zone 
in 10 years. Two years later, they add a further goal of forming a common market between 
the two countries without a pre-determined completion time period. Brazil and Argentina 
take some important steps to implementing their bilateral agreements, but as both 
governments end their terms in office during severe political and economic crises that 
exhaust their political capacity, the integration project comes to a standstill. 
The second stage begins in early 1990 with newly elected presidents in both Brazil 
and Argentina that adopt new economic strategies emphasizing radical economic 
liberalization to achieve macroeconomic stability and reignite economic growth. They share a 
similar interest in reviving the process of bilateral economic integration but under a different 
conception that reflects the priorities and concerns of their liberal agendas.   
Thus, they quickly commit to a revamped bilateral project that accelerates the 
achievement of a free-trade zone by the end of 1994 through generalized, linear and 
automatic tariff reductions. In addition, the original bilateral project becomes a quadripartite 
one with the inclusion of Uruguay and Paraguay. The four countries formally launch the new 
integration scheme, known as the Common Market of the South, or Mercosur, on March 26, 
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1991 when they sign the constitutive Asunción Treaty.   
I examine this process only from the point of view of Brazil. I focus on the foreign 
policy processes and decisions that led its policymakers under the two different and 
consecutive administrations of José Sarney (1985-1990) and Fernando Collor de Mello 
(1990-1992), to persist in the pursuit of a project of regional economic integration in the 
Southern Cone. I accomplish this objective in two successive chapters dedicated to each of 
the two stages. 
In this chapter, I analyze the factors that led the Sarney government to embark Brazil 
on a bilateral economic integration project with Argentina in the mid-1980s. I highlight the 
important conditioning role played by international factors such as the international debt 
crisis of 1982, the new protectionism practiced by advanced industrialized countries in the 
wake of the recession that emerged after the oil shocks of the 1970s, and Brazil’s learning 
experience with Latin American integration schemes like the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).    
I stress however, the more decisive role of domestic variables. I assess the relative 
impact of the institutional structure of foreign economic policymaking, the dominant 
ideological influence of national-developmentalism, the agency role played by President 
Sarney and his close advisors at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the foreign economic 
strategy that stressed the defense of Brazil’s international autonomy.  
In following the Foreign Policy Analysis approach, I organize this chapter and the 
next one into separate sections that deal with different levels of analysis: the individual 
decision-maker, group decision-making or bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and 
international system. I also conclude each chapter with a discussion and synthesis section.  
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The Individual Decisionmaker 
Starting with the Revolution of 1930,
93
 the centralization of state power in Brazil 
resulted in a preeminent role for the presidency in national policymaking vis-à-vis the 
legislative and judiciary powers, and a high degree of political autonomy for the chief 
executive to act relatively free from the pressure of societal forces. In his study of economic 
policy-making in Brazil during 1947-1964, Leff (1968) observes that  
…in what is perhaps the major theme in modern Brazilian political history, this 
[political] power has been concentrated in the hands of the President, with the 
development since the 1930’s of a centralized political apparatus dominating the local 
and state machines […] the President has had the carrot-and-stick power to control 
the lesser politicians […] Consequently, the relative autonomy of the political elite 
from the broader society has come to mean freedom of action for the Presidency […] 
Congress has been in no position to challenge the President in policy formulation and 
has been placed in the weak tactical position of reacting to his initiatives, 
administrative decrees, and faits accomplis (1968, 125). 
 
Not unexpectedly, military rule in Brazil during 1964-1985 increased the centralization of 
state power and strengthened presidential authority to the detriment of Congress, the 
Judiciary and civil society (Malamud 2001). During that period, the legal framework 
established by the Constitution of 1967 and subsequent amendments dictated by the military 
shaped the Brazilian political system instituting a strong presidentialist system. This regime 
granted the president full control of the Executive and the ability to govern autonomously by 
decree practically without any constraint derived from Legislative control (Amorim Neto 
2000).    
In March 1985, after a long and complex transition from authoritarian rule, there 
finally occurred the peaceful transfer of power to a civilian government. The new government 
represented a broad coalition of the opposition that prevailed against the candidate of the 
military in indirect elections by the vote of an Electoral College formed by members of 
Congress and six representatives from each state Assembly.  Shortly thereafter, a new 
                                                             
93 Successful civil-military uprising led by Getúlio Vargas against the political power of regional 
landed oligarchies that replaced their decentralized political system with a centralized one favorable to 
the middle-class interests of urban sectors (Erickson 1977). 
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Congress elected in November 1986 was invested with constituent powers in order to draft a 
new Constitution for the nation.
94
 Installed in February 1987, the Constituent Congress 
finally produced a new Constitution in October 1988. Thus, between March 1985 and 
October 1988, the new civilian regime still functioned under the strong presidential system 
inherited from the military (Amorim Neto 2000).    
In the aftermath of the transfer to civilian rule in 1985, the military used its 
considerable political clout to constrain the democratic development of the new government 
and to ensure the continued political preeminence of the President’s authority (Hagopian and 
Maiwaring 1987). It intervened in the deliberations to draft the new Constitution by 
pressuring the Constituent Congress in favor of a presidentialist system instead of a 
parliamentary one. The military also supported José Sarney, the new civilian President, who 
demanded that his mandate be maintained for a full five-year term, thus ensuring that he 
would have influence over the constitutional making process.
95
 Thus, “…the Constitution of 
1988 was written by Congress, but with considerable input from President Sarney, who 
inherited strong presidential powers” (Alston et al. 2008, 115).  
Accordingly, while the 1988 Constitution introduced innovations that were cherished 
by opponents to military rule, such as decentralization, transparency, participation, social 
control, and redistribution, it also preserved the concept of strong presidential powers 
inherited from the military regime, including decree and veto powers, legislative rules, and 
                                                             
94
 It had been part of the conditions demanded by the military to accept the transfer of power to a 
civilian government that Congress rather than an independent National Assembly directly elected by 
popular vote should write the new Constitution rather than (Zaverucha, 1997).   
95
 According to Zaverucha (1997), “Sarney relied heavily on the military. On March 2, 1988 he said 
‘there exists, inside Congress, a group of radicals and opportunists that aims to disrupt order [...] If 
they think that will knock me out they are totally mistaken […] If bloodshed is necessary, then it will 
take place.’ On the eve of the Constituent Congress’s vote on both Sarney’s four-year presidential 
term and on parliamentarism, the military again backed the president […] The military preferred 
presidentialism over parliamentarism because they considered Sarney an ally and he would have more 
power as a president rather than as a prime-minister. The military threatened a coup in the case that 
Sarney’s mandate was shortened and parliamentarism approved” (1997, 8). 
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the budgetary process, which permitted the head of the executive branch to carry out most of 
his policy agenda (Alston et al., 2008). According to Amorim Neto and Tafner (2002),  
Critics and defenders of the Brazilian institutional design [...] converge on one point, 
that is, the great extension of the President’s constitutional prerogatives. As it is 
known, besides having the power of naming and dismissing state ministers and heads 
of state agencies of enormous relevance […] and controlling public expenditures (at 
the Federal level) with great autonomy, the Brazilian head of government can also 
veto, partially or totally, laws approved by Congress, and above all, issue decrees 
with force of law and immediate validity, the so-called provisional measures. These 
confer him/her enormous strategic advantages in his/her relationship with Congress, 
even more so as regards to the definition of the legislative agenda of the country and 
its rhythm of implementation (2002, 6; translated from Portuguese).  
 
In practice, these advantages offer Brazilian presidents considerable political autonomy to 
pursue their policy agenda despite the presence of other institutional features that may 
complicate it. The most important of these is a distinctive and enduring combination of 
presidentialism, electoral proportionality, political fragmentation or numerous political 
parties, 
96
 and organization of the Executive based on coalitions, which Abranches (1988) 
aptly baptized as “coalition presidentialism” (presidencialismo de coalizão). In this regard, 
Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) contend that:  
Constrained by the separation of powers, Brazilian presidents must obtain political 
support in a congress in which party fragmentation has reached one of the highest 
levels ever found in the world. In addition, the open list system prevents party leaders 
from exerting control over candidacies and, consequently, over party members' voting 
decisions within the congress. With this institutional framework, it is usually inferred 
that parties will not be disciplined and that presidents will face systematic resistance 
to their legislative proposals. This inference is not true. […] since the enactment of 
the 1988 Constitution Brazilian presidents have had a considerable degree of success 
in enacting their legislative agenda (2000, 151). 
 
Thus, Brazilian coalitional presidentialism resembles an informal parliamentary system 
where the president is compelled to play a role similar to that of a prime minister who creates 
a coalition government in order to reign over a legislature where numerous parties are 
represented
97
 (Lamounier 2003).  
                                                             
96
 “By 1985, there were eleven parties represented in Congress.  By 1991, the total was nineteen” 
(Cardoso 2006, 167). 
97
 Lamounier (2003) made this analogy with reference to the role played by former President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) as a skillful coalition builder. 
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Traditionally, the Brazilian political system has ensured that the area of foreign policy 
remained an exclusive preserve of the Executive, and debates about its orientation had been 
rarely present in the country’s political agenda (Neves 2003). Besides the constitutional 
prerogative
98
 that Brazilian presidents had normally enjoyed in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy under express delegation of authority from the legislative 
branch (Lima and Santos 2001), two other factors help to explain this characteristic of the 
Brazilian presidential system.   
One is the long-standing presence of a highly professional and specialized 
bureaucracy dedicated to foreign affairs headquartered at the Ministry of External Relations 
(MRE), also known as Itamaraty.
99
 The other is the relative disinterest of Brazilian legislators 
on matters of foreign relations and international politics given their scant repercussion on 
electoral outcomes. The combination of these two factors has greatly contributed to make 
foreign policy decision-making a process relatively insulated from control or supervision 
from powers other than the presidential (Neves, 2003).   
In addition to these institutional conditions that facilitate the Brazilian president’s 
political autonomy to determine foreign and domestic policies, there is an important 
additional agency factor to consider:  
…in systems of this type [presidentialist], the leadership capacity of the President is 
fundamental, which means that the functioning of the system much depends of the 
personal attributes of only one person (Kinzo 1997, 13; emphasis added; translated 
from Portuguese). 
 
Overall, the above noted characteristics of the Brazilian presidentialist system offers a clear 
rationale for examining the variables that influenced Brazil’s policies for regional integration  
                                                             
98
 The 1988 Constitution in the main preserved this tradition. It prescribes that the President has a 
reserved authority to celebrate treaties, conventions and international actions, subject to approval by 
Congress (Art. 84, Sect. VIII), and that it is exclusive competence of the National Congress to 
definitively resolve about treaties, accords or international actions that carried onerous duties or 
obligations for the national patrimony (Art. 49, Sect. I) (Brazil Constitution 1988). 
99
 It refers to the name of the MRE’s former headquarters in the city of Rio de Janeiro, when this was 
the capital of Brazil.  
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at the level of analysis of the individual decision-maker.   
Brazil’s Return to Democracy  
The transition from authoritarian rule in Brazil began in 1974 as a modest and gradual 
process of political liberalization initiated by the military. It culminated eleven years later 
with the transfer of government to elected civilian candidates of an alliance between the 
opposition and former supporters of the regime that defeated the military’s candidate of 
choice in the indirect presidential elections held in January 1985 (Hagopian and Mainwaring 
1987).    
The result of the election was a significant political upset for the military, which had 
anticipated a transition to civilian rule through a candidate clearly loyal to the regime.  
Moreover, it revealed that despite holding considerable power over the state, the military was 
in the weakest political position since it installed its authoritarian rule in 1964 by means of a 
military coup d’état that overthrew sitting President Joao Goulart (Skidmore 1988; Stepan 
2001).   
Brazil’s return to democracy is perhaps best explained as a process driven by a 
complex and dynamic interplay of “governmental concessions and societal conquest” (Stepan 
2001, 126) in a context of economic decline that an increasingly discredited regime was 
unable to reverse (Skidmore 1988). The moderate political profile of the eclectic alliance that 
triumphed in the indirect presidential election facilitated the prevalence of a consensus among 
the military to accept the adverse electoral result. After all, it permitted shifting the political 
burden of the economic crisis to a non-confrontational adversary that in turn was willing to 
accede to considerable military supervision and control.   
 The authoritarian regime’s approach to govern the country had combined widespread 
repression and intimidation, the issuance of arbitrary “institutional acts” by the military 
leadership that were deemed the supreme law of the land, and the maintenance of an 
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appearance of institutional normalcy as “they purged but did not close Congress, they 
controlled but did not eliminate elections and parties, and they adhered to the existing norms 
of presidential rotation with fixed terms” (Stepan 2001, 92), albeit all presidents from 1964 to 
1985 were army generals. Also, the military had enlisted the support of a well-organized 
conservative political party loyal to the interests of the regime, the National Renovating 
Alliance
100
 (ARENA), which facilitated the political manipulation of Congress (Hagopian 
and Mainwaring 1987).    
Yet, the approach that the military chose to rule Brazil combined with its strategic 
concern with fostering industrial development had unintended consequences as “it 
contributed to a dynamic that increasingly constrained authoritarian state autonomy but that 
would have been costly (even for the internal unity of the state coercive apparatus) to 
abrogate” (Stepan 2001, 92). Thus, when recently-installed President Ernesto Geisel (1974-
1979) began a modest and gradual process of liberalization at a time when the power of the 
Brazilian state to carry its economic project had begun to decline due to slower growth and 
increasing debt, it facilitated the emergence of various opposition forces in civil and political 
societies
101
 that increasingly gained strength against the regime as they began to develop 
mutually reinforcing horizontal ties (Stepan 2001).    
The 1983-84 massive campaign in favor of direct presidential elections played a 
distinctly important role in creating favorable political conditions for the ultimate triumph of 
the broad alliance opposing the authoritarian regime in the indirect presidential elections held 
                                                             
100
 ARENA was founded in 1966 as a result of the regime’s Institutional Act number 2, which 
disbanded existing political parties and supplanted them by a two-party system. The other party 
allowed to exist was the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), which thus became the official 
opposition force. ARENA was renamed Social Democratic Party (PDS) after the regime allowed a 
return to a multi-party system in 1979 (Hagopian and Mainwaring 1987).      
101
 Some representative examples are: the protests of business groups in 1975 against the expansion of 
the state as regulator; the wave of strikes by the labor movement in 1978; the spread of ecclesiastical 
base communities; the campaigns by the Bar Association for the rule of law, and the Press 
Association against state censorship; the electoral triumph of the opposition in the 1982 elections, 
where they gained control of ten states, and the massive political campaigns for direct elections in 
1983-84 (Stepan 2001; Skidmore 1988).   
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in January of 1985. It originated in Congressional representative Dante de Oliveira’s proposal 
for a Constitutional Amendment in April 1983 to change the indirect system established by 
the military to elect the president via an electoral college into a direct one. It rapidly grew 
into a vast and broadly diverse pro-democracy movement united around the banner of Diretas 
Já! (Direct elections now!) that staged the largest political demonstrations in Brazil’s history 
in defiance of the regime’s restrictions (Skidmore 1988).    
The proposed amendment was defeated in April 1984 because it fell 22 votes short of 
the 320 required (two-thirds of the total membership) to pass. Yet, notably, 55 deputies of the 
pro-military PDS had voted in favor. Moreover, “the campaign had come closer to victory 
than anyone would have dared to predict a year, or even six months, earlier” (Skidmore 1988, 
244). Most importantly, the movement’s campaign had been successful in galvanizing wide 
public support for democracy and significantly contributed to discredit the regime’s claims to 
legitimacy, thus encouraging the desertion of former allies of the military (Skidmore 1988). 
The government of military President Figueiredo expected that it would be able to 
control the result of the indirect presidential elections by means of the apparent majority of 
seats that the PDS had in the Electoral College. Yet, the previous vote for the constitutional 
amendment had uncovered deep fissures in the PDS that eventually facilitated the electoral 
triumph of the opposition. According to Hagopian and Mainwaring (1987),  
The campaign's failure strengthened the hand of Tancredo Neves, who headed the 
opposition effort to encourage enough defections among PDS electoral 
representatives to win the presidency in the electoral college. Neves succeeded both 
in persuading military officers not to stage a coup and in attracting the support of 
opponents and former proponents of military rule for his candidacy. Sensing they 
were on a sinking ship, key PDS leaders deserted their party in June 1984, pledging to 
elect Neves (1987, 5). 
  
The Electoral College finally elected Tancredo Neves and José Sarney, the opposition 
candidates of the Democratic Alliance, as president vice-president, respectively, by 480 votes 
(72,4%) against only 180 (27,3%) given to the candidates of the PDS. Moreover, the 
candidates of the Alliance received 166 PDS votes, thus revealing the substantial political 
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realignment of forces that occurred (Skidmore 1988). Neves was a leader of the Party of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the most important political force within the 
Alliance.  José Sarney was one of the defectors from the PDS who joined the Liberal Front 
(FL), also part of the Alliance.
102
  
Neves however, could not officially assume the presidency due to a sudden illness.  
Instead, Sarney assumed as acting President, immediately after being sworn in as Vice 
President in March 1985. Neves never recuperated and subsequently died on April 21, 1985.  
That same day, Sarney officially became President of Brazil. 
President-elect Tancredo Neves  
Despite the fact that he was never sworn-in, Neves had a “presidential moment”103 
when he embarked in a 15-day long trip through various European countries, United States, 
Mexico, Peru and Argentina in January/February 1985 before falling ill. Danese (1999)
105
 
describes the Brazilian president-elect as somebody who  
did not attribute high priority to foreign policy, preferring to leave it in the hands of 
Itamaraty  […] His vision of the world however, was strongly marked by the foreign 
policy of the 1950s […] In his international debut, Tancredo always preferred to limit 
himself to the norms of the Foreign Ministry [Itamaraty], avoiding controversial 
topics (1999, 370-71).  
 
Tancredo Neves’ visit to Argentina in early February appears to have been an important 
diplomatic antecedent to the eventual forging of a project of bilateral economic integration 
between both countries. But this event has to be understood in the context of the immediately 
preceding history of the diplomatic relationship between both countries.   
                                                             
102
 Sarney (1986) acknowledges that “[m]y political transition to the coalition of Tancredo Neves had 
been the subject of much criticism. After all, I was placed on the ticket because I represented factions 
that would provide the required Electoral College majority” (1986, 1). Azambuja (2012) notes that 
“Sarney had full conscience that the death of Tancredo had carried him to the presidency, and that he 
as representative of the former Arena was not the expression of a majority in Brazil of 1985” (1986, 
82). 
103
 “The unexpected death of Tancredo makes this trip his unique presidential moment” (Lafer 2010, 
197).  
105
 Sergio Danese was at that time a young diplomat who provided assistance to president-elect Neves 
on matters of foreign policy (Lafer 2010).  
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Argentina and Brazil had begun a process of diplomatic rapprochement in the late 
1970s during military rule in both countries, which ended their long-term rivalry and initiated 
a period of sustained cooperation through the settlement of disputes over hydroelectric power 
and nuclear technology in 1979-80 (Resende-Santos 2002). It was a political breakthrough in 
the bilateral relationship that prepared the terrain to further advance in the area of economic 
cooperation and the initiation of a process of economic integration.  
To a large extent, this significant step forward was due to the advent of João Batista 
Figueiredo
106
 as the new military President of Brazil in 1979, which brought a major change 
in the country's foreign policy for the region by declaring that Latin America was a priority 
for Brazil’s diplomacy (Selcher 1984; Saraiva 2010). He acknowledged the possibility of 
bilateral integration in August 1980 on occasion of a lunch that Brazilian businessmen 
offered to the Argentine military President Jorge Rafael Videla during his visit to Brazil by 
declaring that “Brazil and Argentina can offer numerous opportunities for economic 
integration” (RPEB26 1980, 30; translated from Portuguese). However, neither of the two 
countries’ governments took the initiative in making a definite proposal in that regard at that 
time.   
The arrival of the first democratically elected government to Argentina in December  
1983, after almost eight years of military dictatorship
107
 created favorable conditions for the 
advancement to a new stage in the bilateral relationship. According to Barbosa (2010),  
The initiative came from the Argentine civil government in 1984 when it proposed 
the opening of trade negotiations with the last military government in Brazil. The 
gesture did not prosper because the President João Batista Figueiredo did not 
                                                             
106
 According to Spektor (2002), “The start of the Figueiredo government in 1979 created the 
conditions for the general reform of the Brazilian policy in relation to Argentina […] It is in that 
period that the Brazilian diplomacy opened the road to the bilateral cooperation in military, nuclear 
and commercial matters, mechanisms that prepared the bases for an ambitious cooperative project” 
(2002, 135). 
107
 The Argentine military had initiated the war against Great Britain in 1982 for the possession of the 
Malvinas islands. The war proved to be a disastrous adventure that destroyed any remains of political 
legitimacy that the military regime might have had at that time, thus prompting its demise and a rapid 
transition to democratic rule (Rock 1987). 
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authorize the follow-up of the proposal despite the initial contacts made by officials 
from the two countries (2009, 20). 
 
In Buenos Aires, Neves met with Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989), the new Argentine President.  
At the time of the meeting, overall trade between Brazil and Argentina had been declining 
since 1980 to a level that Ambassador Rubens Ricupero described as “ridiculous” (Tavares 
1985). During a joint press conference after the meeting, both presidents coincided on the 
notion that the economic recession had provoked the creation of obstacles to the free trade 
among Latin American countries that needed to be removed. Alfonsín expressed the hope that 
by the end of both presidents’ terms the customs’ obstacles to an economic integration were 
eliminated.   
Neves, in responding to a question over what was the priority of the new democratic 
governments of the Southern Cone, and what could be done to increase their economic 
integration, declared that the priority was the fight against inflation, and that his government 
wanted to intensify trade between Brazil and Argentina to make it return to the record level 
attained in 1980 (Folha de São Paulo 1985). According to José Tavares de Araujo Jr.,
108
 
during the meeting Neves approached Alfonsín with a proposal to resolve any remaining 
security issues between the two countries in order to eliminate any possible military threat to 
the nascent democratic regimes.  He suggested the exchange of presidential visits 
accompanied by high-level military personnel to installations that in each country were 
allegedly related to the development of nuclear weapons so as to satisfy any security 
concerns.  Alfonsín accepted Neves’ initiative but he also suggested starting with economic 
issues like the lack of bilateral commerce, perhaps by means of some form of economic 
integration.  Neves agreed immediately.    
                                                             
108
 Personal interview by author with José Tavares de Araujo Jr. in New York on December 29, 2010.  
He is a former Executive Secretary of the Customs Policy Commission [Comissão de Política 
Aduaneira – CPA] (1985-1988) and of the Chamber of Foreign Trade [Câmara de Comércio Exterior 
– CAMEX] (1995), and former Secretary of Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finances 
[Secretário de Acompanhamento Econômico do Ministério da Fazenda] (2003-04). 
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According to Gardini (2012), Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, who also attended the 
meeting as an advisor to President-elect Neves, offered a more restrained account of the 
meeting, noting that integration was discussed just in broad terms of closer trade relations.  
He added: “It would be an exaggeration to understand the discussion on integration in that 
context as an assessment of specific economic or legal schemes” (cited in Gardini 2012, 125). 
Neves however, did not have an opportunity to further advance in the definition of a 
specific policy to expand and deepen the relationship with Argentina because of his untimely 
death. Instead, that responsibility fell on José Sarney, who very shortly would demonstrate a 
remarkable commitment to a project of bilateral economic integration with Argentina. 
President José Sarney 
The new President acknowledged the difficult position in which he found himself 
when first assuming as acting President: 
Thus it was that I, without wishing it, without having any time to prepare myself for 
it, became the holder of the largest foreign debt on the face of the earth, as well as the 
greatest internal debt. My inheritance included the deepest recession in our history, 
the highest rate of unemployment, an unprecedented climate of violence, potential 
political disintegration and the highest rate of inflation ever recorded in our country’s 
history—250 percent a year, with the prospect of reaching 1,000 percent. I took into 
my hands the fifth-largest country in the world—8.4 million square kilometers, 130 
million inhabitants—the eighth-largest economy in the non-communist world, the 
largest of the world’s Catholic nations (Sarney 1986, 105-06). 
 
From the start, Sarney’s views on foreign economic policy appeared influenced by a mix of 
economic developmentalism and international political autonomy (Saraiva 2010), which the 
adverse international environment contributed to reinforce. He quickly assumed a defensive 
stand toward advanced industrialized economies and international financial institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, like his predecessor, military 
President Figueiredo, he perceived a common ground between Brazil’s interests and those of 
other developing nations, particularly in the South American sub-region.    
Danese (1999) notes that contrary to Neves, Sarney “impressed a strong personal 
accent upon his diplomacy” (1999, 371-72; translated from Portuguese). Sarney had already 
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accumulated some diplomatic experience and knowledge of international politics while being 
a member of the Brazilian Senate:
109
 
I was one of the few members of parliament that dealt with foreign policy […] I 
always had a taste for foreign policy. In the parliament, I don’t remember many who 
had those concerns; I always had them; I gave my opinion on various matters, gave 
some speeches and I was the orator who welcomed [President] Carlos Andres Perez 
when he came to Brazil […] (José Sarney, cited in Danese 1999, 375; translated from 
Portuguese). 
 
Yet, the new President did not have a definite foreign policy project.  He seemingly did not 
have any discussions with Tancredo Neves on the subject, and did not participate in the 
planning of Neves’ trip overseas (Danese 1999). Nevertheless, Sarney brought with him “an 
intuitive and militant vision about the importance of Latin America, more specifically about 
South America” (Danese 1999, 376). In this regard, he offered the following assessment of 
his own role: 
I brought two basic notions to the government: first, that there was a South America, 
and second, that Brazil should have a non-hegemonic position but exercise its specific 
weight in the region. Our complicating factor was Argentina. We never had 
substantial divisions, frontier problems, or wars; there always were superficial 
rivalries; what there was between Germany and France [war] did not exist between 
us. In my head, it was the French-German Treaty
110
 (José Sarney, cited in Danese 
1999, 376, translated from Portuguese).  
 
The Program of Economic Integration and Cooperation (PICE) 
 
Sarney did not hesitate in signaling to Argentina that he was ready to deepen bilateral 
cooperation by means of concrete measures. He ordered the import of substantial amounts of 
wheat and crude oil from Argentina in order to help it to reduce its commercial deficit with 
Brazil (Hirst 1987). Shortly thereafter, Sarney also agreed to formalize an agreement 
according to which every time that one of the two nations had a negative balance superior to 
                                                             
109
 Seixas Corrêa (1996) observes that Sarney “[i]ntegrated diverse Brazilian delegations to 
international conferences and carried out numerous missions abroad as deputy, governor and senator.  
In that process, he acquired an experience that would serve him both to formulate the foreign policy 
of his government and to execute it, in the permanent exercise of the so-called ‘presidential 
diplomacy,’ which he conducted, opening for Brazil access and participation in circles previously 
closed by virtue of his predecessors’ inhibitions” (1996, 364; translated from Portuguese).   
110 Sarney refers here to the Franco-German friendship treaty signed in January 1963 by West 
Germany’s Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and France’s President Charles de Gaulle (Goldsborough 
1976).  
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US$50 million, the other would immediately try alleviate the situation by increasing its 
imports (Moniz Bandeira 2004). 
These actions facilitated the emergence of a new dynamics in the bilateral relation 
that led to a first meeting between the presidents of the two countries on November 29, 1985 
for the inauguration of an international bridge linking the city of Porto Meira in Brazil to the 
city of Puerto Iguazú in Argentina. At the end of two days of direct negotiations, Sarney and 
Alfonsín signed the Declaration of Iguazú and the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy.  The 
first document declared both presidents’ agreement regarding:   
…complex problems derived from the external debt, from the increase of the 
protectionist policies in international trade, from the permanent deterioration of the 
terms of trade, and from the draining of hard currency that the developing countries 
suffer […] the urgent necessity that Latin America reinforce its power of negotiation 
with the rest of the world, expanding its autonomy of decision and avoiding that the 
countries of the region continue vulnerable to the effects of the policies adopted 
without their participation […] [and] their firm political will to accelerate the process 
of bilateral integration in harmony with the regional efforts of cooperation and 
development (RPEB47 1985, 28-30; translated from Portuguese). 
 
The declaration also announced the creation of a High-Level Joint Commission for Bilateral 
Economic Cooperation and Integration. The Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy reaffirmed 
the peaceful purposes of both nations’ programs for the development of nuclear technology 
and announced the formation of a corresponding joint work group.    
The success of this meeting encouraged the continuation of bilateral negotiations, 
which resulted in another bilateral presidential meeting in Buenos Aires on July 29, 1986.  
On that occasion, Sarney and Alfonsín signed the Act for the Brazilian-Argentine Integration 
and twelve related protocols
111
 which constituted the Program of Economic Integration and 
Cooperation (PICE). The joint communiqué declared that the Act  
                                                             
111
 The Protocols included the following: capital goods, wheat, complementation of alimentary 
supply, expansion of trade, criteria for the renegotiation of the Agreement of Partial Scope (Acordo de 
Alcance Parcial) no. 1, binational enterprises, financial affairs, investment fund, energy, 
biotechnology, economic studies, immediate information and reciprocal assistance in case of nuclear 
accidents and radiological emergencies, as well as cooperation in the aeronautical sector (RPEB50 
1986a, 22, translated from Portuguese).  
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constituted a starting point for a modern process of integration through a program of 
gradual application, of sectorial character, that will allow the quantitative and 
qualitative increase of trade and the growth of both economies (RPEB50 1986a, 22; 
translated from Portuguese).  
 
The joint statement also included a political purpose for the agreement.  It affirmed that the 
two Presidents “emphatically reiterate the importance that they attribute to the process of 
bilateral integration as a means to strengthen representative institutions and to give stability 
to the democratic system” (1986, 22). 
The objective of the program was to promote the creation of a common economic 
space through a selective liberalization of the respective markets and the stimulus to the 
complementation of specific economic sectors, based on the principles of gradualism, 
flexibility, equilibrium and symmetry in order to allow the progressive adaptation of the 
business sectors of each country to the new conditions of competitiveness. The agreement did 
not set an explicit target date for the overall completion of the common economic space, but 
it established “desired” partial benchmarks to achieve in different areas, which were detailed 
in the Protocols (RPEB50 1986b).   
Thus, for example, the Protocol number 1, dedicated to capital goods, established that 
in a period of four years a common list of products for a total amount of US$2.0 billion 
would enjoy national treatment in each country, that is, they would be subject to zero tariffs 
and would be excluded from any non-tariff import restriction or barrier. The Protocol detailed 
partial target amounts to be reached each year from 1987 through 1990 in order to fulfill the 
US$ 2.0 billion goal (RPEB50 1986b, 96). 
 The arrangement reflected the respective comparative advantages that each country 
brought into the economic relationship: 
…those two items [wheat and oil] constitute the main of our pattern of imports from 
Argentina, as much as our pattern of exports to Argentina […] is composed by items 
of greater value added, that is, do not have practically primary goods, it is a pattern 
rich in industrial products, etc. […] (Marques 2008, 75, translated from Portuguese). 
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It was a framework that instituted a new way of negotiating economic agreements that was 
different from the approaches prevalent in LAFTA and in LAIA and that satisfied Brazil’s 
economic interests and preferences: 
What the PICE of 1986 brought as novelty […] is that the two countries started to 
negotiate not by product anymore but by sector […] That is, the structure, the dorsal 
spine of the Process of Integration with Argentina was double: it had on the one hand, 
the concessions over capital goods, where Brazil was the most powerful, most 
important economy, with a more diversified industrial park, and on the other hand, 
created increasing preferential access conditions to the Argentine wheat, as a form of 
stimulating the interest of the neighbor country in the process of integration that was 
being assembled […] (Marques 2008, 66-67, translated from Portuguese). 
 
The launching of the PICE occurred in the context of prevalent protectionist import-
substitution strategies, and under the influence of the financial crisis that encouraged debtor 
countries to follow a deliberate policy of constricting imports in order to accumulate trade 
surpluses with which to service the external debt (Marques, 2008). The PICE reflected this 
environment in adopting a “managed trade” approach in attempting to maintain an 
equilibrated balance of trade between the two countries. This approach reflected a deliberate 
policy of Brazil geared to avoid the accumulation of significant trade balances in its trade 
with Argentina, “as a form of not legitimating those internal pressures [within Argentina] 
from public opinion against the process of integration” (Marques 2008, 73, translated from 
Portuguese). 
The PICE had an essentially defensive character in that its emphasis was on 
safeguarding and strengthening the economic autonomy of both countries rather than on 
facilitating their integration with the world economy. It was thus consistent with Brazil’s 
main strategic concerns at that time. Sarney conveyed this interpretation in December 1986 
during a meeting with Brazilian and Argentine businessmen: 
The challenge of our history, the goal that inspired our life since independence was 
without a doubt to create a true autonomy for our countries. To reduce external 
dependence, making of the international relations a conscious option of our 
sovereignty, and not a restriction marked by the inequality, by the servility. The 
program of integration Brazil-Argentina is an example of this effort (Sarney 2008, 64; 
translated from Portuguese).  
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Also, the PICE was congruent with the demands of the South-South orientation that Sarney 
began to impress on Brazil’s foreign economic policy as a response to the new international 
environment that the country confronted at that time. In order to better understand the 
rationale behind that new direction, it is useful to examine in some detail the speech that 
Sarney gave on May 13 1987, on occasion of the Day of the Diplomat at the Itamaraty 
Palace: 
Based on these traditional principles [peaceful solutions, good coexistence, and the 
rule of international law] the Brazilian foreign policy has known how to update its 
thematic horizons […] In the New Republic,113 our foreign policy gained in 
coherence, dynamism, efficacy, transparency and independence. Without attaching 
itself to blocs born in geographical and political contexts different from ours, Brazil 
fights so that the ideological antagonisms and the political impasses between East and 
West as well as the excessive degree of polarization that is still prevalent in the 
international relations are overcome. In accordance with these changes we redefine 
our role in the international scenario […] We fight for a more democratized 
international political order. And also for a revision of the present economic order, 
flagrantly unjust and harmful to the countries that struggle for their development […] 
The Brazilian foreign policy is engaged with our policy of growth and with our 
struggle against unemployment […] the absence of confrontation or the 
acknowledgement of interdependence must not imply a dependency with respect to 
the actual centers of political power and the world economic poles […] We must take 
care of preserving our autonomy as far as essential decisions for our future as a 
nation is concerned […] [Brazil] already has and intends to preserve sufficient power 
to avoid the imposition of an alien will, and thus, have power to affirm its autonomy 
[…] This is the vision that we assert in our international behavior, in the treatment of 
the most different questions with which we are confronted […] We want in reality to 
progress within peace and cooperation through horizontal ties.  That is one of the 
reasons why in order to find our own paths we grant so much importance to 
cooperation between developing countries […] there exists another cardinal point 
besides the East, the West, and the North: the South. And it is in that direction that 
many of our most important recent initiatives are projected. The sphere of action of 
developing countries offers free space for the building of a new type of relations 
devoid of any asymmetries, immune to the imposition whims of dominations or 
dependencies (Sarney 2008, 68-72; translated from Portuguese; emphasis added) 
 
The speech defines what Sarney viewed as a viable and suitable option to satisfy Brazil’s 
core national interests within an international scenario still dominated by Cold War rivalries 
and North-South disputes. The new orientation represented a defensive posture intended to 
carve an international niche where Brazil could protect and advance its national interests  vis-
                                                             
113 Nova República in Portuguese. Name given to the period of Brazilian history that starts in 1985 
with the new civilian government inaugurated during the democratic transition from military rule, 
until the present.  
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à-vis the perceived hegemonic threat from more powerful advanced industrialized nations 
that did not seem to offer Brazil any meaningful alternative form of cooperation. In this 
manner, the South-South orientation became one of the dominant aspects of Brazilian foreign 
economic policy. 
Alfonsín and Sarney met again in December 1986 to sign additional documents that 
defined how to pursue the objectives established in the PICE protocols, and five new 
protocols concerning steel production, surface transport, maritime transport, communications 
and nuclear cooperation (Hirst 1987; Manzetti 1990). Two years later however, other 
pressing issues such as a widening Argentinean trade deficit with Brazil, uncontrolled 
inflation, and increasing political opposition to the economic policies of both governments 
had paralyzed the integration process. 
The Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD) 
On November 29, 1988 Sarney and Alfonsín attempted to revive the bilateral 
integration process by signing a Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD), 
which established that “…the two countries shall form a common economic area …” (TICD 
1988, Article 1; emphasis added), maintaining the same principles of gradualism, flexibility, 
balance and symmetry adopted by the PICE (Article 2). The TICD envisioned the integration 
process in two stages. The first one set a maximum period of 10 years to achieve “the 
removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services” (Article 3).  The 
second stage established that “…a gradual harmonization shall begin of all policies required 
for the formation of a common market between the two States Parties…” (Article 5; emphasis 
added).   
Thus, the TICD introduced an innovation with respect to the bilateral free-trade-zone 
envisioned by the PICE by declaring that the ultimate objective was the establishment of a 
common market. Yet, no formal deadline was set for this goal. Instead, the agreement 
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established a 10-year period of gradual trade liberalization to complete a free trade zone 
between the two countries 
It is important to note here that in the negotiations leading to the signing of this treaty, 
Brazil’s strong opposition to the inclusion of third parties (i.e., Uruguay) prevailed over 
Argentina’s apparent willingness to accept it.114 Brazil’s resistance originated in its position 
that prioritized a bilateral focus in integration and cooperation initiatives within the 
framework of LAIA as a more effective means to overcome the diverse interests and 
situations of Latin American countries.
116
 In the view of Brazilian negotiators, the bilateral 
approach was necessary in order to avoid a repetition of LAIA’s practices where the 
complexity of multilateral negotiations among countries with pronounced disparities in the 
level of economic development had produced impasses and paralyses rather than effective 
progress. Argentina on the other hand, viewed the potential incorporation of other countries 
as a means to counterbalance the relative weight of Brazil as the most powerful partner, and 
thus create more favorable conditions for negotiating with it (Vaz 2002). 
Thus, the formal inclusion of Uruguay as a third party to the Treaty of Integration was 
subject to the 5-year waiting period demanded by Brazil in order to allow for the internal 
adjustments deemed necessary to adapt that country to the decisions already signed between 
Brazil and Argentina in 23 protocols formalized since 1985. On November 30, 1988, one day 
after Brazil and Argentina signed their bilateral Treaty, Julio Maria Sanguinetti, President of 
Uruguay, signed a separate tripartite agreement with Sarney and Alfonsín, which initiated 
Uruguay’s association with the TICD. According to Abreu Sodré, the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister, the idea was to allow the integration of other Latin American countries in the 
intended common market foreseen between Brazil and Argentina to begin in ten years when 
                                                             
114
 The final version of the Treaty’s article 10 reflected Brazil’s position: “A request of association on 
the part of a member-state of the LAIA to this Treaty, or to a specific Accord resulting from it, could 
be examined by the signatory states five years after this treaty comes into effect…” (TICD 1988). 
116
 Confidential telegram no. 510 issued on November 28, 1988 by Itamaraty providing guidelines for 
the Brazilian delegation to the next round of negotiations in the LAIA to take place in March 1989. 
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the Brazilian products will be commercialized in Argentina as if they were national products 
and the Argentine goods will have the same treatment in Brazil (Menezes 1988). 
The final attempt by Sarney and Alfonsín to revive the integration process through the 
TICD however, did not prosper as mounting economic and political problems overwhelmed 
the governments of both countries toward the end of their respective terms (Hirst and Lima, 
1990). Economic integration in the Southern Cone would have to wait until the arrival of new 
administrations in Brazil and Argentina with sufficient political will and capacity to 
successfully revive it. Yet, the integration process initiated in 1986 with the signing of the 
PICE had resulted in a significant stimulation of bilateral trade, which increased from US$ 
1.415 billion in 1986 to US$ 2.052 billion in 1990 (Teruchkin 1992). President Sarney could 
justifiably claim a prominent role for himself in the development of regional integration in 
the Southern Cone as he did in his last speech as President to the Brazilian Congress in 1990: 
It fell on me to sow and to harvest the first fruits of a policy of integration with Latin 
America, participating in the founding of the Group of Eight,
117
 promoting a loyal and 
objective presidential diplomacy with our neighbors, launching the basis of the 
Common Market. I lived and carried this cause [tornei-me andarilho desta causa] 
with great passion (cited in Danese 1999, 378-79; translated from Portuguese)  
 
Group Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Politics 
The previous section noted that within the Brazilian political system the president 
enjoys a significant degree of political autonomy from societal pressures and congressional 
control, particularly in the area of foreign policy. Yet, while the President is an individual 
actor, the Presidency is a collective one integrated by the chief executive and the members of 
his cabinet as well as by the heads of secretariats and other bureaucratic organs (Palermo 
2000).   
                                                             
117
The Group of Eight was created in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on December 18, 1986, as a permanent 
mechanism of consultation and political coordination in Latin America. It resulted from the fusion of 
two other groups: the Contadora Group, formed in 1983 by Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and 
Colombia to promote peace in Central America, and the Contadora Support Group, formed in 1985 by 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru (Vacs 2003).  
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Therefore, in order to explain how and why the Brazilian government makes political 
decisions one needs to also examine relevant variables acting at the level of the interaction 
between the President and his cabinet and the political bargaining that may occur among the 
governmental bureaucracies. That is the purpose of this section but focused on the area of 
foreign economic policymaking. The specific goal is to examine the variables at play at this 
level that influenced Brazilian policies for regional integration starting in the mid-1980s and 
ending with the creation of Mercosur.  
The Historical Role of the Brazilian Foreign Office (Itamaraty) 
A distinctive feature of Brazilian foreign policymaking is the central role that 
traditionally the diplomatic bureaucracy has played by in the formulation of strategies for the 
configuration of the country’s international relations (Albuquerque 2003). Moreover, the 
Brazilian Foreign Office had an active participation in the formation of the nation-state as it 
emerged from the colonial period in the early 1800s (Danese 1999; Cheibub 1985; Becker 
and Egler 1992).    
A factor that seems to have influenced the early emergence and development of a 
professional diplomatic corps in Brazil is the moving of the Portuguese Court out of Lisbon 
to Rio de Janeiro in late 1807 as a result of the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by 
Napoleon’s armies. This event, unique in the history of the Americas, responded to a strategy 
that aimed at protecting and preserving the power of the Portuguese monarchy until it could 
eventually return to Portugal and regain control over its empire. The move was encouraged 
and aided by Britain, which at the time was a dominant ally and protector of Portugal.   
The relocation of the Portuguese Court to Brazil had important consequences for the 
development of the Brazilian nation-state. It effectively ended the colonial era of Brazil even 
before gaining its political independence as the newly relocated Portuguese monarchy 
allowed the opening of Brazilian ports, particularly for the benefit of British merchants, thus 
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terminating Portugal domination via commercial monopoly (Becker and Egler 1992; 
Skidmore 2009). It also helped to preserve the territorial integrity of Brazil, which at that 
time constituted a disarticulated group of provinces, and promoted a sense of national identity 
around the authority of the monarch (RPEB102 2008).    
In addition, the presence of the Portuguese Court helped the early development in 
Brazil of a bigger and more numerous diplomatic corps vis-à-vis the rest of Latin American 
countries, which played an important role in seeking recognition of the Portuguese monarchy 
in Brazil from other European powers of the time even before declaring its independence in 
1822 (Cheibub 1985). The diplomatic bureaucracy also had active participation in obtaining 
international recognition of Brazil’s independence after its declaration in 1822. This effort 
included the mediation of the United Kingdom in exchange for costly economic concessions, 
but Brazilian negotiators were successful in both achieving political recognition of 
independence and the maintenance of the nation’s territorial unity (Cheibub 1985; Furtado 
2006). Thus, both during the initial period of the Portuguese Court in Brazil (1808-19821) 
and the subsequent era of Brazil as an independent nation under a monarchic-imperial regime 
(1822-1889), the diplomatic corps plays an instrumental role in the national formation of the 
Brazilian state. 
It is however, after the transition from empire to republic that occurred in 1889 that 
the Brazilian foreign office acquires its legendary reputation as the main architect of the 
country’s international relations under the charismatic leadership of José Maria da Silva 
Paranhos, Jr., also known as the Baron of Rio Branco. His most important contribution was 
the peaceful settlement of limit disputes with all of Brazil’s neighbors,118 thus helping to 
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 First, as Brazilian representative in international arbitrations (i.e., Argentina, 1895; France-French 
Guiana, 1900), and later as Minister of Foreign Relations (1902-1912) in negotiations of border 
treaties with neighboring countries (i.e., Bolivia, Treaty of Petrópolis, 1903, which resulted in the 
addition of the state of Acre, originally Bolivian, to Brazilian territory; Peru, 1904/1909; Great 
Britain-English Guiana, acceptance of 1904 arbitral award; Venezuela, 1905; Netherlands-Dutch 
Guiana, 1906; Colombia, 1907; and Uruguay, 1909 ratifying Treaty) (Lafer 2009).   
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consolidate the current borders of Brazil. The skillful work of Rio Branco was instrumental in 
resolving one of the most important issues in the formation of the national state, that is, the 
consolidation of its territory through a final delimitation of frontiers (Cheibub 1985).   
Besides this crucial diplomatic legacy, the Baron is also considered the institutional 
founder of the modern Brazilian foreign ministry: “Rio Branco was the great institution-
builder of Itamaraty, which until today uses and benefits from the Baron’s aura as a great 
Brazilian figure to construct its authority” (Lafer 2009, 46). Thus, the example of Rio Branco, 
his approach to diplomacy as well as policies and practices attributed to him are symbols of 
the esprit de corps of the Brazilian Foreign Office that provide diplomats with a distinct 
sense of historical continuity for their mission (Cheibub 1985).    
 Since then, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent processes of rationalization 
and bureaucratization, particularly after the Revolution of 1930, as part of the centralization 
and modernization of the state apparatus that contributed to consolidate its corporate 
presence. By the mid-1980s, Itamaraty was home to a long-standing, highly professional and 
specialized bureaucracy with a powerful organizational culture that enforced the cohesive 
behavior of its members and helped to maintain the stability and continuity of Brazil’s 
foreign policy (Castelan 2009).   
To a large extent, these institutional characteristics were inspired by a time-honored 
belief that “Brazil is destined to become a major power […deserving…] a special place on 
the international scene in political and strategic terms” (Saraiva 2010, 153). This cohesion 
was reinforced by paradigmatic foreign policy concepts and orientations, such as 
independence, autonomy, diversification and universalism (Mello 2000). In addition, 
Itamaraty developed a distinctive capacity to study and learn from its historical experience, 
which Celso Lafer (2002) refers to as “institutional memory.”  
All these attributes contributed to the distinct political respect that Itamaraty 
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commanded at the domestic level, and legitimized its role within the Brazilian political 
system as the agency in charge of the country’s international affairs (Castelan, 2009). Under 
these conditions, the Foreign Office was able to display considerable political autonomy in 
the conduct of Brazil’s foreign affairs.   
Yet, the attitude of the President plays a crucial role in determining the degree of 
decision-making autonomy enjoyed by the diplomatic bureaucracy. According to Lima  
(1994): 
in the Brazilian presidentialism, the parameter the regulates the diplomacy’s degrees 
of freedom or relative autonomy is the Presidential authorization, be it by omission or 
by delegation of power –like in the Medici government (in some areas of foreign 
policy) and Figueiredo- be it by affinity of points of view, like in the cases of Geisel 
and Sarney (cited in Mello 2000, 63; translated from Portuguese).  
 
The Structure of Foreign Economic Policymaking  
The interaction between President Sarney and his cabinet as well as related 
governmental bureaucracies in connection with the decision to initiate and develop a bilateral 
integration project with Argentina can be best analyzed within the institutional setting 
dedicated to foreign economic policy that existed in the mid-1980s. This structure had 
emerged during the 1950s and 1960s to serve the needs of the Brazilian import-substitution 
model of industrialization according to the dictates of the dominant developmentalist doctrine 
of that time. Its central function was to erect an effective wall of protection around domestic 
markets in order to promote national industrial production (Fernandez 2011).    
In the 1970’s, Brazilian policymakers added fiscal and credit incentives to Brazilian 
exports, particularly of manufactured goods, in order to promote trade surplus balances that 
could mitigate the danger of external strangling due to the deterioration of the terms of trade 
between Brazil and developed countries (Fernandez 2011). In the 1980’s, the external debt 
crisis demanded also a deliberate policy to restrict imports mainly to generate trade surpluses 
and thus liquid resources to confront debt payments (Flecha de Lima 1997; Marques 2008).   
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These orientations guided the institutional structure overseeing foreign economic policy in 
Brazil at the time Sarney became President. 
Within that structure, the National Council of Foreign Trade (CONCEX
120
) occupied 
an overarching position. It was an inter-ministerial coordinating body in charge of 
formulating Brazil’s overall foreign trade policy (Law 5025 1966). Its responsibilities 
included: 1) to establish the guidelines of the foreign trade policy, 2) to adopt control 
measures for the operations of foreign trade when necessary for the national interest, 3) to 
state its position regarding the convenience of Brazil’s participation in international accords 
or agreements related to foreign trade, and 4) to formulate the basic guidelines to be followed 
in the policy for financing exports.   
The law established that CONCEX would be presided over by the Minister of 
Industry and Commerce. The other members were the Minister of External Relations, the 
Minister of Planning and General Coordination, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of 
Agriculture, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Mines and Energy, the President 
of the Central Bank of Brazil, the President of the Banco do Brasil S.A., and the Director of 
the Foreign Trade Desk (CACEX
122
).  The Minister of External Relations would preside in 
place of the Minister of Industry and Commerce in case of his/her absence or impediment 
The CONCEX had an Executive Commission (EC), which was in charge of issuing 
the norms and resolutions necessary for the implementation of the foreign trade policy 
determined by the plenary session of the Council. It was integrated by the Secretary General 
of External Policy or the Deputy Secretary General for Economic Affairs of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry, the Director of Exchange of the Central Bank, the President of the Customs 
Policy Council (CPA
123
), the Director of CACEX, a representative from the Ministry of 
                                                             
120 Portuguese acronym for Conselho Nacional do Comércio Exterior.   
122
 Portuguese acronym for Carteira de Comércio Exterior. 
123
 Portuguese acronym for Conselho de Política Aduaneira.   
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Planning and General Coordination, a representative from the Ministry of Finance, and the 
head of the National Superintendent’s office of the Merchant Marine.  It was also presided 
over by the Minister of Industry and Commerce, or, if necessary, by the Foreign Office’s 
representative. In addition, the Banco do Brasil S.A and the External Relations Ministry were 
in charge of executing norms, guidelines and decisions of the CONCEX at the domestic and 
international levels, respectively.    
In practice, two agencies, the Customs Policy Commission (CPA
124
) and the CACEX, 
played distinct dominant roles in the shaping of Brazil’s foreign trade policy. The CPA had 
been created in 1957 as the Council for Customs Policy to establish the basic guidelines of 
the Brazilian tariff policy regarding imports with a view to adapt the customs mechanism to 
the needs of economic development and to protect national production. The Council, presided 
over by the Finance Minister, was integrated by other state ministries, leaders and public 
organs as well as by representatives of the business and labor sectors.  
In 1979, the Council was terminated and its functions were transferred to its 
Executive Commission, which was in turn renamed Customs Policy Commission. The 
possibility of affecting the country’s tariff structure by simple resolutions of an agency like 
the CPA not only ensured a fast processing of the measures that avoided the slow approval 
procedures of the legislature but it also contributed to the Council’s autonomy by insulating it 
from political pressures (Augusto da Silva 2012).   
The CACEX was created in 1953 as a foreign trade desk of the Banco do Brasil to 
replace the former Export-Import Desk that had been launched in 1941 as part of the same 
bank institution (Banco do Brasil, 2012).  CACEX was responsible for issuing export and 
import licenses, controlling prices, weights, measures, classification, qualities and types 
declared in export and import operations, financing the production and export of industrial 
                                                             
124
 Portuguese acronym for Comissão de Política Aduaneira.    
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goods, acquiring or financing import goods necessary to supply the internal market, prepare 
foreign trade statistics in cooperation with other organs of the Finance Ministry. Its director 
was directly appointed by the President of Brazil (Law 2145 1953). 
According to Veiga and Iglesias (2002),    
CACEX had an almost monopolistic institutional power in foreign trade policy 
[amid] the disorderly expansion of the state that generated the juxtaposition of 
competences but also made viable the occupation of spaces by certain agencies, 
bureaucratic groups, etc.” (2002, 57).  
  
The Ministry of Finance (MF) could also exercise considerable influence over foreign 
economic policy by virtue of its key role in the formulation and execution of national 
economic policies. It had jurisdiction over monetary policy, credit and financial institutions, 
public debt, international economic negotiations, oversight and control of foreign trade, 
taxation, and other important areas. Thus, for example, the MF exercised a de facto power to 
cancel decisions made at plenaries of the CONCEX through simple ministerial decrees 
(Castelan 2009). Overall, the MF was viewed as an institution predominantly technical and 
impervious to political interferences that enjoyed considerable autonomy in the formulation 
of economic policies (Loureiro and Abrucio 1999).    
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) was another governmental actor with 
influence on foreign economic policy. It had been created in July 1960 by consolidating 
various departments and institutes dedicated to industrial property, technology, private 
insurance and capitalization, coffee, alcohol, mate, pine wood, salt, siderurgy, heavy 
machinery, and others. The MIC was reorganized in 1961 by establishing its jurisdiction over 
the study and execution of economic and administrative policy related to industry and 
commerce. This mainly included responsibility over industrial development and the 
expansion of domestic and foreign trade (MDICE 2012). The fact that the MIC presided over 
the plenary meetings of the CONCEX and its Executive Commission was an indicator of its 
relative importance.   
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The Ministry of External Relations (MRE) was well positioned to influence the 
decision-making process related to foreign economic policy and thus to also affect policy 
outcomes. Institutionally, Itamaraty enjoyed significant autonomy and was considerably 
insulated from societal pressures. By law, the foreign office was not only entitled to preside 
over the CONCEX plenary in case of impediment by the Minister of Industry and Commerce, 
but it was also authorized to do the same in the sessions of the Executive Commission of 
CONCEX.  In addition, the MRE had exclusive jurisdiction over the execution of CONCEX 
policy decision at the international level.    
How has this institutional structure actually functioned to produce policy outcomes?  
What roles have its different components played in determining foreign economic decisions?  
The answers to these questions mainly depend, as already noted in the examination of the 
Mexican case, on the type of issues under consideration, the President’s leadership style, the 
kinds of ideas and approaches that were prevalent among key decision-makers, and the actual 
distribution of political power among the actors.   
Ideas and Strategies 
The prevalent ideological paradigm among the Brazilian political elite in the mid-
1980s was still the national-developmentalism that emerged and consolidated in the 1950s 
and 1960s (Saraiva 2010). It was this ideational framework that had accompanied and 
inspired the strategy of economic development based on a protectionist, state-led, import-
substitution industrialization, which had relied on increasing levels of foreign debt. The 
relative success of this strategy in Brazil vis-à-vis other Latin American economies had 
resulted in high rates of economic growth and the development of a relatively complete and 
modern industrial park that positioned the country among the ten major economies of the 
world (Vizentini 1999). 
 The severe impact of the 1982 financial crisis had forced Brazilian policymakers to  
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abandon the reliance on foreign savings but it did not immediately cause a paradigmatic crisis 
leading to a sudden discarding of national-developmentalism. After all, that ideational 
framework appeared to have worked well in shaping a successful model of economic 
development and remained dominant among the Brazilian political elite (Saraiva 2010). 
Moreover, the arranged transition to civilian government that brought Sarney to the 
Presidency in 1985 did not bring any significant change in the country’s economic strategy.  
Sarney’s initial governmental cabinet had been selected by Tancredo Neves, and was subject 
to the programmatic commitments of a broad political coalition that opposed the military and 
demanded democratic reforms, but it was overwhelmingly influenced by the same tenets of 
national-developmentalism that had guided most of the military regime’s economic policies 
(Vizentini 2003).  
According to Lamounier (2003):  
Contrary to what happened in Argentina and Chile, in Brazil the state-centered 
industrialization model continued to be perceived by many as successful until the 
early 1990s, causing the Brazilian business and technocratic elites to send Congress 
contradictory signals as to which route it should take. This is why the Constitutional 
Congress of 1987-88 paid little attention to deep fiscal crisis underlying Brazil’s 
chronic super-inflation and wrote much of the economic model inherited from the 
Vargas era (1930-54) into the new constitution (2003, 282). 
 
This helps to explain why the immediate reaction of the Sarney administration was to simply 
adjust the import-substitution model to the constraints imposed by the new international 
environment rather than to break new ground with a program of economic liberalization:  
Our long-term vision is guided by the financial limitations concerning the external 
debt. This reality, in fact, impedes and complicates considerations over any pretended 
liberalization of imports. We are well-informed about theoretical discussions over the 
meaning of free trade, but we cannot give up the administration of imports (Flecha de 
Lima 1997, 143; translated from Portuguese). 
 
It was under the influence of the prevailing developmentalist/autonomist ideational  
framework and its concomitant economic strategy that the process of economic integration 
with Argentina was initially undertaken. Indeed, this ideational framework permeated the 
entire institutional scaffolding supporting the elaboration and implementation of foreign  
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economic policy (Hirst 1997). 
Yet, by 1988 there were signs that the elite-wide consensus around national-
developmentalism was beginning to crack under the weight of domestic political and 
economic crises and external challenges.
125
 Thus, Sarney began to publicly call for a greater 
international economic integration of Brazil in order to advance its process of economic 
modernization.  In one speech on occasion of the Day of the Diplomat on April 20, 1988 at 
the Palace of Itamaraty, the President noted the need to combine the defense of traditional 
principles of Brazilian diplomacy (i.e., national independence, self-determination, non-
intervention, equality among nations, pacific solution of conflicts) with innovation in the 
approach to new realities: 
Foreign policy presupposes a permanent effort of reflection and critical analysis. The 
phenomena that we deal with in this field are extremely complex.  They resist the 
categorical certainties and the rigors of ideologies […] They require from each of us 
constant intellectual improvement and a spirit open to innovation and change 
(RPEB57 1988, 11; translated from Portuguese). 
 
He emphasized the need to adopt a more open attitude toward a rapidly changing world 
economy in order not to miss the opportunity to modernize:   
We have a compromise assumed with modernity. It is time that we discard 
anachronistic conceptions and practices.  The state is capable of much […] During 
the last decades, however, the state magnified itself in such manner in Brazil that it 
ended by inhibiting instead of stimulating. I am firmly committed in reversing that 
trend. Brazil cannot remain against the tide of History. Today, what is noticeable in 
the world is the notable growth of new opening-up tendencies. Not as an ideology; 
but as a necessity to remove the obstacles to progress. Success is on the side of those 
have learn to incorporate themselves into the great international currents of trade, 
investments and technological innovation: to those who have known to add instead of 
to divide; to open-up and integrate themselves instead of remaining isolated; to 
acquire, in summary, the conditions to compete adequately, of fully participating in 
the great adventure of development that leads to increasing levels of prosperity and 
welfare (1988, 12; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Moreover, the president began to openly acknowledge that the strategy of economic 
development based on protectionist import substitution industrialization no longer served 
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 Amorim (2003) notes that “In the last years of the Sarney government –I remember this because I 
was in the Ministry of Science and Technology- the economic authorities of the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce were already looking into the need of giving more competitiveness to the Brazilian 
industry, of reducing the levels of protection…” (2003, 2).    
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Brazilian national interests. Thus, on May 19, 1988, at the time he announced a new program 
of gradual economic liberalization, he declared: 
With the measures that today we announce we want to achieve the modernization of 
the Brazilian economy […] The model of imports substitution played both a 
fundamental role and a historical role in the Brazilian industrialization.  But today it is 
exhausted and it is compromising our development. The moment to reorient our 
economy has arrived so that we are capable of taking a big qualitative leap that allows 
Brazil to occupy a new place in the international division of labor. The world lives a 
technological revolution.  It modifies economic costs. It reorients comparative 
advantages. It introduces new activities, and with them emerge new forms of hierarchy 
in the economic relations [among nations]. Therefore, it is not sufficient to industrialize 
or to export manufactures in order to diminish the degree of international economic 
dependency (Sarney 1988, 234-35; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
 
 The announcement included four decree-laws that defined a new trade policy and a new 
industrial policy for Brazil. The measures facilitated the inflow of imports by reducing or 
extinguishing tariffs affecting them, allowed a freer flow of exports by eliminating almost all 
existing previous control requirements, reorganized the Council of Industrial Development, 
and determined financial instruments for an industrial policy. Yet, the new liberal trade 
policy did not lead to a change in the type of integration scheme that Brazil was willing to 
pursue with Argentina, which remained a long, gradual process of managed trade 
liberalization. 
Itamaraty and Bilateral Integration with Argentina 
The Brazilian Foreign Office played a leading role vis-à-vis other ministries or 
bureaucratic agencies in the bilateral process of economic integration with Argentina that 
eventually led to the creation of Mercosur. This role was noticeable by the prominent 
responsibilities assigned to the diplomatic bureaucracy throughout the different stages of the 
project during the Sarney administration.  Thus, for example, when in 1985 Presidents Sarney 
and Alfonsín made the joint Iguaçu Declaration and created the High-Level Mixed 
Commission for Cooperation and Bilateral Economic Integration to examine and propose 
programs, projects, and modalities of economic integration, they designated their respective 
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Ministries of External Relations to preside over it
126
 (RPEB47 1985).   
In the same manner, when Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín later signed the Act for 
Brazilian-Argentine Integration in July 1986 and established a bilateral commission dedicated 
to the execution of the program, the Foreign Offices of both countries were assigned the 
important responsibility of coordinating the work carried out by the commission, as well as 
that performed by diverse work groups created by the Act’s protocols. The Brazilian side was 
composed of the Ministries of External Relations, Finance, Industry and Commerce, and by 
the Secretary General of the National Security Council. The commission also included the 
business sectors of both countries (RPEB50 1986b). 
Also, as the two Presidents decided in November 1988 to deepen the process of 
bilateral integration through the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD), 
they charged their respective Foreign Offices with the responsibility of coordinating the work 
of the Commission for the Execution of the TICD as corresponding National Secretaries.  
The Commission was to be co-presided by both heads of state and composed by four 
ministers from each country.      
According to Ambassador Rubens Barbosa,
127
 the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was substantial in shaping the outcomes of negotiations related to integration:  
…In all these areas, the creation of LAFTA, the creation of LAIA, the negotiation of 
the PICE with Argentina within the program of economic integration and 
cooperation, and the creation of Mercosur, there was a predominant role of the 
foreign ministries […] Those who prevailed in those negotiations were always the 
foreign ministries and especially the one from here, from Brazil (MRE 2011; 42; 
emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
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 Also, among other sectorial subcommissions created on that occasion (energy, transportation and 
communications, science and technology) the Foreign Ministries of both countries were to preside 
over a Sub-commission of Economic and Trade Affairs charged with the promotion of economic and 
trade cooperation and the diversification of trade between both nations as well as with third markets 
(RPEB47 1985, 32).  
127
 Brazilian Permanent Representative to the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Under 
Secretary-General for Regional Integration, Trade and Economic Affairs in the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, and Coordinator of the Brazilian Section of Mercosur, the Southern Cone Common Market.  
As claimed by himself, “I was Ambassador in the LAIA, I initiated structurally here in Itamaraty the 
department and later the Under-secretariat of integration, I have accompanied and was the first 
national coordinator of Mercosur” (MRE 2011, 41; translated from Portuguese). 
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Hirst (1997) also credits the Foreign Affairs Ministries of Argentina and Brazil with leading 
the political conception and orientation of the bilateral integration process. In a similar vein, 
Sarney (1997) credits Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office 
during his Presidency, as “one of the principal collaborators in the conception and 
implementation of the integration policy with Argentina” (1997, 12). Mello (2000) finds that 
President Sarney and Itamaraty acted in consonance when pursuing the policy of bilateral 
integration with Argentina as evidenced by the high degree of autonomy and support that the 
president provided to the diplomatic bureaucracy in this regard.   
Seixas Corrêa (1996) confirms that President Sarney had an excellent rapport with the 
diplomatic bureaucracy from which invariably sought advice: “[i]t was perceptible the 
pleasure with which the president took care of the diplomatic questions, accompanying and 
personally orienting the work of Itamaraty” (1996, 364). Also, Sarney instituted a formal 
diplomatic counseling post within the presidency to directly advise him on international 
matters, although the job was never clearly defined in the organizational structure. The new 
office was successively led by ambassadors Rubens Ricupero (1985-1987) and Seixas Corrêa 
(1987-1990) (Seixas Corrêa 1996; Danese 1999).    
Three main factors seem to better explain Itamaraty’s preeminent role with regard to 
Brazil’s policy of integration with Argentina. One is that the Brazilian diplomatic 
bureaucracy had historically played a leading role in all the international negotiations where 
Brazil had participated.  In this regard, Lafer (2002) notes that Itamaraty’s “tradition and 
experience in that area date from the time of the Empire. All the international negotiations 
about trade since the Second World War were led by Itamaraty” (2002, B6).   
Another factor is that the Foreign Office had been at the forefront of the diplomatic 
rapprochement with Argentina starting in the late 1970s and had maintained control over the 
bilateral relationship until the end of the Figueiredo administration. The last military 
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President was better inclined to improve relations with Argentina than his predecessor, 
President Geisel, during whose term the relationship had reached the lowest point in many 
years (Barbosa 1996). Moreover, contrary to Geisel’s leadership style, Figueiredo tended to 
rely more on the Foreign Office’s initiative and thus delegated considerable autonomy to its 
diplomatic work (Pinheiro 2000).   
Also, Itamaraty had handled the initial bilateral conversations immediately after 
Alfonsín became President of Argentina where the possibility of economic integration 
appeared to have been first examined at the request of Argentina (Barbosa 1996; 2010).  
These initial talks did not prosper under Figueiredo, most likely because the Brazilian leader 
despite his favorable attitude toward Argentina seemed reluctant to undertake any 
commitments in that direction amid the domestic complications of the ongoing transition 
process toward a civilian government. In this manner, by the time Sarney became President, 
Itamaraty was already better positioned to lead and shape the next stage in the bilateral 
relationship compared to other ministries and governmental agencies.   
The third factor that favored Itamaraty’s prominent influence over Brazil’s decision to  
engage Argentina in a project of economic integration was its leading participation in the 
creation and development of LAFTA in 1960s and 1970s until its demise in 1980 when it was 
replaced by LAIA, in which creation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also played a key role 
(Barbosa 1996).
128
 For Brazilian policymakers, LAFTA and LAIA were mainly instruments 
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 To coordinate domestically the policies for LAFTA, the Brazilian government created the 
Commission for the Affairs of the Latin American Free Trade Association (CLC) to be presided by 
the Foreign Office, which could also designate the Executive Secretary. It was integrated by 
representatives of Itamaraty’s Department of Economics and Trade, the Customs Policy Commission, 
the National Council of Economics, the National Bank of Economic Development, the 
Superintendence of Currency and Credit, the Desk of Foreign Trade and the Desk of Foreign 
Exchange of the Banco do Brasil, the Brazilian Rural Confederation, the National Confederation of 
the Industry, and the National Confederation of Commerce. The CLC was superseded in 1981 by the 
National Commission for the Affairs of LAIA (CNAALADI) with the Executive Secretariat of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Barbosa, 1996). Also, the Foreign Office was in charge of the Brazilian 
Permanent Delegation to LAFTA headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay (Decree 1961), and 
continued representing Brazil when LAIA replaced LAFTA. 
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for the attaining of more favorable conditions for the expansion of exports, particularly of 
manufactured products (Barbosa 1996). The Foreign Office’s activity in these regional 
organizations had allowed it to accumulate an extensive and valuable experience with respect 
to intra-regional trade and integration (Marques 2008).   
Moreover, as a highly professional bureaucracy Itamaraty had applied itself to extract 
lessons from that experience identifying what in its view were the weaknesses and strengths 
of Latin American integration (Lafer 2002). Thus, for example, in the view of Itamaraty’s 
negotiators LAFTA limited the country’s options for deepening economic integration in order 
to serve its own national interests and preferences:   
[t]hat clause
130
 [that forced LAIA members to apply the ‘most-favored-nation’ 
treatment across the board in the region] then was from the beginning an important 
inhibiting element of the negotiation process within LAIA […] The negotiations had 
turned themselves thus merely formal; they complied with the objectives, but did not 
materially advance in the sectors where there really was domestic production, where 
the competition could improve the quality of the products, etc… (Marques 2008, 65-
66, translated from Portuguese). 
   
But in their assessment of LAFTA they also acknowledged the positive role it had played:  
…it certainly created the bases for what exists today, be it the Andean Group, be it 
the Mercosur. That is, LAFTA helped to create a cobweb of interests within the 
region that did not exist before (Marques 2008, 64; translated from Portuguese). 
 
This kind of systematic analysis and evaluation had enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to develop a coherent approach to advance Brazil’s economic interests in the region. By the 
mid-1980s, Itamaraty had a well- informed appraisal of the potential benefits derived from a 
close economic partnership with Argentina not only because of its leading role in the noted 
diplomatic rapprochement but also because of its experience in trade negotiations within 
LAIA. 
Brazilian foreign policymakers had favored the creation of LAIA in 1980 to replace 
LAFTA because in their view it would introduce the kind of flexibility that allowed them to 
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 Article 18: Any advantage, favor, franchise, immunity or privilege practiced by one Contracting 
Party with regard to a product originating from or destined to any other country, shall immediate and 
unconditionally be extended to the similar product originating from or destined to the territory of the 
remaining Contracting Parties (TM60 1991). 
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envision a regional strategy that was in consonance with Brazil’s interests. In particular, it 
allowed Brazil to engage Argentina in a bilateral integration project: 
…the great change between LAFTA and LAIA was that the most-favored-nation 
clause of regional scope was eliminated.  That means that Brazil was able to negotiate 
with Argentina, or with Venezuela […] or with any other country on strictly bilateral 
bases […] there was an important qualitative and quantitative leap in terms of an 
increase in the granting of concessions and in term of an increase in tariff preferences 
because negotiations had started to reflect strict sensu the negotiating and competitive 
capacity of each of the economies… (Marques 2008, 66; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Furthermore, LAIA’s foundational document provided more leeway for Brazil to pursue 
integration schemes outside the limits imposed by Article 24 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. The new Clause of Habilitation agreed at the Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations (1973-1979) allowed developing-country members of an integration agreement 
to grant preferential tariffs to one another without being obligated to make them extensive to 
all participants: 
Because of that, the TM-80 does not have a deadline for the conformation of free-
trade zones, or a common market, or anything, because the legal base […] does not 
oblige countries to comply with the objectives and the parameters of the Article 24 of 
the GATT… (Marques 2008, 80; translated from Portuguese). 
 
This helps to explain why Brazil favored the drafting of trade and integration agreements 
within the legal framework of the Association:  
[t]he fact of having been formalized within LAIA stems from the need […] of 
counting with the legal protection of the Montevideo Treaty so that those integration 
schemes did not have to be extended to third countries by force of Article 1 of the 
GATT (Marques 2008, 79; translated from Portuguese).                                                                             
 
Itamaraty maintained its leading role in shaping the bilateral process of integration during the 
Sarney administration. Thus, for example, the “managed trade” approach used in the design 
of the 1986 PICE and the 1988 Treaty to ensure an equilibrated balance of trade between the 
two countries had been developed by the Foreign Office to deal with Brazil’s trading partners 
in LAIA. It reflected a concern by Brazilian negotiators that trade imbalances, which were 
usually in Brazil’s favor, might induce other LAIA members to seek reductions in the imports 
of its manufactures:   
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…[with] allegations by certain countries that the deficits that they exhibit in the trade 
with Brazil stem from our non-tariff barriers with the consequent threat of reorienting 
their trade to our detriment…[there was]…the need to have a positive and realist 
negotiating position, adequate to each case…[making necessary]…to consider that 
the withdrawal of our non-tariff restrictions to products from countries with chronic 
payment difficulties, with scarce diversification of exportable products, and with 
whom we have ample and constant surplus, do contribute to defend our flow of 
exports to these countries and our interests… (confidential telegram no. 241 to the 
Brazilian delegation to LAIA, September 19, 1986; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Therefore, Itamaraty advocated making concessions to trading partners to facilitate a more 
balanced trade as long as it facilitated the maintenance of export markets for Brazilian 
manufactures: 
…in any trade accord, the lesser the number of products negotiated in it, the stronger 
will be the exchange imbalance tendencies, and the more intense the pressures will be 
felt to seek equilibrium through the withdrawal of concessions (what tends to 
reinforce in the medium- and long-terms, the failure of the agreement as useful and 
desirable instrument to expand and diversify intra-regional trade) […] in those 
conditions, the Brazilian government is willing to include in all trade agreements […] 
mechanisms judged adequate to promote, to the benefit mainly of the deficit country, 
a dynamic re-composition of the exchange equilibrium through the widening of the 
number and reach of concessions/products…  (confidential telegram no. 381 from 
Itamaraty to Brazilian delegation to LAIA, November 4, 1987, 2; translated from 
Portuguese). 
 
This deliberate policy of trade concessions had been implemented with Argentina in 1985 
when President Sarney ordered the purchase of oil and wheat from that country to ensure that 
it would remain a secure market for the flow of Brazilian exports and a willing partner for 
integration. Olavo Setúbal, then Minister of Foreign Relations in the Sarney administration, 
explained the rationale behind those initiatives in his testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Brazilian Senate on September 4, 1985:  
Brazil and Argentina face today similar problems of domestic and external nature.   
We [Setúbal in a meeting with Argentine President Alfonsín and Foreign Minister 
Dante Caputo] dedicated special attention to the imbalances currently observed in the 
balance of trade, which are resulting in the accumulation of increasing surpluses in 
favor of Brazil. That disparity has structural causes that must be studied carefully 
because its maintenance at excessive levels creates problems in sensitive areas in both 
countries. The interest in the preservation of an adequate exchange with Argentina 
led me upon my return to Brazil, to propose the President of the Republic the 
convocation of an inter-ministerial meeting to study possible governmental measures 
to ameliorate the imbalances currently observed. The meeting took place under the 
direction of the President resulting in the decision to channel portions of our imports 
of wheat and oil toward that country. In this manner, it was evidenced our disposition 
to maintain a more balanced trade relationship with Argentina. The discordant 
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situation that was being observed constituted a true challenge to the attainment of one 
of the basic concerns of our foreign policy, which is the cooperation between 
developing nations. If two countries that have so many affinities –to which it adds the 
physical proximity- were not to be capable of establishing a common line of effective 
action, it will be very difficult for the South-South cooperation to become a  reality 
between Brazil and other developing partners (RPEB46 1985, 72; translated from 
Portuguese).  
 
Another indication of Itamaraty’s leading role in shaping the bilateral project with Argentina 
is found in the Brazilian policy of initially restricting the integration process with Argentina 
to a purely bilateral undertaking. The Foreign Office expressed this position in unequivocal 
terms during the negotiations leading to the 1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and 
Development (TICD): 
The simultaneous opening of negotiation processes with third countries […] would 
contribute to hinder and not to accelerate, the realization of the best common interests 
of Brazil and Argentina under the cover of the Treaty […] The presence of Uruguay  
from the very start of the implementation of the Treaty will represent an extraordinary 
political complication to the achievement of the common major objectives of Brazil 
and Argentina […] Therefore, the possible candidates to join the Treaty, including 
Uruguay, must wait that Brazil and Argentina are able to transform into concrete 
reality the commitments that solemnly assume by its text before including others.  
Otherwise, the Treaty will not be more than another expression of empty rhetoric, of 
doubtful implementation, like other solemn documents that in the past dealt with 
Latin American integration […] For all the reasons above considered, it is 
indispensable a period of five years and the procedures suggested by the Brazilian 
writing of article ten, in its two paragraphs (Secret telegram no. 1814 from Itamaraty 
to the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires, November 28, 1988; translated from 
Portuguese). 
 
Itamaraty’s preference for a restrictive policy in connection with the program of integration  
with Argentina had already been expressed previously on occasion of a proposal from the 
European Economic Community (EEC) to cooperate with such project, in particular within 
the field of telecommunications, including Uruguay.
131
 It is important to briefly examine the 
reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the EEC initiative because it not only reveals 
the defensive concerns of Brazilian policymakers for preserving the Southern Cone of the 
Americas as a zone reserved for the strategic interests of Brazil, but also because it shows 
                                                             
131 Confidential telegram no. 371 addressed to the head of the Brazilian mission in the EECC 
(Braseuropa) and other various dependencies of Itamaraty, October 24, 1988.  Cited quotes were 
translated from Portuguese. 
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how they viewed the European integration process vis-à-vis the one being developed in the 
South America.  
The memo from Itamaraty’s headquarters began by firmly stating that  
…the Brazilian position, approved at the highest level, is that the Program of 
Integration Brazil-Argentina is an exclusively bilateral initiative, and that this 
restrictive characteristic is directly related to its possibilities of success […] the 
participation of Uruguay in the Southern Cone process of integration responds to 
circumstances, inclusive geographical and historical, unique and exclusive of 
Uruguay […] Uruguay’s participation occurs as a rule through bilateral 
understandings either with Brazil or with Argentina, and exceptionally through 
specific trilateral initiatives over specific themes […] therefore the position of Brazil 
regarding the relations between the Southern Cone process of integration with other 
countries or groups of countries is essentially restrictive (1988, 1-2). 
  
Additionally, it noted that the EEC initiative, initially made in 1986, had been successfully 
opposed by Brazil at the time in defense of its own economic interests: 
The Brazilian motivation was to avoid that through this quadripartite initiative the 
EEC was able to transfer its technological designs of systems and equipment of 
telecommunications as norms for the Latin-American market that would made 
unviable the future commercial possibilities of Brazilian equipment and systems in 
the regional market (1988, 2). 
 
In this regard, the memo highlights that Brazil already had the technology that could serve as 
the norm for Latin America:   
[Brazil is] the only source of systems and equipment with its own scientific and 
technological development in Latin America: the system TROPICO developed by 
system TELEBRAS, and already in pilot implementation in the Brasília-Rio-São 
Paulo axis. That system could be adopted a technological standard by the rest of the 
Latin American countries by reason of the decisive size of the Brazilian market 
(1988, 2). 
 
In contrasting the European integration project with the one being developed by Brazil and 
Argentina, Itamaraty sharply emphasizes the differences in circumstances and political 
motivations affecting both schemes: 
The present realities and the historical evolution of the European and the Southern 
Cone processes of integration are so different, inclusive regarding the respective 
political motivation of each one, that it is difficult to conceive any concrete 
possibility of useful transfer of experiences between the two processes.  In effect, the 
EECC results from the post-war economic reconstruction with total support from the 
United States in a cold-war context; whereas the integration of the Southern Cone 
inserts itself in the overall integration of Latin America, and it is directly related to 
the region’s own conditions of economic survival and with its political stability and 
social development in a context of competition for international markets with the 
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United States and with the own EEC.  In this sense it is symptomatic that the Program 
of Integration Brazil-Argentina is being contested by the United States in the GATT 
(1988, 3). 
 
Itamaraty concludes that “[u]nder those conditions, the initiative of quadrilateral cooperation 
on integration suggested by the EEC does not interest Brazil […] that is, Brazil does not 
agree with any proposal that means to give content to multilateral initiatives about the process 
of integration of the Southern Cone” (1988, 3).   
Other Bureaucratic Actors      
The work of the Foreign Office in connection with the bilateral integration project 
with Argentina was configured with various other governmental agencies like the Finance 
Ministry, the CPA, the CACEX and the external sector of the Central Bank (Camargo 2000).  
According to Hirst (1997),  
…that articulation was not always harmonious.  In the beginning it was not easy to 
obtain the collaboration from the operators of the Foreign Trade Desk of the Banco 
do Brasil (CACEX) that was oriented toward protecting the local industry and 
ensuring a favorable trade balance. Another bureaucratic stronghold that tried initially 
to block a rapprochement with Argentina was the Agriculture Ministry, committed 
with a young –and highly subsidized- production of wheat in the South of the 
country. In contraposition, other sectors defended the integration with Argentina as a 
manner of loosening Brazilian protectionism, which would open the road for a 
general reform of the foreign trade policy. That was, for example the position of the 
Customs Policy Commission (CPA) and the Finance Ministry (1997, 517).      
 
These different attitudes toward the bilateral integration project appears to have depended on 
two main factors: the political/ideological orientation of their policies, which in turn was 
shaped by the prevalent thinking among those responsible for the direction of the agency in 
question, and their role within the institutional structure dedicated to foreign economic 
policymaking. The adverse reaction of CACEX was certainly conditioned by its original 
function as administrator of the system of protection for the national industry, which had 
eventually evolved into a bureaucratic management of import controls to achieve trade 
surpluses. But it was also shaped by the ideas that prevailed among its team of highly 
qualified technical experts who were trained within the developmentalist approach to foreign 
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trade (Fernandes 2010).  
In contrast, the Customs Policy Commission had become a supporter of economic 
integration with Argentina despite sharing with CACEX a similar protectionist function, 
which was to shape Brazil’s structure of import tariffs to facilitate the development of the 
national industry. The decisive factor in this case appears to have been the different 
political/ideological orientation of the CPA’s leadership in the mid-1980s, which favored 
gradual economic liberalization (Velasco e Cruz 2004). It was the CPA which had been at the 
forefront of the trade policy reform initiated by President Sarney in 1988 with support from 
the Minister of Finance (Castelan 2009).
132
 
Ultimately, the initial opposition of the CACEX and the Ministry of Agriculture was 
overpowered by the stronger coalition of governmental actors (Foreign Affairs Ministry, 
Finance Ministry, and Customs Policy Commission) favorable to the integration project with 
Argentina that also enjoyed the decisive political support of the President. Yet, there were 
indications that those who were united in their support for integration with Argentina were 
also divided into two main currents: one that favored a gradual economic liberalization and 
another that was more inclined to maintain the defensive stand of traditional economic 
developmentalism.   
These contending views were reflected within the diplomatic bureaucracy. Thus, for 
example, Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima (1997), Itamaraty’s Secretary General, argued that “the 
continuity of the dynamism of our process of development demands a coherent and gradual 
policy of liberation of imports” (1997, 173). In contrast, Paulo Nogueira Batista, Chief of the 
Brazilian Mission to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva, had contended 
in 1987 that “we are not ready to ground our work on the candid theoretical thesis of free 
                                                             
132 The CACEX and the CPA had also developed an inter-bureaucratic dispute for spheres of 
influence because the former ruled through administrative controls that often preempted or distorted 
the effects of the tariffs controls designed by the latter (Castelan 2009; Fernandes 2010).   
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trade according to which one should choose unilaterally for liberalization” (cited in Castelan 
2009, 95). 
This phenomenon seemed to evidence that the nature of the bilateral integration 
project with Argentina was able to accommodate conflicting views on trade policy. Liberal-
minded policymakers saw in it an instrument to begin the process of reforming and opening 
up of an old bureaucratic system of protection that no longer served the needs of an economy 
with a substantial level of industrialization and that impeded its modernization. 
Developmentalists viewed it instead as a vehicle for enhancing the country’s capacity to 
project its international autonomy.    
National Politics 
 
The levels of analysis examined in the previous two sections go a long way toward 
explaining the main factors that led Brazil to seek economic integration with Argentina and 
eventually to create Mercosur due to the considerable insulation and autonomy enjoyed by 
the Brazilian President and the relatively small circle of bureaucratic actors involved in 
foreign economic policymaking. Yet, a satisfactory explanation of the domestic political 
dynamics that shaped Brazil’s policy for regional integration in the Southern Cone of the 
Americas requires to expand the analytical scope to other relevant actors within the Brazilian 
polity, including business organizations, labor unions, Congress, and political parties.   
Business Sector  
 
The project of economic integration in the Southern Cone emerged from the political 
initiative of Brazilian and Argentine policymakers
135
 rather than from a market-driven 
                                                             
135
 Soraya Saavedra Rosar, Executive Manager of the International Negotiations Unit of the Brazilian 
National Confederation of Industries (CNI), confirms that the initiative came from state policymakers: 
“The beginning of the Mercosur was the Treaty between Brazil and Argentina during the Sarney 
government. It started without any participation from the business sector. There were no 
consultations, not any type of consultations. It was a political decision of the governments of the time 
to try to bring the two countries together.” (Personal interview by author in Brasília on July 27, 2010; 
translated from Portuguese). 
 177 
 
demand of the business elites,
136
 which initially showed disinterest and even resisted the idea.  
Once under way, the integration project essentially advanced as a “top-down” process led by 
presidential diplomacy and managed by state bureaucracies. Overall, business participation in 
political decision-making was kept at a minimum and was subordinated to the political 
agenda of governmental actors (Hirst and Lima 1990; Manzetti 1993; Camargo 2000; Cason 
2000; Schneider 2001; Malamud 2005; Gardini 2006; Marques 2008). 
The governments of Brazil and Argentina acknowledged the need to incorporate 
business and other societal actors to the integration process in joint declarations and signed 
agreements that also established the institutional setting for their participation. The bilateral 
Iguazú  Declaration issued in November 1985 established that integration “must be deepened 
by the Governments with the indispensable participation of all the sectors of their national 
communities (RPEB47 1985, 30; translated from Portuguese). Moreover, the Declaration 
included a decision to create a High Level Mixed Commission for Bilateral Economic 
Cooperation and Integration that should be composed by governmental and business 
representatives from both countries “to examine and propose programs, projects and 
modalities of economic integration” (1985, 30).   
The act that created the 1986 Program of Economic Integration and Cooperation 
(PICE) confirmed that “the execution of the Program will have the active participation of the 
business community.” In addition, it provided for the participation of business entrepreneurs 
from Brazil and Argentina in the Commission for the Execution of the Program (RPEB50 
1986b, 95). It restricted however, that participation to the execution phase of the integration 
                                                             
136
 According to Hirst and Lima (1990), there were some market-driven experiences of industrial 
cooperation between Brazilian and Argentinian entrepreneurs in the years that preceded the bilateral 
integration program. These experiences were limited by the macroeconomic realities in both countries 
and did not develop into business-led demands for integration but contributed to its subsequent 
conception: “[t]he attempts of industrial complementation realized in the period preceding the 
launching of the Program of Integration allowed to delineate a map of potentialities that were 
subsequently exploited by its [governamental] authors” (1990, 82; translated from Spanish). 
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process, thus leaving up to the governmental negotiators the task of shaping the actual 
agreement.   
The private sector did participate in the drafting of sectorial protocols for the 
integration program. Thus, for example, a June 1986 confidential memo from Itamaraty
137
 
reproduces a draft of the protocol for the food and drinks industry that was jointly prepared 
by the Brazilian Association of Food Industries (ABIA) and the Argentine Coordinating 
entity of the Food Products Industry (COPAL) for the consideration of the governments of 
Brazil and Argentina. The text reflected the consensus reached by both industry organizations 
in meetings that had taken place in Buenos Aires, Argentina.    
In contrast with the PICE and the Iguazú Declaration, the 1988 Treaty of Integration, 
Cooperation and Development (TICD) did not make any provision for the formal 
participation of the business community in the Commission for the Execution of the Treaty 
(TICD, 1988). This appears to confirm a trend in which the participation of the business 
community was confined to consultations with governmental bureaucrats (Gardini 2006).      
Despite its initial reticence to the integration project, the Brazilian business sector 
objected to being marginalized from the decision-making process leading the integration 
project. This is evidenced in a memo from the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires to 
Itamaraty giving account of a two-day meeting between Brazilian and Argentine businessmen 
on December 6, 1985, which noted that  
Luis Eulalio Vidigal, President of the FIESP […] criticized the governmental 
bureaucracy that until today had not permitted greater participation of the private 
sector in the bilateral negotiations. According to Vidigal, businessmen are only 
consulted about specific points, but they are not allowed a more active participation 
in an overall vision of the ‘packages’ in discussion. That partial and incomplete 
participation would be one of the reasons for the obstacles observed when opposed 
sectorial interests appear (confidential telegram no. 2124, December 6, 1985; 
translated from Portuguese). 
 
                                                             
137
 See confidential memorandum no. 1684, November 25, 1986; translated from Portuguese. 
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Brazilian entrepreneurs routinely complained to policymakers about the inadequate 
representation of their interests in international trade negotiations. A memo from Itamaraty
141
 
provides an example. It notes that business representatives expressed their concern “over the 
presumed disadvantages that an ‘indiscriminate opening’ (sic) of the Brazilian market to 
imports under LAIA-based agreements, particularly to those coming from Argentina, can 
represent for the national industry” (1985, 2; emphasis in the original). Additionally, the 
report notes that “the representatives of the private sector expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the modalities presently available
143
 to express their interests either during the process of 
elaboration of the Brazilian bargaining position or at the proper negotiations in Montevideo 
[LAIA headquarters]” (1985, 2). The memo also notes that it was “clear the intention of 
business representatives of seeking additional mechanisms to achieve greater influence over 
the Brazilian trade policy for Latin America” (1985, 3). 
Explaining the Weak role of Business  
Several factors account for the lack of active participation of business in the process 
that led Brazil to pursue economic integration with Argentina. They are: the level of bilateral 
economic interdependence, the prevalence of import substitution policies, the structure of the 
national policy-making process, and the relative weakness of the Brazilian business sector as 
a collective actor. 
The level of bilateral economic interdependence prevalent by the mid-1980s was 
                                                             
141
 It describes a meeting in São Paulo between representatives of the Foreign Office (i.e., the head of 
the Subsecretaria-Geral de Assuntos Econômicos e Comerciais –SGAC, and the Chief of the Divisão 
Econômica da América Latina –DECLA), the Executive Secretary of the Customs Policy 
Commission, and representatives of Brazilian business organizations of various industrial sectors 
from around the country to analyze topics related to their participation in trade negotiations with 
Argentina and in LAIA (confidential telegram no. 0fC2001-00029, February 10, 1989; translated from 
Portuguese).  
143
 Some of the existing mechanisms at that time were representation in the Comissão Nacional para 
Assuntos da Associação Latino-Americana de Integração (CNAALADI) and participation in the 
Tariffs Negotiation Work Group of the Commission through the National Confederations of 
Agriculture, Commerce and Industry as well as the inclusion of representatives from these entities in 
the Brazilian delegations authorized for negotiations in LAIA (1985, 2).   
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insufficient to unleash a sustained market-driven process of bilateral economic integration, 
notwithstanding the above-noted limited spontaneous experiences of industrial cooperation 
that took place in the years that preceded the program of bilateral integration (Hirst and Lima 
1990). 
Such a process could have motivated business entrepreneurs in both countries to take 
the initiative in demanding from their respective governments the supply of appropriate 
integration agreements to minimize transaction costs and mitigate political risks that could 
jeopardize their potential gains from deeper economic interaction (Mattli 1999). The 
disconnect between the two neighbor economies is noted by Selcher (1985),  
The two economies, first and third in size in Latin America, have shown no great 
propensity to trade with each other in spite of proximity. There has been no tendency 
for mutual trade to climb upward as a percentage of total trade of either partner
144
 
[…] Even in its Third World trade drive, now badly blunted, up to 1981 Brazil found 
greater success elsewhere; since 1982 it has been concentrating the bulk of its 
promotion efforts on Western and East Asian markets, particularly on the U.S. The  
outstanding characteristic of Argentina's trade pattern, since 1980, has been the 
upsurge in sales to the USSR, which was aided  by the  partial U.S. grain embargo on 
Moscow (1985, 39).  
 
The prevalence of import substitution policies in both countries was a second factor closely 
related to the previous one, which tended to discourage economic actors, particularly 
multinational corporations (MNC) and large domestic economic groups from seeking 
bilateral economic integration. According to Chudnovsky and Lopez 2002),  
During ISI, the basic motivation of multinational companies […] was the desire to 
exploit the protected domestic market […] Their subsidiaries had little production 
complementation and/or linkage with their peers elsewhere in the company, and the 
little they exported went mainly to Latin American markets […]These subsidiaries 
performed better in terms of productivity, technology assets, etc., than locally owned 
firms, but because they were operating in an environment that offered relatively few 
incentives for technical progress and efficiency-seeking, the technologies and 
productivity levels they worked with tended to fall further and further behind 
international best practice. In certain respects, in short, the subsidiaries of 
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 “…from 1981 to 1985, Argentina’s exports to and imports from Brazil averaged 5.9 percent and 
13.8 percent of its trade.  The comparable figures for Brazil were 3 percent and 2.8 percent 
respectively” (Manzetti 1990, 113). Moreover, “Argentina's total exports to Brazil fell from 765 
million dollars in 1980 to 496 million dollars in 1985, while Brazil's exports to Argentina fell from 
1.1 billion dollars to 611 million during the same period” (Manzetti 1990, 113).   
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multinationals showed a tendency to accentuate the main problems of the substitution 
model (2002, 153). 
 
Under those conditions, the tendency of MNCs to focus on the preservation of domestic 
markets led them to resist integration in Latin America (Chudnovsky 1993; Barbosa 2011).   
A similar logic was at work in the case of large domestic economic groups: 
By the 1980s, the economic groups (GE) of local capital had reached significant 
positions in the economies of Argentina and Brazil based on strategies that generally 
privileged the domestic markets and that included a significant degree of 
diversification as well as forward and backward vertical integration. These strategies 
had flourished in a context where not only the competition with imported production 
was closed but where also there was a set of instruments through which the respective 
states helped the expansion of such groups […] During the stage of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), in a context of inward-oriented economic policies, 
the Argentine and Brazilian firms concentrated their operations in their respective 
domestic markets (Chudnovsky and Lopez 2002, 115-16). 
 
Another important factor was the structure and dynamics of the national policy-making 
process in Brazil, which since the 1930s was characterized by the centralization of power in 
the office of the Presidency and its relative insulation from societal influences. Moreover, the 
political culture associated with this institutional arrangement emphasized the normative 
conception that the government was the only legitimate interpreter of national interests and 
thus facilitated the exclusion of private groups from any relevant participation in the political 
decision-making process (Leff 1968).    
An additional related variable was the relative inadequacy of the Brazilian business 
sector as a collective actor (Olson 1965): 
An analysis of the business sector’s performance […] reinforces the conclusions of 
the main studies concerning the trajectory of business through the various phases of 
the Brazilian industrialization: its weakness as a collective actor despite the relative 
strength of some of its sectors, the importance of its organizational resources, the 
economic caliber of many enterprises and the weight of the personal connections of 
segments of these elites with the state authorities (Diniz and Bresser-Pereira 2007, 
14).  
  
Schneider (2001) contends that the “overall strength of associations (or the intensity of 
collective action in them) and their capacity to represent business” (2001, 168) is one of the 
two major factors influencing the participation of the private sector in trade and integration 
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negotiations. The other is government’s openness to business involvement in decision-
making. In the case of Brazil, Schneider mainly explains the lack of strong business 
participation in trade negotiations by the organizational deficiency of its associations: 
…peak sectorial associations, especially CNI [National Confederation of Industry] 
and FIESP [Industry Federation of the State of São Paulo], appear very strong at first 
glance and have large professional staffs, but they do not represent members well or 
resolve conflicts among them, largely because they are still regulated by corporatist 
legislation dating from the 1940s (which makes membership compulsory and over-
represents marginal sectors) (2001, 170).   
 
In other words, the corporatist legacy in Brazil appears to have been a major impediment for 
the development of powerful, economy-wide representative business associations that could 
have made possible a stronger collective action and thus greater political capacity to 
influence the policy-making process. Yet, while this factor may have played a role in 
facilitating the marginalization of the private sector, it is important to note that the same 
factor under different circumstances did not preclude Brazilian business, particularly its 
industrial sector, from having an active participation in the political life of the country
146
 
(Mancuso 2007; Mancuso and Oliveira 2006).  
From Corporatist Control to Autonomous Assertion   
The structure of corporatist representation in Brazil originated in the 1930s when 
Vargas created the Estado Novo and the country began to transition from an agro-export 
economy toward an import-substitution model of industrialization.
147
 Like in the case of other 
late-comers to industrialization the state in Brazil assumed a leading developmental role to 
promote and direct the process of economic modernization. A highly centralized and 
                                                             
146
 For example, “The National Confederation of Industry (CNI) played an important leading role in 
the business organization and mobilization that occurred in the 1990s, in both the movement for the 
reduction of the Brazil cost and the creation of the CEB [Coalizão Empresarial Brasileira -Brazilian 
Business Coalition] (Mancuso and Oliveira 2006, 149; emphasis in original). The CEB was a multi-
sectorial business entity formed to participate in ongoing processes of international negotiations such 
as in the case of the Free Trade of the Americas.   
147
 This account of corporatist business-state relations is mainly based on Diniz and Vericat (1995), 
unless otherwise noted.    
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interventionist state configured its role at the top of the “commanding heights” through a 
corporatist institutional framework of interest intermediation.   
In this manner, representative organizations of business and labor lost their autonomy 
and were subordinated to state control.
148
 The emerging corporatist structure was marked by 
its sectorial character due to the low degree of centralization and concentration and territorial 
dispersion of the local representative class organizations as the institutional design did not 
include the formation of peak multi-sectorial entities.    
In practice, contrary to the case of labor, business was allowed to have direct 
representation of its interests in the governmental bureaucracy through admission in various 
councils and commissions where it played a consulting role in connection with areas of 
economic policy. Thus was established a privileged negotiation venue where business could 
present its demands to the state. This practice that flourished during the 1940s and 1950s was 
continued and expanded during the military regime (1964-1985), which increased the number 
of consulting commissions.   
At the same time, the organized representation of business interests in these forums 
was discouraged thus leading to the establishment of informal, personal links between 
governmental bureaucrats and business entrepreneurs: “businessmen participated in decision-
making instances not as representatives of a class but as prestigious leaders or as heads of 
enterprises with strong economic weight” (1995, 81). These informal relationships evolved 
into the configuration of networks that Cardoso (1975) aptly labeled “bureaucratic rings,” and 
which coexisted with the representation of interests through sectorial national associations.
150
   
                                                             
148
 Direct state control over the corporatist system was evidenced by the requirement that associations 
or unions obtain authorization before their creation, or the power to intervene in the internal elections 
for leadership positions, and the capacity to interfere in the entities’ everyday operations (Mancuso 
2007).  
150
 In this regard, Leopoldi (2000) notes that the military regime withdraws from the FIESP, the 
FIRJAN (Federation of Industries of Rio de Janeiro) and the CNI their role as representative 
organizations of the industry and establishes a direct relation with firms and entrepreneurs bypassing 
the official corporatist system without eliminating it (2000, 300).  
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The Council of Economic Development (CDI), the National Monetary Council (CMN) and 
the CACEX, for example, utilized these two forms of business participation.  
In this manner, state-led industrialization in Brazil was shaped by an institutional 
framework that incorporated the representation of interests in a hierarchical, non-competitive 
structure without the mediation of political parties, where business-state relations developed 
mainly on the basis of a system of sectorial bargaining and bipartite cooperation between 
business leaders and governmental bureaucrats. This institutional arrangement favored a 
fragmented representation of interests in the business sector and discouraged the formation of 
economy-wide peak organizations.  
Subsequent changes in the structure of interest representation of the Brazilian industry 
starting in the 1950s contributed to the autonomous assertion of business from state control 
but also furthered fragmentation. Those changes led to the formation of a hybrid system of 
representation where corporatist entities
151
 coexisted with a newly developed arrangement of 
parallel private associations (Leopoldi 2000). 
The new private entities included business firms concentrated in the corridor Rio de 
Janeiro- São Paulo that belong to advanced sectors of the Brazilian industry, such as the 
Associação Brasileira da Infrastructure e Indústrias de Base
152
 (ABDIB) (Brazilian 
Association of Infrastructure and Basic Industries), the Associação Brasileira da Indústria de 
Máquinas e Equipamentos (Abimaq) (Brazilian Association of Machinery and Equipments), 
                                                             
151
 The three peak sectoral corporatist organizations are the Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) 
(National Confederation of Industry), the Confederação Nacional do Comércio de Bens, Serviços e 
Turismo (CNC) (National Confederation of Commerce) and the Confederação Nacional da 
Agricultura e Pecuária(CNA) (National Confederation of Agriculture). They all group federations 
from all states. The CNI was born in 1933 as the Confederação Industrial do Brasil (CIB) and became 
part of the corporatist system in 1943 under its current name. The CNC was founded in 1945. The 
CNA was established in 1951 as the Confederação Rural Brasileira (CRB) and became the CNA in 
1965 (Schmitter 1971; Leopoldi 2000).    
152
 Includes those industries that initiate the productive process transforming raw materials into semi-
elaborated products that other industries utilize for their final transformation (i.e., siderurgy, which 
transforms iron into steel, which in turn will be used by other industries in the manufacturing of 
consumer goods or equipment) (Sanchez 2013). 
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the Associação Nacional de Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (Anfavea) (National 
Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers) and the Associação Brasileira da Indústria 
Elétrica e Eletrônica (ABINEE) (Brazilian Electrical and Electronics Industry Association)  
(Leopoldi 2000).   
A similar process occurred in other sectors of the Brazilian economy during the 
1980s.  In the financial sector emerged the Associação Brasileira de Bancos Comerciais e 
Múltiplos (ABBC) (Brazilian Association of Commercial and Multiservice Banks) and the 
Confederação Nacional das Instituições Financeiras (CNF) (National Confederation of 
Financial Institutions). In the agricultural sector, the Organização das Cooperativas 
Brasileiras (OCB) (Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives) and the Associação Brasileira de 
Agribusiness (ABAB) (Agribusiness Brazilian Association) joined older existing ones like 
the Sociedade Rural Brasileira (SRB) (Brazilian Rural Society) and the Sociedade Nacional 
da Agricultura (SNA) (Agriculture National Society) (Gros 2003).    
The 1988 Constitution introduced reforms to the corporatist scheme of interest 
representation by essentially ending the intervention of the state in the associational system  
and legally acknowledging the existence of a dual system of representation:    
On one side, there is the legal semi-corporatist system constituted by a more flexible 
associational structure and with capacity of self-management that insists in 
maintaining links with the state regarding the capture of resources (via association 
dues) and the monopoly of representation by sector and by region (associational 
uniqueness). On the other, the existence of private representation organizations is 
admitted constitutionally [i.e., the parallel entities of the industry] (Leopoldi 2000,  
302; translated from Portuguese).  
 
Also, the significant size reached by the Brazilian state-owned business sector by the mid-
1980s helps to explain the relative weakness of the private sector vis-à-vis the government 
inasmuch as the growth of the former kept in check the further development of the latter:
153
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 Interestingly, it was in protest against the growing statization of the economy that the private sector 
mobilized for the first time against the military government since its instauration in 1964. It occurred 
towards the end of 1974 during the term of General Ernesto Geisel (1974 – 1979) amid the economic 
crisis generated by the first oil shock.  Brazilian entrepreneurs demanded the withdrawal of the state 
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The country had one of the largest public sectors outside the former Communist bloc.  
In 1985, Brazil’s public sector accounted for just under half of the net assets of its 
8,000 largest firms, for about a quarter of their sales, and for a fifth of their total 
employment. As late as 1990, before the administration of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso began to privatize state-owned assets, 38 of Brazil’s 100 largest firms were 
still government owned (Brainard and Martinez-Diaz 2009, 5).   
 
Another variable affecting the capacity of the business sector to act as a unified collective 
actor is the relative lack of consensus around a common program of political and economic 
demands. The division of the business community into various economic segments (i.e., large 
domestic groups, multinationals, medium and small enterprises) with diverging interests and 
political/ideological orientations is the direct immediate cause of the lack of consensus 
(Leopoldi 2000).   
The emergence of new entities in the 1980s like the Instituto Liberal, the Instituto de 
Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (IEDI) and the Pensamento Nacional das Bases 
Empresariais (PNBE), which attempt to interpret the interests of the business sector and 
provide political orientation according to differing ideological orientations, express the 
diversity of tendencies that have developed within the business community (Bianchi 2001).  
Itamaraty’s strategists and negotiators were mindful of the fragmentation of business  
interest representation and acknowledged the difficulties that it entailed for the participation 
of the private sector in economic policymaking. A confidential memo
154
 from the Brazilian 
representative in LAIA addressed to Itamaraty noted this situation:  
…it would be pertinent to analyze the impact on the agreements derived from the 
diversification of the economic agents in many sectors by the emergence of new 
enterprises and  by movements of verticalization and/or horizontalization of 
production from which resulted fragmentation of sectorial representation at the 
national level […] certain class entities find themselves today in the delicate 
circumstance of acting simultaneously as representatives of export and import 
interests with all the difficulties derived from it.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
from the economy and the end of their marginalization from the economic decision-making process 
(Diniz and Bresser-Pereira 2007).  
154 Confidential telegram no. 2007 from BRASALADI to EXTERIORES, June 8, 1988; translated 
from Portuguese.  It reported on a meeting held with representatives of business associations to 
exchange ideas about the functionality of sectorial trade agreements within LAIA. 
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A subsequent confidential memo
155
 from Itamaraty’s headquarters repeated this assessment 
verbatim while also noting “the increasing divergence of interests among the enterprises and 
business associations involved in the pre-negotiation of the agreements.”  
Labor Unions  
 
Organized labor had no meaningful participation in the political decision-making process that 
led Brazil to adopt a policy of bilateral economic integration with Argentina (Vigevani 1996; 
Camargo 2000; Mariano 2011). Two main interrelated factors appear to best explain labor’s 
lack of any relevant role in the integration project during the Sarney administration. They are: 
the traditional elitist structure of Brazilian foreign policymaking and labor’s relative 
weakness as a collective actor.   
I already discussed in previous sections of this chapter the restrictive character of the 
institutional configuration that shielded Brazilian policymakers from societal actors. Thus, 
here I only examine the constraints that prevented labor from asserting greater influence over 
state policymaking. I argue that the lack of a unique and independent peak labor organization 
has been a major contributing factor to such weakness, which the persistence of the 
corporatist legacy and the political fragmentation of the working class have fostered.  
Estado Novo and Suppression of Labor’s Independence  
The authoritarian regime that emerged from the Revolution of 1930 under the 
 leadership of President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945), also known as the Estado Novo (1937-
45) attempted to reform and modernize Brazil via a top-down political conception permeated 
with elitism and paternalism (Erickson 1977). Its basic policy toward social actors like 
business and labor was to control their development and political participation “from above” 
so as to ensure social harmony and the subordination of their particular interests to the state-
                                                             
155 Confidential telegram no. 0fC2001-00029 from EXTERIORES to BRASALADI, February 10, 
1989; translated from Portuguese. It established governmental policy for the negotiation of trade 
agreements within LAIA. 
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defined national interest. The regime thus promoted their political subordination to the state 
and preempted their independent organization as collective actors.    
The Estado Novo conditioned workers’ right to organize and access to material and 
welfare to their submitting to state control. To this end it suppressed existing independent 
unions and replaced them with “highly constrained, state-penetrated labor organizations” 
(Collier and Collier 2002). In this manner, the nascent Brazilian working class was 
incorporated into the national polity under the aegis of a corporatist state. During this period, 
Vargas opted for not organizing an “official” political party to channel support for his regime 
and avoided mobilizing the working class and other popular sectors to advance his political 
agenda. The Estado Novo did not formally incorporate the labor sector in the state structure.  
Instead, it established indirect administrative control over it through an elaborate institutional 
framework that ensured its subordination to the authority of the state.    
Three major pillars sustained this corporatist architecture.
160
 One was a hierarchical 
arrangement of labor unions, federations and confederations that existed legally only by 
express authorization of the state acting through the Ministry of Labor. Corporatist laws 
aimed to prevent the development of a united labor movement by only providing for the 
formation of separate confederations representing workers of different economic sectors and 
excluding the possibility of establishing a legally-recognized unique peak labor organization.    
The role of the official labor unions was to serve the needs of affiliated workers but 
they were constrained by legally-established obligations to conciliate in labor conflicts and to 
cooperate with the government in the promotion of social solidarity under the principle that 
the defense of any private interests was to be subordinated to the demands of the national 
interest as interpreted by the state. Control over the labor movement was reinforced by the 
government’s right to intervene labor organizations and to monitor their activities by 
                                                             
160
 The description of the Brazilian corporatist system is based on Erickson (1977). 
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demanding submission of transactions records. The threat of intervention, through which the 
state could take possession of the union’s headquarters, seize its funds and replace its leaders, 
was used as deterrent against non-compliance with labor policies or union activism against 
the state’s political objectives.  
Another key component of the corporatist framework was a grid of labor-courts that 
served to mediate in worker-employer disputes mostly according to legal corporatist 
principles that tended to subordinate private interests to the general public interest as 
represented by the state. The main goal of this mediation system was to ensure political 
stability and the safeguarding of the socio-economic order through the peaceful resolution of 
class conflicts.   
The third constituent piece was a social security system aimed at providing welfare 
benefits (i.e., health care, retirement) to workers that could ameliorate the effects of widening 
income gaps and unequal distribution of wealth in order to encourage social harmony. This 
system was to be sustained economically by equal contributions from workers, employers 
and the federal government. Yet, in practice, it tended to rest mostly on workers’ own 
contributions. 
Democracy, Labor Activism, and Resilient Corporatist Laws 
A non-violent civic-military coup deposed Vargas in 1945 and inaugurated a period of 
electoral democracy in Brazil (1946-1964). The new era brought considerable political 
freedom for the labor movement that facilitated its mobilization and politicization, but it did 
not end state control over workers’ organizations. The Constitution of 1946 sanctioned 
democratic institutions but it also preserved the corporatist system of state-labor relations 
(Erickson and Middlebrook 1982). 
The new dynamics that emerged within the Brazilian polity, which was marked by an 
alliance between activist labor leaders and populist politicians, prompted the mobilization of 
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the working class against the corporatist constraints imposed on the labor movement. Yet, 
this movement confined itself to reforming rather than destroying the legal framework that 
ruled over state-labor relations (Erickson and Middlebrook 1982).       
Three main parties dominated the political scene during this period.  Two of them, the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), were conceived by 
Vargas toward the end of the Estado Novo in anticipation of the political opening that 
followed his demise in 1945 (Erickson and Middlebrook 1982). The PSD reflected the 
interests of the civil-military alliance that had supported the Revolution of 1930 and had 
benefitted under Vargas’ presidency. The PTB was organized by former Ministry of Labor 
officials to channel the interests of organized labor under the populist banner of Varguism.   
The third important political party, the National Democratic Union (UDN) mainly 
represented the liberal anti-Vargas sector of the Brazilian economic elites. A fourth party, the 
Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) became an important political force within the working 
class that tended to establish a tactical alliance with the populist PTB (Collier and Collier 
2002). 
Organized labor achieved significant gains that translated into labor leaders’ 
considerable influence on national politics during the 1946-1964 period. Still, “Vargas’ labor 
law […] remained almost untouched through 1964” (Erickson 1977, 30). The main 
explanation for this phenomenon mainly resides in the political ideas that guided the two 
parties with the most influence within the working class, the PTB and the PCB.   
From different political perspectives, neither of these two organizations promoted an 
organization of the labor movement that was independent from the official unions controlled 
by the state. The PTB had been inspired by Vargas and created from the corporatist trade 
union structure, and was thus ill-prepared to change the corporatist framework of state-labor 
relations (Gomes and Prado 2011). The PCB had in the main accepted the existing corporatist 
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structure and merely worked to reform aspects of it as part of its policy of alliance with 
national populism. Thus it did not seek the development of an autonomous union movement 
(Erickson 1977; Mendes and Lowy 1976). In addition, the UDN, notwithstanding its 
professed liberalism and its substantial presence in Congress, did not make any serious 
attempt to change the corporatist labor laws (Erickson 1977).  
Military Rule and Autonomous Reassertion in the 1970s    
The military coup that overthrew Goulart in 1964 brought an end to the labor activism 
that predominated during the period of electoral democracy (1946-1964). It established a 
strict authoritarian control over unions via repression, intimidation, and new legislation that 
“refined and supplemented the techniques of the Estado Novo in order to make the 
corporative system work better as an instrument of social control” (Erickson 1977, 157).   
Yet, a vigorous resurgence of workers’ struggles in the late 1970s started a process of 
autonomous reassertion by the Brazilian labor movement that created favorable conditions 
for the erosion of the corporatist structure of union control by the state. This new labor 
movement survived the authoritarian regime and continued during the administration of 
President Sarney.   
Redemocratization and Fragmentation of Organized Labor  
The 1988 Constitution reflected labor’s advances by recognizing freedom of  
association and forbidding state interference in union affairs (Gomes and Prado 2011).   
However, the failure to reach a unifying consensus among the various internal currents of the 
labor movement prevented the emergence of a powerful single economy-wide peak labor 
organization.   
Instead, two new top labor unions emerged in the 1980s, the Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores or CUT (Workers’ Unique Central) and the Confederação Geral dos 
Trabalhadores or CGT (Workers’ General Confederation). A third major labor organization, 
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the Força Sindical or FS (Labor Union Force), emerged in 1991 from a split of the CGT 
(Castro and Wachendorfer 1998; Mariano 2011). Thus, despite the more autonomous 
organization of labor and the weakening of state control, the fragmentation of representation 
among competing organizations constrained labor’s further development as a collective actor.   
The common point of origin of the CUT and the CGT was the First National 
Conference of the Working Class (I Conclat
162
) jointly convoked by 183 union leaders from 
13 states in August 1981 with the objective of discussing the fate of the labor movement.  
The Conference took place in Praia Grande, a coastal municipality of the state of São Paulo, 
with the presence of more than 6,500 union delegates representing not only a wide spectrum 
of associations, sindicatos, federations and confederations,
163
 but also all the different 
factions that were active within the labor union sector. The event was a major organizational 
feat in light of the existing authoritarian rule and the constant surveillance by state security 
agencies (L. Rodrigues 1991; Castro and Wachendorfer 1998; ABC 2012).   
The I Conclat made a call for unitary action of urban and rural workers against the  
recessive economic policy of the military regime. Among other demands,
164
 it pressed for the 
immediate replacement of the old corporatist labor legislation by a new National Code of 
Labor devised with the participation of the labor sector that included recognition of union 
autonomy and the right to create an independent peak labor organization. The conference 
established a pro-CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores) commission in charge of 
organizing the foundation of a new central labor organization for the following year (ABC 
2012).  
                                                             
162
 Portuguese acronym for Conferência Nacional da Classe Trabalhadora. 
163
 According to L. Rodrigues (1991) there were present 480 urban sindicatos, 384 rural sindicatos, 
and 32 associations of public employees, 176 pre-union associations, 33 urban federations, 17 rural 
federations, and four confederations.     
164 These included: employment stability, reduction of working hours to 40 per week, the right to 
strike and to unionize for public employees, end of the exception laws, amnesty, freedom of political 
organization, convening of a National Constituent Assembly, agrarian reform, and others. 
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The Conclat was a landmark attempt to unify the Brazilian labor movement. Yet, the 
wide diversity of interests and political orientations of the delegates conspired against the 
formation of a unique peak labor organization. The different currents tended to coalesce into 
two main blocs that contended around three main issues: the immediate creation of a single 
national top labor organization, the freedom of labor association as proposed by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 87,
165
 and the call to a national strike as 
an ultimatum to the government in case the demands presented by the I Conclat were not 
accepted. 
One of these two groups, the Bloco da Reforma (Reform Bloc), also known as Labor  
Unity (US
166
), constituted a broad coalition of very diverse labor forces that included 
members or followers of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PC do B), the Revolutionary Movement 8th October (MR-8), the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), moderate and traditional labor leaders like Joaquim 
dos Santos Andrade,
167
 also known as Joaquinzão, and liberal labor unionists with links to the 
AFL-CIO like Antônio Rogério Magri, leader of the Electricians’ Union of São Paulo (L. 
Rodrigues 1991).   
Labor Unity opposed the immediate launching of the CUT arguing that the conditions 
were not ripe for it. It also opposed the ILO’s Convention 87 because it allowed the 
formation of more than one trade union of the same professional category in the same district, 
thus violating one of the basic tenets of the corporatist system. In this regard, the Reform 
Bloc was in favor of the unions’ autonomy from state control but defended the principle of a 
single union (unicidade) in labor representation, and was thus against absolute freedom to 
                                                             
165
 Convention no. 87 is also known as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, which was adopted in 1948 (ILO87 2012). 
166
 Portuguese acronym for Unidade Sindical. 
167 Joaquim dos Santos Andrade was a long-standing leader of the Steel Workers’ Union of São Paulo 
who was widely perceived as a pelego, a term used to identify those union leaders considered too 
close to the state, quiescent and bureaucratic (Carvalho 1997, 73).  
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unionize (L. Rodrigues 1991).   
Finally, the adherents of Unidade Sindical resisted using the threat of a national strike 
as a means of pressuring the government to accept workers’ demands. They emphasized the 
need for labor’s tactical moderation in order to ensure the achievement of the country’s 
transition toward a democratic regime, which they considered to be the dominant political 
objective. In their view, the strike ultimatum risked a confrontation with the military that 
could jeopardize that main goal (L. Rodrigues 1991). 
The other labor bloc, also known as “authentic” or “combative,” assumed the opposite 
posture with regards to the three contending issues. It urged the immediate launching of a 
national peak labor organization, pressed for the call to a national strike if workers’ demands 
were not met, and defended the idea of workers’ freedom of association. This group included 
two main currents. One of them comprised a new generation of independent labor leaders 
forged in the labor struggles of the 1970s that had little or no experience in political 
participation.  Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, leader of the Metal Workers' Union of São Bernardo 
do Campo and Diadema, and one of the original founders of the Workers’ Party (PT) in 1980, 
was one of these labor leaders that began to be known as “authentic,” in contraposition to the 
more traditional ones.   
The other strand of unionism within this bloc was represented by so-called “union 
oppositions” (oposições sindicais) or labor activists, mostly members of the Catholic left or 
of small Marxist, Leninist or Trotskyist groups, that prioritized the formation of factory 
committees (comissões de fábricas) as autonomous workers’ organizations outside the 
structural control of the unions’ leadership. In contrast, the members of the “authentic” 
current gave preeminence to the union delegate as representative of the factory committees 
which should be structurally subordinated to the leadership of the sindicatos (L. Rodrigues, 
1991).   
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The conflict of views between the two major blocs resurfaced inside the pro-CUT 
commission once the conference was over. The commission became particularly divided on 
whether to call a new congress within a year to launch the CUT as decided by the I Conclat.  
The radical sector was in favor but the moderate faction, which had a majority within the 
commission, was not, arguing that it would be difficult to adequately prepare a new labor 
congress only one year after the I Conclat. In the end, a divided commission could not agree 
on calling a new congress in 1982 to create the CUT (L. Rodrigues 1991).   
Disenchanted with the lack of consensus, the more radical bloc, led by Lula da Silva, 
decided to call the First National Congress of the Working Class in August 1983 without the 
participation of the labor union representatives of Unidade Sindical and formally launched 
the CUT.
169
 In turn, the moderate sector decided to convene a congress of its own in 
November of the same year from which it emerged a Coordenação Nacional da Classe 
Trabalhadora (National Coordination of the Working Class), also known as Conclat. In 
1986, via another congress, this organization became the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores 
(CGT) (Workers’ General Central) with Joaquim dos Santos Andrade (Joaquinzão) as its first 
president (L. Rodrigues 1991). 
As to be expected, the CUT and the CGT diverged in their conceptions about the  
organization of the labor movement and in their attitudes toward the Sarney’s government.  
The CUT, politically associated with the PT, defended the notion of a “free trade unionism” 
based on the ILO’s Convention 87, and proposed a “unionism of contestation” (sindicalismo 
de contestação) characterized by a more critical and confrontational attitude than its 
counterpart.    
The CGT on the other hand, supported the principle of trade union unicity and the  
                                                             
169 Currently, the CUT is present in all economic sectors. It is considered the major peak labor union 
in Brazil and Latin America, and the 5th largest of the world. It accounts for almost 7.5 million 
associated workers, more than 22 million base workers, and 3,438 affiliated entities (CUT 2012). 
 196 
 
validity of the CLT
171
 inherited from the Vargas labor regime. In addition, being politically 
closer to the governing coalition of the PMDB, it tended to support the regime of the New 
Republic
172
 (L. Rodrigues 1991; Barbiero and Chaloult 2001).    
The division of organized labor into two competing peak trade unions in general 
weakened the capacity of the Brazilian working class to play an influential role in state 
policymaking. Yet, in the case of the process of economic integration with Argentina initiated 
in 1986 with the Program of Economic Integration and Cooperation (PICE) there was an 
additional factor that contributed to labor’s relative political marginalization.   
Neither the CGT nor the CUT appeared adequately prepared to demand an active role 
in the integration project initiated by the government which seemed distant from the most 
immediate national problems that occupied their attention. Thus, despite the important 
differences that separated them, the two organizations coincided in not opposing the process 
of gradual economic integration between the two countries. Instead, they adopted a reactive 
attitude of critical support inasmuch as the project could promote economic development. 
They objected to the strict commercial character of the initiative while noting the need to 
incorporate the social question (Vigevani 1996).       
 
Congress 
The Brazilian legislature played a rather passive role vis-à-vis the Presidency in the 
political process that decided Brazil’s policy of bilateral economic integration with 
Argentina. The observed primacy of the Executive in this case reflects a historical pattern of 
relations between both branches of government where the Legislative has been relegated to a 
reactive function in the formulation of national policies (Kinzo, 1997). Several interrelated 
                                                             
171
 CLT is a Portuguese acronym for Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (Consolidation of Labor 
Laws). It refers to the corporatist labor laws compiled by Vargas in 1943 (Erickson 1977). 
172 The CUT for example, claimed that it had successfully obstructed the implementation of a social 
pact proposed by the Sarney administration that had been supported by the CGT, arguing that it would 
unfairly unload the burden of the crisis on the workers’ shoulders (CUT 1988).  
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features of the Brazilian political system and the existence of a broad elite consensus on 
economic strategy and foreign economic policy help to explain this interaction dynamics 
between Congress and the Presidency.     
On the one hand, Brazil has a presidentialist system of government that is based on 
the separation and independence of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary powers. In this 
scheme, the President tends to have a prominent position by being both head of state and 
head of government, and as such he/she usually has the initiative in determining the political 
direction of the country.   
On the other hand, the final definition of public policies depends on the interaction 
between the Executive and the Legislative, which is based on the principle of checks and 
balances.  Yet, as noted by Kinzo (1997), “the conditions for the mutual cooperation are not 
pre-defined and must be carefully constructed” (1997, 14). One intervening factor in this 
regard is the composition of Congress by political party and whether the party or the party-
coalition of the President has a majority in both legislative chambers. But even if this is the 
case, there is no guarantee that legislators will necessarily support the President since 
the president and the members of Congress respond to different electoral bases: it is 
the totality of the Brazilian electorate that elects the president by the majority system, 
while the representation of parties in Congress is constituted on the basis of elections 
in every state of the Federation (by the system of proportional representation in the 
case of the Chamber of Deputies, and by the majority system in the case of the 
Senate). In this manner, in the name of the independence of the Legislative power, 
any member of the governmental coalition feels free to position himself/herself 
against the Executive if so pleases him/her (Kinzo 1997, 15). 
 
Additionally, the Brazilian presidentialist system interacts with a highly fragmented multi-
party system and a system of proportional representation that favors the establishment of 
coalition governments (Abranches 1988). However, the forging of a supporting majority for 
the President is complicated by the fact that it usually requires the enrollment of several 
different parties that may not always coincide in their backing of governmental policies 
(Kinzo 1997).   
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Finally, perhaps in response to the fragmentation of power that would make 
governing difficult, Brazilian presidentialism has developed the use of provisional decrees, a 
constitutional instrument that grants the Executive power enormous freedom of action by 
means of interfering in the functioning of the Legislative power (Kinzo 1997). In this manner, 
although the existence of various instances where numerous veto players
173
 (Tsebelis 1995) 
can complicate the policy-making process, the frequent use of provisional decrees by the 
president tends to constrain Congress to play a relatively passive role as a political actor 
(Kinzo 1997).  
Hagopian and Power (2012) describe the means through which the Brazilian president 
is able to control the legislative process: 
The Constitution gives the executive branch the exclusive right to initiate legislation 
fixing or modifying the size of the armed forces, creating public posts and 
reorganizing the Cabinet, and setting pay levels for public employees. Most crucially, 
only the president can initiate appropriations measures […] The Brazilian president 
also can enact provisional measures, which take effect immediately upon issue […] In 
addition to those areas in which the president has exclusive authority, he may also 
significantly alter the legislative agenda by requesting that Congress act on proposed 
legislation ‘urgently’ […] Finally, the president enjoys veto power, which is a 
powerful instrument of executive authority […] only rarely has Congress overridden 
a presidential veto (2012, 504-05). 
 
In the particular area of definition and implementation of foreign policy this pattern of 
Executive-Legislature relations is more clearly tilted towards the supremacy of the 
Presidency. The majority view of the literature claims that the National Congress plays a 
limited and subordinated role in the elaboration of Brazilian foreign policy (Forjaz 2011).  
Souza (2009) contends that “The role of Congress in the formation of foreign policy 
has been limited to little more than to validate (referendar) the international acts celebrated 
by the Executive Power” (page 130). For Lima and Santos (2001), Brazilian foreign policy, 
particularly that dedicated to foreign trade, has transitioned from being the object of a 
                                                             
173
 Tsebelis (1995) defines veto player as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is 
required for a policy decision” (1995, 293). 
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delegation of decision power from the Legislative to the Executive in the 1940s and 1950s to 
being the product of an abdication of that power in the 1990s: 
The interpretation of Brazil’s post-war foreign trade policy history that we propose 
characterizes it as a case of slow, gradual and unexpected transition from a system of 
delegation to congressional abdication. That is to say, if at the beginning of the 
process it is perceived that Congress plays a relevant role for the success of the 
policy, gradually that function becomes mere ratifying power. The emphasis on the 
unexpected aspect of that passage means to say that the abdication does not emerge as 
an act of will or from a contract between Legislative and presidency, but changes in 
the political and economic scenario at different moments in time end up generating a 
situation in that the former founds itself entirely removed of the decision-making 
process in the area of foreign trade policy (2001, 132; translated from Portuguese). 
  
The authors contend that the delegation of decision-making authority developed at a 
time when there was a basic consensus between Congress and the President around 
the import-substitution model of industrialization (ISI) consolidated in the 1940s and 
1950s that required a protectionist foreign trade policy.
174
 During the period of 
military rule (1964-1985) Congress’ decision-making capacity was greatly reduced. 
Yet, as the authoritarian regime essentially continued the protectionist 
industrialization initiated in the 1940s, the assumption of delegation in favor of the 
Executive was carried over despite the practical elimination of the Legislative’s 
autonomy due the lack of significant disagreements over the appropriate foreign 
economic policy (Lima and Santos 2001). 
Contrary to expectations, the transfer of power to a civilian government in 1985 did 
not bring a significant change in the pattern of Executive-Legislative relations that shaped the 
policymaking process compared to the one prevalent during the authoritarian regime:  
The role of the National Congress was merely that of a ratifying power, that is, the 
Legislative Power continued to be devoid of guaranties for an efficient delegation in 
                                                             
174
 According to Lima and Santos (2001), “In the strategy of economic growth according to the model 
of import substitution, the trade policy fundamentally served the objectives of the industrial policy.  
That is to say, the control of imports through adjustments in the exchange rate and the tariffs had the 
objective of protecting and stimulating Brazilian economic growth. It is important to remember that 
this model of growth was sanctioned by the National Congress when approving in 1957 the import 
tariffs law by which it delegated to the Executive the authority to implement the industrial policy 
through the establishment of selective import controls” (2001, 133; translated from Portuguese). 
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the area of foreign trade policy (Lima and Santos 2001, 140; translated from 
Portuguese). 
 
The 1988 Constitution sanctioned the role of Congress as an ex-post ratifying power (Article 
49) and endorsed the use of the so-called “presidential decrees,” a legacy of the authoritarian 
regime, as “provisional measures”175 (Article 62), which granted significant initiative to the 
Executive vis-à-vis the Legislative power. In this manner, the new Constitution did not 
provide for Congress the capacity to participate ex-ante in the definition of the country’s 
international policies (Lima and Santos 2001).  
The participation of the Brazilian Congress in the policymaking process dedicated to 
the integration project of the Southern Cone largely reflected the noted asymmetric 
institutional relationship between the Executive and the Legislative. The 1988 Treaty of 
Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD), for example, included a reference to the 
role of Congress in its Article 8 that evidences its subordinated role vis-à-vis the Presidency: 
The drafts of specific accords negotiated by the governments of the state-members 
[pursuant to the Treaty], before they are sent to their respective legislatures, will be 
appraised by a Joint Parliamentary Commission of Integration, an advisory body that 
will be composed by twelve members of congress from each country designated by 
the corresponding legislatures with two-year mandates (TICD 1988; translated from 
Portuguese; emphasis added). 
   
The delegation of authority from Congress to the Executive in the case of the foreign policy 
for regional integration, however, was not simply a case of relinquishment of power. It was 
based on a broad-based consensus among the political elite regarding the desirability of 
economic cooperation with other South American countries (Neves 2003). This basic 
agreement was perhaps best evidenced by the express mandate enshrined in the Article 4 of 
the 1988 Constitution that “Brazil will seek the economic, political, social and cultural 
integration of the peoples of Latin America with a view to form a Latin American community 
of nations” (Constitution 1988; translated from Portuguese). As noted by Neves (2003),  
                                                             
175 “Article 62. In important and urgent cases, the President of the Republic may adopt provisional 
measures with the force of law and shall submit them to the National Congress immediately…” 
(Constitution 1988; translated from Portuguese).  
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The inclusion of a guiding principle of foreign policy so specific, such as the 
participation of Brazil in projects of regional integration, is an unprecedented 
occurrence in the constitutional history of the country. Moreover, the inclusion of the 
integrationist principle in the Federal Constitution demonstrates the peculiar form in 
which the National Congress delegated powers to the Executive with respect to 
foreign policy of regional cooperation (2003, 119; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Further evidence of the existence of a basic convergence of preferences between the 
Executive and Congress is the seeming absence of any significant opposition on the part of 
members of Congress to the Mercosur integration project
176
 (Neves 2003).    
Thus, the role of Congress in the formulation of the foreign policy for regional 
cooperation in the Southern Cone has not only been affected by the institutional setup of the 
Brazilian polity but also by the convergence of the legislative body’s policy preferences and 
those of the Presidency that in turn expressed an elite-wide political consensus. In this sense, 
the delegation of authority by Congress with can be seen as a rational political arrangement 
rather than as an abdication of institutional power.  
Political Parties  
Political parties did not play an active role in the decision-making process that defined 
Brazil’s policy for economic integration between mid-1980s and early 1990s. Hirst (1996) 
claims that in this regard the participation of political parties was “marginal.” Oliveira (2003) 
describes their intervention as “weak and almost null,” noting that they “only acted in cases 
of disputes around questions of sectorial interests that were adversely affected by the 
integration” (2003, 89). At the same time, Brazilian political parties appeared united in their 
support for the integration initiative:   
…the receptivity of the project [of regional integration, both in its bilateral phase with 
Argentina and in its quadrilateral form –Mercosur] among the political parties was 
exemplarily coincidental, with all of them emphasizing […] the intrinsic virtues of 
                                                             
176
 “It is important to note that the pronouncements from members of Congress are never opposed to 
Mercosur, but merely question technical aspects of the integration. This fact can be confirmed through 
an investigation in the Information System of the National Congress (SICON). In more than one 
thousand documents that constitute the legislative process and that are related to the subject of 
integration no project was found that was opposed to regional integration” (Neves 2003, 123-24; 
translated from Portuguese). 
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regional integration, or better, of Latin American integration according to the old 
idealist rhetoric already cultivated by most of the political leaders (Almeida 1992, 
193; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Their political backing was reflected in the lack of significant opposition in Congress to the 
integration project, and evidenced the broad consensus that united the Brazilian political elite 
behind it. As already noted, that political agreement was most clearly expressed in the 
decision of the Constituent Congress to incorporate a specific directive to pursue regional 
integration in the Article 4 of the 1988 Constitution.  Thus, as observed in the case of 
Congress, one can also attribute political parties’ passive role in part to the fact that they 
shared a common strategic goal with respect to regional cooperation which lessened their 
need to intervene to change course. 
Yet, other factors contributed as well to the weak participation of political parties.  
One is the relatively low relevance that foreign policy issues in general have had for Brazilian 
political parties, both in their thinking as well as in their activities (Almeida 1992). In the 
1980s, some important international issues that affected Brazil (i.e., external debt, trade 
tensions with the United States, the integration project with Argentina) necessarily began to 
demand the increasing attention of the political parties, but “foreign policy remains as a 
relatively esoteric area for the most part of the agents involved in the dispute for power” 
(Almeida 1992, 198). Moreover, inasmuch as regional integration appears as a component 
aspect of foreign economic policy it is perceived by Brazilian political parties as belonging to 
the sphere of competence of the Executive rather than a subject of primary importance for 
their political activities (Vigevani et al. 2001).   
Another factor is the historical conditions that affected the development of political 
parties in Brazil (Kinzo 1993):   
The frequent ruptures of the constitutional order and the prevalence of long periods of 
authoritarianism resulted in a strong discontinuity in the development of political 
parties. The predominance of a strong and centralized state apparatus, making 
difficult the constitution of a true national political arena where the parties could 
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flourish, prevented in the past the institutionalization of party organizations (1993, 
95; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Thus, the party system that emerged in the aftermath of the transition toward a democratic 
regime in the mid-1980s was characterized by mutability, fragility and fragmentation (Kinzo 
1993).     
A third factor is the institutional structure of the Brazilian political system which 
hampered the development of stable, strong parties in Brazil:  
Presidentialism, the system of proportional representation and the party-related 
legislation have negatively affected the consolidation of a party system. The lack of 
mechanisms that ensure the co-responsibility of the legislative to the programs of the 
government, the practice of a system of proportional representation that turns the 
electoral competition in a dispute between individual candidates rather than between 
parties, the permissiveness of the party-related legislation in what pertains to the 
creation and functioning of the parties, are factors that make difficult the creation of 
more defined party identities, fragment the system and place it in a permanent 
transient state (Kinzo 1993, 95-96; translated from Portuguese). 
 
All these factors combined weakened the capacity of Brazilian political parties to claim a 
more robust role in the definition of foreign policy and precluded their more active 
intervention in the shaping of the integration project that culminated in Mercosur.     
In the case of Sarney, although he was a leader of the Party of the Liberal Front 
(PFL), there is no available evidence revealing what influence, if any, this party had on the 
President’s decision to pursue bilateral integration with Argentina.177 According to Almeida’s 
(1992) examination of the political profile of the PFL in connection with Brazilian foreign 
policy, it does not seem likely that this political party played any particularly influential role 
in promoting the idea of regional integration:  
[t]he launching of the “Manifesto” of January 1985 mentions the importance of 
“preserving our identity and our culture, maintaining under national control the 
process of development and seeking the progressive reduction of our external 
                                                             
177
 The PFL’s electoral alliance with the PMDB benefitted it enormously.  In a remarkable turn of 
events for the lesser (albeit important) partner of the electoral front Democratic Alliance, the illness of 
Tancredo Neves and his subsequent death allowed Sarney, and with him the PFL, to effectively be at 
the helm of the so-called “New Republic” regime thus resulting in a significant loss of political power 
for the PMDB. Moreover, through Sarney’s ministerial reform in 1986, the PFL was able to fill the 
ministries of Mines and Energy, Education, Foreign Relations, Communications, Transports and Civil 
Cabinet (Gabinete Civil) (Kinzo 1993).   
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dependency, especially in the technological field.” But clarifies that Brazil should be 
maintain “our windows open to the world, where interdependence tends to increase 
and isolationism tends to disappear.” The party’s program, elaborated subsequently, 
does not define specific foreign policy directives, but among its principles it 
establishes for example ‘to propose a foreign policy founded on the principle of 
sovereign equality of the states and on the respect to the self-determination of the 
peoples and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, oriented in 
favor of the world peace, of disarmament, of a more just division of political and 
economic world power and of a greater access of the developing countries to the 
fruits of material progress, and turned toward the establishment of relations with all 
the nations that wish to cooperate with Brazil on the basis of mutual respect’ (1992, 
189; translated from Portuguese). 
 
There seems to be no evidence either to substantiate the case that the Party of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (PMDB), the other member of the governing coalition during the 
Sarney administration, led the way in promoting a project of regional integration or 
encouraging Sarney to do so. Instead, its role was most likely a reactive one through the 
support it provided to the government as a dominant political force in Congress.   
At the time of the 1985 indirect presidential election, the PMDB had the second 
largest party delegation in the Congress with 200 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (42% of 
the total seats), and 21 in the Senate, or 30% of the total.
178
 In the subsequent legislative 
election of 1986, the PMDB increased its seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 260 (53% of 
the total), and those in the Senate to 44 (61%).  In contrast, the PFL obtained 118 seats (24%) 
in the Chamber and 16 (22%) in the Senate (Kinzo 1993).     
The PMDB suffered from several weaknesses that lessened its capacity to influence 
political events. On the one hand, it did not feel that it was a real co-participant in the Sarney 
government, inasmuch as the President was perceived as a political figure alien to the beliefs 
and history of the party and a former supporter of the authoritarian regime that only shortly 
before the elections joined the political opposition (Kinzo 1993).   
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 These figures resulted from the 1982 legislative elections when the country was still under 
authoritarian rule. At that time, the Social Democratic Party (PDS), which mainly represented the 
interests of the military, had 235 deputies (49%)  and 46 senators (67%). The PFL was created in 
1985 as a result of a split from the PDS. Thus, in 1985 it did not hold any legislative seats (Kinzo, 
1993).   
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In addition, the PMDB suffered of an “identity crisis” caused by the lack of a clear 
definition of its political profile that originated in the history of its formation. Born from the 
“compulsory bi-partisanship” forced by the military government in 1965 as the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (MDB) it attracted a diverse array of political forces that were mainly 
united in their opposition to the authoritarian regime. Thus, the PMDB resembled more a 
loose coalition than a political party (Kinzo 1993).   
Finally, the presidentialist system’s own nature contributed to the political ambiguity 
of the PDMB because “it establishes a long distance between the Executive and the party that 
must lend it support, nor demanding that the latter partakes the effective responsibility of 
governing” (Kinzo 1993, 26).    
 The International System  
Three major interrelated international factors acting at the systemic level of analysis 
played a critical role in shaping Brazil’s option for regional integration in the Southern Cone 
in the mid-1980s. The effect of these external variables as they worked their influence 
through the domestic political economy of the country was to encourage the development of 
Brazil’s commitment to a South-South regional integration strategy. They were: the outbreak 
of the 1982 debt crisis, the emergence of a protectionist wave among the developed 
economies of Europe and the United States, and the legacy of Brazil’s participation in Latin 
American integration schemes like LAFTA and LAIA.  
The International Debt Crisis of 1982  
An international financial crisis started on August 12, 1982, when Mexico publicly  
announced that it was unable to service its foreign debt. The crisis rapidly spread to a total of 
twenty seven countries, of which sixteen were in Latin America, including Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Argentina (FDIC 1997).   
A sharp increase in crude oil prices that started in 1973 and lasted almost a decade 
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rapidly increased the availability of funds in the so-called Eurodollar market through the 
accumulation of dollar-denominated bank deposits of oil-exporting countries. This rapid 
buildup of international liquidity combined with reckless credit practices and regulatory 
indulgence facilitated a quick expansion of lending by international banks to developing 
countries.
179
  
While the oil shocks of the 1970s had made available enormous amounts of loanable 
funds for international banks, they had also induced inflation and stagnation in developed  
countries. These in turn had an adverse effect on the exports of developing economies, thus 
aggravating their balance of payment problems and fueling more international borrowing.   
When the U.S. Federal Reserve decided to sharply increase interest rates in order to bring 
inflation under control, it brought on a global recession and helped to trigger the overall 
crisis. 
The combination of rising levels of debt, increased costs of borrowing, and decreased 
markets for their exports had severely hampered developing countries’ abilities to continue 
servicing their debts. Mexico’s moratorium declaration signaled the beginning of an 
international financial crunch as banks began to refuse new loans and tried to recuperate or 
restructure outstanding ones (FDIC 1997). 
The crisis signaled the end of Brazil’s strategy of “growth through indebtedness,” 
which it had pursued since the 1960s. The benefits for Brazil had been impressive. The 
country achieved record economic growth during 15 years, particularly during the period 
known as the “Brazilian miracle” in the years 1968-1973 (Castello Branco 1993):   
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 International borrowing by Latin American countries had been rising steadily in the 1970s. Total 
outstanding debt grew from a low of approximately $29 billion at the end of 1970 to a high of 
approximately $159 billion by the end of 1978, equivalent to an annually compounded growth rate of 
nearly 24 percent. Almost 80 percent of this debt was sovereign, that is, it comprised claims owed by 
national governments, government agencies, or private firms with public guarantees. The range of 
annual growth rates varied from country to country, but in absolute terms, Mexico’s and Brazil’s 
debts combined totaled almost $89 billion, or 56% of the total outstanding debt as of December 31, 
1978. From the start of 1979 to the end of 1982, total Latin American debt more than doubled from 
$159 billion to $327 billion (FDIC 1997).   
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The external debt was then seen as an adjustment mechanism that would equilibrate 
consumption and investment at levels compatible with the possibilities of long-term 
growth, at the same time that undesirable distributive conflicts would be postponed.  
The process of growth itself would generate the necessary resources for future 
payment […] The problems that emerged in the 1980s started when the countries had 
to stop growing to begin paying their debts (1993, 5; translated from Portuguese). 
 
The crisis forced policymakers to re-design Brazil’s foreign economic policy in order to 
stress exports and restrict imports in order to generate enough trade surpluses and thus liquid 
resources to confront debt payments (Flecha de Lima 1997; Marques 2008). Sarney’s speech 
at a plenary session of the United Nations in New York on September 23, 1985, describes the 
new dilemma confronting Brazilian policymakers at that time due to the constraints imposed 
by the external debt and protectionism in advanced developed economies: 
Overwhelmed by the weight of the enormous external debt the countries of the region 
[Latin America] experience a situation of grave difficulties […] Trapped by a vicious 
combination of economic factors –high international interest rates, fall of primary 
products prices and selectivity of markets in developed countries- we confront a crisis 
only comparable to the one that affected the market economies in the beginning of the 
1930s. The load of the external debt imposes an economic policy oriented toward the 
achievement of trade surpluses destined to the payment of interest. The international 
organizations propose inadequate adjustment policies. That road leads to a recession, 
to unemployment and a renouncement of the capacity to grow […] To increase our 
difficulties, the markets of the developed countries shut themselves off to our exports.  
The protectionist barriers multiply and we are unjustly accused of unfair trade 
practices.  In this manner it is confused the protectionism that aims to fence obsolete 
sectors of developed countries with the legitimate right of developing countries to 
create propitious and transitory conditions for the establishment of nascent industries 
that absorb  modern technologies indispensable for sustaining our growth, thus 
exercising our sovereignty and independence […] We want only and exclusively to 
defend our most sacred interests […] The crisis of the external debt in the meantime 
is forcing our economy to a process of isolation and autarky translating into minimal 
possibilities of importation and in weak and unsatisfactory links with the international 
financial market (Sarney 2008, 15-16; translated from Portuguese). 
 
At the same time, the relative strength achieved by Brazil’s economy derived from the level  
and quality of its industrial development made it relatively better prepared to withstand the 
consequences of the crisis in the immediately subsequent years: 
Brazil, like other debtors, is affected by international factors beyond its control, but 
our economy has certain characteristics of its own that render it less vulnerable. The 
impressive expansion of the country’s industrial base during the past few years not 
only allows us to diversify our exports but also to reduce our dependence on imports. 
The ratio of imports to gross national product is, in the case of Brazil, only six 
percent (three percent if oil is excluded), perhaps the lowest in the world. This 
explains why Brazil was able in the last three years to grow, to expand its reserves, to 
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produce annual trade surpluses of about $12 billion, and to pay the interest on its debt 
without receiving any new money and without an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (Sarney 1986, 110). 
 
In this manner, the debt crisis forced a reassessment of Brazil strategic choices and the search 
for alternative sources of trade surpluses:  
Brazil must achieve trade surpluses in order to adjust its balance of payments. The 
credits derived from trade balances are re-exported in the form of debt service. 
Should protectionism close the industrialized markets from which we must obtain our 
trade balances, where shall we seek alternate sources to keep up the payments? 
(Sarney 1986, 110-11). 
 
New Protectionism Among Developed Economies 
 
As noted previously, the oil shocks of the 1970s prompted inflation and stagnation in 
developed countries that translated in a decline in economic activity and increase in 
unemployment during the ensuing 1980-1982 recession. These severe economic conditions 
not only reduced the economic capacity of developed markets to absorb the exports from 
developing countries but also helped to fuel a new wave of protectionist policies despite 
commitments to the liberal principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(UNCTAD 1986).    
Moreover, the economic recovery that followed the recession did not result in a 
reversal of quantitative restrictions and other protectionist measures originally undertaken 
under the pressure of declining economic activity. Thus, while there was some relaxation or 
termination of protectionist measures since 1982, “these have been more than offset by new 
restrictions elsewhere” (UNCTAD 1986, 80). The UNCTAD report also notes that in 
consequence, developing countries confronted trade restrictions imposed on them by  
industrial countries:  
[s]everal voluntary restraint arrangements have been concluded or renewed, anti-
dumping and countervailing measures have been taken or initiated […], and 
quantitative restrictions  have been imposed on products and sectors in which 
developing countries have a competitive advantage (1986, 80). 
 
In studying the spread of non-tariff protection in developed countries between 1966 and 1986, Sam 
Laird and Alexander Yeats (1988) confirm that “while a major effort was made in multilateral trade 
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negotiations to reduce tariffs protectionism in the form of nontariff barriers greatly expanded, and 
may have even offset or exceeded the effects of liberalized import duties” (1988, 26). The authors 
note that between 1966 and 1986 the percentage of developed countries imports affected by non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) increased from 25 per cent to 48 percent, mostly involving textiles, clothing, 
foodstuffs and ferrous metals. Their study shows that during the mentioned 20-year period the highest 
increase in the percentage of trade affected by NTBs occurred in the European Community, but it also 
points to a problematic upsurge in the United States and Japan of new forms of NTBs in agriculture.   
For highly-indebted developing countries like Brazil, the new protectionist policies of 
advanced industrialized countries posed a serious challenge to their efforts to expand exports 
in order to meet their increasing debt-service obligations. At the same time, the pressing need 
to produce trade surpluses forced them to restrict imports, thus reinforcing the perception of 
developed countries that developing economies like Brazil were committed to protectionist 
policies and practices.  In this manner, a conflictive trade relationship between advanced 
industrialized economies and countries like Brazil ensued that was characterized by mutual 
recriminations of protectionism. The dominant perception among the Brazilian political elite 
was that industrialized nations were unwilling to cooperate in solving the difficult economic 
predicament in which Brazil found itself.    
Thus, in searching for an answer to Sarney’s question, it became increasingly clear 
for Brazilian policymakers that the country’s suddenly changed position in the international 
political economy seriously limited its options for establishing any solid economic 
partnership with advanced industrialized countries. On the other hand, the increasing benefits 
derived from trade with Latin American partners within the LAIA integration framework 
encouraged policymakers to pursue closer ties with Latin America (Danese 1999).  
LAIA and Brazil’s Industrial Hegemony in South America  
Trade with Latin American countries offered Brazil a means of generating substantial  
 210 
 
positive trade balances with which to confront the problem of the external debt (Setúbal 
1986).   The facts seemed to validate those expectations. According to Laviola (2004),  
[It is noteworthy] in the last years, the continued and increasing bilateral [trade] 
surpluses that our country [Brazil] has obtained with almost all the Latin American 
countries. The last surveys made by the CACEX  indicate that Brazil’s global 
[positive] balance with the LAIA in 1985 reached an amount close to US$600 
million, adding this amount to another US$700 million obtained in 1984 (2004, 61; 
translated from Portuguese). 
 
Moreover, regional trade within the domain of LAIA, particularly with South American 
economies, was a significant driver of Brazil’s industrialization and modernization. A 
confidential telegram from Itamaraty
180
 to various Brazilian diplomatic missions abroad 
explained Brazil’s position with respect to the incoming 1986 LAIA’s Round of Regional 
Negotiations, and it illustrates how this international factor impacted policymakers’ 
preferences:  
For political and economic reasons, Brazil, which is the country with the most 
diversified industrial structure and the most advanced technological level in the 
region, has a strategic interest in assuming the leadership of the reactivation process 
of regional trade, of the expansion of economic cooperation […] To succeed in this 
role, Brazil must always present its behavior as emanating from a philosophy and 
attitude of solidarity and sovereign cooperation, and never from a hegemonic or 
paternalist posture. Trade in the region [South America and Mexico], especially the 
one dedicated to manufactures, is regulated to a large extent by the Montevideo 
Treaty that created the […] LAIA in 1980 […] The LAIA framework permits its 
members to grant more advantageous tariff treatment to the goods included in the 
agreements that they celebrate with each other than those conferred to the same goods 
when they originate from non-member countries […] Latin America’s generalized 
difficulty in servicing the foreign debt has led to an effort in reducing imports and 
expanding exports that results in the proliferation of administrative restrictions to the 
intra-regional trade  (quotes, licenses, regulations) […] For Brazil, the countries of 
LAIA, despite the current deep crisis, have been an area par excellence for the 
placement of sophisticated manufactures and services exports that are the dynamic 
elements of our trade, which in turn is a strategic factor of our development […]  for 
Brazil, the most fertile potential for international political cooperation resides in its 
surroundings. It is with our neighbors that we can remove suspicions in order to 
configure a joint action in the international arena to modify the rules in our favor, and 
not with the traditional beneficiaries of those rules or with those that distance 
themselves from us through geography, habits and ideas […] 
 
It was under the influence of this vision that the government of President Sarney began to 
embrace the idea of a bilateral economic bloc between Brazil and Argentina as the 
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 Confidential telegram no.13904, November 6, 1985; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese. 
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centerpiece of a strategy for a broader South American regional integration that could serve 
Brazil’s needs to dynamize its economic growth. For Brazilian policymakers, the rationale for 
the project seemed quite powerful and self-evident: 
…our pattern of exports to Argentina consists basically of industrial products, of 
products with higher value added, a condition that is common of our pattern of 
relations with Latin America as a whole. To the contrary of our sales to the European 
Union and Japan that register a higher concentration in agricultural goods or sub-
processed, as orange juice, soya cereal, finally includes numerous products of the 
food chain and with less value added [. ..] Thus, it is one more reason why Brazil 
turned, starting in a certain moment, in that period to seek the deepening of relations 
with neighboring countries like Argentina and Latin American in general. That 
program of integration led to […] an increase quite accentuated of our imports and 
exports…  (Marques 2008, 76-77; translated from Portuguese). 
 
Discussion and Synthesis 
 
International factors played a crucial role in compelling a re-orientation of Brazil’s  
foreign economic policy that led decision-makers to seek a bilateral integration project with 
Argentina in the mid-1980s. Changing external conditions however did not dictate the 
government’s policy response. The choice largely emerged from the dynamic interaction of 
domestic variables.    
The financial crisis of 1982 was a catalytic factor at the systemic level that by making 
unviable the continuation of the “growth through indebtedness” strategy it started the ball 
rolling in Latin America toward the search for new strategic approaches to economic growth.  
In the case of Brazil, the immediate effect was to force a sharp restriction of imports and the 
promotion of exports in an effort to generate sufficient financial capacity to fulfill its debt 
obligations thus initially deepening the protectionist orientation of its foreign economic 
policy.   
Additionally, the spread of protectionism in the United States and Europe in the wake 
of successive oil crises restricted Brazil’s access to the markets of advanced industrialized 
economies and thus further aggravated the effect of the debt crisis. Both events compelled 
Brazilian policymakers to re-assess available options to defend core national interests. In 
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doing so, their perception of the challenges, their evaluation of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of Brazil’s international position, and the policy response they elaborated were 
all shaped by the system of developmentalist ideas that at that time predominated among the 
political elite.   
Three attributes of the Brazilian economy acquired particular relevance for the 
strategic calculations of policymakers. One was its relatively high level of industrial 
development vis-à-vis most other Latin American countries. Another was the country’s 
advantageous geographical location in the heart of South America. The third was Brazil’s 
membership in the LAIA. All these characteristics combined offered Brazil the opportunity to 
bolster its comparative industrial advantage in the regional market of the LAIA by means of 
preferential trade agreements.    
Two additional factors intervened to facilitate the decision of the Brazilian 
government to further develop the Latin American focus of its foreign economic policy into a 
bilateral economic bloc with Argentina. The first was the diplomatic rapprochement between 
the two countries that took place in the late 1970s which made possible the end of a long-
term rivalry, thus establishing the basis for sustained bilateral cooperation. The second was 
the relative economic weakening of Argentina vis-à-vis Brazil mainly as a result of the 
different economic strategies followed by their respective military regimes in the 1970s. In 
Argentina the ruling military followed a deliberate policy of de-industrialization whereas in 
Brazil the authoritarian government continued promoting industrial development (Moniz 
Bandeira (2004).    
Therefore, when Brazilian policymakers began entertaining the idea of economic 
integration with Argentina they were fairly confident that Brazil had the upper hand in terms 
of economic strength and level of industrialization. In their view, Argentina had a 
comparative advantage as an agricultural producer whereas Brazil enjoyed comparative 
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advantage as an industrial powerhouse. This perception convinced the Brazilian government 
that such an economic alliance protected by the legal framework of the LAIA would enable 
Brazil’s continued industrial development and modernization and ensure the preservation of 
its international autonomy.       
The new policy of regional integration played to the relative strengths of the Brazilian 
economy and thus allowed Brazilian policymakers more flexibility in dealing with the 
pressing demands for change generated by systemic events over which they had little control.   
In this manner, they were able to postpone the adoption of drastic liberal economic reforms, 
which in Brazil was slower and more gradual than in other Latin American countries (i.e., 
Mexico, Argentina).    
The need to consolidate the political transition to a democratic regime was an 
additional incentive for the governments of Brazil and Argentina to converge in a project of 
economic integration that could facilitate economic development and thus provide the 
necessary material basis for political stability. Yet, the relative importance of this domestic 
political factor has to be assessed against the larger context of the threat to the national 
interests of both countries derived from systemic events.   
The fundamental factor that drove the governments of Brazil and Argentina to seek a 
closer form of bilateral cooperation was the defense of their nation’s right to economic 
development with autonomy.  In this regard, the overriding assumption of both governments 
was that economic integration would grant them greater bargaining power to negotiate better 
conditions for economic growth.    
In the case of Brazil, both the definition of South America as a privileged area of 
influence for Brazil’s foreign economic policy and the concomitant search for economic 
integration with Argentina mainly constituted defensive proposals inspired by national-
developmentalist ideas to protect the country’s national interests against a threatening 
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international environment. Thus, the approach that prevailed in the design of the 1986 PICE 
and the 1988 TICD privileged political and economic autonomy over integration with the 
world economy. 
President Sarney played a critical role in leading the adoption of the policy for 
bilateral integration with Argentina with the close collaboration and influence of Itamaraty.   
In this regard, the institutional structure of the foreign policymaking process in Brazil was 
instrumental in ensuring the relative autonomy and insulation of the foreign policymaking 
process from societal influences.  At the same time, this domestic institutional factor helped 
to ensure that the prevailing political and economic ideas of leading actors were able to shape 
the outcome of the decision-making process in a decisive manner. 
Another important domestic factor that facilitated the inception of the government’s 
policy of economic integration with Argentina was the coalescence of a supportive political 
coalition among governmental bureaucracies with influence on foreign economic 
policymaking in addition to the Foreign Office (i.e., Finance Ministry, Customs Policy 
Commission) and political parties with majoritarian representation in Congress (i.e., PMDB 
and PFL). The decision of the Constituent Congress to incorporate Latin American 
integration in the new Constitution of 1988 as a governing principle of Brazil’s international 
relations clearly reflected a broad national consensus.  
The role of societal actors in the political process that led the Sarney administration to 
pursue the integration project with Argentina was minimal and rather passive. Two 
interrelated factors were mainly responsible for this outcome.  One is the elitist institutional 
setting of the foreign economic policymaking process, which tended to insulate state 
policymakers from the influence societal actors. The other is the relative weaknesses of 
business and labor as collective actors. Both factors are historically linked in Brazil to the 
manner in which the state since the Revolution of 1930 assumed a leading role to promote 
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and direct the process of economic development by means of a highly centralized structure 
and a corporatist institutional framework of interest intermediation that inhibited the 
independent development of both business and labor.  
The lack of enough of interdependence between the economies of Brazil and 
Argentina to motivate a market-driven process of integration was a factor that contribute to 
discourage the business elite from lobbying the government in favor of international 
economic integration with Argentina. Thus, Brazilian business was in the beginning skeptical 
of the initiative, and only became interested when the initial experience proved to be 
beneficial for its interests. Still, the business elite resented the fact that the government 
allowed it to participate in specific sectorial forums but not in the elaboration of the main 
policy guidelines.    
Besides the noted structural factors that conditioned the marginal participation of 
organized labor in the integration project (i.e., elitist governmental decision-making and 
weakness as a collective actor), another agency-related variable also contributed to the same 
outcome. Neither of the two major labor organizations at that time, the CGT and the CUT, 
were politically prepared to attempt a more active role in the integration initiative of the 
government, which seemed distant from the most immediate and acute problems that 
occupied their attention. Thus, despite the important differences that separated them, the two 
organizations coincided in not opposing the process of gradual economic integration between 
the two countries. Instead, they adopted a reactive attitude of critical support inasmuch as the 
project could promote economic development. They mainly objected to the strict commercial 
character of the initiative while noting the need to incorporate the social question.   
******* 
 
This chapter has examined the first stage of the process that led to the formation of Mercosur 
by focusing on the foreign policy processes and decisions that led Brazilian policymakers 
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during the administration of President José Sarney (1985-1990) to pursue a project of 
bilateral economic integration with Argentina. The next chapter studies the second stage of 
the process from which Mercosur finally emerged as a quadripartite project that also included 
Uruguay and Paraguay. The analysis also concentrates its attention on Brazil’s foreign 
policymaking to explain why and how the new government of President Fernando Collor de 
Mello (1990-1992) decided to continue the pursuit of a project of economic integration in the 
Sothern Cone albeit under a different conception that reflected his liberal agenda to 
modernize Brazil.   
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Chapter 4 
Brazil Pursues Mercosur as a Vehicle for Competitive Integration  
In this chapter, I explain the decision-making process that led the government of 
President Collor to seek the creation of Mercosur as the centerpiece of a new strategy to 
integrate Brazil into the world economy. This account requires the solution of two 
interrelated puzzles.   
The first one is why the new Brazilian president decided that continuing the bilateral 
project of economic integration with Argentina was the main path to inserting Brazil 
internationally instead of directly seeking a trade agreement with the United States and/or 
Europe. Given the importance that Collor’s international strategy attached to integration with 
the so-called “First World” of advanced developed economies, one would have expected the 
latter choice.   
The second puzzle is why the Collor administration opted for the creation of a 
common market, which presupposed the formation of a customs union, as a preferred type of 
scheme instead of striving for a free-trade agreement. Considering the importance that 
international autonomy has within the political culture of Brazil, one would have expected the 
choice of a type of agreement that would allow for greater autonomy to engage trade partners 
without the constraints of a common external tariff and the coordination of economic policies 
demanded by a common market. Moreover, under the liberal rationale underlying Collor’s 
strategy for Brazil’s modernization, a free-trade agreement would seem to offer more 
freedom to manage the external tariff structure of the country according to its needs.     
In solving these two puzzles, I consider the influence of international factors such as 
the appeal of the regional market of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) for 
Brazil’s industrial development and modernization, the economic benefits derived from the 
integration experience with Argentina since 1986, the emergence of international economic 
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blocs, and the launching of the “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” by the United States 
in June 1990. As in the previous chapter however, I emphasize the pivotal effect of domestic 
variables, including the existence of an elite-wide political consensus in favor of Latin 
American integration, the institutional predominance of the Presidency in foreign 
policymaking, the agency role played by the president, and the mediating influence of 
neoliberal ideas that pervaded his political thinking and that of his close advisors.     
The Individual Decisionmaker 
President Fernando Collor de Mello  
On March 15, 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello, a little-known young governor from 
the small state of Alagoas and a candidate for the National Reconstruction Party, became the 
32
nd
 President of Brazil after defeating Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a trade-union leader 
candidate for the Workers’ Party, in a runoff held in December 1989, one month after the 
results of the first round in the presidential election. His arrival as the “the first Brazilian 
president elected by a popular vote since Jânio Quadros in 1960” (Cardoso 2006, 170), 
appeared to consolidate Brazil’s transition to a democratic regime following the presidency of 
José Sarney, the first civilian President of Brazil after twenty one years of authoritarian 
military rule.     
The particular circumstances of Collor’s electoral triumph had created contradictory 
tendencies. On the one hand, his political authority as President enjoyed a markedly higher 
level of legitimacy than the indirectly-elected Sarney because the new President had been 
elected by direct popular vote. In the runoff against Lula da Silva, Collor had prevailed by 
taking 49.94% of the popular vote, against 44.23% obtained by his opponent. This meant that 
he started his term in office with a significant political advantage vis-à-vis the political 
establishment in Brasília:  
His personal image, the electoral legitimacy of the election in two rounds and the 
constitutional norms inherent to the Presidency of the Republic gave Collor a 
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handicap very favorable for the task [stabilize the currency and promote liberalizing 
reforms]. In effect, Collor’s personal prestige and the legitimacy of the direct election 
accentuated the considerable normative power of the Presidency of the Republic in 
the political system instituted by the Constitution of 1988 (Sallum Jr. 2011, 262, 
translated from Portuguese).   
  
On the other hand, the way in which Collor rose to political prominence weakened his 
capacity to forge a working cooperation with the legislature. The president-elect was a little-
known outsider supported by a weak political organization of his own, and he did not have a 
stable alliance with any other political parties with influence in congress: 
During the campaign, Collor did not organize his mass supporters into a political 
party. The party he formed in 1989, the Partido de Reconstrução Nacional (PRN), 
served merely as an electoral vehicle and involved little political weight, 
organizational strength, or commitment to a defined program. Assembling a disparate 
group of politicians from varying backgrounds, who jumped on the Collor 
bandwagon as it gained momentum, the PRN lacked internal focus or cohesion. In 
late 1989, it held only about 4% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Weyland 
1993, 8).  
 
Political and Economic Crises 
 
Collor assumed the presidential office in the wake of a serious political crisis 
originated in the failure of the Sarney government to deal effectively with Brazil’s most 
pressing economic problems: continued stagnation, draining of external sources of financing, 
increasing external debt difficult to re-negotiate, and rampant hyperinflation. This resulted in 
increasing popular discontent, expressed through strikes and food riots and highly negative 
polls in main cities toward the end of Sarney’s term, evidencing the breakup of the broad-
based political consensus that sustained the democratic transition initiated in 1985 (E. 
Williamson 1992).    
On the external front, Collor found that Brazil remained marginalized from external 
capital flows, while its relations with major centers of international economic power were 
strained due to the debt moratorium that Sarney had declared in 1987 and the perception that 
the country stubbornly maintained a protectionist trade policy (Sallum Jr. 2011). 
Additionally, the initiation of Collor’s presidential term coincided with the dramatic fall of 
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the Berlin Wall that marked the end of the Cold War, the intensification of the spread of 
globalization, the rapid formation of economic blocs, and the emergence of protectionist 
economic policies in developed countries (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009).    
These international developments introduced new challenges to Brazil’s national 
interests as its political elite pondered the country’s place in the world economy and searched 
for means to revive economic development. Moreover, these challenges demanded an 
immediate adequate strategic response from Brazil’s chief executive. In the case of Collor, it 
was an opportunity to assert his political autonomy. In this connection, Schneider (1991) 
aptly noted, “[a]ny crises would be daunting to a new president; together they could easily be 
overwhelming. Yet, paradoxically, they could also give an energetic, innovative, new 
government greater leeway” (1991, 321).  
Leadership Style  
Collor succeeded in the electoral contest by riding a huge wave of popular discontent 
against established politicians as a young and energetic Brasília outsider that was not afraid 
of challenging the status quo.
181
 Very quickly, the new president demonstrated his 
willingness to impose his political authority in policymaking, which appeared driven by an 
imperious sense of urgency that demanded immediate results. Several scholars had made 
reference to his personal style of leadership.  
According to Santana (2006), “[t]he Collor government […] was marked by a 
personalist and immediatist style provoking the marginalization of certain members of the 
state bureaucracy” (2006, 8). Batista (1993) critically describes the president as “impulsive 
and voluntarist, anxious for immediate results” (1993, 108). Weyland (1993) claims that 
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 According to Flynn (1993), “[t]he 1989 vote  for  Collor,  then,  was  not  a feckless  aberration,  
but  a rational vote  for change, and a new beginning.  This, again, rationally, was linked to disillusion 
and mistrust of the current politicians and the political system. In April  1989,  a public opinion  poll 
found that a massive 81  per cent  of respondents  had no  trust  in  politicians, and  70 per  cent, none 
in political parties or the Federal Government.  Yet, at the same time, 87 per cent said that they 
wanted to vote in the presidential election of 1989” (1993, 360-61). 
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“[l]acking a firm political base,[Collor] tried to maintain autonomy and centralize power 
when in office” (1993, 3), and that “he embarked upon a relentless campaign designed, on the 
one hand, to ensure his personal leadership and, on the other, to undermine more established 
political forces and power centers which might hamper that goal. In this way, he guaranteed 
wide latitude for himself and his close aides…” (1993, 12-13). Danese (1999) observes that  
Collor brought a personal impulse to the diplomacy of his government lending 
himself with great emphasis of gestures to the task of advancing, with the presidential 
authority, some important themes for the actualization of the diplomatic agenda of 
Brazil (1999, 390). 
 
President Collor himself, during a press conference in May 1990 acknowledged his assertive 
leadership style as follows: 
… in this government there only exists one political will, which is the will of the 
President. The regime is presidentialist, and to a certain extent because of a question 
of temperament  and manner of behaving, I am used to acting in that manner … 
(Collor 1990d, 73; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese).    
 
In this manner, a particular combination of factors encouraged Collor’s active role in policy-
making, including foreign economic policy. The noted strengths and weaknesses of his rapid 
successful political rise encouraged him to act forcefully in the pursuit of his policy agenda 
by using his privileged institutional position as President in order to prevail against a 
Congress where he had few political allies. The severity and urgency of the economic 
problems faced by Brazil and the high expectations derived from his electoral success also 
demanded that he act swiftly in order to address the crisis. Finally, his own leadership style 
propelled Collor to actively take the initiative to determine policy outcomes. 
A New Strategy for Brazil’s Modernization  
As he took office on March 15, 1990, Collor presented his vision to tackle Brazil’s 
critical situation in a speech he delivered before Congress. His proposal, dubbed “Project for 
National Reconstruction,” outlined the programmatic priorities that would orient his 
government: consolidation of the democratization process, monetary and financial 
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stabilization,
182
 economic modernization through privatization and economic liberalization, 
concern for the environment, social justice, the search for new formulas to insert Brazil in the 
world, and an acceptable solution to the problem of the external debt (Collor 1990a).   
Collor’s message evidenced that he was intent on bringing a new orientation to the 
country’s foreign economic policy.  He argued that Brazil faced a drastically changed 
international political economy. The Cold War was over, and the spread of globalization was 
generating unprecedented economic interdependence among nations. In particular, the 
accelerated formation of new economic blocs pressured countries to act decisively in order to 
re-position themselves (Collor 1990a).    
Therefore, according to his view, Brazil needed to seek new ways to participate in the 
world economy, and it needed to do it quickly in order not to further delay the modernization 
of its economy. The option for Brazil could not be other than active participation in 
international affairs in order to safeguard its interests: 
One of the key characteristics of modern Brazil has to be the active participation in 
the great international decisions […] For a country of our dimensions, with our 
determination of development, there is no better option than to be an active part in 
international decisions (Collor 1990a, 20). 
 
Collor also reaffirmed international principles that were part of Brazil’s traditional diplomatic 
culture: respect of sovereignty, non-intervention, auto-determination, pacific solution of 
conflicts, compliance with treaties, and respect of human rights (Collor 1990a). Yet, his 
speech did not have the defensive, “circle the wagons,” tone that Sarney used when alluding 
to Brazil’s international position, which emphasized the need of upholding the country’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis the power of advanced developed economies.   
On the contrary, in delineating the contours of a new foreign economic policy, the 
new President explicitly emphasized economic opening-up and integration to the world 
markets: 
                                                             
182
 “The immediate purpose of my government […] the goal number one of my first year of 
administration, it is not to contain the inflation but to liquidate it” (Collor 1990a, 13). 
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Brazil will be open to the world. We want integration, increasing and competitive.  
Diplomacy will act, in an intense manner, both bilaterally and collectively, seeking in 
each moment new forms of cooperation […] The impressive dynamics of the changes 
now in course in the international scenario makes the risk of falling in a situation of 
confinement and marginalization more dangerous […] It is imperative to abdicate the 
sterile and unrealistic discourse of pseudo-nationalism that leads to isolation, to 
distrust, to the myopic illusion of self-sufficiency (Collor 1990a, 21; translated from 
Portuguese). 
 
Collor signaled a break with traditional tenets of Brazilian developmentalism in a more 
definite manner than Sarney’s late discourses. Since the 1960s, that paradigm had 
emphasized international autonomy and protectionist trade policies in support of import-
substitution industrialization (Veiga 2009).   
The key terms in the new international orientation launched by the president were 
opening-up and competitive integration. Remarkably, the declaration that Brazil “will be 
open to the world” was unilateral, that is, regardless of what counterparts would offer in 
exchange. On the other hand, the search for a “competitive” integration implied the further 
dismantling of protectionist structures defending the domestic Brazilian market that Sarney’s 
reforms had initiated in 1988. 
Yet, “competitive integration” did not mean a mere abandonment of economic 
nationalism but a reinterpretation of it in light of new international conditions: 
… it was not a proposal to passively ‘adjust’ to the dynamisms of world capitalism; 
on the contrary, it was intended to restructure the Brazilian productive system with a 
view to make the Brazilian industry competitive in the international arena. Thus, 
formulators and diffusors of the ‘competitive integration’ project emphasized the 
formulation and implementation of industrial policies that stimulated private 
entrepreneurs to act in that direction. In that sense it distinguished and opposed itself 
to the neoliberal ideology. The ideology of the ‘competitive integration’ also 
differentiated itself from neoliberalism for being, contrary to it, not a form of 
defensive nationalism but of national assertion at the international level (Sallum Jr. 
2011, 264-65; translated from Portuguese).  
 
Sallum’s interpretation of Collor’s international economic strategy is important because it 
helps to better understand why in spite of his liberal vision he remained committed to a 
South-South integration project like Mercosur and resisted the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) advanced by U.S. President George Bush in mid- 1990. 
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In his speech, Collor also noted that the new political developments in Eastern Europe 
constituted another reason that pressed Brazil to seek international economic integration, 
particularly in light of its relatively high level of industrialization:   
[i]t represents another factor to convince ourselves of the absolute necessity of a 
competitive integration of Brazil in the world economy. As a country equipped with 
an industrial park already complete and integrated, Brazil can march confident toward 
the experience of opening up of its economy (Collor 1990a, 24).  
 
Toward the end of his speech, the president reiterated the need to focus on international 
integration in response to demands dictated by its national interest:  
Brazil does not accept to remain in tow of the process of international transformation.  
The only road marked by the national interest is the gradual but constant and assured 
integration of the economic process (Collor 1990a, 27). 
 
Collor used a cautious tone to address Brazil’s relationship with the United States that 
reflected the conflictive state of affairs with the North American nation inherited from his 
predecessor.   
In the bilateral relationship with the United States, I intend to exert the best 
disposition for dialogue and understanding. In the coexistence between the two 
democracies, the acknowledgement of their own characteristics, the respect for 
different or even divergent opinions must prevail. I am certain that differences of 
interest and perception, natural in an exchange as dense as ours will be treated in a 
constructive manner for mutual benefit (Collor 1990a, 23).  
 
Sarney had confronted some serious difficulties in the bilateral relationship with the U.S. that  
was overshadowed by commercial disputes and the specter of the external debt
183
 (Correa 
1996). Thus, despite his intentions of seeking for Brazil a new competitive integration with 
world markets, Collor did not allude to a potential preferential trade agreement with the 
United States.
184
 
                                                             
183
 Examples are: the inclusion of Brazil in a list of countries that could suffer trade retaliation under 
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 (see previous chapter, page 124), the actual retaliation suffered in the case 
of pharmaceutical products, and the tensions originated in the debt moratorium declared by Brazil in 
February 1987 (Correa 1996). 
184
 According to Abreu (1995), the participation of Brazilian exports to the United States market in 
1990 represented 24.5% of Brazil’s total exports, while Brazilian imports from the United States 
accounted for 1.66% of total imports. The author concludes that a free-trade zone would bring 
significant benefits to Brazil because of the significant absolute value of the exports to the United 
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Regional Integration in the Southern Cone  
Contrasting with his call for a drastic change in foreign economic policy, Collor 
confirmed in his first presidential speech that Brazil would continue considering South 
America as an immediate area of economic relevance and influence for Brazil’s interests:  
[f]or Brazil, the great immediate space is Latin America, with its economic epicenter 
in the Southern Cone […] Whence the increasing importance of the Latin American 
process of integration that I intend to systematically deepen in my government. I 
think that integration is the obligatory step for the modernization of our economies so 
that Latin America can join the protagonists of this moment of change in the world 
scenario (Collor 1990a, 22).  
 
The statement represented a continuation of the Latin American policy adopted during the 
Sarney administration that had allowed the country to play a greater political role in the 
region, particularly in the Southern Cone (Correa 1996). Moreover, the new president 
acknowledged that the completion of the economic integration of the Southern Cone, already 
initiated under president Sarney, was a necessary springboard to insert the country into world 
markets. 
Collor had already confirmed on February 14, 1990 his decision to continue the  
process of regional integration in South America, when he offered to the press an account of 
his trip abroad as president elect touring 12 countries: 
…I travelled to three countries that are neighbors and friends of the Southern Cone. I 
held frank and fruitful talks with President Carlos Menem of Argentina, with 
President Julio Maria Sanguinetti and with President-elect Luis Alberto Lacalle of 
Uruguay, and with President Andrés Rodríguez of Paraguay. I confirmed in those 
meetings the density of our relationship with each one of those nations […] I 
reaffirmed the ideal of integration that will be the crossbeam of the Latin American 
policy of my government. I understand that integration is the necessary step for the 
modernization of our economies, and therefore, condition for Latin American to have 
a relevant role in this moment of profound transformations of the world scenario 
(cited in Flores 2005, 57; translated from Portuguese).   
 
It was a confirmation that Collor was willing to assume the commitments undertaken by his 
predecessor with respect to regional integration. Moreover, on January 21, 1990 during his 
visit to President Sanguinetti in Montevideo, Collor had defended the idea of a Latin 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
States. However, Brazilian gains would be limited by the diversification of its markets that results in a 
relatively modest participation of the exports to the U.S. within the total exports (1995, 251). 
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American common market, specifically mentioning Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, noting 
that such integration could not only remain at the rhetorical level. He also said that the idea 
had to progress in a firm and gradual manner, without losing sight that the integration of the 
Southern Cone was the only way that would lead the South American countries to exit the 
confinement in which they were submitted (Zímbaro 1990; Flores 2005).   
On March 16, 1990, one day after he was sworn in as President of Brazil, during the 
ceremony of formation of the Executive Commission of the Treaty of Integration, 
Cooperation and Development Brazil-Argentina,
185
 held in Brasília, Collor declared: 
This is the moment to reaffirm the Brazilian will to fulfill the high purposes of the 
integration between Brazil and Argentina. The integration it weaved today with 
concrete gestures, with firm and unshakeable measures for the coming together of our 
countries. The Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development Brazil-Argentina 
is a fundamental piece of the process […] Despite the economic problems confronted 
by our countries, I see with satisfaction the continued success of the pioneer 
experience of bilateral integration (Collor 1990b, 21). 
 
At a press conference on March 27, 1990, the President again reiterated his commitment to 
continue the process of economic integration with Argentina despite circumstantial problems 
that each country might have from time to time (Collor 1990c). Two months later, during 
another press conference, Collor again affirmed his commitment to regional integration in 
Latin America noting that this strategic orientation was inscribed in the country’s 
Constitution, and that he was concerned with its rapid materialization: 
Latin American integration is one of the primordial themes of our foreign policy. We 
have commitments with our continent, we have commitments with Latin America, we 
have commitments with countries that are friends of ours, and we have commitments 
with our integration. It is fundamental, it is even written in the own constitutional 
text. That is why we are concerned not only with accelerating the agreements that 
were signed by past governments but we also promote new openings that make 
effectively possible that this integration leaves the sphere of the plan, the treaties, the 
decrees, the agreements and the terms signed by Brazil and those friendly countries 
and passes to the sphere of practice (Collor 1990d). 
 
Bilateral Economic Integration with Argentina 
 
Collor found an appropriate partner for the continuation of the bilateral integration 
                                                             
185
 Treaty signed by presidents José Sarney and Raúl Alfonsín on November 29, 1988 (TICD (1988,  
28).  
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project with Argentina in Carlos Menem, the new Argentine president since July 8, 1989.  
Menem won the elections as a candidate for the traditionally nationalist/populist Peronist 
party, but pressed by a deep economic crisis characterized by hyperinflation and recession, he 
very quickly embraced a program of radical economic reforms similar to the one that Collor 
proposed for Brazil. Like Collor, Menem was also determined to continue the integration 
policies of his predecessor, Raúl Alfonsín, which were centered on a close economic 
partnership with Brazil (Candeas 2010).   
Yet, the Collor-Menem approach to integration was going to be different from the one 
shared by Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín, thus reflecting the contrast between their 
respective economic strategies. As noted by Candeas
186
 (2010): 
The ideological convergence of Presidents Collor and Menem was determinant for 
the acceleration of the trade liberalization policies. The bilateral integration, 
conceived during the Sarney-Alfonsín period as an integration project of productive 
units for the formation of large scale regional undertakings, became a project 
concentrated on commercial liberalization. The ‘common economic space’ 
anticipated by the 1988 Treaty was read under the optic of an expanded market for 
commercial ends, without necessarily a strategic complementarity of sectors (2010, 
221; translated from Portuguese).   
 
Presidents Collor and Menem acted rapidly on their promises to continue bilateral 
integration.  They first met in Buenos Aires on January 21, 1990. According to a report
187
of 
the meeting by the Brazilian Ambassador to Itamaraty,  
The two Presidents reaffirmed their intention of moving ahead with firmness and 
determination the program of integration between the two nations: the 24 protocols 
and the Treaty of Integration already signed will have to be fully complied with.  
 
As already described above, in March 1990, immediately after Collor officially became 
President, both political leaders met again in Brasília to formalize the creation of the 
Executive Commission prescribed by the article 6 of the 1988 Treaty of Integration, 
Cooperation and Development Brazil-Argentina. In addition, Collor and Menem had also 
                                                             
186 Brazilian career diplomat and professor at the Rio Branco Institute. 
187
 Confidential memo no. 2107 from the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires to Itamaraty, January 22, 
1990; translated from Portuguese). 
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signed an agreement for the construction of a bridge over the Uruguay River linking the cities 
of São Borja (Brazil) and Santo Tomé (Argentina), and another one for the purchase of 
Argentine gas and the construction of a gas pipeline running from the Argentine Northeast to 
the Brazilian state Rio Grande do Sul (Collor 1990b).   
The Buenos Aires Act 
On May 28, 1990, Brazil announced that at the invitation of the Argentine 
government, President Collor would officially visit to Argentina on July 5 and 6, noting that 
the event underlined “the density of the ties that unite both countries reinforced by the 
program of economic integration […] as well as the identity that surges from the increasing 
convergence of interests.” (RPEB65 1990, 66-67). This new meeting would constitute an 
inflection point in the development of the bilateral integration project. 
During his visit to Argentina, President Collor spoke at a dinner offered in his honor 
by his Argentine counterpart, on July 5, 1990. He noted that the main goal was to continue 
the process of integration under novel schemes: 
With a view to achieve the major objective of the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation 
and Development, we will be giving firm and decisive steps in the direction of the 
effective establishment of a common market, basing the bilateral economic 
integration on still more solid foundations. The initiative undertaken by our countries 
opens a favorable perspective for the integration of Latin America. Its success can 
contribute in a significant manner to a greater sub-regional and regional convergence, 
this time based in new methods and creative approaches […] With this action we 
seek to strengthen our bargaining position, allowing a new and more just insertion of 
our countries in the world scenario (RPEB66 1990a, 6; emphasis added; translated 
from Portuguese). 
 
The following day, Collor and Menem signed the Buenos Aires Act, which set the stage for 
the new approach to bilateral integration that would eventually shape the creation of 
Mercosur. It declared that “a common market between the Federative Republic of Brazil and 
the Argentine Republic will have to be definitely formed on December 31, 1994” (RPEB66 
1990b, 61; translated from Portuguese).    
The Act also established that “a special emphasis will be given to the coordination of  
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macroeconomic policies and to the generalized, linear and automatic tariff reductions as 
principal methodology for the creation of the Common Market” (RPEB66 1990b, 61; 
translated from Portuguese). In addition, a bi-national Common Market Group would 
formulate proposals to implement the Act.   
The Annex 1 to the Act established the methodology to achieve the goals. It 
determined that “the progressive development and the definitive establishment of the 
Common Market make indispensable the coordination and harmonization of macroeconomic 
policies.” It also defined that “the backbone of the construction process of the Common 
Market will be constituted by generalized, linear and automatic tariff reductions to reach on 
December 31, 1994 a zero rate and the annulation of non-tariff barriers over the totality of the 
tariff universe” (RPEB66 1990b, 61; translated from Portuguese).    
The Act’s approach represented a distinct departure from the one envisioned by the 
1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD). It not only brought an 
accelerated timetable but it also established, for the first time, a target date for completion of 
the common market. The TICD had followed the gradual, flexible, balanced and symmetrical 
approach first established by the 1986 Program of Economic Integration and Cooperation 
(PICE). Thus, it did not set a specific date for the achievement of the common market but it 
did determine that in a first stage a free trade zone between the two countries was to be 
reached by the end of 1999.   
Once that first stage was completed, the Treaty envisioned another of undetermined 
length through which the two countries would seek the final establishment of the common 
market through a gradual harmonization of policies. Thus, the Buenos Aires Act collapsed 
the two-stage process of the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development into one 
where both the free-trade zone and the common market were to be achieved by the end of 
1994.   
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The new approach to the integration process reflected a belief shared by both 
governments that it was necessary to expedite their competitive integration to the new 
international political economy. In a joint message issued immediately after the signing of the 
Act, Collor and Menem declared “that through this decision of transcendental importance for 
the future of both Nations the economic and social development of their people will be 
accelerated and the necessary conditions for jointly competing and participating more 
actively in the world markets will be generated” (RPEB66 1990a, 10; translated from 
Portuguese).    
The Act was also to function as a “locking mechanism” in the sense that it helped to 
ensure the implementation of Collor’s and Menem’s respective domestic programs of market 
liberalization because it was required in order to comply with the terms of the new integration 
agreement (Vaz 2002). Thus, the target date of December 31, 1994 determined by the Act 
coincided with the deadline foreseen by the new industrial and trade policies that the Collor 
administration had announced on June 26, 1990 to complete a timetable of tariff reductions 
aimed at facilitating Brazil’s competitive integration to the world economy. These new 
policies constituted a continuation and deepening of the process of economic liberalization 
initiated by President Sarney in May 1988. 
In presenting the new policies during a public interview on Brazilian television, the 
Economy Minister of the Collor administration, Zélia Cardoso de Mello, stressed that they 
represented “a break with the past:”   
We are really making a great modification in the direction of modernization. We are 
going to completely modify the model [of import substitution] that was in force until 
today, […] First, starting July 1 we are formalizing the end of the quantitative control 
of imports […] In other words, we are signaling and making effective the end of 
administrative controls. We are making a reduction to 70% of the maximum 
nationalization indexes to be demanded in operations with governmental organs and 
agencies, against a previous average of 85% […] We are also reducing to 0% the 
tariff rate for machines, parts, components […] that do not have national production.  
We are reducing the tariff rates for textile imports. We are reducing in 20% the rate of 
IPI [federal excise tax on industrialized products] levied on automobiles […] which 
will allow the production of cars at fairly reasonable prices […] We are also creating 
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a commission that will have until March 31, 1991 to define the tariffs to be in force 
between 1991 and 1994.  Today, we have custom tariffs that vary from zero to 105%.  
Our objective is to arrive at 1994 with tariffs that vary between zero and 40%, 
whereas the average should be 20% […] Those are, basically, the measures that we 
are taking today […] measures that represent, in fact, a great revolution (Folha de 
São Paulo 1990b; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese).  
 
Thus, one can perceive a programmatic connection between the unilateral liberalization 
policies that intended to prepare Brazil for a competitive integration with the world economy 
and the new approach to the economic integration with Argentina that Collor had been 
stressing in his public discourse. In other words, Collor’s vision of a fast-tracked process of 
economic integration in the Southern Cone was in consonance with his strategy of rapid 
market liberalization for Brazil’s economy. 
It is also relevant to examine Zélia Cardoso’s response to a journalist’s question about 
Brazil’s integration strategy during the noted televised interview because it provides an 
indirect glimpse into Collor’s policy intentions and expectations at that time: 
Journalist: “Which is the strategy of the Brazilian government? Is it to join […] 
Argentina or to do like Mexico, to try to make a Common Market with the United 
States?” 
 
Zélia Cardoso: “Even though I can’t respond completely to that question at this 
moment […] I can tell you in advance the following: we want –and this is a change 
quite important in connection with all the orientation that was followed until now- we 
want […] to integrate with the first world, without prejudice of our integration with 
Latin America […] In other words […] we are insisting with that question of the 
integration of Brazil to the developed capitalist world and the most advanced nations.  
I also guarantee you that we will be giving consistent steps in connection to our 
integration with Latin America. In sum, what I am telling you is the following: we do 
not understand that these are two conflictive objectives […] With the most developed 
nations, with the United States, we have important points of contact, as we do also 
with Europe and Japan. Brazil is in a privileged position because of its geographical 
position and its importance in the world scenario […] In sum, it [Brazil] can in 
several areas choose which are its adequate partners, and that is the policy that we 
will be following, trying always to offer the best conditions and trying always to walk 
in the direction of an enhancement of our relations with those blocs, with the United 
States, with Japan and with the European Economic Community” (Folha de São 
Paulo 1990b; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese).  
  
Zélia Cardosos’s response, although somewhat disorderly worded, suggests that Collor was 
determined to pursue a two-track integration policy based on what he perceived to be Brazil’s 
“privileged” position that allowed on its part a relatively more autonomous international 
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behavior than other developing countries. One track was committed to Latin American 
integration and its immediate focus was to deepen the bilateral integration with Argentina, 
which appeared posed to achieve quick concrete results in the form of a new type of scheme.  
The other track was dedicated to integration with the “first world” (i.e., United States, 
Europe, Japan), which Collor also viewed as crucial for the success of his liberal economic 
strategy.  
A Wider Scope for the Integration Project  
Until then, Collor had continued Sarney’s policy in favor of maintaining the bilateral 
scope of the integration project at least for five years after the signing of the 1988 Treaty of 
Integration, Cooperation and Development, before other countries (i.e., Paraguay and 
Uruguay) were allowed to formally participate.  Argentina, on the other hand, had showed 
marked interest in including other Southern Cone countries. This was clearly perceived by 
Brazilian diplomats. Thus, for example, a memo
188
 from the Brazilian ambassador to 
Argentina addressed to the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations in early May 1990 gave 
account of his meeting with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Domingo Cavallo, 
noting that:  
In reality, it is clearer each time the purpose of the government of President Menem 
to incorporate, as far as possible and at a faster rhythm as possible, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Chile, and maybe Bolivia to the process of integration Brazil-Argentina. 
 
Yet, by the time President Bush launched his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 
June 1990 to create a hemispheric free-trade zone Brazil began to soften its resistance to the 
participation of other countries in the integration project. Behind this policy change there was 
a concern on the part of Brazilian policymakers for creating a broader front to resist what 
appeared as a new trade offensive on the part of the United States. The new attitude of the 
Brazilian government was evidenced, for example, in a memo
189
 from Ambassador Barbosa 
                                                             
188
 Confidential telex no. 0812, May 5, 1990; translated from Portuguese. 
189
 Confidential telex no. 437, July 27, 1990; translated from Portuguese. 
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to Itamaraty in late July 1990 about the possibility of creating a “group of the Southern Cone” 
in the Latin American Integration Association. Noting that there was an increasing tendency 
on the part of Chile and Uruguay to participate in the process of integration between Brazil 
and Argentina, Barbosa observed that “the participation of the four countries  in the 
coordination of a common response  to the ‘Initiative for the Americas’ reinforces that 
process of strengthening of the coordination links in the Southern Cone.”  
The occasion for a bilateral agreement to allow the inclusion of other countries in the 
Brazil-Argentina integration project came during a bi-national ministerial-level meeting held 
on August 3, 1990 with the purpose of complying with the joint statement issued by 
Presidents Collor and Menem on July 6, 1990 that called for a coordinated response to the 
EAI, and to examine issues related to the bilateral integration. The memo from Itamaraty
190
 
reporting on the meeting highlighted “the ample coincidence of points of view about the 
issues examined.” It summarized the basic agreement between Brazilian and Argentine 
representatives regarding the EAI by noting that  
…the “Initiative” was evaluated as positive as far as it contemplated a region 
considered in the last 30 years of lesser priority for the United States. In that respect, 
despite the definitions and precisions still necessary to compose a more concrete 
picture of that program, it was considered fundamental the coordination of positions 
between Brazil and Argentina in order to present a common position before the 
“Initiative.” The continuation of this exercise […] will allow us to present proposals 
to the North-American government that also contemplate our interests, such as the 
inclusion of the subject ‘access to technology’.  
 
The memo also reported the agreement reached regarding the possibility of including 
Uruguay
191
 and Chile to the integration project:  
On this subject, it was noted that Brazil and Argentina form the central nucleus of the 
process on which velocity and critical mass the integrationist project depends. In view 
of that, there was a coincidence that could be included the countries of the Southern 
Cone that were ready or in conditions of accompanying the rhythm that we were 
impressing to the process. Therefore, the new partners should not vindicate 
differentiated treatment under the pretext that their economies were less competitive 
                                                             
190
 Confidential memo no. 17950, August 4, 1990; translated from Portuguese. 
191 It should be noted that Uruguay had already important contractual links to Brazil and Argentina 
through partial accords within LAIA, such as the Argentine-Uruguayan Accord of Economic 
Complementation and the Protocol of Expansion of Brazil and Uruguay Trade (Flores 2005). 
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or diversified. It was remembered that the differentiated treatment was at the origin of 
the failure of the ALALC [LAFTA] and the relative immobility of the ALADI 
[LAIA] and other integrationist projects (emphasis added).  
 
Thus, the meeting reinforced the idea of a united Brazil-Argentine front to respond to the 
U.S. proposal in a positive but cautious manner that avoided a simple acceptance of it.
192
 It 
also opened the door for the formal incorporation of other members to the bilateral 
integration project but, as demanded by Brazil, only if it was without any conditionings on 
their part. Consequently, Brazil and Argentina invited Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile to 
integrate the future common market at a meeting that took place at Itamaraty in August 1990 
(Marques 2008).  
 Since then, the development of the process of integration in the Southern Cone 
proceeded in two parallel tracks for some time before it transitioned to a single quadripartite 
endeavor. One track remained the exclusive domain of Brazil and Argentina, the founders of 
the project that proceeded according to the political and legal agreements already formalized 
between them. The other track included Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It 
progressed mainly on the basis of initial political understandings between the five parties 
where Brazil and Argentina tended to act as a bilateral bloc.  
A memo
193
 from Itamaraty described the status of the integration process in the 
Southern Cone in early August1990 based on its perceptions of the respective positions 
maintained by Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay:   
Brazil seeks a competitive insertion in the international market and an increasing 
economic approximation with its neighbors of the Southern Cone, which is seen as 
the natural “economic space” given the facility of communications and the density of 
the relations between their members. The acceleration of the time periods for the 
creation of the common market with Argentina (until December 31, 1994), to which 
now adhered Uruguay, sets the tone of the understandings in the Southern Cone and 
indicates the priority of Brazil’s regional foreign policy. The proposal for the 
formation of a Free-Trade Zone with Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay until 12/31/95 
                                                             
192
 The memo evidenced a more circumspect attitude on the part of Brazil by noting in a separate 
added paragraph that “the Brazilian delegation manifested that the document [the framework 
agreement offered by the U.S. government] should be the object of negotiation, avoiding its actual 
characterization as ‘a treaty by adhesion.’” 
193
 Confidential memo no. 17962, August 9, 1990; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese).  
 235 
 
defines a second level of action […] Argentina […] considers that the frustrated 
tentative to […] form a Free-Trade Zone in the regional sphere [of LAIA] was the 
factor that accelerated the understandings in the Southern Cone […] Chile considers 
that its only alternative is an ample insertion in the world economy and that the 
liberalization achieved is irreversible because it is the ‘vertebral column’ of its project 
of economic development […] The low tariff profile of Chile (15%) contrasts with 
the predominant levels in its neighbors (in Brazil, the average is 37%). This 
asymmetry turns integration into a delicate exercise: first because the ‘motto’ of 
integration lost credibility in Chile and politically would not be ‘sellable’ […] second, 
because despite these conditionings Chile shows a real desire to integrate, having 
thus to seek formulas that permit the conciliation of the two aspects. Thus, it is 
willing to accompany efforts to form a Free-Trade Zone, but it cannot in this stage 
adhere to the common market project because it would compromise its freedom in the 
handling of the external tariff […] Uruguay considers that given the level of trade 
with Brazil and Argentina, integration is a national imperative, without any type of 
conditioning related to the dimension of its market and productive park. It estimates 
that […] the reconversion of its industry could be faster and less painful than in Chile.  
It insists in the adhesion to the Treaty of Integration Brazil-Argentina by the 
formalization of conventional legal instruments […] The form of Uruguay’s insertion 
therefore should be negotiated and formal even if the accord to be subscribed is not 
yet defined.    
   
What immediately strikes the reader is that there appears to have existed at that time a 
proposal under consideration to create a 5-country free-trade zone alongside the bilateral 
common market project between Brazil and Argentina, most likely as a way to 
accommodating the existing differences between the potential partners.   
The first meeting of the Common Market Group (GMC), which was established by 
the Buenos Aires Act to design its implementation, was scheduled for the first days of 
September 1990 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The inclusion of Uruguay in that meeting was 
not clearly defined yet. An Itamaraty memo
194
 noted that 
…the expansion of the Common Market through a full participation of  Uruguay in 
the process of formation of the mentioned Common Market, already accepted 
politically, is still pending of negotiations to conform the bases of that insertion of 
Uruguay […] in those conditions, prevail today different strategies of negotiation in 
the economic field […] and different levels of legal commitments […] the 
incorporation of Uruguay to the meetings [of the Common Market Group] on 
September 5 and 6 […] results from an accommodation with the timetable accepted 
previously to the adhesion, full and without pre-conditionings, of Uruguay to the 
process of formation of the Common Market Brazil-Argentina […] Therefore, it 
would correspond to the Uruguayan government to accentuate, at its convenience, the 
‘trilateral’ scope of the negotiations on September 5 and 6.   
 
                                                             
194
 Confidential memo no. 00468, August 25, 1990; translated from Portuguese. 
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According to a telex
195
 from the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires to Itamaraty, the first 
meeting of the CMG occurred “in a climate of extreme cordiality and understanding.” It 
resulted in the adoption of a timetable for the semi-annual liberalization of the tariffs of the 
two countries [Brazil and Argentina] and the progressive reduction of the exception lists to 
the general scheme of liberalization. In addition, it created sub-groups dedicated to the 
harmonization of instruments for macroeconomic policies. The telex also referred to 
agreements reached regarding the incorporation of Uruguay and Paraguay to the common 
market project:  
There was coincidence of interest in preserving the treaty of economic integration, 
thus recommending the formalization of a new legal instrument to accommodate the 
insertion of Uruguay and Paraguay to the project of common market. Both 
delegations [Uruguay and Paraguay] reiterated a disposition of not contemplating 
differential treatment in the process of formation of the common market (except 
maybe the deferment of the time for the application of common regime). They 
emphasized the need to harmonize policies, especially, the clause of origin 
adjustments that discipline the inflow of products from third countries […] It was 
even admitted that until the formalization of the legal instruments to incorporate 
Uruguay and Paraguay, those countries participate, as observers, in the meetings of 
the CMG. 
 
The Agreement of` Economic Complementation (ACE) No. 14 
 
As the official participation of Uruguay and Paraguay was being negotiated, Brazil 
and Argentina continued making progress in their bilateral project separately. In December 
1990, the governments of both countries subscribed the Agreement of` Economic 
Complementation No. 14
196
 (ACE-14) in order to implement the objectives and deadlines 
established by the Buenos Aires Act under the legal framework of the Latin American 
Integration Association.
197
 The ACE-14 essentially consisted of a schedule of progressive 
                                                             
195
 Confidential telex no. 1341, September 5, 1990; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese. 
196
 According to Article 11 of the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, ACE’s had the objective of promoting 
the optimal employment of factors of production and stimulate economic complementation (TM80 
1991).  
197
 The rationale was that under LAIA, no member country of GATT could request access to the same 
terms and conditions that the two countries had agreed upon (Marques 2008). 
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trade liberalization,
198
 linear and automatic, benefiting the importation of products included 
in the tariff universe of the agreement to be achieved by December 31, 1994. In addition, the 
ACE-14 incorporated the 24 protocols that were part of the 1988 TICD, and established that  
with the objective of making viable the achievement of the liberalization schedule 
[…] as well as the definitive establishment of the Common Market, both countries 
will harmonize their macroeconomic policies as referred to in the Treaty of 
Integration, Cooperation and Development beginning with those connected with the 
flows of trade and the configuration of the industrial sector of both countries (Art. 
10).  
  
In this manner, the Act of Buenos Aires signed in July 1990 together with the ACE-14 signed 
in December of that year, constituted the necessary instruments to carry forward the 
economic integration of Brazil and Argentina. The formal inclusion of Uruguay and Paraguay 
to the project of creating a common market took place later through a new quadripartite 
agreement. The Common Market Group, now also including representatives from Uruguay 
and Paraguay, was charged with the responsibility of completing the necessary preparation 
for that event. To that effect, the CMG met several times between September 1990 and 
February 1991 (Vaz 2002). 
The Asunción Treaty 
The Presidents of the four countries finally met in Asunción, Paraguay, and signed the 
Treaty constituting Mercosur on March 26, 1991. The Treaty did not introduce any novelty in 
the terms and conditions of the integration process that had already been developed by Brazil 
and Argentina and had been stipulated in the Act of Buenos Aires and the ACE-14.   Its first 
article declared the decision “to constitute a Common Market that should be established by 
December 31, 1994,” defining the common market as one that included:  
[t]he free circulation of goods, services and factors of production among the countries 
[…] The establishment of an external common tariff and the adoption of a common 
trade policy in relation to third States or group of States and the coordination of 
positions in regional and international commercial-economic jurisdictions. The 
                                                             
198 It refers to “preferences” (preferências) or percentage reductions of “the most favorable tariffs 
applied to imports from third countries not members of ALADI (LAIA),” and other terms agreed 
upon for the importation of products originating from the countries signatories (ACE14 2012).  
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coordination of macroeconomic and sectorial policies between the State parties… 
(RPEB68 1991a, 34; translated from Portuguese). 
   
Article 5 established a transition period running from the date of the Treaty’s signature until 
the end of 1994, during which the program of trade liberalization would be implemented in 
order “to arrive at December 31, 1994 with zero tariff, without non-tariff restrictions, over the 
universe of goods negotiated” (RPEB68 1991a, 35). Although the Treaty established that 
during that period the main instruments for the achievement of a common market would also 
be the coordination of macroeconomic policies and the agreement on a common external 
tariff, it did not determine specific deadlines for their accomplishment. Thus, the Asunción 
Treaty can be considered  
…essentially a framework agreement, it does not have other categorical provisions, 
beyond those contained in its Annexes […] It does not, for example, stipulate 
deadlines for the implementation of a common market in the cabal sense of the term.  
That is, in the same manner that a framework agreement, it makes a series of 
declarations of intentions, but what itself defines strictly speaking […] is the deadline 
for the constitution of the free-trade-zone between the four countries, anticipated to 
be reached by December 31, 1994. […] and it is for that reason that it [the Asunción 
Treaty] could be negotiated so rapidly, because it does not go into details (Marques 
2008, 84-85; translated from Portuguese). 
 
President Collor offered his perspective on the creation of Mercosur during the ceremony of 
the Treaty’s signature. The message stressed an argument that he had made from the 
beginning of his mandate, that is, that economic integration in the Southern Cone was a 
necessary instrument for a beneficial insertion in the world economy and thus, for the 
achievement of modernization: 
We are not launching today a rhetorical and decorative piece of work in the history of 
the Southern Cone […] We knew that in an international conjuncture in so many 
aspects adverse due to the extemporaneous resurgence of trade barriers, protectionist 
practices and discriminatory measures in the North-South sense, the most 
recommendable alternative was the completion of what here, in the Paraguayan 
capital, we are creating to the surprise of the pessimists but for the greatness and 
prosperity of our countries. We knew that in a world made gigantic by the 
transnationalization of the economic and financial relations, and at the same time 
seduced by the impulse of gathering in mega blocs the influential post-industrial 
centers, there was no option to modernity. We started to write our own modernity by 
creating a Common Market that by strengthening our productive capacity on the basis 
of complementing our economies, it does not cut us off from the outside. On the 
contrary, it blesses our sub-regional mechanism the certainty that together we open up 
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enriched to establish partnerships with third parties, to capital flows, to technological 
innovation, in sum, to the vigor of the most promissory forces of the international 
scenario (RPEB68 1991a, 32; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese).  
 
The message reflected Collor’s conviction that a scheme like Mercosur was the only way to 
achieve what he had been advocating since his presidential campaign, that is, to integrate 
Brazil with the advanced economies of the First World. This belief seemed to have been 
strengthened as the stagnant status of the ongoing multilateral negotiations within the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT revealed to him how difficult it was for Brazil to reach 
satisfactory agreements with developed countries even after his government had evidenced a 
commitment to open up and integrate the country to the world economy through a sweeping 
program of unilateral economic liberalization.    
The Rose Garden Agreement 
In June 1991, Collor travelled to the United States on occasion of the formalization of 
the so-called Accord Four-Plus-One, also known as the Rose Garden Agreement, between the 
countries members of the Mercosur and the United States. The agreement resulted from the 
political process to structure a united response to President Bush’s Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI) that Brazil had encouraged. The main outcome of the agreement 
was the creation of an intergovernmental Trade and Investment Consultative Council to 
discuss trade barriers and forms to reduce them, but it did not establish any deadlines to that 
effect.
199
    
The Brazilian President expected that the event could provide an opportunity for him 
to meet again with President Bush in order to obtain some tangible progress in the bilateral 
relationship. During a press conference in Brasília the day before his trip, he had said that he 
expected results in the areas of trade, external debt, transfer of technology, and the 
                                                             
199
 In practice, this scheme would remain mostly “dormant” until after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001, when ministers from the Mercosur countries agreed to reinvigorate the so-called Four-Plus-One 
mechanism in order to strengthen trade ties between the Mercosur region and the United States 
(FourPlusOneAccord 2001). 
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preservation of the environment, stressing however, that “Brazil does not ask for help, Brazil 
asks for a reciprocal treatment.” He seemed more moderate in his expectations this time, as if 
more aware of the difficulties that this goal entailed:   
Let’s see if with this trip people gain in objectivity regarding our relationship with the 
United States, somewhat leaving  the romantic and amateurish phase of our relations 
and entering a more professional, more pragmatic phase that reverberates rapidly in 
terms of reciprocal advantages for our countries (Folha de São Paulo 1991b; 
translated from Portuguese). 
    
The day of his arrival, Collor spoke at the official reception offered by President Bush, 
remarking from the start that “[t]he relations with the United States are a priority for Brazil,” 
and underlining the sincere efforts of his administration to eliminate trade frictions between 
the two nations. The Brazilian President also hailed the EAI, appealed to President Bush to 
“close the chapter of trade disputes and the problems of the debt that belong to the past […] 
to join our efforts to expand bilateral trade, technological cooperation and new credits and 
investment flows,” and called for the formation of a new partnership between the two 
countries (RPEB68 1991b, 165; translated from Portuguese). Yet, despite his efforts and 
President Bush’s warm welcome, Collor’s visit did not make any significant inroads in the 
bilateral relationship (F. Rodrigues 1991).   
In this manner, the disappointing experience with the United States was another 
confirmation that the actual behavior of the leading developed economies of the world did not 
live up to Collor’s expectations. They did not seem willing to engage Brazil in a preferential 
economic relationship simply in exchange for his efforts to change Brazil into a modern open 
economy that had abandoned its Third World rhetoric and its traditional defensive foreign 
economic policy. This reality was likely to give ammunition to those in Brazil who opposed 
his liberal views and policies. Collor referred to this opposition during a speech at the 
Washington Exchange of the Brookings Institution while visiting the U.S. in June 1991: 
We come from decades along which the idea of development was associated with the 
search of autarkic roads of progress that led to a lesser density in economic relations 
with the exterior. That perception was deeply crystalized among us, and still there are 
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sectors that do not understand that progress is more associated each time to an intense 
and diversified insertion in the international environment. I had confronted, and 
continue having to confront, now in a lesser scale, the resistance of two basic types of 
distorted vision of the concept of national development: first, the one that insists in 
seeing the international environment as necessarily hostile and dangerous; second, the 
one that resorts to the argument of national interests to reclaim protection and subsidy 
for the inefficiency in the productive area […] If before the dictum was self-
sufficiency, today the motto is ‘greater integration’ (cited in Flores 2005, 59; 
translated from Portuguese).  
 
Collor’s presidency ended prematurely two and a half years after it began. His administration 
had been besieged by continued accusations of corruption in the media and public discourse.  
Eventually, the Brazilian National Congress decided to create a Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry in May 1992 to investigate his government. The Commission found evidence of 
corruption on the part of the president himself. This led to a request for his impeachment in 
the Chamber of Deputies.  Collor resigned his post in December 1992, before the Senate had 
a chance to vote on the impeachment. Vice-President Itamar Franco assumed office as 
interim president at the beginning of the impeachment process on October 2, 1992, and upon 
Collor’s resignation he became president of Brazil until January 1995. 
Mercosur after President Collor 
Even though the creation of Mercosur resulted in a significant increase in intra-
regional trade, by the end of 1994 the process of integration anticipated by the Treaty of 
Asunción had not progressed to the point of being able to establish a common market.  
Instead, what emerged by the end of the four-year period was an imperfect free-trade zone 
among the four Southern Cone economies. In August 1994 the presidents of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay decided that Mercosur would be a customs union via the 
establishment of a common external tariff (CET). According to Rubens Barbosa:
200
 
 The Treaty of Asunción signed in 1991 foresaw the establishment of a common 
market among the four member-countries in an unrealistic period of time. On the road 
to the formation of the common market it was foreseen the creation of a customs 
union, which was realized in 1994. There was an initial ambition in the four countries 
that was unrealistic. The governments sought to accomplish what it was established in 
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 Response to a questionnaire by author, Rio de Janeiro, June 26, 2010; translated from Portuguese. 
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the Treaty without taking into account the difficulties that they would confront to 
achieve even a customs union. 
 
In practice, the customs union scheme largely favored Brazil’s interests. In this regard, 
Gregory and Gonçalves
201
 note that  
The Customs Union was chosen because it strengthened the industry of Brazil 
guaranteeing a good margin of preference of Brazilian products in the markets of the 
other countries. The Brazilian private sector started to export more taking advantage 
of the opening of those markets. 
 
Moreover, the ECT negotiated by the four countries in 1994 largely reproduced the tariff 
profile of Brazil (Veiga and Rios 2007). Thus, the decision to transform Mercosur in a 
customs union mainly reflected the interests of the Brazilian business sector and the 
preferences of Brazil’s foreign economic policymakers, which were ultimately motivated by 
the urge to preserve markets and to consolidate Brazil’s bargaining position to negotiate with 
developed nations. In this sense, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay acted mainly as “regime 
takers” that accepted Brazil’s lead in the design of the institutional arrangement or model of 
integration and the definition of the external common tariff for the bloc (Veiga and Rios 
2007). 
Finally, in December 1994, the four member countries signed the Ouro Preto Protocol 
(OPP), which granted Mercosur legal international personality and further defined its 
institutional structure. The OPP continued the design pattern established by the Treaty of 
Asunción that created Mercosur, which emphasized intergovernmental decision-making 
based on consensus rather than a rules-based approach reliant on a detailed contractual 
agreement such as the one adopted by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
In this manner, the institutional model of Mercosur was characterized by a high level of 
flexibility and adaptability that facilitated continuous bargaining among the parties (Bouzas 
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 Joint response to a questionnaire by author, Rio de Janeiro, December 23, 2010; translated from 
Portuguese.  Denise Gregory is Diretora Executiva of CEBRI - Centro Brasileiro de Relações 
Internacionais, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  José Botafogo Gonçalves is Presidente of CEBRI and 
Diplomat, former Minister of Industry and Commerce, former Ambassador Extraordinary for 
Mercosur Affairs, former Ambassador to Argentina. 
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and Soltz 2001).   
Group Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Politics 
Collor introduced sweeping changes in the administrative organization of the 
Presidency in an attempt to facilitate the implementation of his liberal strategy for the 
economic modernization of the country. The main goal of this reorganization was to 
dismantle the decades-old system of protection and inducements by eliminating bureaucratic 
strongholds traditionally aligned with developmentalist strategy and policies that could 
impede or delay his program of economic liberalization (Villela 2000; Fernandes 2010).   
Changes in the Institutional Structure of Foreign Economic Policymaking 
Given the political priority assigned to opening up and integrating into to the world 
economy, it is not surprising that the changes implemented centered on the traditional 
institutional framework dedicated to foreign economic policy. The main outcome of this 
institutional remake was a redistribution of decisional power in favor of those actors aligned 
with the liberal agenda of the President.    
The most important measure in this administrative reform that affected the structure 
devoted to foreign economic policy was the centralization of economic policymaking through 
the merging of three ministries, Finance, Planning, and Industry and Commerce into one all-
embracing Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning (MEFP
202
). The MEFP became the 
central governmental organ responsible for the design and implementation of Collor’s 
economic policies, including industrial development, foreign trade and international 
economic and financial negotiations (Law 8028 1990).     
The restructuring included the elimination of the Foreign Trade Desk (CACEX) and 
the Customs Policy Commission (CPA). Their functions were transferred to a new 
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 Portuguese acronym for Ministério da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento. 
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Department of Foreign Trade (DECEX
203
) as mere technical coordinating offices.
204
DECEX 
was in turn subordinated to the National Secretariat of Economy (SNE
205
) within the MEFP.  
In this manner, Collor removed or neutralized the long-standing influence of a previously 
powerful developmentalist bureaucracy that enjoyed enormous autonomy in foreign 
economic policymaking (Fernandes 2010).   
The structural subordination of the foreign economic policymaking apparatus to one 
powerful MEFP which centralized economic decision-making in the hands of one minister 
reflected the intention of the Collor government to align Brazil’s trade policy with the goals 
of its domestic economic program to control inflation and achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization.
206
 The rationale was that trade liberalization would promote greater competition 
from foreign producers in the domestic market thus encouraging Brazilian entrepreneurs to 
lower their prices and to modernize their productive structures in order to become more 
productive and competitive (Villela 2000).  
Collor and the Ministry of External Relations  
The sweep of the institutional reorganization of the Presidency and the consequent 
change in the established distribution of power among ministries and bureaucratic agencies 
affected the scope of institutional influence that the Foreign Ministry had in the old structure 
of foreign economic policymaking. The centralization of decisional power in the MEFP had 
also resulted in the termination of the CONCEX where Itamaraty had important 
responsibilities. Moreover, the description of the Foreign Ministry’s areas of responsibility in 
the law that instituted Collor’s reorganization of the Presidency included a somewhat 
ambiguous reference to “participation in trade, economic, technical and cultural negotiations 
                                                             
203
 Portuguese acronym for Departamento de Comércio Exterior. 
204
 The CACEX became the Technical Coordinating Office for Trade (CTIC), and the CPA was 
converted into the Technical Coordinating Office for Tariffs (CTT) (Fernandes 2010). 
205 Portuguese acronym for Secretaria Nacional de Economia.  
206
 Collor’s economic strategy was implemented through two successive stabilization plans, Collor 
Plan I and Collor Plan II, and the Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy (PICE) (Villela 2000). 
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with foreign countries and entities,”207 which appeared to reduce the traditional leading role 
played the diplomatic bureaucracy in international trade negotiations (Law 8028 1990).   
As a result, Collor’s administrative reform aroused concerns in Itamaraty that its 
institutional role in the new government was being eroded in favor of the new all-powerful 
Ministry of Economy. Amorim (2003) offers a view of that reaction:  
What I can say is that at that time I was in the Cultural Department of Itamaraty […] I 
transferred to the Economic Department with Minister Rezek.
208
 And the main 
preoccupation during the first days, and later when I was in the Economic 
Department, that took about a month, more or less, was above all to guarantee the 
competences of Itamaraty. Because in those first decree-laws
209
or some provisory 
measure, some competences were transferred to the Economy Ministry […] like 
foreign trade negotiations that always was an area of competence of Itamaraty […] 
The writing was a little ambiguous but it gave a predominant competence to the 
Ministry of Economy. Thus, our concern was above all to guarantee the continuity of 
Itamaraty’s competence, which was achieved (cited in Fernandes 2010, 67; also 
referenced in Mello 2000).   
 
Itamaraty’s concerns seemed justified given that Collor had not shown early signs of relying 
on the advice of the diplomatic bureaucracy to configure his foreign policy vision. Thus, for 
example, according to Amorim (2003) the Foreign Office had little participation in the 
elaboration of the foreign affairs section of his inaugural speech in March 1990:  
I imagine that he [Collor] had had some diplomatic advice but it had not been a 
formal advice from Itamaraty. I, personally, did not participate in anything, so all 
those measures occurred with great surprise, some of them more because of the 
extent, perhaps, than because of the manner in which they were supported, approved 
[…] In the speech, it’s possible that he had had the collaboration of some diplomat, 
but to my knowledge there was not any institutional participation properly from 
Itamaraty. More so because I realize that the selection of the Minister of Exterior was 
made close [in time] to the taking of office,
210
 and I don’t think that there was a team 
properly formed” (2003, 3). 
 
On the other hand, Collor recognized the prestige of Itamaraty as a diplomatic institution and  
                                                             
207
 In contrast, the presidential decree no. 94327 of May 13, 1987 established more unequivocally that 
the Ministry of Foreign Relations had “in its area of competence” trade, economic, financial, technical 
and cultural negotiations with foreign countries and entities (Decree 94327 1987).  
208
 Francisco Rezek was Minister of External Relations in the Collor administration from March 1990 
to April 1992.  
209
 President Collor introduced most of his reforms via Presidential decrees or provisional measures 
(Fernandes 2010). 
210 At the time, the press circulated the rumor that the preferred candidate for heading the Foreign 
Ministry was Fernando Henrique Cardoso for whose answer Collor reportedly waited until 15 days 
before the inaugural ceremony (Velasco e Cruz 2004).     
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frequently mentioned its efficiency. Additionally, various diplomats were appointed to other 
ministries and to advise the Presidency (Mello 2000). Thus, for example, Marcos Coimbra, a 
career diplomat and former ambassador to Greece, who was also Collor’s brother-in-law, was 
a close advisor during the electoral campaign and became Secretary-General of the 
Presidency (Folha de São Paulo 1990a).   
Itamaraty’s Internal Fissures  
The interrelated effect of two main factors seems to better explain Itamaraty’s relative 
fall from grace vis-à-vis the new MEFP within the Collor administration. One is that foreign 
economic policy, a critical component of the new strategy adopted by Collor to modernize 
Brazil, had to be consistently aligned with, and hence subordinated to, the President’s 
domestic stabilization plan and industrial policy. Thus, in Collor’s view, it made sense to 
place the main responsibility for foreign economic affairs, including international 
negotiations, under the jurisdiction of the MEFP, which under the authority of Zélia Maria 
Cardoso de Mello was solidly unified behind the President’s plan and readily committed to its 
application.   
The other factor was the emergence of diverging orientations within the Foreign Ministry that 
competed for the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy (Velasco e Cruz 2004; Castelan 2009; 
Saraiva 2010; Casarões 2012). An analysis published in Folha de São Paulo on February 17, 
1991 reported that Itamaraty was divided in three main internal currents.  One of them 
proposed a closer relationship with advanced developed economies of the so-called First 
World. Another argued that Brazil had to continue its main alignment with Third-World 
countries. The third internal faction defended a commercial pragmatic approach to foreign 
policy
212
 (Ferreira and Mossri 1991). 
                                                             
212 The analysis seemed to reflect the opinion of Professor Luiz Pedone, Director of the Political 
Science and International Relations Department of the University of Brasília, who was interviewed 
for the piece. The article also identified Minister Razek as a leading advocate of a closer relationship 
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These internal disagreements appeared to undermine the institutional capacity of 
Itamaraty to be at the forefront of a coherent foreign economic policy that was consistently 
aligned with the President’s preferences, and thus placed it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
MEFP. This issue was particularly relevant for a President that demanded allegiance to his 
authority and undivided agreement with his vision.
214
 In the end, Collor’s approach toward 
Itamaraty was not to marginalize it from the foreign policy decision-making process but to 
buttress the internal sector of the diplomatic bureaucracy that was aligned with his liberal 
strategy of opening up and competitive integration to the world economy (Velasco e Cruz 
2004). 
A Pro-Mercosur Coalition 
Yet, despite the dispute over spheres of influence between the MEFP and Itamaraty 
and the resistance of developmentalist sectors within the Foreign Ministry to Collor’s liberal 
policies, there was an issue around which all seemed to find a common ground: the project of 
bilateral integration with Argentina. National-developmentalists that criticized the President 
for his attempt to associate Brazil closely with the developed First World could not disagree 
with him in his commitment to continue the integration process initiated by Sarney.
215
 In this 
manner, the liberal-developmentalist coalition that coalesced around the integration project 
with Argentina during the Sarney administration was maintained under the government of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
with the First World, Ambassador Ítalo Zappa as an exponent of the current favoring alignment with 
the Third-World, and Ambassador Paulo de Tarso Flecha de Lima as the main representative of 
commercial pragmatism. Saraiva (2010) offers a similar characterization.  For her, the liberal wing 
(i.e., pro-First World) within Itamaraty was never more than a minority group that gained strength 
through the support of President Collor. The other two factions, which she identifies respectively as 
pragmatic institutionalist (i.e., commercial pragmatist) and autonomist (i.e., pro-Third World), proved 
to be more resilient and remained relevant after Collor’s political demise. The first one acquired more 
prominence during the era of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). The other became 
predominant during the Presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010).   
214
 As noted by Folha de São Paulo (1990c) on commenting about the President’s cabinet: “Fidelity to 
President Fernando Collor was the principal standard in the formation of the new cabinet. More than 
technical or political questions, what made a difference was the commitment of the chosen candidates 
to follow the line of the President.”  
215
 That is the case, for example, of Paulo Nogueira Batista (1993). 
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President Collor (Saraiva and Briceño Ruiz 2009).   
The Role of Itamaraty in the Creation of Mercosur 
Political convergence around economic integration in the Southern Cone facilitated 
the necessary conditions for the Foreign Ministry’s prominent role in the creation of 
Mercosur vis-à-vis other governmental offices, particularly the all-powerful MEFP. Despite 
any misgivings that Collor may have had toward Itamaraty’s political allegiance, it was fairly 
clear that the diplomatic bureaucracy was largely unified in its commitment to regional 
integration despite divergences regarding the accelerated timetable that the President wanted 
to impose on the Project.
216
  
Moreover, Itamaraty had been instrumental in its development during the previous 
administration. Therefore, when on March 16, 1990, Collor joined his Argentine counterpart 
to formalize the Commission for the Execution of the 1988 Treaty of Integration, 
Cooperation and Development, he allowed the Foreign Ministry to maintain its important 
coordinating role in that Commission.
217
    
Something similar occurred on July 6, 1990, when the Presidents of Brazil and 
Argentina signed the Buenos Aires Act to create a common market between the two 
countries. The Act established the creation of a Bi-national Working Group, also known as 
the Common Market Group (CMG), which was in charge of elaborating and proposing all the 
necessary measures to accomplish the main objective of the Act by December 31, 1994. The 
CMG was subordinated to the Commission for the Execution of the 1988 Treaty, and was 
integrated by four representatives per each country.  In the case of Brazil, this four-member 
team included envoys from the Foreign Ministry, the MEFP (Department of Foreign Trade 
and Department of Industry and Commerce), and the Central Bank. Yet, the Act established 
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 Batista (1993) critically noted that “The ex-President would make a mistake therefore in the 
deadlines and in the objectives for the constitution of Mercosur…” (1993, 110).  
217 The members of the Brazilian team in the Commission were: Zélia Cardoso de Mello (Economy), 
Ozires Silva (Infrastructure), Francisco Rezek (Itamaraty), and Joaquim Roriz (Agriculture) (Folha de 
São Paulo 1990d). 
 249 
 
that representatives from the Foreign Ministries of both countries would preside over the 
CMG meetings (RPEB66 1990b).    
For Amorim (2003), Itamaraty played a key role in ensuring that the process of 
economic and trade liberalization initiated by Collor was used as an opportunity to deepen 
regional integration. Also, according to his view, the diplomatic bureaucracy played a 
moderating role in the instrumentation of Collor’s liberal policies, including the process of 
economic integration that led to Mercosur:  
Itamaraty, by vocation, is a negotiating organ, and there was the risk, the possibility 
let’s say, that other organs, viewing it more from the point of view of domestic 
politics, said: ‘Well, this is good for us, isn’t it? Let’s do it at once and quickly.’ And 
so they would lose the chance to negotiate (2003, 4). 
 
Despite the sweeping changes that Collor introduced in the administrative organization of the 
Presidency, which resulted in a new decision-making structure dedicated to foreign economic 
policy that appeared to sideline the traditional role of the Foreign Ministry in favor of an all-
powerful Ministry of Economy, the diplomatic bureaucracy largely preserved a leading role 
in the formation of Mercosur.   
National Politics 
Business Sector 
The advent of the Collor administration, despite the business-friendly tone of his 
liberal agenda, did not change the fundamental relation between the state and the business 
sector in the decision-making process of the integration project. Collor distanced himself 
from representative business organizations that he painted as part of the corporatist legacy.
218
  
He was critical of traditional business organizations, viewing them as custodians of a pattern 
of industrialization characterized by low efficiency and low competitiveness and thus 
impediments to his modernization program (Diniz 2001).    
                                                             
218
 “Collor rejected a campaign endorsement from FIESP before his election and afterward called 
FIESP one of the most retrograde institutions in Brazil” (Schneider 2001, 176). 
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Yet, despite the political rhetoric, Collor’s ideas to transform Brazil resonated with 
the business community.  His program of liberal reforms thus found broad political support 
from the private sector (Kingstone 1999). According to Sallum (2011),  
… both the changes in foreign policy, especially the construction of Mercosur, and 
the policies of economic liberalization (for example, trade and financial liberalization 
and privatizations) had substantial support from business (2011, 278). 
  
According to Schneider (2001), Brazil’s participation in the new accelerated program of 
integration that culminated in the Asunción Treaty was decided without any significant input 
from business. The Buenos Aires Act, signed by both Presidents in July 1990, did not make 
any provisions for the formal participation of the business sector in the Common Market 
Group that was in charge of proposing measures to advance in the formation of a common 
market (RPEB66 1990b).     
By then however, the reluctance and/or indifference that Brazilian business  
entrepreneurs had expressed at the inception of the program of integration with Argentina in 
1986 had greatly dissipated. According to Marques (2008),  
The reaction [resistance to integration] changed when the economic agents realized 
that the liberalization implemented by the two governments [Brazil and Argentina] 
was selective and gradual and that it did not have the devastating effect that they 
anticipated or feared. On the contrary, it generated very interesting business deals for 
the entrepreneurs (2008, 37). 
     
Moreover, the initial adverse attitude became one of support once industrialists recognized 
that integration resulted in increasing gains rather than losses: 
…the initial negative reaction was rapidly transformed into pressure from the capital 
goods sectors of both countries on the governments to expand the list of common 
goods that enjoyed a zero tariff in the exchange, after they corroborated that the 
agreement [the 1986 PICE] generated greater level of trade between the countries” 
(2008, 38). 
 
A similar effect was perceived in other business sectors such as food production where the 
corresponding bilateral protocol had created fears among Brazilian producers in the southern 
states that it would ruin them. According to Marques (2008), “[n]othing like that occurred.  
On the contrary, the coexistence with imports was very good, generating a climate 
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 indispensable for the negotiation of the Asunción Treaty that created Mercosur” (2008, 38). 
Despite the relative weakness of business as a collective actor noted in the previous 
chapter, this sector played an important role in shaping Brazil’s preference to transform 
Mercosur into a customs union. According to Marques (2008), this decision was made:  
Not because the textbooks on integration said that it should be that way, but for a 
much simpler reason: the Brazilian business sector systematically visited the 
government to say that there existed –and this is true- different conditions of 
production within each of the four economies. Why? Because you have different 
external financing agreements and conditions to access credits. The tariff burden is 
different in each of the four economies. Economic agents in each of them produced 
with important operational differences to the point of generating sensible distortions 
in matters of market competition. In that context, they [the business sector] insisted 
that we should at least try to correct one of them –which they saw as being one of the 
most important – that was the external tariff. Why?  Because let’s say that a textile 
producer in Brazil had to compete with an Argentine textile producer. Not having an 
external common tariff, besides all the other differences in terms of credit, internal 
fiscal burden, etc., the Argentine competitor could import a capital good with zero 
tariff […] and would thus be able to produce a much cheaper supply of clothing and 
throw, by cause of the free-trade zone (FTZ), the final good in the Brazilian market 
with zero tariff. Thus, what did the private sector demand? That at the same time that 
a FTZ was established, a common external tariff was also defined so as to avoid that 
those differentiated tariffs could reflect themselves in artificially induced 
competitiveness by the other economies, playing later their products in the Brazilian 
market […] this is today the principal instrument for equilibrium of conditions within 
that market… (2008, 97; translated from Portuguese; emphasis added). 
 
It is important to note here that in contrast with the case of the Mexico-U.S. Business 
Committee (MEXUS), which played a pivotal role in lobbying for a free trade agreement 
between Mexico and the United States, I have found no evidence that the Brazil-U.S. 
Business Council (BUSBC), a similar bi-organization interested in the growth of the 
economic and commercial relationship between the two countries, promoted the idea of a 
Brazil-U.S. free trade agreement at that time. The apparent lack of such lobbying effort is 
somewhat puzzling given the relative importance of the United States as a trade partner of 
Brazil and President Collor’s interest in promoting Brazil’s integration with advanced 
industrialized economies. 
Labor Unions  
 
At the time Collor became President in March 1990, two main peak labor unions  
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competed to organize and represent the interests of the Brazilian working class: the Central 
Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT) and the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT). The 
previous chapter sketched the processes from which these two organizations emerged in the 
early 1980s. They differed greatly in their approaches to the organization of the working class 
and in their political views. Yet, they tended to converge in their critical support of Mercosur.   
The CUT was politically aligned with the Workers’ Party, upheld the principle of 
“free trade unionism” as stipulated by the International Labor Organization, and promoted a 
“unionism of contestation” based on the idea that workers can only advance their interests 
through struggle and confrontation. In contrast, the CGT tended to be politically aligned with 
the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), it advocated the notion of trade 
union unicity, that is, mandatory representation by a single, legally recognized union, 
defended the validity of the corporatist labor laws originated by the Vargas regime, and was 
less confrontational that the CUT.  
Despite their differences, in 1986 the CUT and the CGT joined other top labor 
organizations from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay
219
 to launch the 
Southern Cone Trade Union Central Coordinator (CCSCS
220
) under the combined 
sponsorship of the Inter-American Confederation of Free Labor Unions (CIOSL) and its sub-
regional unit, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT). The main 
objective of the CCSCS was to configure a joint effort to confront the challenges of the 
dictatorships still ruling in Chile and Paraguay as well as the consolidation of the 
democratization processes under way in the other countries (CCSCS 1986).   
The CCSCS’s foundational act included a paragraph dedicated to the process of Latin 
American integration:   
                                                             
219
 Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) de Argentina, Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), 
Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) and Confederación de Trabajadores (CDT) de Chile, 
Movimiento Intersindical de Trabajadores (MIT) de Paraguay, and  Plenario Intersindical de 
Trabajadores - Convención Nacional Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) de Uruguay. 
220
 Spanish acronym for Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur.   
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In these terms, the need of a Latin American integration that favors a national and 
interdependent development combines with the winds of democratic renovation at the 
political and trade union levels. It shows the importance for the labor movement of 
having higher instances for the exchange of experiences, the aggregation of common 
demands, the elaboration of platforms oriented toward guaranteeing a democratic 
development, as well as to allow the integration of new experiences open to the new 
challenges that presents the international economic order (CCSCS 1986; translated 
from Spanish). 
 
Yet, there is no available evidence that the CCSCS engaged in any serious debate about the 
implications of the integration program for the labor movement or issued any kind of public 
stance on the subject on occasion of the launching of the 1986 Program of Economic 
Integration and Cooperation (PICE), or in the immediate aftermath of the signature of the 
1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (TICD) (Almeida Magalhaes 
2000).   
By the end of 1990 however, the CCSCS decided that labor unions should have an 
active role in the undergoing economic and social integration of the Southern Cone, and it 
began to present proposals for Mercosur by the time the Asunción Treaty was signed in 
March 1991
221
 (CCSCS 1986). In December 1991, at a plenary meeting in Foz do Iguaçu, 
Brazil, the CCSCS approved a document on the integration process that included a proposal 
for the creation of an Employment and Labor Relations Subgroup within the Mercosur 
institutional structure. It was a reaction on the part of the top labor unions to the fact that the 
Asunción Treaty did not establish any specific quadripartite working group to deal with labor 
issues.
222
    
The CCSCS’s document was critical of Mercosur. It pointed to the project’s 
unrealistic deadlines for the achievement of the common market, the lack of concern for labor 
and social issues and its almost exclusive commercial emphasis that neglected the appropriate 
                                                             
221
 Yet, the organization’s website does not offer any specific evidence of the mentioned proposals. 
222
 El Mercosur definió una serie de organismos cuadripartitos para adoptar decisiones. Entre éstos 
diez subgrupos de trabajo se incluyen los temas centrales: política industrial y tecnología, agrícola, 
energética, asuntos comerciales, políticas macroeconómicas, etc. En estos subgrupos se autoriza la 
presencia de representantes del sector privado, es decir empresarios y trabajadores, aunque sólo como 
oyentes: no pueden dar opiniones, ni participar en las decisiones (Rodríguez 1993). 
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consideration of issues related to the industrial sector (Rodríguez 1993; Dirié 1993). Among 
other considerations, the document noted that  
…the commitment of organized labor with integration exists under the condition that 
it is real in the sense of guaranteeing social, political and cultural protection and that 
the transformation of the productive structure is not developed in detriment of the 
workers and the whole of the popular sectors (cited in Dirié 1993; translated from 
Spanish). 
 
Notwithstanding their criticisms, the top union organizations demanded participation in the 
decision-making process of Mercosur (Rodríguez 1993). 
The CCSCS’s proposal to create a labor-related working subgroup within Mercosur 
was eventually approved, and in May 1992 a Work Subgroup (SGT
223
) was officially 
established.  It is today part of the institutional framework of Mercosur as SGT-10
224
 for 
Labor Affairs, Employment and Social Security (CCSCS 1986).  
The breakdown of the political consensus that had sustained the governing coalition 
toward the end of the Sarney administration, the subsequent advent of the Collor presidency 
and his program of economic liberalization, as well as the change in the conception of 
integration process from one typified by gradual sectorial complementation toward another 
one characterized by rapid and automatic liberalization introduced a new dynamic within the 
labor movement. The contradictions among the extremely diverse labor forces coexisting 
inside the CGT, which in 1988 changed its name from Central Geral dos Trabalhadores 
(Workers’ General Central) to Confederação Geral do Trabalho (General Confederation of 
Labor), deepened, thus leading to successive splits.   
One of them occurred in September 1989 when the faction led by Joaquim dos Santos 
Andrade (Joaquinzão) convened its own congress and formed a separate Central Geral dos 
                                                             
223
 Portuguese acronym for Sub-Grupo de Trabalho. 
224
 The SGT 10 is composed by governmental, labor and business representatives.  It discusses 
employment policies, labor laws, and the implementation of application of the ILO conventions in 
Mercosur. It also conducts surveys on the evolution of the labor market in Mercosur, and performs 
research on the situation of migrant and frontier workers in Mercosur (MTE 2012).   
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Trabalhadores.
225
 This CGT had no political affinity with the liberal vision of President 
Collor and tended rather to defend the corporatist/nationalist legacy of Varguism. Its policy 
toward Mercosur tended to be critical inasmuch as the liberal conception of the project 
neglected to consider its social implications and disregarded the participation of traditional 
organized labor in the political decision-making process. In this regard, the Central tended to 
coincide more with the CUT (L. Rodrigues 1991; Mariano 2011).   
Another important split within the Confederação Geral do Trabalho took place in 
March 1991 as a group led by Luiz Antônio Luis Antonio Medeiros, head of the Steel 
workers Union of São Paulo, launched a new national top labor organization under the name 
Força Sindical (FS). Medeiros, in alliance with the leader of the Electrical Workers’ Union of 
São Paulo, Antônio Rogério Magri, had begun to promote within the CGT a so-called 
“syndicalism of results,” which in direct challenge to the pro-socialist and PT-linked CUT, 
upheld a pragmatic, non-partisan form of unionism that favored a market economy and gave 
preeminence to negotiations over confrontation with employers (L. Rodrigues 1991). FS 
supported Collor’s economic policies. The fact that Collor chose Magri as the Labor Minister 
of his administration reveals the political affinity that existed between the FS and the 
government. 
In the case of the CUT, its adverse political reaction toward Collor’s policies was not 
surprising, given that it had supported the presidential election of Lula as “the best candidate 
for the working class” and had warned that “Collor did not represent any possibility of 
solution for this crisis that was of interest to the workers” (CUT 1991). Moreover, it had 
denounced the “recessive, anti-democratic and unconstitutional character” of the Plan Collor 
as opposed to the workers’ interests and to the national interests of Brazil (CUT 1991, 2). 
Yet, despite its criticism of Collor’s policies, the CUT eventually turned instead to  
                                                             
225
 Today it is known as the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CGTB) (Brazilian Workers’ 
General Central).  
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what it called “sindicalismo propositivo,” that is, it adopted a more pragmatic approach 
toward the government’s liberal reforms (Sallum 2011). Thus, Jair Meneghelli, president of 
the CUT, called for a new tactic during the plenary session in Belo Horizonte in 
August/September 1990 arguing that “[i]t is necessary to stop saying only no and start to say 
yes, presenting alternative proposals” (cited in Sallum 2011, 281).   
Moreover, starting in 1991 the CUT began to participate in the sectorial chambers that 
were created by the government’s Industrial and Foreign Trade Program (PICE) to define 
policies aimed at restructuring industrial sectors. It represented an advance in terms of labor 
participation in political decisions for domestic economic affairs (Sallum 2011).  
In a similar manner, despite its severe initial criticism of Mercosur as a neoliberal  
integration project that was at odds with workers’ interests, the CUT eventually opted for 
seeking participation in the design of the integration project in cooperation with organized 
labor of other Southern Cone countries: 
[Mercosur] demands responses from organized labor that exceed the national sphere 
of action. The labor union movement cannot situate itself at the margin of the trade 
accords signed by the governments of the region. It is necessary to intervene in that 
process, questioning its global objective and formulating proposals that preserve the 
interests of workers and the populations involved […] The CUT must make efforts in 
the direction of influencing, jointly with the labor movement of the countries of the 
region, in the course of this process of integration (CUT 1991, 10). 
 
Congress  
In the previous chapter I noted that in Brazil one can observe the traditional 
preeminence of the Executive vis-à-vis Congress in the formulation of national policies, 
particularly in the case of foreign policy. In this pattern the Legislative is relegated to a 
reactive role (Kinzo 1997). The government of President Collor continued and expanded the 
supremacy of the Executive power in the elaboration and implementation of foreign 
economic policy as the main decisions regarding trade liberalization were adopted through 
 257 
 
medidas provisórias (provisional measures) and portarias do Executivo
226
 (executive 
administrative rulings). Thus, the opening of the Brazilian economy in the early 1990s was in 
the main carried out without consultation with Congress (Lima and Santos 2001). 
Amorim Neto (2000) describes Collor’s approach to governing via decree-laws as 
follows: 
[A]rticle 62 of the Constitution granted him [President Collor] the power to issue 
legally binding decrees (provisional measures). From the beginning, Collor made 
clear his political strategy: he decided to confront the hyper-inflation crisis in which 
Brazil was immersed since 1987 exclusively through provisional measures. He signed 
no less than 36 decrees during the first fifteen days of his government (and 163 
during the year 1990), and appointed a ministerial cabinet composed by a majority of 
friends and technocrats. Collor governed through provisional measures during all of 
his first year in office and at the start of the second, despite the increasing 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which he engaged with Congress and with the 
general performance of his government (2000, under “CONCLUSÃO”).  
 
In the case of Mercosur there was another important factor that facilitated the 
preeminence of President Collor’s initiative over Congress. It was the mandate that 
the 1988 Constitution established to pursue regional integration in Latin America.  
Such explicit directive was a delegation of power to the Executive by the Legislative 
that in turn reflected a broad strategic consensus among the political elite in that 
regard. 
Therefore, when Collor decided to continue Sarney’s policy concerning bilateral 
integration with Argentina he could assume that the Constitutional mandate gave him 
sufficient power to act without consulting Congress. The subordinated role that Congress 
played in the decision-making process of the policy for Mercosur was reflected in the 
                                                             
226
 “Among the most important trade liberalization measures there are: the provisional measure no. 
158, which revoked all the exemptions and reductions of the import duty and the IPI [federal excise 
tax on industrialized products] on imports; the Economy Ministry’s administrative rule no. 56, which 
revoked the list of suspended imports (or Annex ‘C’ of the CACEX that banned the import of about 
1,300 products); and the provisional measure no. 161 that eliminated special import regimes and 
abolished fiscal and regional incentives. Additionally, in June 1990, with the launching of the General 
Guidelines of the Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy (executive administrative ruling no. 365) it was 
announced a new tariff structure to be gradually established during the following five years, 
foreseeing a modal tariff of 20% in 1994, with the media of 14% and a maximum tax rate of 40%” 
(Lima and Santos 2001, 142).  
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Asunción Treaty signed in 1991. The document included a provision (Article 24) for the 
establishment of a Parliamentary Joint Commission of Mercosur “[w]ith the purpose of 
facilitating the implementation of the Common Market.” It also indicated that “[t]he 
Executive Powers of the State Parties shall maintain their respective Legislative Powers 
informed on the evolution of the Common Market object of this Treaty” (RPEB68 1991a, 37; 
translated from Portuguese). 
Political Parties  
 
During Collor’s Presidency, the influence of political parties on foreign economic 
policy was less likely to occur mainly due to the characteristics of his ascent to power and his 
governing style, which were already addressed in the first section of this chapter. What is 
important to examine here is the peculiar way in which the new president interacted with 
political parties during the period of his administration when the Mercosur project was born.   
In 1990, the political party of President Collor, the Party of National Reconstruction  
(PRN) had only 31 seats in the Chamber of Deputies representing 6.3% of the total, and just 3 
senators (4%). Given the weakness of his party’s position in Congress, under the conditions 
of the Brazilian presidential system one would have expected Collor to seek the support of 
other parties in Congress via political concessions and the offering of cabinet positions 
(Mainwaring 1997).   
Yet, as already noted, the President followed a different path that essentially bypassed 
Congress’ approval and thus isolated him from any support from the political parties holding 
substantial positions of strength in the Legislative, such as the PMDB (26.5% of seats in the 
Chamber and 29.3% in the Senate), the PFL (18.2% and 17.3%), the PSDB or Party of the 
Brazilian Social Democracy
227
 (12.1% and 16%), and the PDT or Democratic Laborist 
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 The PSDB was created in June 1988 mostly by legislators that left the PMDB (Kinzo 1993).  
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Party
228
 (7.7% and 6.7%), and others.
229
 When Collor decided to move ahead with the 
integration project initiated by his predecessor, he did so with little consultation, if any, with 
political parties. Again, Collor counted on the fact that his commitment to regional 
integration was already instituted as a strategic mandate by the 1988 Constitution, and most 
political parties supported it.    
The International System 
International factors had an important influence on the policy of regional integration 
adopted by the government of President Collor, which combined continuity and change. On 
the one hand, it continued the project of regional integration centered in the Southern Cone of 
the Western Hemisphere initiated by the Program of Economic Integration and Cooperation 
(PICE) in 1986. On the other hand, it embraced a new conception that stressed an accelerated 
timetable and generalized linear and automatic tariff reductions instead of the long and 
gradual process of trade liberalization that Brazil and Argentina had established until then 
under the principles of gradualism, flexibility, balance and symmetry.   
Two different sets of international variables affected Brazil’s regional integration 
policy during the Collor administration. One encouraged the continuation of the project 
initiated in the mid-1980s. The other fostered a change in the approach to integration.     
The most important international variables that contributed to the continuation of the 
integration policy initiated by Sarney were 1) the enduring relevance of the Latin American 
Integration Association’s regional market for the industrial development and modernization 
of Brazil, and 2) the positive results derived from the integration experience with Argentina 
since 1986. Collor alluded to the importance of these factors at a press conference on March 
27, 1990: 
                                                             
228
 The PDT was intimately linked with the figure of Leonel Brizola who led it since 1979 (Kinzo 
1993). 
229
 For a full breakdown of party composition of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, see Kinzo 
(1993, 22). 
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The Latin American integration is irreversible because it does not depend on 
circumstantial moments of prosperity or difficulty that countries go through.  What is 
important is the ideal of Latin American integration […] and without a doubt the 
Latin American integration has to start with the Southern Cone, not because the 
Argentine president or the Uruguayan president and the Brazilian president so desire.  
No! It is because facts naturally determine that it must happen: by the links that we 
have, by the commercial ties, by the proximity that we already have, by the trade that 
is already established in a very clear manner between our economies. Thus, 
naturally, integration would begin with the Southern Cone, and that is perfectly 
understood by all the countries of South America and of Latin America as a whole 
[…] It is fundamental that those initiatives do not perish, that those ties that aim 
above all at that integration in a short-term are not loosened. And we count also on the 
decisive participation of ALADI [LAIA], that in these last years is having an 
importance that really must be underlined, so that such integration occurs within the 
smaller space of time (Collor 1990c, 38-39; translated from Portuguese; emphasis 
added).  
   
The systemic forces that encouraged a change in the approach to economic integration were 
essentially two: the rapid emergence of competing economic blocs and the so-called 
“Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” (EAI) launched in June 1990 by President George 
Bush.    
The Impact of New Economic Blocs  
President Collor referred to the emergence of new economic blocs in his inaugural 
speech before Congress in March 1990: 
First of all, it is necessary to register the impressive change in the international 
scenario. The profile of a new Eastern Europe reveals the closing of one phase in the 
history of international relations dominated by the East-West ideological 
confrontation […] new areas are ready to adopt the laws of the market economy, 
respect for human rights and the culture of liberty that are today universal trends.  
Everywhere, monolithic power, dirigiste structures and authoritarian residues are on 
the defensive. In that dynamic scenario, so different from that of only ten years ago, 
large economic spaces tend to emerge. It is not necessarily the case of closed blocs 
but of new economic and political configurations to which the competitive potential 
of each country will have to adjust. In the face of these transformations that 
accelerate the historical time, it is necessary to seek new formulas to insert the 
country in the world (Collor 1990a, 20; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
 
In this manner, the new post-Cold War international scenario changed the conditions for 
Brazil’s participation in the world economy. The seemingly irresistible trend toward 
economic unification under a capitalist mold and liberal economic institutions (Sallum, 2011) 
combined with the formation of competing regional economic alliances pressured 
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policymakers to find new, more competitive ways for integrating Brazil into the world 
markets.   
Collor had also alluded to these new circumstances during a speech addressed to 
graduates from the Rio Branco Institute in May 1990:    
… in the midst of the various and profound changes that in today’s world universalize 
the international relations, we have to seek and protect national solutions […] But it 
is important to equally recognize […] challenges that cannot be underestimated. I 
mention as an example the tendency in favor of the creation of economic mega blocks 
in the Northern Hemisphere that threaten to accentuate the marginalization of Latin 
America and Africa due to their structural economic fragility (RPEB65 1990, 7-9; 
emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
 
One can interpret the new model of bilateral integration first envisioned in the Buenos Aires 
Act of July 1990 as a “national solution” to confront the threat of marginalization posed by 
the “mega blocs,” which in turn facilitated Brazil’s “competitive integration” to the world 
economy in a way that preserved and enhanced its industrial hegemony in South America. 
The U.S.-Backed “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” (EAI) 
President Bush’s EAI contributed to convince President Collor not only of the need to 
accelerate the timetable of the integration project with Argentina but also of the convenience 
to allow other partners to participate in it (i.e., Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay). The EAI , 
announced on June 27, 1990, marked an important shift in the United States policy toward 
Latin America.   
In his remarks introducing the proposal, the U.S. president described it as follows: 
The three pillars of our new initiative are trade, investment, and debt. To expand 
trade, I propose that we begin the process of creating a hemisphere-wide free trade 
zone; to increase investment, that we adopt measures to create a new flow of capital 
into the region; and to further ease the burden of debt, a new approach to debt in the 
region with important benefits for our environment (Bush 1990). 
 
 The EAI had come on the heels of the news in March 1990 that Mexico and the U.S. were 
engaged in negotiations to achieve a free-trade agreement, and it followed the conclusion of a 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988, thus suggesting a new trend in U.S. foreign 
economic policy. It was released shortly before Brazil and Argentina signed the Buenos Aires 
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Act in early July 1990. It was precisely at the time Collor visited Argentina to conclude this 
new agreement that he expressed his reaction to the EAI on July 6, 1990:  
…I could not fail to welcome the important pronouncement made by President 
George Bush last June 27 when he announced a revision of the economic policy of 
the United States in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean. It is a courageous, 
innovative, and comprehensive initiative that is based also on the premise that “each 
country of the region has to make its own options.” The “Enterprise for Americas” is, 
moreover, an acknowledgement that in Latin America there has emerged “a new 
leadership supported by the force of a popular mandate.” The perfect political-
diplomatic understanding that today exists between Brazil and Argentina thus 
receives a constructive stimulus that will allow the two countries to reiterate their 
unity of purposes. President Bush’s proposal opens new horizons for hemispheric 
solidarity that will be more solid as long as the Latin American unity is also 
strengthened. There is not any conflict between these two venues: on the contrary, 
they complement each other in a historical synthesis that should always be more 
harmonic and beneficial for the stability of the American continent (RPEB66 1990a, 
9; emphasis added; translated from Portuguese). 
 
For Collor, the Bush initiative seemed to offer an opening to his expectations of integrating 
Brazil into the so-called “first world” of advanced industrialized economies. At the same 
time, the Brazilian President confirmed his position in favor of a dual strategy when he 
asserted that there was no conflict between the EAI and the process of integration with 
Argentina.     
The U.S. proposal carried a new risk for Brazil because it offered Latin American 
countries, particularly those in the Southern Cone of the hemisphere, an appealing alternative 
to regional integration that objectively competed with the one offered by Brazil.
230
 The  
dilemma that Collor now faced was how to take advantage of the Bush Initiative while 
at the same time avoiding a potential disruption of Brazil’s regional project for Latin America 
that was centered on a close partnership with Argentina.   
The EAI did not take Brazilian policymakers by surprise. Already in early June, 1990, 
Rubens Barbosa, who at the time was the Brazilian Permanent Representative to the Latin 
                                                             
230 For Batista (1993), the Initiative exerted “sufficient attraction by its simple announcement to 
individually attract several Latin American countries and perturb processes of sub-regional 
integration” (1993, 111; translated from Portuguese).   
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American Integration Association in Uruguay, had reported to Itamaraty
231
 on the mounting 
evidence that President Bush may be announcing “concrete measures with the objective of 
reactivating the relationship of the United States with the region [Latin America]” during his 
upcoming trip to five Latin American countries.  Barbosa offered in his memo ample 
evidence in support of that possibility.   
Among the several references cited by the Brazilian ambassador, one provoked a 
comment on his part that revealed a central concern of Brazilian policymakers. It was a recent 
report by Carlos Pauletti, journalist for the Uruguayan newspaper El País, according to which 
the Bush administration was determined to carry out the first complete revision of American 
policy for the region in thirty years, including the possible negotiation of an important 
regional trade agreement to reduce or eliminate trade barriers between the United States and 
Latin America.   
This possibility led Ambassador Barbosa to suggest that it was necessary to analyze  
its impact on the current regional schemes in force, as well as the role that Mexico
232
 
could come to represent as a link between the United States and Latin America, 
particularly as a channel for the entry of industrialized products in competition with 
Brazil.   
 
In other words, the vital issue for Brazil was how to preserve its preeminence in Latin 
American markets as an industrial powerhouse by containing competition from the United 
States and Mexico. The bilateral integration project with Argentina and its potential regional 
projection played a crucial role in this regard.   
The U.S.-sponsored Initiative for the Americas had introduced a new variable in the 
international relations of Latin America that helped to modify Collor’s calculations regarding 
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 Confidential telex no. 0509, June, 6, 1990; translated from Portuguese. 
232
 Brazilian foreign policymakers had been following Mexico’s foreign economic strategy with some 
apprehension. A confidential memo from Itamaraty to the Brazilian embassy in Mexico, for example, 
noted in early March 1990: “… it acquires especial relevance for the Brazilian Foreign Office to 
monitor […] the evolution of the Mexican trade policy with respect to its effort of penetration in the 
regional market, because it will be in direct competition with the Brazilian manufactures [which 
constitute] 83% of our exports to the countries of the ALADI [LAIA]” (confidential telex no. 129, 
March 3, 1990; translated from Portuguese).    
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the timing and scope of the integration project. It led Brazilian policymakers to broaden the 
economic bloc of the Southern Cone in order to increase Brazil’s bargaining capacity vis-à-
vis the United States in the shaping of a potential hemispheric free-trade zone (Vaz 2002).    
Discussion and Synthesis 
I indicated at the beginning of this chapter that my explanation of the decision-making 
process that led the government of President Collor to seek the creation of Mercosur emerges 
from the solution of two interrelated puzzles. The first one refers to the president’s choice in 
favor of continuing the bilateral project of economic integration with Argentina instead of 
changing course via a trade agreement with the United States and/or Europe, which one 
would expect to be the preferred option of a leader convinced of the need to integrate Brazil 
with the advanced economies of the First World. The second puzzle alludes to the choice of a 
common market scheme instead of a free trade agreement, which would have appeared to be 
a better fit for Brazil’s concerns regarding its international autonomy.   
The elucidation of the first puzzle recognizes the influence of the following factors.  
First, the pre-existing integration project centered on the Southern Cone had important 
advantages for Brazil. As the largest and most industrially developed economy, Brazil was 
the strongest party with substantial power to determine the main direction of joint decisions 
in accordance with its preferences and interests. It was a situation that satisfied the traditional 
concern of Brazilian policymakers with playing a hegemonic role in Latin American 
integration.   
In addition, the initial implementation of existing agreements had proved in practice 
that, contrary to early pessimistic expectations from the business sector, economic integration 
with Argentina was highly beneficial for the industrial interests of Brazil. Thus, Brazilian 
policymakers had at their disposal the layout and the foundation of an integration project that 
had been cemented through years of diplomatic negotiations and signed agreements that in  
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addition enjoyed the sympathetic approval of other Southern Cone countries eager to join.    
Second, despite the relative importance of the United States as a trade partner, 
conflicts affecting the bilateral economic relationship such as U.S. complaints against 
Brazil’s protectionist policy in the computer industry and its alleged disregard for intellectual 
property rights in the pharmaceutical industry, and Brazilian criticisms regarding U.S. 
barriers to the import of  products like steel, orange juice and shoes (Folha de São Paulo 
1991a), had made unlikely the possibility of an immediate negotiation of a bilateral trade 
agreement. Third, I found no available evidence that the U.S. private sector with business 
interests in Brazil tried to organize a lobby in favor of a trade agreement between the two 
countries. 
Fourth, the policy of “competitive integration” promoted by President Collor implied 
the creation of an alternative bloc centered in the Southern Cone that could serve to negotiate 
Brazil’s engagement with advanced developed economies. Moreover, although Collor 
stressed the need to incorporate Brazil to the “First World”, in practice his foreign economic 
policy did not seek an exclusive alignment or partnership with the United States but rather it 
promoted the formation of an alliance with South American nations to confront the challenge 
of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (Moniz Bandeira 2004). Therefore, the priority 
granted to the formation of Mercosur was consistent with Collor’s policy of competitive  
integration.   
The second puzzle can perhaps be fundamentally explained by the defensive character 
that Brazilian policymakers wanted to instill in the integration project even in the case of an 
open model of economic integration like Mercosur. A common market implied “the 
establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy in 
relation to third States or groups of States, and the co-ordination of positions in regional and 
international economic and commercial forums” (RPEB68 1991a, 34; translated from  
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Portuguese).    
Such an arrangement allowed Brazil to maintain a sub-regional economic bloc under 
its hegemonic leadership that mainly responded to its strategic interests and preferences.  
These were in the end motivated by the need to protect a regional market for its industrial 
exports and to preserve a zone of influence for Brazilian diplomacy that served to reinforce 
the country’s bargaining position vis-à-vis more powerful international actors.    
The fact that the common external tariff established for Mercosur mainly reflected the 
preferences of Brazil is evidence of this claim. Another confirmation is that Brazil’s 
preferences prevailed in the design of Mercosur institutional structure and that the other 
members of Mercosur mainly accepted its lead in this regard.   
Despite the controversial character of his presidency and the severe fallout of his 
political demise, Collor’s leadership was instrumental both in reviving the process of 
economic integration in the Southern Cone initiated in the mid-1980s and in changing its 
character toward a model that served the needs of an accelerated liberalization of the 
Brazilian economy. The President’s leadership style and the institutional structure of foreign 
economic policymaking that he helped to further centralize were contributing factors to his 
agency role in the formation of Mercosur. Because of these conditions, the ideas that 
dominated Collor’s thinking helped to shape the political outcome and are thus part of the  
explanation of Mercosur.  
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Chapter 5 
The Difference that Ideas Make: Comparing Processes and Decisions   
In the previous three chapters, I studied separately why and how Mexico joined 
NAFTA and Brazil joined Mercosur in the early 1990s. The in-depth analysis of each case 
exposed important factors that influenced each country’s political decision-making in that 
regard. In this chapter, I compare the foreign policy processes and decisions that led Mexico 
and Brazil to make those choices. In doing so, I seek to confirm Rosenau’s (1980) claim: 
The comparative method […] is most useful with respect to the generation and testing 
of propositions about foreign policy behavior that apply to two or more political 
systems. Only by identifying similarities and differences in the external behavior of 
more than one national actor can analysis move beyond the particular case to higher 
levels of generalization (1980, 87).  
 
I probe for similarities and differences in the relative influence exerted by a set of variables 
that I found were equally present in the foreign policymaking processes of the two countries.   
The results of this comparative analysis can both help to address the questions that originally 
motivated this study, and serve for the testing of the main hypothesis that I advanced in 
Chapter 1.  
I organize the chapter in several sections. In the first one, I compare the effect of 
variables acting at the international level of analysis. In the second, I do the same with those 
operating at the domestic level. I offer a comparative synthesis in a third section.  In the final 
section, I draw the main conclusions of the study, including lessons for the literature and the 
discipline.     
International Variables 
As developing Latin American countries, Mexico and Brazil confronted a similar 
pattern of international influences that conditioned their economic development and shaped 
their political  behavior in the global political economy. The most relevant international 
factors associated with the foreign economic policies for regional integration that both 
countries began to devise in the mid-1980s are the following: Mexico’s and Brazil’s 
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participation in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA), the international debt crisis of 1982, the defensive trade 
policy of the United State in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the surge of international 
economic blocs, and the spread of globalization by transnational corporations.     
Participation in LAFTA and LAIA  
The experience of participation in LAFTA and LAIA conditioned Mexico’s and 
Brazil’s choice of new integration policies that led to the creation of NAFTA and Mercosur.   
The involvement of both countries with Latin American integration schemes in the post-
World War II period started in 1960 with LAFTA. This experience was important for both 
countries in two main respects.   
On the one hand, it allowed them to interact with other Latin American economies 
within an institutional framework that stimulated economic cooperation and intra-regional 
trade. It was thus an important learning experience in international trade negotiations with 
developing peers that facilitated the perception of common interests with a view to creating a 
free-trade zone (Marques 2008). On the other hand, it permitted them to discern and compare 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions in the political economy of 
the region as they advanced in their industrial development.    
Between the creation of LAFTA in 1960 and its replacement by LAIA in 1980,  
Mexico and Brazil developed comparable positions of relative economic strength vis-à-vis 
other Latin American nations.  Their relatively strong standing among peers had been fueled 
by similar patterns of economic development (i.e., large domestic markets, sizable gross 
domestic products, and high growth rates) that allowed them to achieve some of the most 
advanced industrial structures among developing economies. Besides sharing size attributes 
(i.e., big populations and large geographical areas), their respective economic trajectories had 
been shaped by analogous strategies of import-substitution industrialization with participation 
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of foreign capital (Douglas Graham 1982). 
Yet, Brazil experienced greater economic interdependence with other members of 
LAFTA than Mexico did. This phenomenon reflected a highly concentrated geographical 
pattern of trade within that regional market. According to Bulmer-Thomas (2003), “in 
LAFTA Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed a bloc that dominated 
intra-LAFTA trade” (2003, 297). In analyzing patterns of interdependence among LAFTA 
members according to trade flows, Milenky (1973) concludes that in the case of Mexico 
“[r]emoteness from the rest of the zone seems to put Mexico out of the pattern of large-
country dominance” and “at the fringes of the group” (1973, 70). In contrast, the author 
identifies Brazil as one of the two countries (the other was Argentina) most tied through trade 
to other countries of the area.    
LAFTA however, failed to achieve its original goal of creating a free-trade zone 
among its members in a period of 12 years. By introducing a more open and flexible 
approach, LAIA brought a new dynamics to the program of Latin American integration. As 
noted above, the institutional change originated with the agreement reached at the Tokyo 
Round of GATT trade negotiations in 1979 that allowed for a new economic integration 
mechanism for developing countries known as economic preference areas:   
The novelty was that these countries were authorized to negotiate among themselves 
–multilaterally, plurilaterally, or bilaterally- economic preferences not extending to 
the other Contracting Parties and without the need to include the substance of their 
trade as required by GATT Article XXIV for free trade areas and customs unions 
(INTAL 2010, 5).  
  
Thus, LAIA’s legal framework allowed country members to engage mutually in regional 
integration agreements encompassing economic preference areas of reduced scope. Under 
these circumstances, it was logical to expect similar integration initiatives on the part of  
Mexico and Brazil in order to take advantage of LAIA’s flexibility.    
Both countries shared a pattern in the geographical distribution of their international 
trade. They had a relatively low degree of interdependence with the regional market of the 
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Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), although Brazil had a relatively higher one 
than Mexico. In addition, Brazil enjoyed the geographical advantage of proximity to its 
regional trading partners, as it shared frontiers with Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, 
Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. In quantitative terms the 
largest portion of both economies’ exports and imports was linked to advanced industrialized 
nations (United States and Europe) rather than to developing Latin American countries.   
Yet, in qualitative terms LAIA did represent a significant market for the export of 
Mexico’s and Brazil’s manufactures and thus it constituted an important stimulant for their 
industrial development, which for both countries was a strategic concern. Moreover, it 
constituted an incentive to seek the establishment of PSAs with other country-members in 
order to institutionalize preferential access to markets for their manufactured exports.   
In this sense, a regional conflict of interests developed between Mexico and Brazil.  
They competed for export markets in Latin America and for potential integration partners 
under the more flexible rules established by the LAIA. A confidential memo
233
 from 
Itamaraty to the Brazilian embassy in Mexico retransmitting a telegram from the Brazilian 
representative to the LAIA reflected this situation as perceived by Brazilian policymakers:  
The composition and geographical distribution of Mexico’s foreign trade with the 
other members of LAIA [for the years 1987 and 1988] represents about 3% to 4% of 
its global exchange […] In reference to the intra-zone distribution, the main markets  
for Mexican products for the year 1988 are Argentina (14.9%), Brazil (13.8%), 
Colombia (22.5%), Chile (23.9%). The main imports come from Argentina (23.9%) 
and from Brazil (52.2%). The relative marginal importance of the LAIA countries is, 
however, qualitatively significant inasmuch as more than 60% of Mexico’s exports 
for the region are of manufactured goods […] It is perceived that Mexico pursues a 
double-reach strategy in that it seeks on the one hand to maintain open the political 
channels through trade ties negotiated with the countries of the area, and on the other 
hand, to establish the bases to expand the exports of manufactures […] Thus, […] it 
acquires special relevance for the Brazilian foreign service to monitor the evolution 
of Mexican trade policy in connection with its penetration effort in the regional 
market, because it will be in direct competition with Brazilian manufactures, which 
represent  83% of our exports for the countries members of LAIA (1990, 2-3). 
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 Confidential telegram no. 129 addressed to BRASEMB Mexico, March 2, 1990; translated from 
Portuguese.   
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Mexico and Brazil responded differently to the incentives provided by LAIA. Brazil, which 
within the former market of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was most 
closely linked by trade flows to Argentina (Milenky 1973), embraced a bilateral scheme of 
economic integration that became the cornerstone of its regional integration policy. The 1986 
PICE, the 1988 TICD, and Mercosur were all undertaken under the protection of the legal 
framework of LAIA, which allowed them to avoid being subject to the “Most Favored 
Nation” clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with respect to both members 
and non-members of the association.   
In the 1980s, Mexico subscribed to Agreements of` Economic Complementation 
(ACEs
234
) with Uruguay, Argentina and Peru but these agreements were modest by 
comparison with the magnitude and importance of the process of economic integration 
initiated by Argentina and Brazil in 1986. Mexican policymakers at that time did not envision 
a closer economic association with Latin America as an alternative strategic means to deal 
with the effect of the 1982 crisis. Instead, since 1985 Mexico had already begun a sustained 
process of rapprochement with the United States, its most important trade partner, which 
helped to clear the way for a more appealing economic integration option to overcome the 
effects of the crisis and revive economic growth. Brazil did not have such an alternative and 
did not search for it. 
 The institutional framework of LAIA conditioned Brazil’s and Mexico’s definitions 
of regional integration policies but did not determine them. Its impact was different in each 
country due to the intervening influence of other relevant factors, such as the different 
patterns of bilateral relationship with the United States and the dissimilar economic strategies 
pursued by the political leadership of each country.    
                                                             
234 ACE is the Portuguese acronym for Acordo de Complementação Econômica. The ACEs signed by 
Mexico were: no. 5 with Uruguay in 1986; no. 6 with Argentina in 1987; and no. 8 with Peru in 1987 
(Aladi 2012).  
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The successive experiences of LAFTA and LAIA allowed Mexico and Brazil to 
gauge the extent of their respective economic interdependence with other countries of the 
region, and to assess their own relative strengths and weaknesses as they developed their 
respective economies. Both countries were large economies with substantial industrial 
development that also shared a similar geographical distribution of international trade. The 
largest share of Mexico’s and Brazil’s overall foreign trade was absorbed by advanced 
industrialized economies, but the regional market covered by LAFTA-LAIA attracted most of 
their industrial goods exports. Yet, Brazil was favored by a closer proximity to its regional 
trade partners than Mexico, and in turn this factor helped Brazil to also establish a higher 
level of economic interdependence with countries in the region than Mexico. Under those 
conditions, the new institutional context established by the LAIA’s legal framework opened 
an opportunity for Brazil, better positioned than Mexico, to launch an integration scheme 
with its closest trading partner, Argentina. 
The International Debt Crisis of 1982 
Mexico and Brazil were similarly constrained by the international financial crisis that 
began in August 1982 when Mexico declared that it could not service its foreign debt. The 
phenomenon rapidly extended to twenty seven countries, including Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Argentina (FDIC 1997). The crisis originated with the sharp increase in crude 
oil prices that occurred when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) reduced production in 1973-74 to assert their political power and augment their 
revenues
235
 (Smith 2008). The surge in oil profits led to the accumulation of dollar-
denominated bank deposits, which thus became available as loanable funds by international 
banks. Careless credit practices and lax bank regulations facilitated an enormous expansion 
of lending to developing countries (FDIC 1997). 
                                                             
235
 Other oil shocks followed in 1978-79 due to strikes in the oil sector of Iran that preceded the Iranian 
Revolution, and in 1980-81 due to the Iran-Iraq War (James Hamilton 2011).   
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At the same time, the oil shocks had induced inflation and stagnation in developed 
countries, forcing them to restrict imports from developing economies, thus exacerbating 
their balance of payment problems and further stimulating their international borrowing.   
The U.S. Federal Reserve’s decision to sharply increase interest rates in order to control 
inflation triggered the overall crisis in mid-1982. The combined effect of rapidly growing 
levels of indebtedness, decreased markets for their exports, and the sudden rise in borrowing 
costs severely strained the capacity of developing countries to service their debts, which 
culminated  with Mexico’s moratorium declaration in August1982 (FDIC 1997; Smith 2008).   
Immediately, banks stopped lending to debtor countries, thus severely constraining the 
continuing development of Mexico’s and Brazil’s economies, which until then had been 
heavily reliant on foreign savings by following a strategy of “growth through indebtedness” 
(Castello Branco 1993). Yet, the relative impact of the crisis in the two countries was 
different.   
In Mexico, the crisis created favorable conditions for a significant political change at 
the top of the official party, the PRI, where a new leadership began to promote a new 
economic strategy to revive stagnant economic growth based on trade liberalization and the 
abandonment of the import-substitution model of industrialization (ISI). In contrast, the 
constraints imposed by the debt crisis did not lead policymakers of the military regime in 
Brazil to change the long-established ISI model of development based on developmentalist 
tenets. The new government of President Sarney (1985-1990) continued that economic 
strategy and the foreign policy of his military predecessor that pursued deeper economic 
relations with Latin American partners, particularly in the Southern Cone, as a way to forge a 
defensive economic bloc that could preserve Brazil’s international autonomy amid the 
perception of a threatening international environment dominated by more powerful state 
actors. 
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Thus, the international crisis was a broad precipitating factor that shook the external 
conditions of existence of Mexico and Brazil, and in so doing it provoked different reactions 
that were shaped by their respective domestic political economies. Brazil focused its attention 
in Latin America and embraced bilateral economic integration with Argentina. In contrast, 
Mexico concentrated its immediate international efforts in mending economic relations with 
the United States.   
The Trade Policy of the United States    
In the 1980s, the United States was the major partner of both Mexico and Brazil in 
trade, investments, technology, and international financing. Its trade policy decisions tended 
to have significant implications for the bilateral economic relations with both Latin American 
countries. In this manner, it constituted a major factor in the strategic calculations of 
Mexico’s and Brazil’s political elites when defining a path for the development of their 
economies, including their articulation with the world economy and policies of regional 
integration. 
From the 1970s the United States began to implement a defensive foreign economic 
policy that attempted to counterbalance the relative decline of its international competitive 
position vis-à-vis the growing challenge of Europe and Japan. It was reflected in successive 
Trade Acts issued by the U.S. government starting in 1979 that focused on measures to 
oppose what it perceived to be “unfair practices” by trade partners (Destler 2005). Mexico 
and Brazil were among the targets of this new trade policy orientation that resulted in 
significant bilateral trade disputes and frictions during the 1980s. 
At the same time, in the 1980s the U.S. began a new bilateral approach in its trade 
policy notwithstanding its traditional commitment to GATT-based multilateralism that it had 
maintained since the end of the WWII. The new orientation led to successive FTAs with 
Israel in 1985 and Canada in 1988. The new emphasis on bilateral trade agreements was also 
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motivated by strategic concerns regarding its declining competitive position in the 
international political economy. This U.S. policy change introduced a new factor in the 
complex causal matrix of regionalism in the western Hemisphere. 
The pattern of bilateral interaction that consequently emerged between the U.S. and 
the two Latin American nations however was different. The United States pressured Mexico 
to reform its trade policies but it also showed early on that it was interested in exploring the 
possibility of a North American economic bloc. The United States had an additional strategic 
interest in ensuring the economic progress and political stability of its southern neighbor.  
Thus, during the course of the 1980s the U.S. and Mexico reached successive bilateral 
understandings (i.e., the Bilateral Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in 
1985; the Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade and 
Investment Relations in 1987; the Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment 
Facilitation Talks in 1989) that gradually cleared the way for an eventual comprehensive free 
trade agreement.   
Brazil and the United States on the other hand maintained a more contentious 
economic relationship throughout the Sarney administration. Moreover, by the time the U.S. 
and Mexico had begun solving their differences in the mid-1980s Brazil was already focused 
on a project of economic integration in the Southern Cone that was being challenged by the 
U.S. in the GATT. There is no evidence that the U.S. ever entertained the idea of a trade 
agreement with Brazil at that time. The period of President Collor did not bring a diplomatic 
breakthrough in the bilateral relationship.   
Therefore, the influence that the United States exerted both through political pressure 
to force a change in Mexico’s and Brazil’s foreign economic policies and via the example of 
its new bilateral FTAs with Israel and Canada, operated through the different domestic 
political economy of each country. In Mexico, it  not only encouraged the deepening of 
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market liberalization and the opening up of the economy that the administration of President 
De la Madrid began to introduce in 1983 but it also found a disposition on the part of the 
Mexican government to negotiate bilateral frictions away.    
 In contrast, the political reaction in Brazil was more defensive and less 
accommodating. Instead of seeking a negotiated compromise to U.S. complaints, Brazilian 
policymakers tended to firmly withstand what they perceived as a threat from a more 
powerful state actor and focused their efforts on economic integration with Argentina.    
Revival of Regionalism and Emergence of Economic Blocs 
The emergence of the European Economic Community played a role in the creation of 
LAFTA in 1960 (Milenky 1973). The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was for Latin 
American countries both a competitive threat and an incentive to advance their own project of 
regional economic cooperation. It constituted an example of policy diffusion in the area of 
international cooperation (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).   
The revival of the European integration project and a new trend in the United States’  
foreign trade policy in favor of bilateral trade agreements helped to propel a somewhat 
similar process of policy emulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The spread of 
regionalism and the emergence of economic blocs influenced the strategic calculations of the 
Mexican and Brazilian governments. It put pressure on them to find new ways to insert their 
economies into the international economy. But their respective responses were different.   
In Mexico there was an active and deliberate search for international experiences of  
economic integration beyond the Latin American region from which policymakers could 
learn and adapt to the needs of the country. Policymakers followed with interest the revival of 
the European integration project in the 1980s, particularly the incorporation of Spain and 
Portugal into the European Union in 1986, and the process of forging a free-trade agreement 
between Canada and the United States that started in late 1985. These processes informed  
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and shaped Mexico’s ultimate decision to seek a trade agreement with the United States.  
Brazil  showed a marked reluctance in seeking inspiration from outside the Latin 
American region to validate their bilateral project with Argentina. Yet, despite rejecting any 
quick comparison with the European process of integration, Brazilian policymakers 
visualized a parallel between the German-French example of economic and political 
cooperation and that of Brazil and Argentina. In both cases, the country with a comparative 
advantage in industrial development (i.e., Germany and Brazil) joined in economic 
integration with another that had an agricultural comparative advantage (i.e., France and 
Argentina) (Marques 2008, 68).
236
  
President Collor perceived the growing importance of regional economic blocs after 
the end of the Cold War, noting that they presented a competitive challenge for Brazil.  
However, the main influential thrust of this perception was to prompt the revival of the 
existing bilateral project of integration with Argentina initiated by Sarney rather than to 
search for alternative venues elsewhere.    
Globalization and Transnational Corporations    
Transnational enterprises (TNEs), also known as multinational corporations (MNCs), 
are associated with the advance of economic globalization by means of their foreign direct 
investment, transnational production processes and international trade. In that regard, 
Frischtak (2004) notes that  
By the late 1980s MNCs began shifting from mostly an inward orientation, where the 
compelling logic of the investment was to serve domestic markets behind high trade 
barriers, to organizing production systems and investing in platforms serving markets 
on either a regional or global scale. The strategy of integrating MNCs regional (and 
then global) operations dovetailed with efforts to establish regional trade 
arrangements (RTAs) (2004, 1).   
 
Thus, TNEs may be motivated to play a leading role in the promotion of regional integration  
                                                             
236 Also, as noted in Chapter 3, President Sarney’s vision of a partnership with Argentina appeared to 
have been inspired by the example of the French-German treaty that ended the perennial enmity 
between the two European countries.   
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agreements. Their relative role in the promotion of regional integration policies in Mexico 
and Brazil has been, however, quite different.   
In Mexico, the active political lobbying by a transnational pro-NAFTA business 
coalition led by U.S. multinational corporations with interests in Mexico was an important 
factor in Mexico’s decision to join a free trade agreement with the United States.  In contrast, 
I have found no available evidence of a similar organized lobbying effort by TNEs in Brazil 
in favor of a trade agreement with the United States. Nor have I found evidence of 
transnational business enterprises pressuring the Brazilian government into seeking bilateral 
economic integration with Argentina. Multinational corporations benefitted from and 
provided political support for the creation of Mercosur but they did not constitute an initial 
driving force of the project.     
Domestic Factors 
International variables represented external forces that conditioned decision-making 
processes in Mexico and Brazil to define regional integration policies. Yet, only the action of 
causes internal to the specific political economy of each country ultimately explained actual 
political outcomes. The most relevant domestic factors exposed by the individual analysis of 
each case are the following: the institutional structure of foreign economic policymaking, 
political-economic ideas among top decision-makers, the interpretation of the national 
interest, the choice of strategy for economic development, and the role of the business sector. 
The Institutional Structure of Foreign Economic Policymaking  
When Mexico and Brazil began to define their new regional integration policies in the 
1980s, their presidential political systems shared an important attribute. In both cases, the 
Presidency, a collective actor composed by a reduced circle of policymakers that included the 
president and members of his cabinet and governmental bureaucracies, had substantial 
political power to act autonomously from societal influences and congressional control. This 
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was even more salient in the case of Mexico’s and Brazil’s foreign policy decision-making, 
including issues related to international trade and regional integration agreements.   
Accordingly, definitions of foreign economic policy in both Mexico and Brazil 
largely depended on the President’s leadership style, the actual distribution of political power 
within the decision-making group, the interests that motivated its members and the kinds of 
ideas and approaches that were prevalent among them. The President’s management style 
determined the level to which decision-making authority was delegated and was a deciding 
factor in the actual distribution of political power within the governmental bureaucracy. The 
ideas of the most powerful decision-makers constituted a crucial intervening factor that 
helped to shape the interpretation and definition of interests and policy outcomes.   
This type of institutional setting for decision-making facilitated the relatively rapid 
and unobstructed development of Mexico’s and Brazil’s policies for regional integration 
according to the preferences of their key policymakers. Yet, paradoxically, other important 
idiosyncratic institutional features that separated Mexico’s presidential system from that of 
Brazil did not make a significant difference in the relative ease with which their respective 
decision processes unfolded.   
In Mexico, during De la Madrid’s and Salinas’ governments, the corporatist 
dominance of an official party, the PRI, that controlled Congress, complemented and 
reinforced a strong presidential system. In contrast, Brazilian presidentialism, which also 
granted enormous power to the executive branch, faced a high level of party fragmentation 
combined with an open-list electoral system that weakened party discipline in Congress, thus 
forcing the President to seek political support in the legislature via the formation of a 
coalition cabinet. Yet, the Brazilian presidential system, while seemingly at a disadvantage 
with respect to that of Mexico, worked effectively in processing policy decisions as the 
President’s power to govern via decrees and his capacity to determine Congress’ agenda 
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more than compensated for the potential lack of legislative support. 
There were two important additional institutional factors that distinguished Brazil 
from Mexico regarding foreign economic policy processes and decisions for regional 
economic integration at the time both began pursuing their respective projects. They help to 
explain the continuity that characterized Brazil’s foreign policy for regional integration vis-à-
vis Mexico’s inclination for change.   
One of those factors was the fact that the 1988 Brazilian Constitution established a 
clear mandate to seek economic, political, social and cultural integration with other Latin 
American countries. It constituted a specific delegation of power to the Executive branch by 
Congress with respect to the country’s foreign policy for regional cooperation. It also 
signaled the existence of a broad consensus among the Brazilian political elite that South-
South regional integration was a preferred strategic orientation for Brazil. Thus, the noted 
constitutional prescription limited the possibility that the Presidency could undertake a 
change in orientation toward a North-South integration policy. 
In Mexico, the Constitution did not establish a similar mandate for the country’s 
foreign policy, in favor of either a South-South or a North-South strategy for regional 
integration, and thus the Presidency did not have a specific delegation of power from 
Congress to act in this regard. On the contrary, at the time that the government of President 
Salinas decided to seek an FTA with the United States, there was no consensus in this regard 
among the Mexican political elite. Moreover, given the controversial nature of the proposal, 
the President, despite being the party leader, had to work politically to gain the support of the 
PRI in the Senate in order to obtain the necessary approval for the initiative as prescribed by 
the Mexican constitution.     
The other institutional factor was the distinctly prominent role that Brazil’s 
professional foreign affairs bureaucracy, maintained during the successive administrations of 
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Presidents Sarney and Collor, albeit with relatively less intensity in the latter, in the 
formulation and implementation of regional integration policies. The institutional 
participation of Itamaraty’s high quality bureaucracy, which exhibited a low level of 
politicization, helped to shield the foreign policy decision-making process for regional 
integration from influences or controls external to the Presidency.   
Also, the Foreign Office’s long-standing, strong organizational culture developed 
around paradigmatic foreign policy concepts and orientations tended to establish a cohesive 
behavior on its ranks that contributed to the stability and continuity of Brazil’s foreign policy.   
Itamaraty’s diplomats, for example, contributed to the writing of Article 4 of the 1988 
Constitution, which established a long-term mandate to pursue the regional integration of 
Latin America (Côrtes 2010, 284).   
The emergence of at least two competing currents within Itamaraty, one nationalist 
and another liberal, in the late 1980s, did not result in a significant politization of the 
institution nor did it lead to a breakdown of the basic consensus uniting its personnel around 
the project of integration with Argentina. Thus, overall the Foreign Ministry tended to be a 
moderating force against radical and sudden foreign policy changes, including those 
pertaining to regional integration. 
Additionally, Itamaraty had been restructuring its organization, expanding spheres of 
competence and responsibility and enhancing the professional expertise of its personnel, 
particularly on international trade,
237
 in an effort to meet the demands of Brazil’s evolving 
foreign policy and maintain its paramount institutional standing within the structure dedicated 
to foreign economic policymaking. This effort allowed the diplomatic institution to be 
relatively well-positioned to play a leading role in the development of bilateral economic 
integration with Argentina and the subsequent creation of Mercosur.  
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 See essay “Diplomacia e comercio: Notas sobre a política externa brasileira nos anos 70,” in 
Flecha de Lima (1997).   
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Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE) did not have an institutional stature 
and prestige comparable to that enjoyed by the Brazilian counterpart within the state structure 
dedicated to foreign economic policymaking. Also, the SRE’s institutional capacity had not 
kept up with the demands imposed by increasingly complex international affairs, particularly 
those related to international trade, for which its diplomatic personnel were not adequately 
prepared. 
These limitations, united to its strong organizational culture deeply embedded in a 
nationalistic paradigm, hampered the SRE’s chances of playing a major role in the new 
foreign economic policy that the successive administrations of Presidents De la Madrid and 
Salinas began to pursue as a result of their new strategy to open up and liberalize the Mexican 
economy.  
In consequence, the diplomatic institution suffered marginalization from the reduced 
group of actors that participated in the NAFTA decision-making process, that is, President 
Salinas and his economic cabinet, particularly the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial 
Development (SECOFI). The lack of significant SRE involvement facilitated the drastic and 
sudden change of course that Mexico’s policy for regional integration experienced during the 
Salinas administration when it embraced the idea of a free trade agreement with the United 
States.   
The Core National Interests 
The relative size and development of Mexico’s and Brazil’s economies as well as 
their relative power as sovereign states within the international political economy were 
attributes that determined the strategic national needs of both countries. Two core national 
interests, besides the basic need to survive as states, broadly conditioned the international 
behavior of Mexico and Brazil, and thus their foreign economic policies and corresponding 
regional economic integration projects.    
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One was the need for economic development, that is, the interest in becoming 
advanced industrial economies, which as developing countries both shared. The other, desire 
to maintain autonomy, represented their interest as sovereign states in controlling the 
direction of their own affairs despite external constraints. As large but relatively weak Latin 
American regional powers, both countries shared these interests since they were similarly 
exposed to potential restricting influences from other more powerful states, particularly those 
of the United States. 
The debt crisis of 1982, for example, seriously threatened these two core national 
interests of Mexico and Brazil by thwarting the continued development of their economies, 
limiting their options, and making them more vulnerable to external pressures. This was a 
reflection of both the relatively limited development of their economies and the relatively 
weak international power position of their countries. Thus, the governments of both countries 
were pressed to reassess the manner in which they viewed these interests in light of new 
conditions, and to devise effective means to protect them, while always mindful of the 
structural conditions that constrained them.    
When both the Mexican government of De la Madrid and the Brazilian government of 
Sarney began to consider what to do to get their countries out of the crisis, they had to 
consider not only their own interests as elected Presidents, or the interests of their respective 
business communities, or those of their respective popular sectors. All these interests were 
certainly relevant, and needed to be attended. But also, as heads of state, they had to take into 
account the more fundamental interests of their nations as collective actors in the world 
scenario. 
It is in this sense that their respective national interests broadly shaped their economic  
strategies and foreign economic policies. Yet, this influence was mediated by the 
interpretation that policymakers made of them according to the ideas that informed and 
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guided their thinking. In other words, Mexico’s and Brazil’s national wants motivated 
decision-makers to act but a more proximate cause of their actual decisions was what they 
thought they needed to do to meet those needs (Wendt 1999).  
The fact that both nations had similar core national interests (i.e., development and 
autonomy) led their governments to frame their respective projects of regional economic 
integration to serve two basic national needs. One was the revival of economic growth and 
the promotion industrial development and modernization. The other was the preservation and 
strengthening of the international autonomy of their nations.    
Globalization and the emergence of competing economic blocs had significantly 
changed the structure of the post-Cold War international political economy. Thus, Mexican 
and Brazilian policymakers were forced to seek new formulas to insert their economies in the 
world economy in order to satisfy Mexico’s and Brazil’s national interests. 
In NAFTA, Mexico was a developing country in association with two more advanced, 
developed nations, one of which had become the sole superpower after the demise of the 
Soviet Union.  Mexico was the weakest partner of the three that formed the new bloc. As 
such, it chose an economic integration with partners that offered greater chances of rapid 
export-led growth than other alternatives, and it thus satisfied the need for economic 
development. At the same time, it chose a type of agreement that was contractual, subject to 
strict negotiated rules that minimized the possibility that the U.S., a more powerful partner, 
could act unilaterally or arbitrarily to impose onerous conditions on Mexico with adverse 
consequences for its interests, thus meeting the demand for preserving its autonomy.   
Brazil was in a different position as a member of Mercosur. It was the strongest 
economy and the most powerful country of the four members. Its need for continued 
industrialization and modernization was met by partnering with countries with relatively less 
industrial development, hence providing a preferential market for its industrial exports. As a 
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regional power, Brazil could use Mercosur to leverage its trade negotiations with the United 
States and Europe in a manner that satisfied its need for autonomy. Moreover, Mercosur’s 
customs union model was based on intergovernmental consensus rather than on contractual 
agreements. It gave Brazil, the stronger partner, the opportunity to prevail in negotiations 
with the other governments of the bloc instead of subjecting itself to the “tyranny” of a 
contractual agreement that left no room for political maneuvering.       
Mexico’s and Brazil’s divergent roads to integrate themselves into the world economy 
via NAFTA and Mercosur are largely due to the different way in which their governments 
conceived of their core national interests and the manner to defend them. In order to 
understand their divergent views we need to compare the economic strategies they devised 
and the development paradigms that influenced their political thinking.    
The Strategy for Economic Development 
Historically, Mexico’s and Brazil’s development strategies have played an important 
role in shaping their relationship with the world economy (Gereffi and Wyman 1990). Their 
foreign economic policies, including policies for regional integration, tended to be largely 
determined by, or were dependent on, the choice of national economic strategy.    
Thus, in the long period during which the two countries engaged in state-led import-
substitution industrialization, their trade policies were similarly focused on protecting 
domestic markets in order to develop their national industries. Accordingly, their policies for 
regional integration, centered in Latin America around schemes like LAFTA and LAIA, 
mainly aimed at enlarging domestic markets in order to achieve economies of scale for their 
industries rather than at promoting the expansion of free trade among members to enhance 
economic efficiency and industrial productivity through foreign competition.   
The 1982 international debt crisis put an abrupt end to the strategy of “growth through 
indebtedness” that accompanied Mexico’s and Brazil’s import-substitution models for 
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industrialization (ISI). In devising a response to the severe challenge imposed by the sudden 
lack of external financing, the two countries undertook divergent roads to reignite economic 
growth.   
Mexico, under the government of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), began to 
abandon ISI in favor of an export-led growth strategy based on market-oriented reforms and 
the opening up of the economy, and started to normalize its trade relations with the United 
States while seeking to expand markets in Europe and Japan for its exports. Brazil reacted 
differently. Still under military rule, it adjusted its import-substitution strategy to the 
constraints imposed by its external debt obligations rather than changing it for a different one.   
Thus, it severely restricted imports and intensified the promotion of exports to  
generate a surplus with which to service its debt. In doing so, it deepened the pursuit of a 
South-South trade strategy that its last military President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo 
(1979-1985) had started, which focused on Latin America’s markets for its manufactured 
exports via the LAIA’s legal framework. This trade strategy led the new civilian government 
of José Sarney (1985-1990), still inspired by the ISI model, to initiate in 1986 a bilateral 
project of economic integration with Argentina that became a centerpiece of Brazil’s regional 
integration policy. 
Therefore, the bilateral integration scheme (PICE) was designed on the basis of a 
“managed trade” approach rather than according to principles of competitive free trade. In 
this manner, it sought to maintain an equilibrated balance of trade between the two countries 
through a gradual, flexible, balanced and symmetrical integration process negotiated by 
sectors that would establish a free-trade zone in 10 years. Thereafter, according to a new 
treaty (TICD) signed two years later, the project would become a common market in an 
unspecified period of time.     
The different strategic development choices made by Mexico and Brazil in the  
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aftermath of the 1982 crisis conditioned the later development of their respective regional 
integration policies. In the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War, the spread of globalization 
and the emergence of competing economic blocs further pressed both countries to find new 
ways for inserting themselves into the global economy to ensure economic growth.   
Again, the two countries followed different paths. Mexico, now under the government 
of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), continued and deepened its neoliberal strategy and 
further advanced in the settlement of trade-related issues with the United States to the point 
where both countries were ready for a comprehensive treaty. Faced with indifference in 
Europe and Japan, the Mexican government finally asked the U.S. to initiate negotiations for 
an FTA that became the tripartite NAFTA (Whalley 1993; Salinas 2002). The step was 
coherent with the logic of its chosen strategy for economic development. It helped to further 
open the country to the world economy by means of a treaty that ensured preferential access 
to the large developed market of the U.S. for its industrial exports, and the flow of capital 
investments from that country.    
By late 1988, the Sarney administration began to acknowledge the exhaustion of the 
ISI strategy that had guided Brazil’s economic development, and started to move the country 
toward a process of gradual economic liberalization. His successor, Fernando Collor de Mello 
(1990-1992), pursued the new strategic orientation with renewed vigor by seeking the rapid 
opening up of the Brazilian economy combined with an accelerated domestic program of 
economic liberalization in order to achieve the country’s competitive integration to the world 
economy.  
The conception of the bilateral project of economic integration with Argentina 
changed significantly in accord with the new economic strategy pursued by the Collor 
administration, which coincided with that initiated by the new government of Argentina 
headed by President Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999). Thus, they agreed on a revamped and 
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accelerated bilateral project to establish both a free-trade zone and a common market by the 
end of 1994 through a new approach consisting of generalized, linear and automatic tariff 
reductions affecting the entire tariff universe, and the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies.   
The bilateral integration scheme thus redesigned eventually became the instrument for 
the creation of the quadripartite Mercosur once Paraguay and Uruguay joined in. By August 
1994, however, realizing that Mercosur would not meet the deadline to be a common market, 
the four signatory countries agreed to establish the common external tariff, thus effectively 
transforming Mercosur from an imperfect free-trade zone into a customs union.  
Thus, despite the similarity of the liberal approaches implemented by the governments 
of President Salinas in Mexico and President Collor in Brazil to direct the economic 
development of their countries, their respective economic strategies diverged in one crucial 
respect: the manner in which they sought to configure the two countries’ relationships with 
the world economy in the early 1990s.   
By joining NAFTA, Mexico adopted a more open and direct path for its insertion in 
the global economy through economic integration with advanced developed economies 
structured around a comprehensive free-trade agreement. It was a defining prelude to the 
subsequent transformation of Mexico into a major Latin American trading power via the 
negotiation and conclusion of numerous FTAs with both developed and developing countries 
from different parts of the world (Ortiz Mena L.N. 2004).   
In contrast, Brazil chose a less open and more indirect route via the simultaneous 
support for the creation of Mercosur and resistance to the U.S.–sponsored Initiative for the 
Americas. Instead of directly procuring economic integration with advanced industrialized 
countries, Brazil prioritized the strengthening of its international bargaining capacity via a 
customs union with other developing Southern Cone countries. Since then, Brazil’s has 
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projected itself internationally as a global trader but it has been reluctant to conclude 
preferential trade agreements with advanced industrialized economies like the United States 
and the European Union (Veiga 2004).
238
  
Ideational Factors  
A variety of internal and external variables conditioned Mexico’s and Brazil’s foreign 
economic policy options. Yet, how policymakers viewed and interpreted the impact of those 
factors as they generated threats and opportunities for their countries’ national interest was a 
critical intervening factor that affected their policy choices. Their views and interpretations as 
well as the policy designs that ensued emerged through the lenses of the ideas that informed 
and guided their political thinking at that time.    
In Mexico, the selection of Miguel de la Madrid as the official PRI candidate for the 
1982 presidential elections in the aftermath of the debt crisis signaled a momentous shift in 
the correlation of political forces within the party. Given the presidential-corporatist structure 
that dominated the Mexican political system at that time, this selection not only determined 
the successful takeover of the PRI’s direction by the candidate’s faction and his subsequent 
electoral victory in the presidential contest. It also ended the longstanding ideological 
hegemony of national-developmentalism in the party and in the direction of Mexican politics 
by bringing to power a new set of liberal political and economic ideas that would shape a new 
strategic course for Mexico’s economic development. 
 Structural constraints imposed by the severe debt crisis of 1982 did not prescribe De 
la Madrid’s new economic strategy of export-led growth based on market-oriented structural 
reforms and the opening up of the economy through unilateral trade liberalization. It was 
rather a response dictated by the choices made by the president and the small group of 
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 Amorim (2007) explains Brazil’s approach in this regard, as follows: “With developed countries, 
the expansion of our economic relations does not necessarily depend on the negotiation of free-trade 
agreements. In our experience, these agreements are difficult to negotiate by virtue of the many 
protectionist barriers that developed countries refuse to eliminate, especially in areas in which we are 
competitive –as in the case of agribusiness” (2007, 73). 
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government officials that controlled the political decision-making process dedicated to 
economic affairs under the influence of the liberal ideational framework that shaped their 
analyses.   
Something different occurred in Brazil. The 1982 debt crisis did not lead to a sudden 
end of national-developmentalism as the guiding doctrine for economic development and 
foreign policy. It remained dominant during the final years of the military regime, and 
continued controlling the political thinking of Brazilian elites for the greater part of the 
Sarney administration. Thus, neither the end of international financing and its severe 
economic consequences nor the transition to a democratic civilian government brought to 
power a new set of ideas that could have shaped an earlier process of economic liberalization 
and the opening up of Brazil to the world economy.   
One important factor that helps to explain the two countries’ contrasting susceptibility 
to changing their dominant development paradigms in the face of severe external constraints 
is the different situation of relative external vulnerability in which they found themselves at 
the beginning of the international financial crisis of 1982. Mexico’s relatively weaker 
economic position made it more vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, as demonstrated by its 
inability to service its debt in August 1982, an event that is generally considered the 
beginning of the Third World debt crisis. This greater vulnerability made a sector of 
Mexico’s political elite more predisposed to replacing national-developmentalism by 
neoliberal thinking.  
The difference in economic strength largely originated with the divergent economic  
strategies adopted by Mexico and Brazil at the time of the 1970s oil shocks. Mexico diverted 
its economic focus to developing the production of newly found oil reserves for export, while 
Brazil centered on developing alternative sources of energy and on deepening its ISI model, 
thus further advancing in the integration of its industrial structure and expanding the export of 
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manufactured goods. As a result, Brazil, an oil importer that had been adversely affected by 
the oil shocks, was now in a relatively better position to withstand external pressures derived 
from the debt crisis than Mexico, which also suffered from the sudden fall in the international 
price of oil that occurred in mid-1981 (Villarreal 1990).    
Therefore, national-developmentalism maintained a dominant influence among the 
Brazilian political elite that was cemented by the relatively successful results obtained 
through the ISI model that it had inspired. These achievements contributed to the belief that 
Brazil, because of its size and level of development, was relatively less vulnerable to external 
pressures, less dependent on imports (which the need to service its international debt had 
made more onerous), and thus more capable of generating international reserves through 
exports (Sarney 1986). Thus, the debt crisis did not lead in Brazil to an immediate breakup of 
the consensus around the dominant paradigm for economic development but to an adaptation 
of the ISI strategy to the new international constraints. 
Accordingly, when the government of President Sarney initially decided to pursue 
bilateral economic integration with Argentina in the mid-1980s, its conception of the project 
reflected the autonomist orientation of a defensive economic strategy drafted according to 
tenets of national-developmentalism. Similarly, the fact that the government of President De 
la Madrid showed receptivity to the pro-free-trade lobby of the MEXUS, the bi-national 
coalition of business, and also reacted positively to the pressures from the United States 
regarding trade policy, was not a direct result of structural economic constraints, although 
these played an important conditioning role. The determining factor that led to this political 
behavior was the liberal orientation of De la Madrid’s policies, which tended to coincide with 
those of the MEXUS and the United States.   
In this manner, the contrasting development paradigms that influenced the 
governments of President De la Madrid and President Sarney were crucial intervening factors 
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in the interpretation of national interests and the design of different economic strategies for 
Mexico and Brazil. Their foreign economic policies emerged from these strategies and the 
paradigms that inspired them.  
Carlos Salinas de Gortari continued and deepened the new strategic course that the  
government of De la Madrid had established for the country. Salinas not only shared his 
predecessor’s vision for the economic development of Mexico, but he had actually been a key 
member of the previous administration and had participated in the elaboration of its policies.   
The continued political prevalence of the development paradigm inaugurated by De la 
Madrid however, depended on Salinas being elected as the new president of Mexico in 1988.   
The fact that Salinas prevailed by a margin that was the smallest of any previous PRI 
candidate and amid serious allegations of fraud on his part evidenced that a return to the 
predominance of national-developmentalism in Mexico was possible, via the electoral 
triumph of his main opponent, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, candidate for the left-leaning PRD.   
Once he became President of Mexico, however, Salinas consolidated the influence of 
the liberal framework over foreign economic policy, including regional economic integration.  
In this sense, during his administration there was a cohesive orientation toward economic 
opening up, and the decision to join NAFTA marked the beginning of a consistent Mexican 
regional integration policy based on FTAs with developed and developing countries that 
reflected a liberal vision of trade. 
In Brazil however, the emergence of neoliberal thinking toward the end of Sarney’s 
government
239
 and its consolidation during the Collor administration did not completely 
overcome the influence of national-developmentalism over the country’s foreign economic 
policy. Thus, trade liberalization began in late 1988 during Sarney’s Presidency and advanced 
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 Despite the initial predominance of national-developmentalism in the Sarney administration, an 
incipient liberal current of thought that advocated a policy of gradual foreign trade liberalization was 
already present. Its two most visible representatives were perhaps the secretary general of the 
Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima (1985-1990), who also was a close advisor of 
the President, and the head of the Customs Policy Commission, José Tavares de Araújo (1985-1988).   
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with President Collor, but there was a persistent defensive posture in Brazil’s international 
trade negotiations with developed economies, that continued to reflect the ideological 
influence of the national-developmentalist paradigm (Veiga 2004). Such influence was 
present in the explicit reference to the formation of a Latin American community of nations 
as a strategic goal of Brazil’s foreign policy by the 1988 Constitution, which expressed a 
developmentalist consensus among the political elite.     
Brazil’s foreign policy for regional integration combined the contradictory influences  
of liberalism and national-developmentalism.
240
 Mercosur, for example, established an 
accelerated time table to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers over all traded goods among 
the four countries that formed it, which represented a liberal approach to trade. But it also 
instituted a protective common external tariff that favored Brazilian industrialists, which 
reflected the intellectual influence of national-developmentalism.   
Another example of ideological ambivalence is Brazil’s response to the U.S.-
sponsored Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) during the Collor administration. As a 
government that appeared to be under the dominant influence of neoliberal ideas and 
determined to integrate Brazil with the so-called “first world,” one would have predicted 
more receptivity on its part to the EAI as an opportunity to engage the United States in the 
negotiation of an FTA. Yet, the Brazilian government resisted the Bush initiative as a threat 
to Brazil’s interests, that is, its interpretation of the EAI and its corresponding political 
response were shaped by national-developmentalist logic. 
In this fashion, despite a coincidence in the liberal framework that appeared to guide 
the governments of both countries in the early 1990s, their actual interpretation of national 
interests, design of economic strategies, and approaches to foreign trade and regional 
                                                             
240 Itamaraty’s Secretary General Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima acknowledged the existence of two 
competing ideological currents within Itamaraty, which he labeled “liberal” and “nationalist” 
(Casarões 2012). 
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integration differed. The main ideational source of that difference was the extent to which 
national-developmentalism retained a degree of influence over policymaking.    
In Mexico, neoliberal thinking was a more consistent ideological factor influencing 
the making of foreign economic policy than in Brazil in the early 1990s. The government of 
President Salinas prevented ideological inconsistencies by marginalizing potential 
adversaries, such as the ministry of foreign relations, a nationalist stronghold, from the main 
decision-making process, thus facilitating the decision to join NAFTA.   
In contrast, despite President Collor’s seemingly steadfast adherence to a liberal 
outlook there was a persistent ideological duality in the Brazilian foreign economic 
policymaking process leading to Mercosur. A factor that appears to have played an important 
role in this regard is the participation of Itamaraty, where national-developmentalism was still 
influential, in the process that decided Brazil’s policy for Mercosur. 
Business Elites 
Two important differences distinguished the role of the business sector in the 
decision-making process of NAFTA from that of Mercosur. One is that in Mexico, despite 
the relative institutional insularity of foreign economic policymaking from societal 
influences, there was an important proactive effort by a section of the business community to 
influence the policy outcome in its favor. In the case of Brazil, business elites mainly played 
a reactive role in a process initiated and guided by state policymakers, thus evidencing a 
relative lack of interest in the project. However, once the bilateral integration project with 
Argentina began to take shape and demonstrate that was beneficial to their interests, Brazilian 
business sectors lent their necessary support, which continued throughout the process leading 
to Mercosur.  
A factor that affected the dissimilar behavior of the business sector in each country 
was that in Mexico, ideas played an important role in helping to forge the bi-national 
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coalition of business elites that lobbied for NAFTA, because of the agency effort of the U.S. 
Council’s business leaders. In contrast, there is no available evidence that in Brazil interested 
political entrepreneurs attempted to build consensus to organize a lobbying effort among 
business elites in support of the initial integration project with Argentina and later in 
connection with Mercosur. Thus, ideas could not play a similar role in Brazil. 
The other difference is that in Mexico, the interests of export-oriented business 
sectors that favored free trade tended to prevail in the making of foreign economic policy, 
while in Brazil, the interests that predominated in that regard were those of domestic-market-
oriented industrial elites. These business segments had growing trade links to the Latin 
American regional market but were at the same time very sensitive to competition from 
advanced industrialized countries, which caused them to maintain a defensive attitude toward 
foreign trade negotiations with the United States or the European Union (Markwald 2006).   
They also showed concern for what they perceived as potential unfair competitive advantage 
from Mercosur partners if they were able to adopt a tariff structure that was lower than the 
one used by Brazil.
241
 Thus, they lobbied the Brazilian government for the establishment of a 
common external tariff to protect Brazil’s industrial interests and hence helped to transform 
Mercosur into a customs union (Marques 2008). 
In this manner, in both countries there was a convergence of interests between the 
government and the business elite, which was necessary for the successful implementation of 
the corresponding integration projects they pursued. Yet, the kind of interests that united 
these two actors was different in each country.   
In Mexico, government needed to ensure economic growth and wanted to do it 
through an export-led strategy that included preferential access to the huge U.S. market and 
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 The concern of Brazilian business in this regard was evidenced during the negotiations to 
determine the degree of openness that the customs union should have: “Argentina, like Uruguay and 
Paraguay, had low tariffs on capital goods; one of its aims in opening its economy was to allow its 
firms cheap access to imported technology. Brazil, in contrast, wanted to protect its own capital goods 
industry” (Economist 1996). 
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inflow of capital investments from the U.S. business sector. This coincided with the business 
interests of U.S. multinationals and large internationally-oriented Mexican enterprises, which 
wanted a trade agreement that could minimize transaction costs and mitigate political risks 
while also granting preferential access to markets, liberalizing foreign direct investment, 
strengthening intellectual property rights, and establishing dispute settlement procedures.   
In Brazil, the locus of mutual interest was different. In the pursuit of economic 
growth, the government wanted to secure a market for the country’s manufactured exports 
that could also serve as a training ground for the gradual modernization of its industrial park 
so as to make it internationally competitive, while at the same time establishing an economic 
bloc to strengthen its bargaining capacity in international negotiations with the United States 
and the European Union. The interests of the Brazilian industrial elite were similar.  
Industrialists needed a regional preferential market for their manufactured products that was 
also protected by an external common tariff so that they could avoid a sudden open 
competition with the industry of developed economies.      
Comparative synthesis 
In the early 1990s, Mexico and Brazil were the two largest and most industrially 
advanced developing countries in Latin America. They enjoyed considerable regional reach 
but were significantly weaker than advanced industrialized countries like the United States, 
major European powers, and Japan. Having comparable economic and power attributes 
determined that the two countries also shared core national interests in terms of economic 
development and international autonomy. These interests broadly shaped their international 
behavior and thus also affected their decisions to join regional integration agreements like 
NAFTA and Mercosur.    
Notably, despite their analogous strategic interests at that time, each country 
developed a distinctive policy for regional integration. Mexico opted for a North-South FTA 
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with the United States and Canada, two stronger partners with advanced developed 
economies. Brazil decided instead to join a South-South customs union with Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, three weaker developing partners with different degrees of lesser 
industrial development than Brazil’s.   
Moreover, in the eyes their respective policymakers, Mexico’s and Brazil’s divergent 
RIA choices satisfied the requirements of their national needs at a time of significant 
structural changes in the international political economy. The key to this apparent puzzle lies 
in the different effect that a similar set of international and domestic factors had in each 
country’s foreign policy processes and decisions.     
The state structure dedicated to foreign economic policymaking was a key factor that 
intervened to shape the decision-making processes of the two countries. The relative 
institutional insulation and autonomy that this structure enjoyed determined that policy 
outcomes in both countries originated in a restricted circle of policymakers that included the 
President, close advisors, members of his cabinet, and related governmental bureaucracies.   
Political decisions largely depended on the issues at hand, the President’s leadership style, the 
interests that motivated the members of this group, the kind of ideas and approaches that 
informed their thinking, and the actual distribution of political power among them.   
The success of a RIA largely depends on the fact that it meets a demand for economic 
integration from market forces represented by business elites, who would stand to gain from 
the institutional arrangement provided by the government (Mattli 1999). Thus, although 
Mexico’s and Brazil’s political structures at that time restricted the participation of societal 
actors in foreign economic policymaking, the successful launching of NAFTA and Mercosur 
required at least the political support of the business sector.   
The business backing of both projects existed, but the manner in which it emerged 
was different in each country. In Mexico, there was a pro-free-trade binational business lobby 
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that proactively sought to influence the NAFTA decision-making process and provided early 
political support to the government. In the case of Brazil however, the initial reaction of the 
business elites to the bilateral integration project with Argentina initiated in 1986 was a mix 
of skepticism and resistance. Their support was forthcoming only after the integration project 
was under way and the potential gains became tangible, but business participation continued 
to be subordinated to the initiative of governmental policymakers.    
Overall, Mexico’s and Brazil’s different policy choices for regional integration 
emerged from similar institutional patterns of decision-making. The key question that drove 
the process in each country was how to re- configure global economic relations to ensure 
continued economic growth in a changed international political economy. The divergent 
paths that top Mexican and Brazilian foreign policymakers chose to insert their countries into 
the world economy were thus major determining factors that set their policies for regional 
integration apart.  
The roads they chose responded to different re-interpretations of their national 
interests in light of external events that changed the conditions of Mexico’s and Brazil’s 
existence. In this regard, international factors played an important role in triggering domestic 
political processes to realign their needs for development and autonomy accordingly. A most 
important event with major consequences for the subsequent course of Mexico’s and Brazil’s 
political economies through the 1980s and early 1990s was the international debt crisis. It 
ended the possibility of continuing the strategy of growth through indebtedness that both 
countries had adopted since the 1960s to promote their import-substitution models of 
industrialization. In so doing, the crisis forced policymakers to reassess their countries’ 
options, encouraging them to adopt different development strategies and corresponding 
foreign economic policies according to their respective domestic political conditions and 
processes.   
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Previous international experiences that both Mexico and Brazil had with regional  
projects like LAFTA and LAIA also played a role in conditioning their strategic responses in 
late 1980s and early 1990s. These experiences made them aware of their relative international 
standing in Latin America and the potential opportunities that such regional markets had for 
each of their economies. In essence, they suggested that despite the similar relevance that the 
LAIA market had for the export of Mexican and Brazilian manufactures, Brazil had an edge 
because of the higher level of trade interdependence it had achieved with other countries of 
the area.  
The foreign economic policies of the United States in the 1980s also played an 
important role in shaping the strategic calculations and policies of Mexico and Brazil in two 
main ways. One was through political pressure to force a change in these countries’ trade 
policies away from what the U.S. labeled to be “unfair” practices. The other was through a 
new emphasis on bilateral free-trade agreements vis-à-vis a traditional support for 
multilateral agreements. These two aspects of U.S. trade policy evoked contrasting reactions 
from Mexico and Brazil that contributed to their different foreign policies for regional 
integration.    
Mexico tended to acquiesce to U.S. demands, and visualized an opportunity in the 
new U.S. openness to trade bilateralism to forge economic integration via a comprehensive 
free-trade agreement. Brazil resisted U.S. pressures and focused instead on creating an  
alternative South-South economic bloc.   
 Several new international developments toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as the emergence of competing economic blocs, the spread of globalization, and the end 
of the Cold War, were additional factors that further pressed Mexico and Brazil to search for 
new ways to insert their economies in the global currents of trade and investment in order to 
satisfy their need for development and autonomy. Again, the responses from Mexican and 
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Brazilian policymakers diverged, thus leading to the development of different regional 
integration policies. 
   In both Mexico and Brazil, the existence of centralized and autonomous institutional 
frameworks dedicated to foreign economic policymaking facilitated that key policymakers’ 
political and economic views played an important intervening role in the redefinition of 
national interests and related strategies to satisfy them. In Mexico, neoliberal ideas shaped 
policymakers’ conceptualization of the country’s needs for development and autonomy. In 
their view, economic growth demanded Mexico’s immersion in the international currents of 
trade and investment, particularly those of advanced developed economies. Likewise, the 
effective defense of the country’s autonomy required them to acknowledge the inevitability 
of the international interdependence brought about by globalization.   
Brazilian strategists viewed their core interests differently through the combined 
lenses of liberalism and national-developmentalism. Economic development was conceived 
as part of a competitive integration with the world economy that relied on a more cautious 
and defensive opening up of the economy. Autonomy continued to be a paramount concern, 
as the recognition of a more interdependent international system was accompanied by a 
concern for building South-South coalitions that mediated the relations with the major 
international centers of power. 
Diverging visions of strategic interests gave rise to differing strategies for economic  
development and international behavior. In turn, these strategies determined the paths to 
integrate Mexico and Brazil into the international political economy. In Mexico, the 
government chose export-led growth based on market-oriented reforms and economic 
opening up through trade liberalization. Its foreign policy focused on generating 
advantageous external conditions for economic development. NAFTA was a type of regional 
integration scheme that fitted the vision of Mexican policymakers to insert their country in  
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the international currents of trade and investment via its association with the United States. 
Brazil’s policymakers decided to focus on securing a regional market for the export of 
manufactured goods that could serve to gradually modernize its industrial structure and make 
it more competitive in global markets. They promoted economic liberalization and opening 
up but at a more gradual pace than Mexico as they resisted open competition from the United 
States and Europe. Foreign policy emphasized the creation of favorable external conditions 
for the autonomous behavior of Brazil. Mercosur was the preferred integration scheme for 
Brazil because it satisfied the defensive strategy devised by the government to bargain its 
way into the world economy protected by a common external tariff. 
Conclusions 
My study addressed two main questions that have received inadequate attention in the 
pertinent literature: Why and when do governments decide to join regional integration 
agreements? Why do they opt for a particular type of scheme? To do so, I undertook a 
comparative study of the foreign economic policy processes and decisions that led Mexico to 
join NAFTA and Brazil to join Mercosur. I chose a comparative methodology because it not 
only brings together in-depth case study and cross-case comparison, which mitigates the risk 
of making erroneous inferences, but it also allows a higher level of generalization than a 
single case (Rosenau 1980; George and Bennett 2004). I structured the study of the individual 
cases applying the Foreign Policy Analysis methodology (Hudson 2007), which distinguishes 
several basic levels of analysis: the individual decision-maker, group decision-making or 
bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and international system. I used an eclectic analytical 
framework as recommended by scholars to study a phenomenon as complex as regional 
integration (Gilpin 2001; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009).    
 In essence, my argument claimed that both the decision to join a regional integration 
agreement and the choice of a particular type of agreement crucially depend on how top 
 302 
 
policymakers want to configure the country’s relationship with the world economy. Their 
interpretation of core national interests and their selection of economic strategy largely shape 
this determination. A critical intervening factor in this process is the political and economic 
ideas that inform and guide the behavior of political leaders.   
In this regard, I hypothesized that a greater predominance of neoliberal ideas will 
increase the likelihood that the government will adopt an economic strategy that emphasizes 
opening up to the world economy and that it will seek North-South free trade schemes that 
rely on contractual agreements to govern the integration process. In contrast, a greater 
influence of developmentalist ideas will increase the probability that the government will 
choose a defensive strategy of economic development that resists open integration with the 
international economy and that it will prefer South–South integration schemes based on 
intergovernmental bargaining and consensual decision-making to manage the integration 
process.    
Another important intervening variable is the institutional structure of foreign 
policymaking that shapes and manages the decision making process. In this case, I 
hypothesized that the greater the institutional power of the presidency vis-à-vis the legislature 
and the greater its political autonomy from domestic societal influences, the greater would be 
the relevance of top decision-makers’ ideas in foreign economic policymaking, including 
ideas on regionalism.   
I also argued that international factors play an important role in determining the 
external conditions under which states must define their interests and determine strategies to 
satisfy them, including policies of regional integration. On balance, however, the most 
decisive explanatory variables affecting policy decisions concerning regional integration are 
domestic.   
In Chapter 2, I investigated why the government of President Salinas decided to  
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pursue a free-trade agreement with the United States which set in motion the creation of 
NAFTA. I showed that drastic international changes caused by the end of the Cold War, 
globalization, the formation of economic blocs, and the new trade policy of the United States 
created propitious conditions for a radically new regional integration initiative. I also noted 
the important lobbying efforts of a powerful pro-free trade Mexican-U.S. business coalition.  
Yet, I highlighted the decisive role played by a pragmatic president and the small group of 
government officials that controlled the foreign economic policymaking process. In this 
regard, I stressed the intervening influence of neoliberal ideas that oriented Mexican 
decision-makers in their assessment of national interests, in devising an export-led economic 
strategy based on market-oriented reforms and trade liberalization, and in determining that 
the country needed to engage the United States in the negotiation of a free trade agreement.    
In Chapter 3, I studied the causes that induced the government of President Sarney to 
pursue a project of bilateral economic integration with Argentina starting in 1986, which 
eventually became the precursor of Mercosur. I noted the important conditioning role played 
by international factors such as the debt crisis of 1982, the new protectionist policies of 
advanced developed economies, and the increasing strategic importance of the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) for Brazil’s industrial development. I underlined, 
however, the more decisive effect of domestic variables, such as the institutional structure of 
foreign economic policymaking, the agency part played by President Sarney and his close 
advisors at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the dominant ideological influence of 
national-developmentalism, which shaped an economic strategy centered on a protectionist 
model of industrial development and international autonomy. 
In Chapter 4, I analyzed why the government of President Collor decided to continue 
the integration project initiated by his predecessor, which led to the creation of Mercosur. I 
analyzed the impact of international variables such as the continuing attraction of the 
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Southern Cone market for Brazil’s development and modernization, the positive initial 
integration experience with Argentina, the emergence of international economic blocs, and 
the launching of the “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) by U.S. President Bush in 
June 1990. Yet, I focused on the more critical influence of domestic factors such as the elite-
wide political consensus in favor of Latin American integration, the leading agency role 
played by the president in formulating the integration project in the Southern Cone as an 
instrument for the competitive integration of Brazil into the world economy, the continuing 
relevance of the Foreign Office in shaping Brazil’s integration policies, and the peculiar mix 
of neoliberal and developmentalist ideas that molded  the overall political thinking of the 
government. 
Finally, in this chapter, I compared the processes and decisions through which Mexico 
and Brazil defined their policies for NAFTA and Mercosur, respectively. This comparative 
analysis showed that in both countries the changing structure of the international political 
economy provoked a re-interpretation of core national interests (i.e., economic development 
and autonomy), the adoption of new economic strategies, and the consequent definition of 
new foreign economic policies to configure the country’s insertion into the world economy in 
order to primarily ensure economic growth and also preserve international autonomy. These 
were key processes and forces that drove the definition of new regional integration policies.   
The presidents and the reduced group of governmental actors working within the 
institutional structure dedicated to foreign policymaking played a decisive role in each 
country’s decision to enter a regional integration agreement (i.e., NAFTA and Mercosur).  
The contrast between the clear predominance of neoliberal ideas in Mexico and the 
prevalence of a more ambivalent mix of neoliberal and developmentalist ideas in Brazil 
largely explain the different views that policymakers developed on national interests, 
strategies of economic development, and policies of regional integration. These ultimately  
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determined the different integration paths chosen by Mexico and Brazil. 
Lessons for the Literature and the Discipline   
The evidence from my research of the Mexican and Brazilian foreign policymaking 
processes and decisions points to the importance of powerful decisionmakers within the 
executive as pivotal political actors whose preferences are critical in determining regional 
integration outcomes. Leaders choose the economic development strategy that establishes 
how they want to configure the country’s relations with the world economy, which is a major 
factor influencing regional integration decisions. In turn, top decisionmakers’s interpretation 
of core national interests is an important variable shaping the choice of development strategy.  
Finally, leading policymakers’ political and economic ideas are a crucial intervening factor 
because they provide the lens through which national interests are interpreted, economic 
strategies are chosen, and specific integration policies are decided upon.   
My study brings attention to the role of strategies for economic development, a causal 
factor that has been relatively overlooked by the literature in connection with the sources of 
regionalism. Inasmuch as economic strategies determine the relationship that a country wants 
to establish with the international economy (Gereffi and Wyman 1990), they largely shape 
the design of foreign economic policies that a government adopts, including regional 
integration policies. Thus, I contribute to account for the relationship between the political 
economy of economic development and processes that determine foreign policy preferences, 
two issue areas that often appear disconnected in scholarly studies.    
In addition, I show why and how domestic foreign policymaking processes are critical 
to understand the mechanisms through which national economies connect with the structure 
of the international political economy. As noted by Hill (2003), “[f]oreign policy is at the 
hinge of domestic politics and international relations” (2003, 23). Thus, while policymakers’ 
choice of economic strategy shapes a country’s relationship with the world economy, foreign 
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policy processes ultimately define such relationships via specific policies.   
Also, my investigation relates to the sources of variation in foreign policy decisions.  
In this regard, I offer a distinctive explanation for the divergent path taken by the integration 
policies of Mexico and Brazil, two countries that shared similar national attributes and 
confronted analogous international challenges. In this account, I relate national interests, 
strategies of economic development, and regional integration policies in a causal sequence.  
The executive (i.e., the presidency) a collective actor whose behavior is shaped by the 
institutional structure of foreign policymaking, constitutes the vital link that activates the 
decision chain. The definitions required along the decision-making sequence depend on the 
president’s leadership style, the actual distribution of political power within the decision-
making group, the interests that motivated its members and the kinds of ideas and approaches 
that were prevalent among them. In this manner, I suggest a causal mechanism that relates 
broad national interests to final foreign policy decisions and helps to explain the source of 
variation in foreign policy outcomes.  
My work validates various claims made by different theoretical approaches. Changes 
in the structure of the international political economy precipitated domestic processes that led 
to new policies in favor of regional integration (Waltz 1979; Keohane and Nye 1989; Gilpin 
2001; Grieco 1997; Garrett 1992; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig 2009). Political elites in both Mexico and Brazil reacted to these 
changes by reconsidering their interests and roles (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Gilpin 
2001).   
In the case of Mexico, growing economic interdependence with the United States was 
a powerful incentive (Haas 1958; Deutsch et al.1957; Keohane and Nye 1989; Garrett 1992; 
Moravcsik 1998). The dynamic of bilateral relations that ensued between Mexico and the 
United States on the one hand and between Brazil and Argentina on the other, which 
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facilitated their road towards economic integration, lends support to the process of 
transactions and interactions through which Adler and Barnett (1998) explain the emergence 
of security communities. Brazil’s pursuit of bilateral integration with Argentina in the mid-
1980s fits Gilpin’s (2001) claim that regional integration is often a response to competitive 
international threats, where partners form defensive regional alliances. 
Mexico’s example illustrates how powerful socio-economic actors [i.e., MEXUS, the 
binational coalition of Mexican and U.S. corporations] can influence national preference 
formation favorable to economic integration (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Milner 1997; 
Moravcsik 1998). The crafting of Mercosur validates Garrett’s (1992) argument that the 
preferences of stronger states often prevail in the institutional design of regional agreements.  
Mexico’s and Brazil’s contrasting reactions to the foreign economic policies of the United 
States resonate with Grieco’s (1999) use of the asymmetries-of-interdependence concept to 
explain Japan’s and Germany’s divergent behavior towards regional integration at the end of 
the Cold War.   
The important role played by the institutional structure of foreign policymaking in 
both Mexico and Brazil confirms the relevance of Milner’s (1997) claim that the makeup of 
the “institutional structure of power sharing” is one of the keys to understand the dynamics of 
state policymaking. It also validates the importance of studying the institutional setting of 
group decision-making and bureaucratic politics according to the approaches developed by 
Allison (1971) and Halperin and Clapp (2006). The agency role played by the chief 
executives of both countries in the definition of regional integration confirms the emphasis 
that approaches to foreign policy decision-making place on the study of individual decision-
makers (Snyder et al. 2002; George 1969; Stein 1994; Jervis 1976; Herman et al. 2001). The 
processes through which Mexican and Brazilian policymakers came to redefine the national 
interests of their countries and adopted strategies of economic development in light of 
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changing international conditions substantiates McNamara’s (1998) argument that 
policymakers learn from policy failures, adopt new paradigms, and emulate successful 
experiences. 
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List of Interviews 
All interviews were conducted in person by the author, unless otherwise indicated. 
I. Brazil 
Abreu, Marcelo de Paiva. Professor in the Economics Department at the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Rio de Janeiro, June 28, 2010. 
 
Albuquerque, J. A Guilhon. Research Professor in the Center for Research in International 
Relations (NUPRI) at the University of São Paulo. São Paulo, June 17, 2010.   
 
Almeida, Paulo R. Career diplomat. Alternate Brazilian Representative to the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) in Montevideo, Uruguay (1990-1992). Assistant to 
the Foreign Trade and Integration Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992-
1993). Head of the Financial Policy Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996-1999).  
Minister-Counselor at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (1999-2003). Special Advisor to 
the head of the Strategic Affairs Unit of the Brazilian Presidency (2003-2007). Brasília, July 
7, 2010.  
   
Araújo Jr., José Tavares de. Economist. Director of the Study Center for Integration and 
Development (CINDES). Executive Secretary of the Customs Policy Commission (CPA) 
(1985-1988).   Executive Secretary of the Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) (1995). New 
York City, December 29, 2010.  
 
Barbosa, Rubens A. Senior Director of Albright Stonebridge Group. Former career 
diplomat.  Brazilian Ambassador to the United States (1999-2004). Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom (1994-1999). Served as: Secretary for International Affairs at the Ministry of 
Finance; Brazilian Permanent Representative to the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA); Under Secretary-General for Regional Integration, Trade and Economic Affairs in 
the Ministry of Foreign Relations; and Coordinator of the Brazilian Section of Mercosur, the 
Southern Cone Common Market. Written questionnaire by author, Rio de Janeiro, June 26, 
2010. 
 
Baumann, Renato. Professor in the Economics Department of the University of Brasília 
(UnB). Director of the Brazilian Office of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC). Telephone interview by author, Brasília, July 14, 2010. 
 
Bielschowsky, Ricardo A. Academic, Economics Department, Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ). Economic Affairs Officer, Brazilian Office, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Brasília, July 9, 2010. 
 
Botafogo Gonçalves, José. President of the Board of Trustees, Brazilian Center for 
International Relations (CEBRI). Career diplomat. Former Ambassador Extraordinary for 
Mercosur Affairs.  Former Undersecretary-General for Integration, Economic and Foreign 
Trade Affairs at the Ministry of External Relations.  Former Executive Secretary of the 
Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX), Government Council of the Presidency. Jointly with 
Denise Gregory. Written questionnaire by author, Rio de Janeiro, December 23, 2010. 
 
Cervo, Amado Luiz. Professor in the International Relations Institute (IREL) at the  
 310 
 
University of Brasília (UnB), and at Rio Branco Institute, Ministry of External Relations.  
Brasília, July 14, 2010. 
 
Costa Baptista, Rosária. Coordinator of International Negotiations at the Customs Policy 
Commission, Finance Ministry (1980- 1990).  Director of the International Negotiations 
Department, Secretariat of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade (MDIC) (1995-2012). Rio de Janeiro, July 1, 2010. 
 
Fleischer, David Verge. Professor in the Political Science Institute (IPOL) at the University 
of Brasília (UnB). Brasília, July 5, 2010. 
 
Gregory, Denise. Executive Director of the Brazilian Center for International Relations 
(CEBRI). Jointly with Ambassador Botafogo Gonçalves. Written questionnaire by author, 
Rio de Janeiro, December 23, 2010.  
  
Iglecias, Wagner Tadeu. Professor in the School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities at the 
University of São Paulo. São Paulo, June 23, 2010. 
 
Lafer, Celso. Professor in the Law School at the University of São Paulo. Minister of 
Foreign Relations (1992-1992; 2001-2002). Minister of Development, Industry, and Trade 
(1999-1999). São Paulo, June 23, 2010. 
 
Mancuso, Wagner Pralon. Professor in the School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities at the 
University of São Paulo. São Paulo, June 21, 2010. 
 
Markwald, Ricardo Andrés. Economist. General Director of the Foundation Center for the 
Study of Foreign Trade (FUNCEX). Rio de Janeiro, June 6, 2010.  
  
Onuki, Janina. Professor in the International Relations Institute (IRI) and in the Center for 
the Study of International Negotiations (CAENI) at the University of São Paulo. São Paulo, 
June 6, 2010.  
 
Pio da Costa Filho, Carlos Roberto. Professor in the International Relations Institute 
(IREL) at the University of Brasília (UnB), and at the Rio Branco Institute, Ministry of 
Foreign Relations. Brasília, July 7, 2010.  
 
Rios, Sandra Polónia. Economist.  Director of the Study Center for Integration and 
Development (CINDES). Consultant for the National Confederation of Industry (CNI).  
Professor in the Economics Department at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica of Rio de 
Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Rio de Janeiro, July 7, 2010. 
 
Saavedra Rosar, Soraya. Executive Director of the International Negotiations Unit at the 
National Confederation of Industry (CNI). Brasília, July 7, 2010. 
 
Souza, Amaury de. Political scientist-researcher. Founding partner of Techne and MCM 
Consultores Associados. São Paulo, June 6, 2010. 
 
Tachinardi, Maria Helena. Journalist. Assistant editor for Revista Política Externa. Editor 
for Revista Interesse Nacional. Brasília correspondent for Gazeta Mercantil (1985-1996). São 
Paulo, June 6, 2010.  
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Vaz, Alcides Costa. Professor at the International Relations Institute (IREL) of the 
University of Brasília (UnB). Brasília, July 7, 2010. 
 
Veiga, Pedro da Motta. Economist. Director of the Center for Integration and Development 
Studies (CINDES). Managing Director of EcoStrat Consultants. Regional adviser of the 
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation. Consultant for the National Confederation of 
Industry (CNI). Rio de Janeiro, July 1, 2010. 
 
Vidigal, Carlos Eduardo. Professor in the History Department at the University of Brasília 
(UnB). Brasília, July 16, 2010. 
 
Vigevani, Tullo. Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State 
University of São Paulo (Unesp). Researcher at the Center for the Study of Contemporaneous 
Culture (Cedec), and at the National Institute of Science and Technology for the Study of the 
United States (INCT-INEU). São Paulo, June 22, 2010. 
 
II. Mexico 
All interviews took place in Mexico City, unless otherwise noted. 
Anaya Pons, Ramon. Former Deputy Director General for Central America and the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), Ministry of Economy. October 29, 2010.   
 
Anguiano Roch, Eugenio. Research Professor at the Center for Economic Research and 
Teaching (CIDE). Former Ambassador to Costa Rica, People’s Republic of China, Argentina, 
Austria, Brazil, and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations (Vienna).  
Served as Chief Director for Economic Affairs at the Mexican Foreign Office. November 8, 
2010.   
   
Arriola, Salvador. Secretary for Ibero-American Cooperation for the Ibero-American 
General Secretariat (SEGIB). Former Secretary of the Latin American and Caribbean 
Economic System (SELA). Served as Ambassador to Guatemala and as Consul General in 
São Paulo, Brazil. Telephone interview by author, New York, December 28, 2010. 
 
Artz Colunga, Wanda Sigrid. Commissioner of the Federal Institute for Access to 
Information and Data Protection (IFAI). Former Technical Secretary of the National Security 
Council. October 20, 2010.   
 
Aspe Armella, Pedro Carlos. Co-Chairman of Evercore Partners, Inc., Chairman of Protego 
Casa de Bolsa, and Managing Director of Protego Asesores. Minister of Finance (1988 – 
1994) in the cabinet of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Minister of Planning and 
Budgeting (1987-1988) and Deputy Minister of Planning (1985-1987) in the cabinet of 
President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. October 27, 2010. 
 
Baker Pineda, Juan Carlos. Director General for Evaluation and Monitoring of 
Negotiations, Ministry of Economy. October 22, 2010. 
 
Cordera Campos, Rolando. Professor Emeritus in the Faculty of Economics at the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Coordinator of the University 
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Program on Development Studies. Weekly columnist for the newspaper La Jornada.  
President of the Pereyra Foundation, A.C. Director of the magazine Configuraciones.  
November 23, 2011. 
 
De la Calle, Luis. Managing director and founding partner of De la Calle, Madrazo, 
Mancera, S.C. (CMM). Served as Undersecretary of International Trade Negotiations at the 
Ministry of Economy, and as Minister of Trade Issues at the Mexican Embassy in 
Washington, D.C. November 19, 2010. 
 
De la Mora Sanchez, Luz Maria. Director and founder of LMM Consulting.  Professor at 
the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE). Former Unit Chief of Economic 
Relations and International Cooperation at the Mexican Foreign Office. Served as Unit Chief 
of Coordination of International Negotiations at the Ministry of Economy. Worked as 
Mexico’s Alternate Representative to the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), 
and was member of the Mexican negotiating team for NAFTA in the automotive sector.  
October 25, 2010  
 
Dussel Peters, Enrique. Professor in the Post-graduate Studies Division of the Economics 
Faculty at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). November 18, 2010 
   
Flores-Quiroga, Aldo. Secretary General of the International Energy Forum (IEF).  Former 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Ministry of Energy (2007-2011). Assistant 
Secretary for Bilateral Economic Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001-2005).   
November 1, 2010. 
 
Fuentes Berain, Rossana. Editorial Vice President of Grupo Editorial Expansión. Worked 
as: Editorial Director at El Universal; Deputy Director of Special Affairs and Investigation at 
Reforma; Business section editor at El Financiero; and Notimex correspondent in Nueva 
York. November 9, 2010. 
 
Garrido Noguera, Celso. Professor in the Economics Department at the Autonomous 
Metropolitan University (UAM), Campus Azcapotzalco, Mexico City. October 28, 2010. 
 
Jasso Torres, Humberto. General Director of the National Chamber of the Sugar and  
Alcohol Industries (CNIAA). Former Director of International Negotiations at the Ministry 
of Economy. October 27, 2010. 
 
López-Córdova, José Ernesto. Senior Country Economist for Mexico at the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). October 20, 2010. 
 
Márquez Manquero, Adela Isela. Coordinator of Advisors at the Undersecretariat of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economy. October 21, 2010. 
 
Oropeza García, Hector Arturo. Researcher at the Institute of Legal Research of the  
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Served as Economic Representative 
of Mexico for the Mercosur region. Telephone interview. November 23, 2010.   
 
Pellicer, Olga. Research Professor at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico  
(ITAM). Served as: Alternate Ambassador to the United Nations (New York); ambassador to  
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Austria; ambassador to Greece; and Permanent Representative to the International 
Organizations headquartered in Vienna among other diplomatic positions. October 26, 2010. 
 
Rubio, Luis. President of the Research Center for Development, A.C. (CIDAC). Weekly 
columnist for newspaper Reforma and frequent writer for The Washington Post, The Wall 
Street Journal and Los Angeles Times. October 22, 2010. 
 
Serra Puche, Jaime. Presidente of SAI Consultores, S.C. Undersecretary of finance in the 
cabinet of Miguel de la Madrid (1986-1988). Minister of Commerce and Industrial 
Development (SECOFI) in the cabinet of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994).  
Minister of Finance (SHCP) in the cabinet of President Ernesto Zedillo (1994). October 25, 
2010. 
 
Solis Sanchez, Eduardo Javier. Executive President of the Mexican Automotive Industry 
Association (AMIA).  Chief Mexican negotiator for NAFTA and for the conclusion of FTAs 
with Latin American countries (1995-2000). Worked in the office of the Minister of 
Economy to promote foreign trade and investment (2001-2003). Unit Chief for the Promotion 
of Investment at the Ministry of Economy (2003-2008). November 16, 2010. 
 
Soto Gonzalez, Cecilia. Executive Director of the Institute Carso for Education.   Mexican 
ambassador to Brazil (2000-2006). Presidential candidate for the Labor Party (1993). 
November 5, 2010.  
 
Vega Cánovas, Gustavo. International Relations Research Professor specializing in 
International Political Economy (IPE) and North American integration. Director of the 
International Studies Center at El Colegio de México. November 3, 2010. 
 
Villarreal Arrambide, René Patricio. Economist. Former Deputy Minister at the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI), and at the Ministry of Energy, Mining 
and Parastatal Industry (SEMIP). Telephone interview, November 9, 2010. 
 
Zabludovsky, Jaime. President of the Mexican Council of International Affairs.  Executive 
President of the Mexican Council of the Consumer Goods Industry, A.C. (CONMEXICO).   
Vice President and founding partner of IQOM Commercial Intelligence. Economist in the 
Economic Research Directorate of the Banco de Mexico (1984-1985). Member of the 
Committeee of Economic Advisers of the Presidency (1985-1988). Deputy Chief for the 
Negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1990-1994).  
Undersecretary of International Trade Negotiations in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industrial Development (1994-1998). Ambassador to the European Union (EU) and Chief 
Negotiator of the FTA between Mexico and the EU (1998 a 2001). November 9, 2010. 
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